S. R. SINGH, J. Both these petitions being grounded on identical facts may be disposed by a common order. Sri B. D. Mandhyan learned counsel appearing for the respondents in both the petitions stated at the very outset that the writ petitions may be heard and disposed of at the motion-hearing stage itself without inviting any formal counter affidavit. The learned counsel for the parties were heard accordingly. 2. The petitioner in each of the writ petitions is engaged in the business of sale/purchase of fooagrains as dealer and commission agent at Kashipur, Nainital and for that purpose it has been issued licences under the provisions of the U. P. Scheduled Commodities Dealers (Licensing and Restrictions on Hoarding) Order, 1989 and those of the U. P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhi niyam, 1964 (in short the Adhiniyam ). The notice dated 23-6-1993 and the orders dated 29-7-1993 and 15-9-1994 are sought to be quashed in these petitions. 3. It was by means of the impugned notice dated 23-6-1993 that the Mandi Samiti, Kashipur, district Nainital had called upon the petitioner to pay market fee on the sale/purchase of specified agricultural produce which were admittedly brought within the Mandi area of Kashipur. The notice was contested by the petitioner on the ground that the specified agricultural pro duce in fact was purchased outside the market area of Kashipur and it was brought in Kashipur Mandi for and on behalf of Ex-U. P. Principals for the purposes of transportation only and no transaction of sale/purchase had, in fact, taken place in the Mandi area of Kashipur. The Secretary, Mandi Samiti, Kashipur passed an order of assessment dated 29-7-1993, whereby market fee amounting to Rs. 43,984-60 was levied in the case of writ petition No. 34160 of 1994 and Rs. 20,455. 65 in the case of writ petition No. 34161 of 1994. The orders of assessment in each of the two cases having been affirmed by the revisional authority vide order dated 15-9-1994, the petitioner i. e. the concerned commission agent has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the aforesaid orders. 4. 20,455. 65 in the case of writ petition No. 34161 of 1994. The orders of assessment in each of the two cases having been affirmed by the revisional authority vide order dated 15-9-1994, the petitioner i. e. the concerned commission agent has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the aforesaid orders. 4. The main thrust of argument advanced by Sri Sunil Ambwani, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners was that no transaction of sale of the specified agricultural produce had, in fact, taken place in the market area of Kashipur and the goods were brought there only for the purposes of transportation to Ex-U. P. Principals on whose behalf they were purchased by the petitioner as commission agent at other Mandies, for which the market fee had already been paid. It was urged by Sri Ambwani that due to lack of transportation facility in or near the Mandi area, where the goods were purchased, the petitioner had to bring the goods in Kashipur Mandi for the purposes of loading and despatching them to the Ex-U. P. Principals by rail which facility Is admittedly available at Kashipur Mandi. Sri B. D. Mandhyan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents refuted the submis sion made by Sri Ambwani and urged that the petitioner failed to prove that the specified agricultural produce brought inside market area of Kashipur was taken out of it not in pursuance of any transaction of sale having taken place in the market area of Kashipur but in pursuance of a sale transaction which took place, as alleged by the petitioner, at the point of purchase out side Kashipur Mandi. Sri Mandhyan relied upon the Explanation of Sec tion 17 of the Adhiniyam and submitted that the impugned order passed by the revisional authority being based on consideration of material on record is not liable to be quashed by this Court in its extraordinary certiorari juris diction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. Sri Mandhyan relied upon the Explanation of Sec tion 17 of the Adhiniyam and submitted that the impugned order passed by the revisional authority being based on consideration of material on record is not liable to be quashed by this Court in its extraordinary certiorari juris diction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5. A bare perusal of Section 17 (iii) (b) of the Adhiniyam would indicate that a Committee is vested with the power to levy and collect market fee on transaction of sale of specified agricultural produce in the market area on such rates, being not less than one percentum and not more than two per-centum of the price of the agricultural produce so sold, as the State Govern ment may specify by Notification and that such fee is liable to be realised from the commission agent if the produce is sold through a commission agent. The commission agent may, however, realise the same from the purchaser. According to the Explanation appended to Section 17, any specified agricultural produce taken out of a market area, by or on behalf of a licenced trader, is presumed to have been sold within such area, The presumption is, however, rebuttable, as is clear fro01 the expression "unless the contrary is proved" occurring in the Explanation. The Explanation has the effect neither of enlarging nor of diminishing the scops of the charging clause. It only lays down a rule of evidence in that it visualises that "unless the contrary is proved", the movement-actual or proposed-of specified agricultural produce out of market area would be presumed to have taken place as a result of a transaction of sale materialised within such area. In view of this statutory presumption the burden to prove that no transaction of sale took place within the market area is on the commission agent and if he fails to rebut the presumption, the authorities under the Adhiniyam would be well within their jurisdiction to take any movement of specified agricul tural produce from Mandi area to an outside place, whether within or without the State, to have taken place as a result of a transaction of sale having materialised within the market area so as to attract the charging clause i. e. Section 17 (iiii) (b) of the Adhiniyam. 6. 