JUDGMENT - V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. :---A tenant questions the order passed under the provisions of Clause 28 of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rent Control Order" for the sake of brevity). By the instant order the Rent Controller has restored the respondent in the shop, which is the disputed premises. 2. First the factual panorama for understanding the controversy in the petition. The respondent Nilkanth Krishnaji Mahajan claims to be the landlord, while the petitioner claims to be a tenant. Admittedly the present petitioner and the respondent have been operating from a small 6 x 6 shop wherein the respondent was working as a petition writer, while the petitioner was working as a stamp vendor. Though the avocations of both were supplementary to each other, both were not complimentary to each other in the sense that the relations between the two were probably strained. It was, therefore, that the present respondent claiming to be the landlord threw out the present petitioner. The petitioner tenant did not take this throwing out and filed an application under Clause 28 of the Rent Control order for restoration of possession in respect of this shop. Rent Control Case No. BRA-28/Karanja/77-78 was registered and ultimately by an order dated 25-4-1980 it was held that the tenant should be restored on the same terms and conditions on which the premises were held by him within a fortnight from the date of the order. It was held that the present respondent was not entitled to eject the tenant without obtaining the permission to give quit notice under Clause 13(3) of the Rent Control Order. This order came to be challenged by the present respondent before the Resident Deputy Collector, Akola, who confirmed this order. A writ petition was, therefore, filed being Writ Petition No. 111 of 1982 and the said writ petition also met the same fate. This Court by an order dated 9-6-1986 dismissed the said writ petition, thereby putting a final seal on the correctness of the order dated 25-4-1980. 3. So far the things were in order. A writ petition was, therefore, filed being Writ Petition No. 111 of 1982 and the said writ petition also met the same fate. This Court by an order dated 9-6-1986 dismissed the said writ petition, thereby putting a final seal on the correctness of the order dated 25-4-1980. 3. So far the things were in order. It is only when the said order dated 25-4-1980 was sought to be executed by the Tahsildar, Karanja that further complications ensued, in the sense that the Tahsildar Karanja not only put back the tenant - petitioner in the shop, but in addition to this, he threw out the landlord who was also admittedly occupying the shop. It is to be appreciated that this was an admitted position in the application made by the present petitioner himself. In the application it was clearly admitted that both the tenant himself as well as the present respondent were occupying the shop. However, what seems to have happened is that the Tahsildar broke open the lock and removed all the articles even belonging to the landlord, which were admittedly there. 4. It is because of this that the further application under Clause 28 came to be made by the landlord praying for his own restoration in his own premises. The application was opposed firstly by way of preliminary objection dated 17-12-1986. The preliminary objection was rejected by the House Rent Controller by an order dated 4-2-1987 and the enraged petitioner, therefore, filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the order dated 4-2-1987 rejecting the preliminary objection. However, the High Court this time in Writ Petition No. 686 of 1987 upheld the order rejecting the preliminary objection. Unfortunately enough the order of this Court in Writ Petition No. 686 of 1987 is not available here. It may be remembered that the tenant had questioned the very tenability of the application under Clause 28 and this Court had held by order dated 1-10-1989 that such application was tenable. It is really unfortunate that the said order is not produced. However, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties have submitted that the only question which was raised was that of res judicata. 5. Be that as it may, after the order was confirmed, evidence was led before the Rent Controller on the merits by the present respondent. It is really unfortunate that the said order is not produced. However, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties have submitted that the only question which was raised was that of res judicata. 5. Be that as it may, after the order was confirmed, evidence was led before the Rent Controller on the merits by the present respondent. Before the parties went for evidence, the present petitioner also filed the written statement through his son and went on to the extent of denying the ownership of the present respondent. Instead he tried to set up the said ownership in one public trust, namely, Shri Balaji and Kamakshadevi Sansthan. However, we are not concerned with that question. Considering the evidence the Rent Controller came to the conclusion that in fact it was an admitted position that the present respondent was working as petition writer at Karanja and they both were doing the business at Karanja in the same disputed premises. He came to the conclusion on the basis of evidence that prior to the restoration of the petitioner in the shop and ouster of the tenant, for 45 years, the petitioner as well as the respondent were occupying the shop. He relied upon the deposition of the respondent dated 22-4-1987 that the suit shop was in joint possession and the petitioner was working as stamp vendor. He