Kalyan Prasad Chorsia v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation
1994-01-27
MOHINI KAPUR
body1994
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner has challenged order (Annex. 1) by which he has been retrenched from service. 2. The facts leading to this retrenchment are that the petitioner was appointed as a Conductor in the Kota Region of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') in the year 1977. In the year 1979 he was posted as a Booking Clerk, then again as a Conductor and again as a Booking Clerk, from time to time. In December, 1980, he was charge-sheeted for an incident and placed under suspension but on 10.3.1981 his suspension was revoked. Thereafter, he did not join duty because he was posted as a conductor. He claimed to be posted as a Booking Clerk. As this situation continued, his representations were not accepted and he did not join in pursuance of the directions of the respondent. He was removed from service from 31.3.1984. This termination order was challenged by him in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1714/1984, decided on 29.11.1988. This was partly allowed. The petitioner was directed to be posted as a Booking Clerk as he had worked on this post for a long time but back wages were not allowed to him as he remained absent throughout. While passing this order it was observed that the petitioner was not justified in not joining duty but considering that he had worked as a Booking Clerk for a long time, he had a right to be posted as a Booking Clerk. With this observation, the following operative order was passed : "Consequently, the writ petition is partly accepted. The petitioner shall be posted within one month as a booking clerk as he has worked on this post for a long time. The petitioner shall not be entitled to the back wages, if any as he had remained absent throughout. No order as to costs." Thereafter, order (Annex.
The petitioner shall be posted within one month as a booking clerk as he has worked on this post for a long time. The petitioner shall not be entitled to the back wages, if any as he had remained absent throughout. No order as to costs." Thereafter, order (Annex. 2) dated 12.1.1989 was passed by the respondents, which reads as under : jktLFkku jkT; iFk ifjogu fuxe] dzekad ,Q 3@laLFkk 2@88 fnukad dk;kZy; vkns'k Jheku~ egkizcU/kd ( fof/k ) t;iqj ds i= dzekad 16047 fnukad 29-12-88 ,oa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ,l0ch0 flfoy fjV fiVh'ku ua0 1714@84 ds fu.kZ; vkns'k fnukad 29-11-88 dh vuqikyuk esa Jh dY;k.k izlkn pkSjfl;k iq= ckcwyky Hkw0iw0 ifjpkyd >kykokM+ vkxkj dks iqu% fuxe lsok esa fy;k tkdj budk inLFkkiu dksVk vkxkj esa fd;k tkrk gSA Jh dY;k.k izlkn pkSjfl;k dks cqfdax DydZ ds in ij inLFkkfir fd;k tkrk gSA budks iwoZ dh vof/k dk dksbZ osru ,oa vU; ykHk ns; ugha gksaxsA ,l0Mh0 lEHkkx izcU/kd] dksVk 3. The question to be decided in this writ petition is whether by virtue of Annexure No. 2 dated 12.1.1989, the petitioner became a fresh appointee, or his appointment relates back to the year 1977. In case he is held to be an appointee of 1989 then he comes within the appointees after 1987 who were retrenched by order Annexure-1, dated 15.4.1989. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the termination order of 1984 was not set aside in the earlier writ petition which was decided on 29.11.1988 and, as such, it cannot be said that the petitioner's service from 1977 has to be counted. According to the learned counsel, this was a case of fresh appointment vide Annex. 2 from 12.1.1989 and the petitioner would fall in the zone of persons who were retrenched as being surplus. It is also argued that in Annexure 2 it has been specifically mentioned that he would be posted as a Booking Clerk but no salary would be paid for the earlier period and no advantage of the earlier period would be available to him. This means that the earlier service was not to be counted and when the petitioner did not challenge this condition in the appointment, he cannot be said to be in service from 1977 onwards so as to say that his retrenchment has been wrongly made treating him to be an appointee of 1989. 5.
This means that the earlier service was not to be counted and when the petitioner did not challenge this condition in the appointment, he cannot be said to be in service from 1977 onwards so as to say that his retrenchment has been wrongly made treating him to be an appointee of 1989. 5. The post of Conductor and Booking Clerk are in the same cadre and even the learned counsel for the petitioner admits that certain persons for whom it is not possible to travel all the time with the vehicle, as conductors, are given opportunity of being posted as Booking Clerk, to sit at the booking windows. 6. A number of writ petitioner were filed by different persons who had been retrenched from service, along with the petitioner, challenging the retrenchment but the order of retrenchment was upheld. Reference in this connection can be made to S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3034 of 1989, Devi Lal v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, decided on 2.1.1991 , along with several other similar writ petitions. However, the present writ petition cannot be disposed on the basis of the decision in these other writ petitions because the question is whether the petitioner should be treated as a person who entered service of the Corporation in the year 1977 or as a person who entered service in the year 1989. The earlier termination order was challenged by the petitioner and in the writ petition, already referred to above, he was ordered to be posted as a Booking Clerk as he had worked on that post for a long time. Back wages were not allowed to him as he had remained absent. Though, nothing has been said about the termination order but the direction to post him as a Booking Clerk implies that he has been treated as having continued in service and on the consideration that he had worked on the post of Booking Clerk for a long time, he was directed to be posted as a Booking Clerk. Even the order (Annex. 2) says that the petitioner has been 'taken back' in the service and posted in the Kota Depot. The order does not say that it is a fresh appointment. Merely because the petitioner has not been allowed wages or other benefits for the earlier period, it does not mean that he has been appointed afresh.
Even the order (Annex. 2) says that the petitioner has been 'taken back' in the service and posted in the Kota Depot. The order does not say that it is a fresh appointment. Merely because the petitioner has not been allowed wages or other benefits for the earlier period, it does not mean that he has been appointed afresh. It was, looking to the conduct of the petitioner, who absented himself for a long period, that back wages were refused to him. Refusing other benefits is not mentioned in the order of this Court and even though it is mentioned in Annexure-2, but it has not been specified as to what are these other benefits which are not allowed. It does not mean that the earlier service has not to be counted or the appointment is made afresh. Had there been an intention of the respondent to give a fresh appointment to the petitioner, it would have been specifically mentioned in the order Annexure-2. Even this Court in its judgment dated 29.11.1988 has not directed the respondent to give a fresh appointment to the petitioner. Considering all these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner was appointee of 1989. Treating him to be so and retrenching his services is bad in law. He does not fall within the list of those persons who had come last and were to go first. 7. This writ petition is allowed. The order of retrenchment of the petitioner dated 15.4.1989 is set aside. The petitioner shall continue in service. He may be posted on the post of Booking Clerk on compassionate grounds, if they exist. As far as the back wages are concerned, the petitioner can apply for the same under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The parties shall bear their own costs.Writ Petition Allowed. *******