J. M. PANCHAL, J. ( 1 ) THE order dated February 14, 1984 passed by the Gujarat secondary Education Tribunal (the Tribunal for short) in Application No. 148 of 1982 is the subject-matter of challenge in these two petitions which are instituted under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. In Special Civil Application No. 4324 of 1984, the declaration granted by the Tribunal to the effect that the respondent no. 1 therein is entitled to receive the compensation equivalent to 13 months salary including allowances on the basis of the last pay, is challenged whereas in special Civil Application No. 4326 of 1984, the declaration granted by the Tribunal to the effect that the respondent No. 1 therein is entitled to receive the compensation equivalent to 16 months salary including the allowances on the basis of the last pay she was receiving in the School is challenged. Both these petitions arise out of the common order dated February 14, 1984 and, therefore, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. ( 2 ) IN the year 1981-82, there were five classes of Standard VIII to X in D. P. High School, Khadia, Ahmedabad and in all, there were seven teachers including the Principal. Due to insufficiency of number of students, the management was obliged to reduce one class as a result of which, the management was also required to relieve one teacher. The management thereupon approached the District Education officer, who after hearing the Principal of the School and the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4324 of 1984, passed an order giving permission to relieve the said respondent from service. Pursuant to the permission, service of the said respondent were terminated by the management. Thereupon the respondent no. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4324 of 1984 moved the Tribunal by way of filing Application No. 148 of 1982 challenging the order of termination. ( 3 ) IN the meantime, while the said application was pending, one more class was required to be reduced in the year 1983-84 and, therefore, again the management approached the District Education Officer for his permission to remove one more teacher. ( 3 ) IN the meantime, while the said application was pending, one more class was required to be reduced in the year 1983-84 and, therefore, again the management approached the District Education Officer for his permission to remove one more teacher. The District Education Officer, after taking into consideration the seniority list of the teachers, the qualifications possessed by them and the subject-wise requirements, accorded approval to terminate the services of the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4326 of 1984. The respondent No. 1 of the said petition thereupon preferred Application No. 186 of 1983 before the Tribunal challenging the order of termination for her services passed by the management consequent upon approval granted by the District Education Officer. As both the applications were directed against the same management and common evidence was required to be recorded, the Tribunal disposed of both the applications by a common judgment and order dated September 30, 1983. After taking into consideration the relevant factors, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the termination of services of both the employees was just and proper and that there was no breach of provisions of Sec. 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act, 1972 (the Act for short ). In that view of the conclusion, the Tribunal dismissed both the applications. ( 4 ) FEELING aggrieved by the said order, the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil application No. 4326 of 1984 preferred Special Civil Application No. 4939 of 1983 before this Court. After hearing the parties, this Court (Coram: A. P. Ravani, j.), passed the following order on November 16, 1983 : "the petition is directed against the order of Secondary Education Tribunal. No illegality or infirmity is found in the impugned order so as to exercise my powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution. Hence rejected. However, after hearing the counsel for the D. E. O. , Respondent No. 3 herein, it is directed that the salary paid and/or payable to the petitioner for the period during which interim relief operated, the same shall be admissible for the purpose of grant. Subject to the aforesaid direction rejected. Notice discharged. " it may be noted that the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4324 of 1984 had not challenged the order dated September 30, 1983, which was passed by the Tribunal in Application No. 148 of 1982. Subject to the aforesaid direction rejected. Notice discharged. " it may be noted that the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4324 of 1984 had not challenged the order dated September 30, 1983, which was passed by the Tribunal in Application No. 148 of 1982. ( 5 ) AFTER the rejection of Special Civil Application No. 4939 of 1983 by this court on November 16, 1983, the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application no. 4324 of 1984 submitted an application on December 8, 1983 for review of the order dated September 30, 1983 passed in Application Nos. 148 of 1982 and 186 of 1983 and prayed that necessary directions be given to the petitioner for payment of compensation as required by Regulation 33 of the Gujarat Secondary education Regulations, 1974 (the Regulations for short ). ( 6 ) FROM the impugned order, it is apparent