accepted the evidence of the present respondent that there was a stainless steel utensils shop in the disputed premises. The Rent Controller also relied upon the fact that the description of the rented premises was accepted and admitted. He also referred to the original application under Clause 28 filed by the present petitioner in which it was stated that both the petitioner as well as the respondent were occupying the shop. The Rent Controller thereafter came to the conclusion that the premises are very small and that since the earlier Court had ordered restoration of the tenant, the authority concerned acted beyond its powers to throw out the landlord, who was also holding the possession of the premises in question. He, therefore, allowed the application and ordered that the present respondent should also be put back into the disputed premises. It is this order which is challenged in this petition. 6. The learned Counsel Mr. He, therefore, allowed the application and ordered that the present respondent should also be put back into the disputed premises. It is this order which is challenged in this petition. 6. The learned Counsel Mr. Deshpande on behalf of the petitioner contended that the order was wrong both on the question of jurisdiction as well as on merits. He contended that the landlord could not have invoked the powers of the Rent Controller under Clause 28 as there was no breach of any of the provisions of the Rent Control Order. He pointed out that the landlord could persue any other remedy available to him in law, but the remedy under Clause 28 was certainly not available to him as under that clause the concerned authority is empowered to take steps only to ensure compliance of the provisions of the Rent Control Order or to prevent or rectify any breach of the provisions of the Rent Control Order. His contention is that since there is no such breach, there is no question of rectification or correction and there was also no question of any provision being complied with. Therefore, according to him, the application itself was not maintainable and in entertaining the same the learned Rent Controller committed an error of jurisdiction. On merits his contention is that at any rate the Rent Controller could not have ordered division of shop as he has ordered. He pointed out that there was no material to hold that the respondent - tenant was at any time holding the possession. His contention is that in fact the petitioner was the tenant of the whole shop and he had merely allowed the present respondent as licensee, though in fact he may or may not be the landlord of the shop. He also disputed the status of the respondent as landlord and contended that the title of the premises lay with some public trust. In that view of the matter, Shri Deshpande contended that the Rent Controller was not justified in allowing the application and ordering the restoration of the so-called landlord in the disputed premises. 7. He also disputed the status of the respondent as landlord and contended that the title of the premises lay with some public trust. In that view of the matter, Shri Deshpande contended that the Rent Controller was not justified in allowing the application and ordering the restoration of the so-called landlord in the disputed premises. 7. Shri Palshikar, the learned Counsel for the respondent supported the order contending that in the garb of executing the order under Clause 28 passed by the Rent Controller on first occasion, the authority concerned had overstepped its jurisdiction and instead of restoring status quo ante which was the objective of the original order, the authority had thrown the existing landlord, who also was admittedly holding the joint possession. His contention is that the Tahsildar, who executed the earlier order under Clause 28 had no authority whatsoever to alter the situation which was existing prior to the commencement of the dispute. According to him, the Tahsildar took steps as provided under Clause 28 and if those steps themselves were beyond the powers of the authority, then there was certainly a jurisdiction in the authority to pass an order under Clause 28. On merits also he pointed out that it was an accepted position that the respondent also was occupying the shop. 8. I have heard Shri Madkholkar, A.G.P. on behalf of the respondent No. 3 Sub-Divisional Officer. He supported the order suggesting that the interpretation put forward by the petitioner on Clause 28 was not correct. 9. Considering the rival contentions,I will first consider the question of jurisdiction and/or tenability raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Clause 28(1) runs as under : "28(1) The Collector may take or cause to be taken such steps and use or cause to be used such force as may, in his opinion, be reasonably necessary for the purpose of securing compliance with, or for preventing or rectifying any contravention of this order or for the effective exercise of such power." Relying on this language Shri Deshpande contends that it is for the Collector to take steps or use force in a reasonable manner for firstly securing compliance with or for preventing or rectifying any contravention of any of the provisions of the Rent Control Order. His contention is that if pursuant to the execution of order under Clause 28, the so-called landlord was thrown out of the shop, he would be left with no remedy more particularly under Clause 28, because the landlord would not be complaining of any non-compliance with any of the provisions of the Rent Control Order, nor would he be complaining regarding contravention of any of the provisions of the Rent Control Order. According to Shri Deshpande, Clause 28 in fact can be used only by a tenant, who has been thrown out in breach of the provisions of the Rent Control Order. He suggested that unless the landlord comes out with a specific breach of any provision by or at the instance of the tenant, Clause 28 can never be put in use. In the present case, Shri Deshpande contends that even if it is assumed that the present respondent was holding possession of the disputed shop along with the petitioner and had to lose the said possession because of the faulty execution of the first order under Clause 28 he would not be able to file any such application. According to Shri Deshpande, he may use his remedy available to him at common law. 10. The contention is obviously incorrect. Here was a case where the petitioner himself had filed the application under Clause 28 and had in no uncertain terms admitted in the application that he was holding the possession along with the present respondent. We are not concerned as to whether the petitioner had treated the present respondent as his landlord or not. We are also not concerned in this case whether the present landlord had any proprietory right of ownership over the disputed shop or not. That question is entirely outside the present controversy. It was an admitted position that the application came to be made by the present petitioner, wherein the present petitioner had without mincing any words accepted the possession of the present respondent along with him and also complained that it was the present respondent, who had thrown him out of the shop without taking recourse to Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order. The said indication is clearly found in the impugned order. The said indication is clearly found in the impugned order. The Rent Controller has found from perusal of the application made by the petitioner in first Revenue Case No. BRA-13(3)/Karanja/77-78 that it was an admitted position that the present respondent was working as petition writer at Karanja and was doing his business. He was in possession of the premises in dispute, with the petitioner. Now considering this position, we will have to come back to the original order dated 25-4-1980 wherein the present petitioner was directed to be restored as even being a tenant he was thrown out by the present respondent and one Govind Pandurang Khedkar. The order dated 25-4-1980 is unfortunately not produced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner here, but we have the final order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 111 of 1982 emanating out of that order. It has been observed by this Court in that order that Nilkanth Krishnaji Mahajan, the present respondent and Gopal Pandurang Khedkar were found to be the owners by the trial Court in the order dated 25-4-1980. The finding regarding ownership of the present respondent along with one Shri Khedkar seems to have been arrived at on the basis of the sale-deed dated 28-5-1977. It is further observed by this Court that the respondent No. 1 therein i.e. the present petitioner was a tenant of the suit premises and therefore he could not have been thrown without taking recourse to Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order. This Court also observed that if the possession of the tenant was lost, it would be open under Clause 28 to restore that possession and therefore this Court dismissed the petition filed by the present respondent upholding the order dated 25-4-1980. Thus in effect it was the order dated 25-4-1980 which was to be strictly complied with. However, the complaint made by the present landlord, namely, respondent No. 3 is to the effect that the compliance of the order dated 25-4-1980 was excessive. Under the garb of restoring possession of the petitioner herein, not only the petitioner tenant was inducted in the shop, but the respondent who was already a person holding joint possession was also thrown out, and the petitioner tenant was given exclusive possession of the premises. Under the garb of restoring possession of the petitioner herein, not only the petitioner tenant was inducted in the shop, but the respondent who was already a person holding joint possession was also thrown out, and the petitioner tenant was given exclusive possession of the premises. Now it is apparent that what was ordered by the order dated 25-4-1980 was only to restore the petitioner tenant in the shop and thereby obtaining the status quo ante. That order nowhere sanctioned dispossession of the present respondent who admittedly was in possession of the shop along with the present petitioner. On the basis of evidence led before him the Rent Controller has reached the conclusion that in fact there has been excessive execution and therefore the status quo ante had to be restored and thereby the present respondent, who was illegally thrown out during the execution of the order dated 25-4-1980, had to be restored back. The language of Clause 28 suggests that thereunder the Collector is given the discretion to take some steps as also to use reasonable force firstly for the purpose of securing compliance with the provisions of the Order and secondly for preventing or rectifying any contravention of any of the provisions of the Order, and thirdly for effective exercise of such power. These are the three purposes for which the Collector is empowered to take steps or to use force. The power is created under Clause 28 to take the corrective measures by using force, if necessary, and if that power is to be effectively implemented then Clause 28 could be always used. Indeed the last words "or for the effective exercise of such power" clearly indicate that the Collector could take steps and also use reasonable force for effective exercise of his powers of securing compliance with the provisions of the Order and preventing or rectifying any contravention of the Order. Now here in this case the Rent Controller has corrected the excessive execution of the order dated 25-4-1980. That order was only to the extent of restoring the petitioner back into the shop and nothing more. The Tahsildar while executing the same not only put back the petitioner - tenant in the shop, but he also threw out the respondent and dispossessed him. That order was only to the extent of restoring the petitioner back into the shop and nothing more. The Tahsildar while executing the same not only put back the petitioner - tenant in the shop, but he also threw out the respondent and dispossessed him. In effect the Tahsildar in executing the order has acted in breach of the order itself and breach of that order could also be viewed as the breach of Clause 28. If an officer exercising the powers under Clause 28 takes excessive steps or uses force unreasonably or goes beyond his own powers under Clause 28, that would also amount to breach of the provisions of the Rent Control Order and such excess would be liable to be corrected again by using the powers under Clause 28. It is not only something which is done either by the landlord or by the tenant which is corrected under Clause 28. If the Collector finds that something has happened, not necessarily at the instance of the landlord or the tenant, but because of some other eventuality, which has resulted into injustice having been done to either of them or any provision of the Rent Control Order being breached, the Collector would be fully justified in exercising his powers under Clause 28. Shri Deshpande suggested that the words "for effective exercise of such power" do not indicate any independent power as such. He points out with reference to sub-clause (2) of Clause 28 that the powers of the Collector will have to be read in the light of that clause. The contention is not correct. Sub-clause (2) does not limit the powers of the Collector to effectively exercise his powers. Now in the present case, in the garb of executing the order the person already in possession is thrown out contrary to the order and the order is excessively executed. It cannot be said that the Collector would be powerless to correct this wrong done during the execution of order. It is clearly pointed out at the bar that excessive use of power or excessive execution of the order dated 25-4-1980 has occurred causing breach of Clause 28 itself and, therefore, Clause 28 could be brought into action for remedying the wrong done while executing the order under that clause itself. It is clearly pointed out at the bar that excessive use of power or excessive execution of the order dated 25-4-1980 has occurred causing breach of Clause 28 itself and, therefore, Clause 28 could be brought into action for remedying the wrong done while executing the order under that clause itself. In that view of the matter, it must be held that the application under Clause 28 was tenable and the Rent Controller had the jurisdiction to deal with it. 11. On merits it is pointed out that the petitioner had not chosen to give evidence controverting the evidence led by the respondent supporting the application, thereby it was held that the Tahsildar while executing the earlier order under Clause 28 had acted excessively and instead of merely complying with the order, had over done his duty by throwing out the respondent from the shop. The Rent Controller has relied upon not only the contents of the application made by the petitioner, but has also considered the evidence led before him, oral as well as documentary. He found as a fact that the respondent had his articles like almirahs in the disputed premises and these articles were thrown by the Tahsildar while executing the order dated 25-4-1980. The Rent Controller has given the balanced finding on this factual aspect, which needs no interference by this Court. However, Shri Deshpande pointed out that the Rent Controller has directed the parties to partition the whole shop and has directed that half of the area should be restored. Now here Shri Deshpande points out that there was no partition as such and the order was regarding the whole shop. He pointed out that the shop being 6 x 6 could not be partitioned and, therefore, additional direction by the Rent Controller to the effect that the respondent should be restored to half the share would be incorrect. There is force in the contention of Shri Deshpande. Now there was no partition in the shop. At least from the record there are no traces of such partition. The contention of the parties only appears to be that the landlord was in possession of the shop, while some of the portion of the shop was being used by the present petitioner. Now there was no partition in the shop. At least from the record there are no traces of such partition. The contention of the parties only appears to be that the landlord was in possession of the shop, while some of the portion of the shop was being used by the present petitioner. It is hereby made clear that the status-quo ante would be restored inasmuch as the position which was in existence prior to the throwing out of the petitioner herein will be restored. The last direction by the Rent Controller that half of the tenanted premises should be restored will have to be set aside and it will have to be directed instead that the respondent who was dispossessed from the shop should be restored in the shop, keeping the rights of the petitioner to remain in the shop intact. With these observations the petition is disposed of without any order as to costs. Petition partly allowed. *****