ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) THE appellants (hereinafter referred to as the 'accused') stood charged for commission of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, 'ipc'), and in addition accused Jugal stood charged under Section 302, and accused Krupasindhu under Section 323, IPC. The learned Sessions Judge, Cuttack found accused Krupasindhu guilty of the offence punishable under second part of Section 304 read with Section 34 and S. 323, IPC and accordingly sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years for the former offence and one year for the latter offence, with a direction that the sentences were to run concurrently. Accused Jugal was found guilty of offence punishable under Section 304, Part I, IPC and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years. The conviction and sentence of both the accused-appellants are the subject-matter of challenge in this appeal. ( 2 ) ACCUSATIONS which led to the trial of the accused persons are as follows :one Sangram Bhoi (P. W. 6), a neighbour of the two accused persons, had laid a fish-trap in a filed of hamlet Mahakadhipa on 10-12-1987 in the evening. On the following morning his father Kangali Bhoi (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') found that the fish-trap was missing, returned to his house which is a distance of 250 feet from the house of the accused persons, st upon the front varandah along with Sangram and started hurling abuses at the unknown culprits who were responsible for removal of the fish-trap. On hearing the abuses accused Jugal came there with a crowbar in his hand, followed by his son accused Krupasindhu, who had a stick in his hand, and dragging the deceased into the street to a distance of about 120 feet, gave a blow on his head by means of the crow-bar and made him to go flat in front of the house of one Bhikari Bhoi. When P. W. 6 went to rescue of his father, he was assaulted by accused Krupasindhu by the stick. As a result of the stick blow, P. W. 6 sustained a lacerated wound of simple nature. Nachia alias Laxmidhas Bhoi (P. W. 2) saw the occurrence from a distance. He intervened, caught hold and clapped accused Jugal for which he was given a stick blow by accused Krupasindhu. As a result of the stick blow, P. W. 6 sustained a lacerated wound of simple nature. Nachia alias Laxmidhas Bhoi (P. W. 2) saw the occurrence from a distance. He intervened, caught hold and clapped accused Jugal for which he was given a stick blow by accused Krupasindhu. Chitrasen Bhoi (P. W. 7), the nephew of the deceased, snatched away the crowbar from the hand of accused Jugal and both the accused persons ran away thereafter. Bishnu (P. W. 1), the eldest son of the deceased took him and P. W. 6 to the Primary Health Centre at Mahadorpara for their treatment, but the doctor (P. W. 3) advised shifting of the deceased to S. C. B. Medical College Hospital, Cuttack for better treatment. Following the advice of the doctor, P. W. 1 shifted the deceased to S. C. B. Medical College Hospital, but the deceased breathed his last at 11. 45 a. m. without regaining his senses. Investigation was undertaken on the basis of first information report lodged by P. W. 1 at Sadar Police Station, Cuttack. On completion of investigation charge-sheet was submitted. ( 3 ) THE accused persons took the plea of denial. ( 4 ) NINE witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. Placing reliance on the evidence of witnesses more particularly the eye witnesses, the learned Sessions Judge found the accused persons guilty, convicted and sentenced them as aforesaid. ( 5 ) IN support of the appeal, the learned counsel for the accused-appellants, submitted that the evidence is discrepant and unreliable, and the learned Sessions Judge should not have relied on it. Alternatively it is submitted that an offence under Section 304, Part I is not made out against accused Jugal and so far as accused Krupasindhu is concerned, there is no material to show that he shared common intention with accused Jugal to attract application of Section 34, IPC. There is nothing to show that he had any knowledge about intention of accused Jugal, much less sharing it. Further it is submitted that the occurrence took place long back and therefore, it would not be desirable to send any of the accused persons back to custody. The learned counsel for State, however, supported the judgment of conviction and sentence. There is nothing to show that he had any knowledge about intention of accused Jugal, much less sharing it. Further it is submitted that the occurrence took place long back and therefore, it would not be desirable to send any of the accused persons back to custody. The learned counsel for State, however, supported the judgment of conviction and sentence. ( 6 ) SO far as acceptability of evidence is concerned, no specific infirmity in the evidence could be indicated by the learned counsel for the accused-appellant, so as to render the evidence unacceptable. Therefore, the first plea about non-acceptability of evidence has no force. Coming to the alternative submission, I shall first deal with the question whether conviction of Krupasindhu under Section 304, Part II read with Section 34, IPC can be maintained. The evidence is to the effect that while the deceased and P. W. 6 were hurling abuses at unknown persons, accused Jugal went there with a crow-bar and accused Krupasindhu with a lathi. ( 7 ) SECTION 34 imports that if two or more persons intentionally do a thing jointly, it is just the same as if each of them had done it individually. It is a well recognised cannon of criminal jurisprudence that the Courts cannot distinguish between