that Smt. Minalben Ranmal thakore who was then working as Principal of the School had represented the management before the Tribunal at the time of hearing of review application. She stated before the Tribunal that she had no objection to the order regarding compensation to be paid to the original applicants being incorporated in the judgment and order passed on September 30, 1983. ( 7 ) THE Tribunal, after hearing the parties, noted that at the time of hearing of Application No. 148 of 1982 and Application No. 186 of 1983, it had directed the management to pay the compensation as prescribed under the Regulation 33 of the Regulations to both the applicants, but somehow through oversight when the judgment was dictated to the Stenographer, the order regarding payment of compensation to the original applicants was not incorporated in the judgment. In that view of the matter, the Tribunal allowed the review petition and declared that the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4324 of 1984 is entitled to receive compensation equivalent to 13 months salary including the allowances whereas the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4326 of 1984 is entitled to receive compensation equivalent to 16 months salary including the allowances. As noted earlier, the aforesaid declarations and directions are the subject-matter of challenge in the present petitions. As noted earlier, the aforesaid declarations and directions are the subject-matter of challenge in the present petitions. ( 8 ) LEARNED Counsel Shri J. V. Desai for the petitioner submitted that a bare reading of the provisions of the Act, Regulations and the Gujarat Secondary education Tribunal (Procedure) Order, 1974 makes it abundantly clear that the power of review is not available to the Tribunal and, therefore, the impugned order having been passed without jurisdiction deserves to be set aside. After making reference to sub-secs. (6), (7), (8) and (9) of Sec. 39 of the Act and Rule 14 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Tribunal (Procedure) Order, 1974, the learned Counsel submitted that only certain powers under the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 as enumerated in sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 39 have been conferred on the Tribunal and as the power of review is not conferred on it, the impugned order should be set aside by this Court. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of : (1) Patel Narshi thakershi and Ors. v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 , (2) M/ s. Mehar Singh Nanak Chand v. M/s. Nanulal Thakar Dass and Ors. , AIR 1972 SC 2533 , (3) State of Assam and Anr. v. J. N. Roy Biswas, AIR 1975 SC 2277 , and (4) R. R. Verma and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , AIR 1980 SC 1461 . ( 9 ) IT may be mentioned that stricto sensu the impugned order cannot be said to be the order reviewing the earlier order which was passed by the Tribunal in applications Nos. 148 of 1982 and 186 of 1983. As a general rule, a judgment, decree or final order once drawn up and signed, cannot subsequently be altered, varied or amended in any manner by the Court or Tribunal which pronounced it. However, there is well recognised exception to the said general rule that under Sec. 152 of the Civil Procedure Code, a clerical or arithmetical mistake or an error arising from an accidental slip or omission may be corrected by the Court or the Tribunal when the judgment or order does not correctly express what was really decided and intended by the Court or the Tribunal. Such a power can be exercised by the Court or the Tribunal either of its own motion or on the application of any of the parties. An arithmetical mistake is a mistake of calculation while a clerical mistake is of writing or typing. An accidental slip or error is an error due to a careless mistake or omission unintentionally made and such a mistake should be apparent on the face of the record. It should not depend for its discovery on elaborate arguments on question of law and fact. The Court or the Tribunal has an inherent power to amend, vary or alter the judgment or order so as to carry out its own meaning. The accidental slip or omission is the one made by the Court and one such instance is a slip or omission to embody in the order something which the Court in fact ordered to be done. If the intention to make an order or specify something in the order could be clearly spelt out and making of such an order or specification was inevitable in the circumstances and it was necessarily to be the integral part of the order which was left out accidentally, Sec. 152 of the Code would be attracted so that the order may be amended to reflect the real intention of the Court. The question whether the Tribunal can exercise powers under Sec. 152 of the Code or not is considered in detail in the later part of this judgment but in any view of the matter the power analogous to Sec. 152 of the Code would be available to the Tribunal to do complete justice between the parties. ( 10 ) IN the impugned order, the Tribunal has clearly mentioned that, at the time of hearing of Application Nos. 148 of 1982 and 186 of 1983, the Tribunal had directed that compensation as prescribed under Regulation 33 of the Regulations should be paid to both the applicants, but somehow, through oversight when the judgment was dictated to the Stenographer, order regarding payment of compensation to the applicants was not incorporated in the judgment. Because of the