6. It may be pertinently observed that the onus of proof in its primary sense means duty of establishing a case and in this sense it remains constant and never shifts through out the proceeding. It is a question of law, but in its secondary sense, onus is no more than the duty of adducing evidence being led in the case. This involves no question of law but only of fact. It may also be observed that the Explanation of Section 17 of the Adhiniyam raises a presumption of law, it being statutory in nature, but since the statutory pre sumption under the Explanation pertains to a question of fact, the question whether the presumption has or has not been rebutted, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and if the authorities under the Adhiniyara have, on a proper self-direction to the facts and circumstances of the case, arrived at the conclusion that the statutory presumption has not been rebucted, this Court, in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, would be loathe to inter fere with the view taken by the statutory authorities except where the Statutory Authority is found to have acted arbitrarily and unreasonably. It is well settled that judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be converted into an appeal in that it is directed not against the decisions rendered by the statutory authority, but has to be confined to the examination of the decision making process. Accordingly if the conclusions reached by the revisional authority, are found to be based on consideration of valid material on record after according fair treatment to the parties, then it is not for this Court, sitting in certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to say that the conclusion arrived at by the revisional authority is incorrect and or to supplant the same by its own- (See State of U. P. v. Dharmander Prasad Singh, AIR 1989 SC 997 ). 7. Accordingly it may be examined whether the revisional authority in the instant case, has acted in tune with the principles of natural justice and has decided the revision, on a proper self-direction to relevant considerations i. e. without neglecting to take into account the relevant factors or any material piece of evidence/circumstances having bearing on the point in controversy. 8. Accordingly it may be examined whether the revisional authority in the instant case, has acted in tune with the principles of natural justice and has decided the revision, on a proper self-direction to relevant considerations i. e. without neglecting to take into account the relevant factors or any material piece of evidence/circumstances having bearing on the point in controversy. 8. On the admitted facts the agricultural produce were taken out of the market area of Kashipur and, therefore, the burden to prove that despite movement of the goods out of the market area of Kashipur no transaction of sale had in fact taken place in the market area of Kashipur, was on the petitioner. The revisional authority has on consideration of material on record, held that the petitioner had brought the goods in the market area of Kashipur Mandi and the same were taken out of Kashipur Mandi after the transaction of sale was finalised in the market area of Kashipur. In coming to this conclusion the revisional authority has placed reliance on the gate pass which was issued in the name of the petitioner and not in the name of the person/trader to whom the goods were ultimately despatched. It has also relied on the fact that neither the Mandi fee alleged to have been paid by the petitioner to the Mandi Samiti from where the goods were purchased nor the incidental expenses incurred by it in transporting the goods from such Mandi Samati to Kahipur Maadi, were charged in the bills submitted by the petitioner. The fact that the petitioner was not a licenced commission agent or arhati in respect of the Mandies from where the goods were purchased, has also been taken into consideration by the revisional authority in support of its conclusion that the goods in question were purchased by the petitioner for itself and not for any Ex-U. P. Principal/ trader. According to the revisional authority, the sale transaction between the petitioner and the Ex.-U. P. Principals took place after the goods were brought in the Kashipur Mandi and it was thereafter that the goods were Ex- U. P. Principals by rail. The findings arrived at by the Director, Mandi Parishad/revisional authority are findings of fact arrived on consideration of valid material on record. The findings arrived at by the Director, Mandi Parishad/revisional authority are findings of fact arrived on consideration of valid material on record. Sri Sunil Ambwani, learned, Counsel appearing for the petitioner urged that the market fee on purchase transaction, handling charges and other expenses were included in the price indicated in the bills besides the commission payable to the petitioner and the revisional authority was not justified in holding that the Mandi fee paid by the petitioner on the purchase transaction and other expenses were not charged by it and in drawing the inference it has drawn on the strength of these facts. It is no doubt possible that the price of the goods indicated in the bills submitted by the petitioner may be inclusive of Mandi fee paid by the petitioner on purchase transaction and other incidental charges incurred by it, but it is also settled that other two views on a question of fact are reasonably possible and the statutory authority taken one view, then the matter would go out of the purview of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution as indicated by the Supreme Court in Dharmander Prasad Singhs case (supra), as indicated hereinabove, the Explanation to Section 17 of the Adhiniyam raises a presumption on a question of fact which presumption, on the facts found by the revisional authority, does not stand rebutted. The Explanation is in part materia with clause (2) of Section 4 of the Evidence Act. The impugned order, in my opinion, does, not suffer from any infirmity, perversity or breach of natural justice. 9. The decision of the Supreme Court in C. S. T. v. Bhaktwari Lal Kailash Chand Arhani, (1992) 3 SCC 750 and that of the Division Bench of this Court in Shree Mahalakshmi Sugar Works, Faridnagar and others v. State of U. P. and others, 1987 (2) UPLBEC 957, reliance on which was placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, are not of such avail to the petitioner. Section 17 (iii) of the Adhiniyam being in the nature of reasonable regulation of a transaction of sale of specified agricultural produce in the market area, cannot be said to be offending Articles 286 and 301 of the Constitution. It is not in the nature of a tax on Inter-State sale/purchase of goods. Section 17 (iii) of the Adhiniyam being in the nature of reasonable regulation of a transaction of sale of specified agricultural produce in the market area, cannot be said to be offending Articles 286 and 301 of the Constitution. It is not in the nature of a tax on Inter-State sale/purchase of goods. In M/s. Alma Ram Ratan Lal and others v. State of U. P. and others, 1979 ALJ 126, a Division Bench of this Court has repelled the similar contention and ruled that: "the Act in its term and in its operation, is mealy regulatory of the transaction of sale and purchase in a market area. It does not impede the free flow of trade or commerce in the State. The fact that an importer of commodities from outside State has to pay fee or take out a licence has nothing to do with the purchase of goods. The levy is on the event of storage or sale etc. in the market area. " 10. In view of the above discussion, I find no merits in these peti tions and they are accordingly dismissed in limine. Petition dismissed. .