co-conspirators, nor can they inquire, even if it were possible, as to the part taken by each in the crime. Where parties, as with a common purpose to execute a common object, each and every one becomes responsible for the acts of each and every other in execution and furtherance of their common purpose; as the purpose is common, so must be the responsibility. All are guilty of the principal offence, not of abetment. In combinations of this kind a mortal stroke, though given by one of the parties, is deemed in the eye of the law to have been given by every individual present and abetting. The person actually giving the stroke is no more than the hand or instrument by which the others strike. The leading feature of this Section is the element of participation in action. The essence of liability under this Section is the existence of a common intention animating the offenders and the participation in a criminal act in furtherance of the common intention. The leading feature of this Section is the element of participation in action. The essence of liability under this Section is the existence of a common intention animating the offenders and the participation in a criminal act in furtherance of the common intention. Before a man can be held liable for acts done by another, under the provisions of this Section, it must be established that (i) there was common intention in the sense of a pre-arranged plan between the two, and (ii) the person sought to be so held liable had participated in some manner in the act constituting the offence. Unless common intention and participation are both present, the Section cannot apply. It deals with the doing of separate acts, similar or diverse, by several persons; if all are done in furtherance of a common intention, each person is liable for the result of them all, as if he had done them himself, for that act and the act in the latter part of the Section must include the whole action covered by a criminal act in the first part, because they refer to it. The expression 'common intention' implies a- pre-arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. A pre-concert in the sense of a distinct previous plan is not necessary to be proved. Though common intention may develop on the spot, it must, however, be anterior in point of time to the commission of the crime showing a pre-arranged plan and prior concert. In Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab, 1972 Cri LJ 465 (SC), it was observed that though common intention may develop in course of the fight, but there must be clear and unimpeachable evidence to justify that inference. Common intention presupposes prior concert. It requires a pre-arranged plan because before a man can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of another the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of them all. Accordingly there must have been prior meeting of minds. ( 8 ) IN the case at hand, the evidence is singularly lacking in that respect. The prosecution has not brought any evidence to show prior-concert or meeting of minds. There is one aspect which needs to be noticed. The deceased was dragged for a distance of about 120 feet. During that period no assault was made by accused Jugal on the deceased. The prosecution has not brought any evidence to show prior-concert or meeting of minds. There is one aspect which needs to be noticed. The deceased was dragged for a distance of about 120 feet. During that period no assault was made by accused Jugal on the deceased. It cannot be said that there was pre-concert for causing assault on the deceased. That could have been done at the place where accused Jugal and the deceased came face to face. That is a factor to rule out pre-concert. Therefore, the conviction of Krupasindhu under Section 302/34, IPC cannot be maintained. But so far as conviction under Section 323, IPC for simple injuries on P. W. 6 is concerned, the evidence of P. W. 6 the injured himself and P. W. 2 clearly establishes his guilt. His conviction under Section 323, IPC is therefore maintained. ( 9 ) COMING to the case of accused Jugal, I find that the nature of injuries found during postmortem does not show use of violent force. There is no evidence to show that accused Jugal made any effort to assault the deceased and after dragging him for that distance a blow was given without much force, as is evident from the injuries sustained by the deceased as were noticed by the doctor who was attending him while giving initial treatment. I am, therefore, of the view that accused Jugal made an assault with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. His conviction is, therefore, altered from Section 304, Part I, IPC to one under Section 304, Part II. ( 10 ) COMING to the question of sentence, considering the long passage of time I am of the view that it would not be desirable to send Krupasindhu back to custody. His custodial sentence is restricted to the period already undergone, but a fine of Rs. 1,000. 00 (one thousand) is imposed with default sentence of two months' rigorous imprisonment. In case the fine amount is paid, Rs. 500. 00 out of it shall be paid to P. W. 6, the victim of assault. So far as accused Jugal is concerned, he is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000. 00 (one thousand ). In case the fine amount is paid, Rs. 500. 00 out of it shall be paid to P. W. 6, the victim of assault. So far as accused Jugal is concerned, he is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000. 00 (one thousand ). In default of payment of fine, the custodial sentence would be three months' rigorous imprisonment. The criminal appeal is accordingly disposed of. Order accordingly.