accidental omission, the Tribunal could not give direction to the management to pay compensation as required by Regulation 33 of the Regulations. The intention of the Tribunal to make an order for payment of compesation to the employees is clearly spelt out. Because of the accidental omission, the Tribunal could not give direction to the management to pay compensation as required by Regulation 33 of the Regulations. The intention of the Tribunal to make an order for payment of compesation to the employees is clearly spelt out. Making of such an order was inevitable in the circumstances in view of the mandatory provisions of Sec. 36 and sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 39 read with regulation 33 of the Regulations. In fact, the direction to the petitioner to pay compensation to the employees should have been necessarily the integral part of the order and was left out accidentally. In such circumstances, what is done by the tribunal is to supply the omission and nothing more than that. The original order of termination which was upheld by it and confirmed by the High Court has been kept intact and has not been varied, amended or altered in any manner. It is a maxim of law that an act of a Court shall prejudice no man - actus curiae neminem gravabit. Every Tribunal has an inherent jurisdiction, apart from statutory jurisdiction to correct any error committed by itself. It can invoke such jurisdiction and can exercise it in an appropriate case when its conscience is aroused and if it considers that without the exercise of such powers, the ends of justice would be frustrated. The whole jurisdiction of the Tribunal is to pass a just order in the larger interest so that justice is done both to the management and the employee concerned and that the educational interest prospers. The Legislature has advisedly invested the Tribunal with a very wide jurisdiction to do complete justice in the matter by enabling an employee to have recourse to this efficacious, adequate cheap remedy in supersession of the ordinary Courts of the land so that he could have an appropriate security of tenure. The Tribunal has to give just directions for payment of compensation when it comes to the conclusion that the order of termination is just and proper. In my view, therefore, this is not a case of review of the order dated September 30, 1983 passed by the Tribunal in Application Nos. 148 of 1982 and 186 of 1983, but is a case of supplying omission which is within the power of the Tribunal in view of the provisions of Sec. 152 of the Code. In my view, therefore, this is not a case of review of the order dated September 30, 1983 passed by the Tribunal in Application Nos. 148 of 1982 and 186 of 1983, but is a case of supplying omission which is within the power of the Tribunal in view of the provisions of Sec. 152 of the Code. ( 11 ) EVEN if the impugned order is treated as review of the earlier order dated september 30, 1983, the question which arises for consideration of this Court is whether the power of review is available to the Tribunal or not. In the case of Patel narshi Thakershi and Ors. (supra), while interpreting the provisions of the Saurashtra land Reforms Act, the Supreme Court has held that the power to review is not an inherent power and it must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implications. In the facts of the said case, the Supreme Court found that the authority who had passed the impugned order was functioning as the delegate of the State government and that the order passed by him in law amounted to review of the order made by the Saurashtra Government. The Supreme Court noted the fact that no provision in the Act was brought to the notice of the Court from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order and in those circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that the power to review is not an inherent power and it must be conferred either specifically or by necessary implications. In the case of M/s. Mehar Singh Nanak Chand (supra), the Supreme Court had occasion to interpret the provisions of Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951. The Supreme court considered the question whether the competent officer exercising powers under sec. 17 of the Act had power to review his earlier order or not. It was not shown to the Supreme Court that any authority or any provision in the Act conferred any power on the competent officer to review the order of his predecessor. In that view of the matter, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the High Court and dismissed the appeal holding that the power of review could not have been exercised by the Competent Officer for setting aside the order passed by his predecessor. In r. R. Verma and Ors. In that view of the matter, the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the High Court and dismissed the appeal holding that the power of review could not have been exercised by the Competent Officer for setting aside the order passed by his predecessor. In r. R. Verma and Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court considered the provisions of Rule 3 of All India Services (Conditions of Service - Residuary Matters) Rules, 1960. In the said case, the Supreme Court has held that the principle that the power to review must be conferred by the statute either specifically or by necessary implication is inapplicable to decisions purely of an administrative nature and to extend the principle to pure administrative decisions