SUKANTA KUMAR MISHRA v. DISTRICT JUDGE-CUM-M. A. C. T.
1994-04-11
ARIJIT PASAYAT, D.M.PATNAIK
body1994
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - The petitioner seeks for a direction to the District Judge-cum-Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Balasore (in short, 'the Tribunal') to consider his application for compensation u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short, 'the Act'). The Claims Tribunal has rejected the prayer on the ground that the application was presented beyond the period prescribed for such presentation. Alternatively, it is prayed that the Claims Tribunal be directed to treat information given by the Officer-in-charge, Bhadrak Town Police Station, as a claim petition in terms of Section 166(4) of the Act. 2. The background facts as presented by the petitioner are as follows: On 28.10.1991 a petition u/s 166 of the Act was filed by the petitioner praying for grant of compensation of Rs. 8,00,000/- for the multiple injuries allegedly sustained in an accident on 9.5.1990 near Samraipur octroi check gate on Bhadrak-Balasore Road. In the claim petition it was stated that he sustained multiple injuries all over his body on account of the accident caused by the vehicle bearing registration No. OSB 1587 belonging to Baidhar Nayak (opposite party No. 2 in the writ application). The vehicle was subject-matter of insurance with Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the insurer'). An application for condonation of delay in presentation of the application was filed, inter alia, stating that the applicant was treated initially at the S.C.B. Medical College Hospital, Cuttack and subsequently at his residence up to 13.10.1991 and during that period he was advised to take complete rest because there was every likelihood of failure of his liver. It was further stated that after treatment at the S.C.B. Medical College Hospital, the applicant was treated by Dr. Saroj Kumar Sahu of the said hospital and thereafter, remained under treatment of Dr. Bira Kishore Sahu, Puri. A certificate from Dr. Bira Kishore Sahu to the effect that the applicant was under his treatment from 1.11.1990 to 13.10.1991 was filed. The Tribunal after notice to the insurer and the owner rejected the application on the ground that it has no power to condone delay after the prescribed period laid down in Section 166 of the Act. The said impugned order dated 11.8.1992 is primarily the subject-matter of challenge in this writ application.
The Tribunal after notice to the insurer and the owner rejected the application on the ground that it has no power to condone delay after the prescribed period laid down in Section 166 of the Act. The said impugned order dated 11.8.1992 is primarily the subject-matter of challenge in this writ application. A further plea has been taken in the writ application that after rejection of the claim petition by the Tribunal, the Officer-in-charge of Bhadrak Town Police Station intimated the Tribunal about the accident and the Tribunal ought to have taken action on the basis of the information given. Reference is made to Sub-section (4) of Section 166 as well as Sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act in this regard. The stand of the petitioner is that in a case where the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station forwards a copy of the report to the Tribunal, the same is to be adjudicated in terms of Sub-section (4) of Section 166 of the Act and no period of limitation is prescribed in such a matter. Learned counsel for the insurer, on the other hand, submitted that a combined reading of Sections 158(6) and 166(4) shows that though no period of limitation is provided in the case, it cannot be said that the Tribunal is bound to act on the report, even if it is submitted long after the accident. Reference is made to the expression 'as soon as' appearing in Section 158(6). It is further stated that after having failed in his attempt before the Tribunal, the petitioner has managed to get a report to be submitted by the police officer and if such methods are encouraged, it would lead to failure of justice. 3. Certainly the case presents some novel features. The provisions of Sub-section (6) of Section 158 and Sub-section (4) of Section 166 are relevant for adjudication of the dispute. They read as follows: 158. Production of certain certificates, licence and permit in certain cases.- xxx xxx xxx (6) As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or a report under this Section is completed by a police officer, the Officer-in-charge of the police station shall forward a copy of the same also to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer. 166.