would indeed lead to untoward and startling results. After noticing the evil effects of denial of such powers to the authorities, the Supreme Court has stated that if administrative decisions are reviewed, the decisions taken after review would be subject to judicial review on all grounds and the administrative decisions may be questioned in a Court but any Government is always free to alter its policy or its decision in administrative matters. ( 12 ) IN my view, the above-referred two judgments which have been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner do not apply to the facts of the present case because not only the power to review is conferred in the Tribunal by necessary implications but it is also conferred on the Tribunal by law, i. e. , Civil Procedure code which is applicable to the proceedings instituted before it. In Grindlays Bank ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors. , 1980 (Supplement) SCC 420, the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether the Tribunal constituted under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, has power to set aside an ex parte order in absence of express provisions in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder or not. The Supreme Court has held that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to dischage its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The Supreme Court has held that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to dischage its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The Supreme Court found that there was no express provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to set aside its ex-parte award, and even then it has been held that the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication in the statute to the contrary. After examining the meaning of word "review", it has been held therein that the expression "review" is used in the two distinct senses, namely, (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a Court or tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. The Supreme Court has further held that, when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal. ( 13 ) THE law on the subject has been reviewed and restated by the Supreme court in its latest judgment rendered in the case of S. Nagaraj and Ors. v. State of karnataka and Anr. , JT 1993 (5) SC 27. In para 18 of the judgment, the Supreme court has held as under : "justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Nither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the Court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the higher Courts is founded on equity and fairness. The order of the Court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the higher Courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the Court finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification, depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root from which the power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either statutory or inherent. The latter is available where the mistake is of the Court. In Administrative Law the scope is still wider. Technicalities apart if the Court is satisfied of the injustice then it is its constitutional and legal obligation to set it right by recalling its order. " in para 19 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court has further held as under :"review literally and even judicially means re-examination or re-consideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the Courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest Court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the Courts called out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithvi chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai and Ors. , AIR 1941 Federal Court 1, the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest Court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. In Raja Prithvi chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai and Ors. , AIR 1941 Federal Court 1, the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest Court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Counsel in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Singh, 1 moo PC 117 that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered. ""nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, by errors have been introduced, these Courts possess, by Common law, the same power which the Courts of record and statute have of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have, however, gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies. "basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under :"it is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owning to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a Court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard. " rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. " ( 14 ) THUS, it become clear that the uppermost anxiety in the mind of the Court should be to do complete justice between the parties and when the Court finds that a mistake has crept in inadvertently, it is the duty of the Court or the Tribunal to supply the omission for doing complete justice between the parties. In view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above quoted decisions, i am of the opinion that the power of review is available to the Tribunal and it cannot be said that the order passed by the Tribunal is without jurisdiction. In view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above quoted decisions, i am of the opinion that the power of review is available to the Tribunal and it cannot be said that the order passed by the Tribunal is without jurisdiction. Even otherwise, I am of the view that the powers conferred on a Court of law by the Code would be available to the Tribunal in view of the provisions of the gujarat Secondary Education Tribunal (Procedure) Order, 1974. Rule 14 of the aforesaid Order provides that the Tribunal shall in any matter not provided by this Order follow the procedure as far as it is applicable, laid down in the Civil procedure Code, 1908. In view of the language in which Rule 14 of the Order is couched, there is no reason why the aggrieved party cannot approach the Tribunal invoking its jurisdiction under Sec. 114 read with Order 47 of the Civil Procedure code, 1908. ( 15 ) IN the view which I am taking, I am fully supported by one unreported judgment of this Court rendered in Special Civil Application No. 1613 of 1978, decided on September 21, 1978 (Coram : P. D. Desai, J. as he then was ). In the said petition, the point which fell for the consideration of the Court was, whether the Tribunal had decided the case ex parte without ascertaining whether the notice of the proceeding before it was served upon the petitioner or not. This Court was of the opinion that the proper course for the petitioner was to approach the Tribunal itself for redressal of such grievance. At that time, another question arose for the consideration of the Court as to whether in absence of any express provision in the act or in the statutory Order issued by the State Government regulating the procedure of the Tribunal, the Tribunal has the power to set aside its own decision under such circumastances if it was satisfied that the grievance of the petitioner was justified. ( 16 ) AFTER noting the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi and Ors. ( 16 ) AFTER noting the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi and Ors. (supra ) and Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Their workmen ( AIR 1958 SC 153 ), it has been held that, in view of Rule 14 of the gujarat Secondary Education (Procedure) Order, 1974, there is no reason why the aggrieved party cannot approach the Tribunal invoking its jurisdiction under Order 9 Rule 13 or Order 41 Rule 21 or Order 47 or Sec. 151 or any one or more of them to seek appropriate relief. It has been specifically mentioned in the judgment that reference to the provisions of Order 9 Rule 13, Order 41 Rule 21, Order 47 and Sec. 151 of the Code was made because those were the provisions which were relevant for the purpose of deciding the said case. Thus, it is apparent that long back, this Court has taken the view that the powers of review are available to the tribunal in appropriate cases. I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the above quoted decision and I hold that the impugned order cannot be said to have been rendered without jurisdiction as the Tribunal has power to review its own order. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any substance in the first submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner. MARCH 16, 1994 ( 17 ) IT was submitted that the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application no. 4326 of 1984 had not filed any application for reviewing the order passed in application No. 186 of 1983 and as the Tribunal could not have exercised suomotu power to review its earlier order passed in Applications No. 186 of 1983, the reliefs prayed for in Special Civil Application No. 4326 of 1984 should be granted. In my view, this submission has no merits. As stated earlier, Application nos. 148 of 1982 and 186 of 1983 were disposed of by the Tribunal by common order dated September 30, 1983. The application which was submitted by the respondent No. 1 of Special Civil Application No. 4324 of 1984 for reviewing the order was made for the benefit of both the employees. As stated earlier, Application nos. 148 of 1982 and 186 of 1983 were disposed of by the Tribunal by common order dated September 30, 1983. The application which was submitted by the respondent No. 1 of Special Civil Application No. 4324 of 1984 for reviewing the order was made for the benefit of both the employees. This is quite apparent from the following observations made by the Tribunal in the impugned order :"the learned Advocate for the applicant, therefore, thereafter has given this review petition praying that the order orally passed by the Tribunal on 30-9-1983 awarding compensation to both the applicants be incorporated in the judgment. " ( 18 ) THE above quoted observation made by the Tribunal in the impugned order makes it clear beyond doubt that the application for review was filed for and on behalf of both the applicants and, therefore, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to grant appropriate relief to the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4326 of 1984. Even otherwise, by filing application, the respondent No. 1 in special Civil Application No. 4324 of 1984 had pointed out to the Tribunal that a clear error had crept in the judgment as no direction was given to the management to pay compensation to the employees and when the Tribunal was satisfied that through oversight, direction was not given to the management to pay compensation to the employees, it was its bounden duty to grant appropriate relief to the respondent no. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4326 of 1984 also. On overall view, it cannot be said that any error is commited by the Tribunal in granting relief to the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4326 of 1984. ( 19 ) RELYING on the decisions rendered in the cases of (1) Amratlal Muljibhai thakkar and Anr. v. Ambalal Ranchhodlal Thakkar, [1972] XIII GLR 756, (2) Ratilal balabhai Nazar v. Ranchhodbhai Shankarbhai Patel and Anr. , 1970 All India Rent control Journal 97, and (3) Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial co. Ltd. Calcutta and Ors. , AIR 1963 SC 1124 , the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal in Application Nos. , 1970 All India Rent control Journal 97, and (3) Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial co. Ltd. Calcutta and Ors. , AIR 1963 SC 1124 , the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal in Application Nos. 148 of 1982 and 186 of 1983 had merged into the order passed by this Court in Special Civil application No. 4939 of 1983 and, therefore, the Tribunal had no power to review its decision rendered in the said applications on September 30, 1983. ( 20 ) IT is true that the case of Amratlal Muljibhai Thakkar (supra), a view has been taken that though jurisdiction which the High Court exercises under Art. 227 of the Constitution is neither appellate nor revisional, it is somewhat analogous to the revisional jurisdiction which the High Court generally exercises under different statutes and, therefore, the doctrine of merger would be applicable when the High court exercises powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution. It is also held therein that the order of the inferior Court or the subordinate Court gets merged in the order of the Superior Court and the order of the inferior Court thereafter no longer exists. Similar view has been taken in the other two decisions which have been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. . ( 21 ) IN view of the decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court, it is necessary to find out as to what had merged into the order of the High Court when Special civil Application No. 4939 of 1983 was disposed of by this Court on November 16, 1983. It may be noted that by submitting Application Nos. 148 of 1982 and 186 of 1983, the respective respondents of both the petitions had challenged the order of termination of services passed by the petitioner-management. On appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal had upheld the orders of termination of services by judgment and order dated September 30, 1983. The decision rendered by the Tribunal in Application No. 186 of 1983 was subjectmatter of challenge before this Court in Special Civil Application No. 4939 of 1983. On appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal had upheld the orders of termination of services by judgment and order dated September 30, 1983. The decision rendered by the Tribunal in Application No. 186 of 1983 was subjectmatter of challenge before this Court in Special Civil Application No. 4939 of 1983. When this Court rejected the said petition, what was done by this Court was to confirm the order passed by the Tribunal in Application No. 186 of 1983 by which order of termination of services of the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application no. 4326 of 1984, was upheld. Therefore, it becomes evident that what had merged into the order of the High Court was the order of termination of service of the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4326 of 1984 and nothing else. It may be noted that the decision rendered by the Tribunal in Application No. 148 of 1982 upholding the order of termination of services of the respondent No. 1 in special Civil Application No. 4324 of 1984 was never a subject-matter of challenge before this Court in Special Civil Application No. 4939 of 1983. In fact, the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4324 of 1984 had not challenged the order passed by the Tribunal in Application No. 148 of 1982 before this Court at all. By passing the impugned order, the Tribunal has not reviewed the order of termination as confirmed by the High Court in Special Civil Application No. 4939 of 1983. The order of termination is kept intact and what has been done by the tribunal is to supply the omission. The Tribunal was duty bound to supply the omission as a mistake was committed by it in not giving the directions to the petitioner-management to pay compensation to the employees as required by regulation 33 of the Regulations. In this view of the matter, the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are of no avail to the petitioner and it cannot be said that because of doctrine of merger, the impugned order could not have been passed by the Tribunal. In this view of the matter, the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are of no avail to the petitioner and it cannot be said that because of doctrine of merger, the impugned order could not have been passed by the Tribunal. ( 22 ) LASTLY, it was submitted that the Tribunal committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record in awarding compensation equivalent to 13 months salary including the allowances to the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4324 of 1984 and compensation equivalent to 16 months salary including the allowances to the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4326 of 1984, because the concept of compensation implies that the amount payable should be commensurate with the actual loss sustained by the concerned employee during the period of forced unemployment or non-employment. Elaborating the said argument, it was submitted that the respondent No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 4324 of 1984 is in service of one Kalyan High School, Khokhra, Ahmedabad since november 7, 1973 and, therefore, the said respondent would at the best be entitled to compensation equivalent to salary and allowances which he would have received if he had continued in employment of the petitioner between October 1, 1983 and november 6, 1983. Similarly, it was submitted that the respondent No. 1 in Special civil Application No. 4326 of 1984 is in services of one Akshay High School, bapunagar, since June 27, 1984 and, therefore, the said respondent would be entitled to compensation equivalent to salary and allownaces which she should have received if she had continued in employment of the petitioner between November 17, 1983 and June 26, 1984. In short, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the respondents in both these petitions would be entitled to receive compensation for the actual period of their unemployment and nothing more than that. In short, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the respondents in both these petitions would be entitled to receive compensation for the actual period of their unemployment and nothing more than that. It was also submitted that the tuition fees received by the management from the students have to be remitted by the management to the Government and the grant-in-aid code takes care of the salary and allowances payable by the management to the teaching and non-teaching staff and, therefore, the impugned order by which the liability for payment of amount of compensation to the employees is sought to be fastened on it, should be set aside and the Government should be directed to pay the compensation to the respondents of both the petitions. ( 23 ) IN my view, there is no substance in any of the aforesaid submissions. In Special Civil Application No. 1173 of 1984, decided on May 1, 1985, by the Division bench of this Court (Coram : B. K. Mehta, Acting C. J. and R. J. Shah, J.), the Managing Trustee of Bharati Vidyalaya Khadia Trust and Anr. had moved this Court for appropriate writ, order or direction to quash and set aside the order of Gujarat Secondary Education Tribunal granting compensation under Clause 33 of the Regulations on the ground that Regulation 33 in so far as it permits the award of compensation to the protected teachers who get alternative employment at the same rate at which the compensation is awarded to the ordinary teachers who do not get such employment is unreasonable and arbitrary and, therefore, violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. The Court, while repelling the said argument, upheld the validity of Regulation 33 of the Regulations. An oral application was moved to grant certificate of fitness for taking the matter to the Supreme Court. While rejecting the said prayer, the Division Bench has held that the protected teachers are merely preferred in the matter of employment and that they are not guaranteed and assured employment by the State and that what Regulation 33 provides for is the compensation for termination of services under Sec. 36 of the Gujarat Secondary education Act, and not for unemployment allowance. It has been further held in the said case that a teacher or for that matter, a protected teacher gets the benefit of compensation even though he has a preferential or actual right of appointment in the alternative employment and the fact that he actually gets alternative employment would not preclude him from claiming the monetary compensation for the termination of his services. In view of the above-quoted decision of the Division Bench of this Court, it cannot be said that the respondents in both these petitions would be entitled to compensation only for the period of their actual unemployment. In my view, the concept of employment or unemployment is quite foreign to the determination of compensation under Regulation 33 of the Regulations. Regulation 33 provides that where services of a permanent employee is terminated by the management in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 36, such employee shall entitled to compensation (a) equal to 6 months salary including allowances, if the employee has put in service in the School for a period not exceeding five years nd; (b) equal to 6 months salary including allowances for the first five years and a months salary for every year of the period exceeding five years, if the employee has put in service in the school for a period exceeding five years. This regulation nowhere provides that an employee shall be entitled to compensation as laid down therein only if the employee remains unemployed or that the compensation has to be determined having regard to the length of period of unemployment of an employee. If the concept of unemployment is permitted to be introduced while determining the amount of compensation payable to an employee, it would not only amount to rewriting the regulation but would also frustrate the object for which said provision is enacted. In normal circumstances, a teacher of a registered school is entitled to serve till he attains the age of 58 years in view of the provisions of Regulation 36 and in certain circumstances a teacher who has attained the age of 58 years may be re-employed till he attains the age of 60 years. A teacher till he attains the age of retirement is entitled to receive pay scales as laid down by the State Government from time to time in view of Regulation 24 of the regulations including vacation pay. A teacher till he attains the age of retirement is entitled to receive pay scales as laid down by the State Government from time to time in view of Regulation 24 of the regulations including vacation pay. Similarly, a teacher who retires on attaining the age of superannuation is also entitled to pension benefits as per Regulation 26 of the Regulations. A teacher whose services have been terminated prematurely for no fault of his own is bound to be deprived of several benefits conferred by the act and the Regulations. In such circumstances, to mitigate the resultant hardship and to meet part of the colossal monetary loss, provision for payment of compensation has been made in Regulation 33 of the Regulations. In making the provision for payment of compensation, the Legislature has taken into consideration all the relevant aspects of the matter. Therefore, compensation to be paid under sec. 33 of the Regulations cannot be in any manner correlated to the unemployment period of an employee and an employee is entitled to receive the compensation as provided in the said Regulation irrespective of the fact as to whether after termination of service he is/was employed or not. So also, it cannot be said that the impugned order suffers from infirmity because the liability to pay compensation is fastened on the present petitioner. It may be noted that Regulation 33 of the Regulations clearly provides that where the services of a permanent employee is terminated by the management in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 36, such employee shall be entitled to compensation as provided therein from the management. A teacher is entitled to compensation beacuse of the action of the management in terminating his services. The liability to pay compensation is that of the management and not of Government. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has not pointed out any provision of law under which the State Government can be directed to pay compensation to a teacher. In the circumstances, merely because some financial burden is placed on the petitioner, it cannot be said that the impugned order is bad in law or deserves to be set aside by this Court while exercising powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. In the circumstances, merely because some financial burden is placed on the petitioner, it cannot be said that the impugned order is bad in law or deserves to be set aside by this Court while exercising powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 24 ) AS noted earlier, Smt. Minalben R. Thakore, who attended the Tribunal at the time of hearing of the review application on behalf of the petitioner, had stated before the Tribunal that she had no objection to order regarding compensation being incorporated in the earlier order dated 30-9-1983. Thus, the impugned order was passed by the Tribunal with the consent of the petitioner and the petitioner is, therefore, not entitled to challenge the same before this Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the affidavit of Smt. Minalben R. Thakore filed before this Court on August 24, 1984 and contended that no statement was made by Smt. Minalben before the Tribunal that she had no objection to the order regarding compensation to be paid to the applicants being incorporated in the judgment dated 30-9-1983 and the impugned order should not be treated as one having been passed on the concession of the petitioner. This submission cannot be entertained in view of the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of state of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Anr. , AIR 1982 SC 1249 . The statement of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the Court or the Tribunal is conclusive of the fact so stated and no one can contradict such statement by affidavit or other evidence. The only course open to mrs. Minalben was to call the attention of the learned Member of the Tribunal who made the record, to the fact that the statement made with regard to her conduct was a statement that had been made in error. That was the only way to have the record corrected and that step having not been taken by Smt. Minalben, the matter must necessarily end there. No ground is made out by the petitioner or Smt. Minalben to permit the petitioner to resile from the concession which was given by Smt. Minalben on behalf of the petitioner before the Tribunal. That was the only way to have the record corrected and that step having not been taken by Smt. Minalben, the matter must necessarily end there. No ground is made out by the petitioner or Smt. Minalben to permit the petitioner to resile from the concession which was given by Smt. Minalben on behalf of the petitioner before the Tribunal. Therefore, as the impugned order is based on the concession made on behalf of the petitioner, the petitions are liable to be dismissed on this additional ground also. ( 25 ) THESE were the only submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner. ( 26 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merits in both these petitions. Both these petitions, therefore, fail. Rule in both these petitions is discharged with no order as to costs. Ad-interim relief granted earlier in both these petitions stands vacated. .