166. Application for compensation.- xxx xxx xxx (4) Where a police officer has filed a copy of the report regarding an accident to a Claims Tribunal under this Act, the Claims Tribunal may, if it thinks necessary so to do, treat the report as if it were an application for compensation under this Act. Section 158 of the Act corresponds to Section 106 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (in short, 'the old Act'). Sub-section (6) is a new Section and it requires the Officer-in-charge of a police station: (a) on which information of an accident involving death or bodily injury to a person is recorded; or (b) report u/s 158 is completed, to send a copy of the same to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer. The report is to be submitted in Form 54 as stipulated in rule 150 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (in short, 'the Rules'). It is provided in the said rule that police report referred to in Sub-section (6) of Section 158 shall be in Form 54. The Claims Tribunal may treat the report as an application for compensation as provided in Sub-section (4) of Section 166. Sub-section (4) of Section 166 is a new Section and there was no corresponding provision in the old Act. It is clear on a conjoint reading of the relevant provisions that where the Officer-in-charge of the police station forwards the report to the Claims Tribunal, it may, if it thinks necessary to do so, register it as a claim. A question arises whether there is any period of limitation during which the report is to be forwarded, or it can be done at any time. It is accepted by learned counsel appearing for the parties that very rarely Police Officers-in-charge of different police stations forward any report to the concerned Claims Tribunals. Since the case at hand is one where such a report was submitted, we had directed the Officer-in-charge, Bhadrak Town Police Station to indicate as to under what circumstances the report was submitted long after the accident, we shall deal with the stand of the said officer infra.
Since the case at hand is one where such a report was submitted, we had directed the Officer-in-charge, Bhadrak Town Police Station to indicate as to under what circumstances the report was submitted long after the accident, we shall deal with the stand of the said officer infra. Sub-section (6) of Section 158 has been enacted with beneficial intents, so that where a police officer reports about the death or injury, the Claims Tribunal can act on it even if the legal representatives of a deceased person or an injured has not approached the Tribunal. But it cannot be permitted to be used as a subterfuge to get over period of limitation provided in Sub-section (3) of Section 166. Sub-section (4) of the said Section prescribes that when a report is submitted by a police officer regarding an accident to the Tribunal, it may, if it thinks necessary to do so, treat the report as if it is an application for compensation. Obviously, this is to be done in a case where no claim petition has been filed in respect of the accident earlier. If there is already an application filed by the claimant, there may not be any necessity for treating the report as an application for compensation. The use of the expression 'if it thinks necessary so to do' in Sub-section (4) of Section 166 is significant. If already a claim petition is lodged, the Tribunal need not treat the report as a claim petition because that would be unnecessary. In a given case, the Tribunal may treat the report as a claim petition notwithstanding filing of a claim petition by a claimant. Such a situation may arise if the Tribunal finds that in addition to the person who has filed a claim petition, some other person has been indicated to be sufferer of the accident in serial No. 4 of Form 54 which requires the name and full address of the injured/deceased to be given. (Emphasis supplied) 4. In Vinod Gurudas Raikar Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and others the Apex Court held by necessary implication that the Claims Tribunal acting under the Act has no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the period of twelve months from the date of accident and such an application for compensation is liable to be dismissed.
(Emphasis supplied) 4. In Vinod Gurudas Raikar Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and others the Apex Court held by necessary implication that the Claims Tribunal acting under the Act has no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the period of twelve months from the date of accident and such an application for compensation is liable to be dismissed. Under the old Act in Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A, it was provided that after the expiry of the prescribed period of six months, the Tribunal was authorised to entertain the application if it was satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause. Fundamental changes have been introduced by 1988 Act because extended period beyond prescribed period of six months, up to which an application can be entertained, is specifically provided. In other words, the outer limit is statutorily fixed. The Apex Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar's case (supra) was considering the question whether a case where the accident took place prior to coming into force of the new Act was governed by the period of limitation prescribed under the old Act or new Act. The court ruled that question of condonation of delay was to be governed by the new law and since the application was filed beyond the period of twelve months from the date of occurrence, such delay could not be condoned. It was also ruled that in the new Act, Claims Tribunal has no power to condone delay beyond the period of twelve months from the date of occurrence. It is pleaded that since no specific period of limitation is prescribed in respect of action to be taken on the basis of police report, the same could be acted upon by the Tribunal at any time. It is also stated that no time limit during which report has to be forwarded is prescribed and so it can be forwarded at any time. The language used in Sub-section (6) of Section 158 mandates the police officer to forward a copy of the report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and to the concerned insurance company "as soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury is recorded or a report u/s 158 is completed by the police officer." 5. Use of the expression 'as soon as' implies that there has to be promptitude in action.
Use of the expression 'as soon as' implies that there has to be promptitude in action. To do a thing 'as soon as possible' means to do it within a reasonable time, with an understanding to do it within the shortest possible time. [Per Dysant, J. in King's Old County Ltd. v. Liquid Carbonic Can. Corporation Ltd. (1942) 2 WWR 603. 'As and when' and 'as soon as' are almost synonymous. Whenever these expressions are used in respect of time and place, they denote contemporaneous notion. 'As soon as' and 'forthwith' both are to be normally understood as allowing reasonable time, but latter is more peremptory than the former. But urgency is the hallmark of both expressions. Expression 'as soon as' may be stretched to mean 'as soon as' practicable. The plea that the report can be forwarded at any time is fallacious. It has to be forwarded with promptitude, within a reasonable time. 6. As indicated above, where a claim petition has already been filed, the report is not necessarily to be treated as an application for compensation. Otherwise an anomalous situation would arise. There shall be two claim petitions, one filed by the claimant and the other in terms of Sub-section (4) of Section 166. If the former is not entertainable having been filed after prescribed period of limitation, it would be travesty of justice to act on the other. As in the case at hand, it would be ridiculous to treat the report forwarded by the police officer after considerable length of time as a fresh claim petition and to act on it after having rejected the claim petition filed by the claimant as not maintainable. It is, therefore, not correct as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Tribunal is bound to act on a report given at any time. That would frustrate the purpose for which an outer limit has been prescribed under Sub-section (3) of Section 166. Learned counsel for petitioner states that in spite of a statutory mandate the police officers are not submitting reports and the victims should not be made to suffer on account of their laches. In the case at hand, information was given by the Officer-in-charge. But the same is not in the prescribed form. Direction was given to Officer-in-charge to indicate the background in which information was given. His show cause reply makes interesting reading.
In the case at hand, information was given by the Officer-in-charge. But the same is not in the prescribed form. Direction was given to Officer-in-charge to indicate the background in which information was given. His show cause reply makes interesting reading. It is stated that he joined as the Inspector-in-charge of Bhadrak Town Police Station on 20.7.1992. Prior to his joining, Bhadrak Town P.S. Case No. 85 dated 9.5.1990 was registered and charge-sheet was submitted on 13.6.1990. After his joining, one person who identified himself to be Sukanta Kumar Mishra had approached him stating that he is one of the injured in the aforesaid P.S. Case No. 85 of 1990 and requested him to furnish a copy of formal F.I.R., charge-sheet and injury report. He claimed to have sustained injury on 9.5.1990 and to have preferred a claim before the District Judge-cum-M.A.C.T., Balasore. He further stated that since copies of the aforesaid relevant documents had not been produced before the court, he was facing inconvenience. The Inspector-in-charge refused to hand over papers as charge-sheet had already been submitted before the court, but to help him he submitted detailed report on 31.10.1992 before Tribunal. The petitioner does not appear to have acted bona fide. Claim petition was rejected on 11.8.1992. About two months thereafter, the petitioner went to the Inspector-in-charge and falsely stated before him that copies of the formal F.I.R., charge-sheet and injury report were to be submitted before the District Judge-cum-M.A.C.T., Balasore. By that time, the case was already disposed of. Obvious purpose for which the petitioner falsely represented to the Inspector was to take shelter behind Section 158(6). What was not directly achieved was intended to be achieved indirectly. The petitioner's conduct is not above-board. He has also not come to this court with clean hands. In para 3 of the writ petition, it has been stated that petitioner was bedridden till 25.10.1991 and when he felt somewhat better, he contacted his lawyer and the claim petition was filed on 28.10.1991. His stand before the Claims Tribunal was different. In the petition u/s 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, it was stated that the petitioner was bedridden up to 13.10.1991. The certificate issued by Dr. D.K. Sahu which was also filed is too vague to be taken seriously. In any event, that certificate is hardly of any consequence in view of our conclusions indicated supra.
In the petition u/s 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, it was stated that the petitioner was bedridden up to 13.10.1991. The certificate issued by Dr. D.K. Sahu which was also filed is too vague to be taken seriously. In any event, that certificate is hardly of any consequence in view of our conclusions indicated supra. Action is to be taken by the Tribunal when report is submitted by the Officer-in-charge with promptitude and within a reasonable time after occurrence. What would be a reasonable time would depend on facts of each case. In the case on hand, action was not taken within a reasonable time, but was initiated on fraudulent premises. 7. In the background as delineated above, we find no scope for interference in this writ application which is dismissed. No costs. However, we direct the State Government Home Department to notify Officers-in-charge of Police Stations all over the State to take action as provided for in Sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act. A copy of our judgment be sent to the State Government Home Department. D.M. Patnaik, J. 8. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed