JUDGMENT 1. : This writ petition is a sequel to the judgement of the Apex Court rendered in All India Judges 'Association v. Union of India (JT 1993 4 SC 618 ) and, inter alia, challenges the constitutionality of the provisions of Rule 11 of the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules as amended by the Rajasthan Judicial Services (Amendment) Rules, 1994. 2. Firstly the historical perspective - The Law Commission of India in its 14th report (Vol.1) considered the qualifications for appointment to the judicial services of the States and relying upon the Civil Justice Committee report, - observed: "In most of the cases, what is usually described as recruitment from the Bar is really recruitment from among the disappointed members of the bar who have failed to make any headway in the profession. It was pressed upon us that if we are able to attract to the judicial service the really capable young men from the Universities and subject them to a two years' training, we could have much more competent judicial officers than the so-called recruits from the Bar." The following observations of the Justice Committee were cited with approval: "The rule in force in certain province requiring the candidates to have practised at the Bar for a period of three years or more furnishes no guarantee that the candidates have acquired any really useful experience." The Law Commission of India in its 118th report on method of appointments to subordinate Courts/subordinate Judiciary cited the above comments with approval and observed at page 15 as follows: "Even then, some Judges who responded to the queries of the Commission have expressed preference for retention of minimum practice at the Bar as a pre-requisite for entry into judicial service. It is time to dis-abuse our mind on this point because the Law Commission has reached an affirmative conclusion that this minimum practice at the Bar hardly qualifies the person to be a better judge." The Law Commission, in doing so, gave cogent reasons for reaching this conclusion and the same need not be repeated here. Suffice to say that these were weighty observations indeed by august bodies, who had made indepth study of the matter. 3. Chapter-VI of the Constitution of India deals with Subordinate Courts. Article 233 deals with appointment of District Judges while Article 234 deals with recruitment of persons other than District Judges to the judicial service. Suffice to say that these were weighty observations indeed by august bodies, who had made indepth study of the matter. 3. Chapter-VI of the Constitution of India deals with Subordinate Courts. Article 233 deals with appointment of District Judges while Article 234 deals with recruitment of persons other than District Judges to the judicial service. We may reproduce both the Articles in extenso. They read as follows: "233. Appointment of district Judges. - (1) Appointments of persons to be, and the posting and promotion of, district Judges in any State - shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. (2) A person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a District Judge if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment. "234. Recruitment of persons other than district judges to judicial service of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State." 4. It would be seen that for appointment to the post of District Judge, a person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a District Judge if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment. Article 234 of the Constitution of India, reproduced above, does not use a similar phraseology while laying down qualifications for appointment to the post of judicial service other than the district Judges and the founding fathers of the Constitution in their wisdom left the matter to the Governor of the State, who was required to lay down qualifications in accordance with the Rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. 5. 5. Notwithstanding the aforesaid two reports of the Law Commission of India and the provisions of Article 234 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Cour in the aforesaid All India Judges 'Association & Ors., (supra) ruled as follows: 'It has, however, become imperative, in this connection, to take notice of the fact that the qualifications prescribed and the procedure adopted for recruitment of the judges at the lowest rate are not uniform in all the States. In view of the uniformity in the hierarchy and designations as well as the service conditions that we have suggested, it is necessary that all the States should prescribe uniform qualifications and adopt uniform procedure in recruiting the judicial officers at the lowest rung in the hierarchy. In most of the States, the minimum qualifications for being eligible to the post of the Civil Judge- cum-Magistrate First Class/Magistrate First Class/Munsiff Magistrate is minimum three years' practice as a lawyer in addition to the degree in law. In some States, however, the requirement of practice is altogether dispensed with and Judicial Officers are recruited with only a degree of law to their credit. The recruitment of raw graduates as judicial officers without any training or background of lawyering has not proved to be a successful experiment. Considering the fact that from the first day of his assuming office, the judge has to decide, among others, questions of life, liberty, property and reputation of the litigants, to induct graduates fresh from the universities to occupy seats of such vital powers is neither prudent nor desirable. Neither knowledge derived from books nor pre-service training can be an adequate substitute for the first hand experience of the working of the Court-system and the administration of justice begotten through legal practice. The practice involves much more than mere advocacy. A lawyer has to interact with several components of the administration of justice. Unless the judicial officer is familiar with the working of the said components, his education and equipment as a Judge is likely to remain incomplete. The experience as a lawyer is, therefore, essential to enable the judge to discharge his duties and functions efficiently and with confidence and circumspection. Many States have hence prescribed a minimum of three years' practice as a lawyer as an essential qualification for appointment as a judicial officer at the lowest rung. The experience as a lawyer is, therefore, essential to enable the judge to discharge his duties and functions efficiently and with confidence and circumspection. Many States have hence prescribed a minimum of three years' practice as a lawyer as an essential qualification for appointment as a judicial officer at the lowest rung. It is, hence, necessary that all the States prescribe the said minimum practice as lawyer as a necessary qualification for recruitment to the lowest rung in the judiciary. In this connection, it may be pointed out that under Article 233 (2) of the Constitution, no person is eligible to be appointed a District Judge unless he has been an advocate or a pleader for no less than seven years while Articles 217(2)(b) and 124(3)(b) require at least ten years' practice as an advocate of a High Court for the appointment of a person to the posts of the Judge of the High Court and the Judge of the Supreme Court respectively. We, therefore, direct that all States shall take immediate steps to prescribe three years' practice as a lawyer as one of the essential qualifications for recruitment as the judicial officer at the lowest rung." This judgement was rendered on 24.8.1993. 6. It appears that the petitioner is a law graduate and is working as Legal Assistant in the Office of the Assistant Chief Engineer, Public Works Department, Government of Rajasthan, Ajmer. He was eligible to be considered for appoint- ment to the post of R.J.S. under the unamended Rule 11 of the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). The unamended Rule reads as follows: "11. He was eligible to be considered for appoint- ment to the post of R.J.S. under the unamended Rule 11 of the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). The unamended Rule reads as follows: "11. Qualification.- (1) No candidate shall be eligible for recruitment to the service unless he is- (a) Bachelor of Law (two years course under the old scheme and three years course under the new scheme) or Bachelor of Law (Professional), of any University established by law in the Rajasthan or of any other University established by Law in India and recognised for the purpose by the Governor; or (b) a Barristor of England or Northern Ireland or a member of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland; (2) Every candidate must possess a thorough knowledge of Hindi written in Devnagri Script," The undisputed position before us is that 113 vacancies in R.J.S. were determined in accordance with the Rule 8 of the aforesaid Rules which makes provision for number of persons to be recruited at each recruitment to be deter- mined in consultation with the Court i.e. the High Court. It is also not in dispute that a requisition was sent to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Ajmer, for holding recruitment to the aforesaid 113 vacancies. Meanwhile, the aforesaid judgement of the Apex Court in All India Judges ' Association & Others (supra) saw the light of the day. The result was that the requisition sent to the R.P.S.C. was withdrawn inasmuch as process for amendment of the Rules had to be initiated in accordance with the directive of the Apex Court given in the aforesaid case. We may recall that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding throughout the territory of India in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and by virtue of Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction is empowered to pass such decree or make such orders as is necessary. Eventually, the aforesaid Rule was amended in accordance with the directions of the Apex Court and a new Rule was substituted on the Statute Book whereby a qualification for recruitment to the post in R.J.S. was laid down as directed by the Apex Court. Eventually, the aforesaid Rule was amended in accordance with the directions of the Apex Court and a new Rule was substituted on the Statute Book whereby a qualification for recruitment to the post in R.J.S. was laid down as directed by the Apex Court. The petitioner challenges the constitutionality and legality of the aforesaid amendment and alternatively submits that his experience as Legal Assistant under the Government should be treated as equivalent to practice at the bar and vacancies occurring prior to 24.8.1993 should be directed to be filled in accordance with the old Rule 1 1 as reproduced above. 7. A show cause notice was-given by this Court to the respondents vide order dated 17.8.94. A counter has been filed on behalf of the respondent No.2, Rajasthan Public Service Commission. No counter has been filed on behalf of the State of Rajasthan or on behalf of the High Court, but the writ petition has been opposed by the learned Advocate General on behalf of the State. It has been submitted that the Rule in question is perfectly constitutionally valid and was within the competence of the law making authority and does not suffer from any vice so as to call for any interference. It is also urged.thqt there is no room for interpretation of the amended Rule which is explicitly clear in its import. 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties for final disposal at the admission stage itself with the consent of all concerned and we proposed to dispose of the writ petition in the historical background, as stated above. 9. The first submission of Shri Samdaria on behalf of the petitioner is that a vested right cannot be taken away by the amended Rule which is only prospective in nature. The submission is that once the vacancies could be made only in accordance with the unamended Rule and yet in pursuance of the amended Rule which saw the light of the day only on 13.5.94. Shri Samdaria has cited a number of rulings on this aspect of the matter but we need not encumber this order by citing all of them because to our mind it is a settled proposition of law that a vested right cannot be taken away by legislation which is prospective in nature. Shri Samdaria has cited a number of rulings on this aspect of the matter but we need not encumber this order by citing all of them because to our mind it is a settled proposition of law that a vested right cannot be taken away by legislation which is prospective in nature. The law making Authority can make law to take effect retrospectively and there can be no doubt that such a law cannot take away rights once vested. 10. The question is whether in the present case it can be said that the petitioner had a vested right to be considered for vacancy in R.J. S. prior to 13.5.94. Here we may very briefly discuss the scheme of the Rule-I Rule 7 of the relevant Rules deals with the source of the recruitment. Rule 8 with number of vacancies to be filled. Rule 10 deals with age. Rule 11 deals with qualifications. Part V of the Rules deals with the procedure for recruitment. Rule 14 which falls in this part provides for a competitive examination to be held for recruitment at such intervals as the Governor may in consultation with the Court from time to time determine. This Rule lays down that such examination would be conducted by the commission at such time and at such date as it may inform. Rule 16 of the Rues deals with application and lays down that on receipt of a requisition for recruitment to the service from the Rajpramukh (now Governor) the Commission shall call for applications for permission to sit at the examination by publishing a notice to that effect in the Rajasthan Gazette and in such other manner as the Commission may deem fit. Rule 17 of the Rules deals with the examination fee and Rule 18 deals with admission to the examination. In our considered opinion a person has a right to appear at an examination for recruitment to R.J.S. only as and when a competitive examination has to be held and not earlier. In accordance with Rule 16, the Public Service Commission calls for application for permission to sit at the examination by publishing a notice to that effect and if a candidate applies and is found eligible in all relevant aspects he is granted admission to take the examination under the provisions of Rule 18. In accordance with Rule 16, the Public Service Commission calls for application for permission to sit at the examination by publishing a notice to that effect and if a candidate applies and is found eligible in all relevant aspects he is granted admission to take the examination under the provisions of Rule 18. Thereafter, the R.P.S.C. holds the examination and then eventually a list of candidates is prepared and is recommended by the Commission and thereafter the appointment takes place. The aforesaid scheme of the Rules goes to show that there can be no right to apply for admission to examination unless the posts have been advertised in pursuance of the requisition sent by the Government. In the present case it is an admitted position that the Government did notify vacancies to the R.P.S.C but the requisition was withdrawn and a fresh requisition was sent only after Rule II of the R.J.S. Rules had been amended. In the aforesaid premises it cannot be said that the petitioners had a vested right to appear at the recruitment test even though the recruitment had not been announced. At best, they had an inchoate and incomplete right to make an application for recruitment as and when the examination was to be held. Certain rulings were cited by Shri Samdaria to show that once vacancies have been determined, they have to be filled in, in accordance with the Rules in existence on the date of such determination. In this regard cases reported in Y. Y. Rangaiah & Ors. v. J. Sreenivasa Rao & Ors., 1983 Lab. IC 1240 ; P. Ganeshwar Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., 1988 (4) SLR 549 and Union oflndia v. Mohanti, JT 1994 SC 39 were cited. On a close examination of the various judgements, we find that they have no application to the present case because they deal with those cases where vested right to promotions were affected by an amendment. It is settled law that a right to promotion is a vested right and cannot be taken away by a prospective amendment of a Rule. Dr. P.K. Jaiswal v. Ms. Debi Mukherjee & Others, AIR 1992 SC 749 makes this position very clear viz that there is no vested right in a candidate to appear at a competitive recruitment test, till such a test is actually held. Dr. P.K. Jaiswal v. Ms. Debi Mukherjee & Others, AIR 1992 SC 749 makes this position very clear viz that there is no vested right in a candidate to appear at a competitive recruitment test, till such a test is actually held. In that case a requisition was sent by Government for selection of a candidate for filling the vacancy in question. However, before the Commission could advertise the post, the Government informed it, not to proceed with the process of selection because the Government was at the given point of time considering the question of amending the recruitment Rules with a view to providing for posts in question by promotion. The Apex Court found that withdrawal of the requisition by the Government was in order as amendment of the relevant Rules was contemplated. It was further held that the decision of the Government to withdraw the requisition sent to the Commission before the issuance of the advertisement does not interfere with any vested right of selection because that stage had yet not reached. The Apex Court observed as follows: "The right to selection crystallises only after the candidate is called for interview pursuant to the advertisement. But in the instant case the question is whether the Government can withdraw the requisition sent to the Commission for initiation the process of selection because at that point of time no right had crystallised in anyone for being considered for selection. If the Government is at a given point of time considering the question of amending the recruitment rules with a view to providing for promotion to the post in question, the Government can before an advertisement is issued by the Commission and the process of selection is under way request the Commission to withdraw the same till it decides on the questions of amending the Rules. The decision of the Government to withdraw the requisition sent to the Commission in November, 1989 before the issuance of the advertisement does not interfere with any vested right of selection because that stage had yet not reached." 11. We may here point out that Rule 6 (4) of the R.J.S. Rules lays down as follows: "6 (4). The decision of the Government to withdraw the requisition sent to the Commission in November, 1989 before the issuance of the advertisement does not interfere with any vested right of selection because that stage had yet not reached." 11. We may here point out that Rule 6 (4) of the R.J.S. Rules lays down as follows: "6 (4). The Governor may leave unfilled or hold in abeyance any post or any appointment to the service for such time as he deems fit without thereby entitling any person to compensation." The aforesaid Rule even makes it explicit that the Government has a right to leave unfilled any post in the service. In the present case it was in the light of the judgement of the Apex Court that the Governor was under constitutional obligation to amend the R.J.S. Rules so as to make three years' practice at the Bar a sinequanon for selection to R.J.S. and consequently the aforesaid amendment was made. As we see the situation, the petitioner did not have any vested right to appear at the examination which was announced by the R.P.S.C. after amendment of the Rules and at best an inchoate right existed in him to appear at such an examination as and when the same was held. By no stretch of imagination, such a right could be termed a vested right. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner was serving as a Legal Assistant and his experience in this capacity should be treated as experience at the Bar. In our opinion, the contention has to be noticed only for the sake of rejection. The amended rule does not envisage that person serving as Legal Assistant should be permitted to appear at the R.J.S. Examination. That should be against the very spirit of the judgement of the Apex Court rendered in All India Judges'Association & Others (supra). 13. The petitioner tried to make out a case that he was a Law Officer of the State and, as such, was discharging the functions which a practicing lawyer discharges. Clause 4 of the Law & Judicial Department Manual 1952 defines Law Officers to the Government as under: "4. Law Officer. - The Law Officers of Government are - A (1) Advocate-General; (2) One or more Government Advocates; (3) Deputy Government Advocates; (4) Assistant Government Advocates; (5) Public Prosecutors. Clause 4 of the Law & Judicial Department Manual 1952 defines Law Officers to the Government as under: "4. Law Officer. - The Law Officers of Government are - A (1) Advocate-General; (2) One or more Government Advocates; (3) Deputy Government Advocates; (4) Assistant Government Advocates; (5) Public Prosecutors. B (1) Legal Remembrancer to Government; (2) Joint Legal Remembrancer to Government; (3) Assistant Legal Remembrancer to Government; (4) Legal Draftsman, Law & Judicial Department; (5) Additional Legal Draftsman, Law & Judicial Department;" The aforesaid clause goes to show that Legal Assistants do not fall within the category of the said Officers of the Government. 14. In the writ petition a reference was made to Hon'ble Mr. Justice Y.R. Meena and an endeavour was made to show that he was appointed as Judicial Member in the Income Tax Tribunal after he had worked as a Law Officer in the Law Ministry, Union of India.Reliance was also placed on Exhibit 4 and its enclosures showing that a judicial member of a Railway Claims Tribunal could be appointed if he is a member of the Indian Legal Service and has held a post of Gr. I of the service for a period of three years. In our opinion, the two analogies are absolutely misplaced because a Member of the Indian Legal Service cannot be compared at all with Legal Assistants serving under the Government of Rajasthan. The appointment as Legal Assistant is governed by Rajasthan Legal Service Rules, 1981 as amended by Rajasthan Legal Service (amendment) Rules, 1985. In our opinion, by no stretch of imagination, a Legal Assistant can claim to be a Law Officer of the State or can compare and equate his experience with practice at the Bar. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed great reliance upon Exhibit 1/A, a Circular of the Rajasthan Government, issued in the Legal Department on 27.4.1983 wherein various duties of Legal Assistant, Head Legal Assistant, Assistant Legal Remembrancer, Assistant Legal Draftsman, Deputy Legal Remembrancer were laid down. It was submitted that in some cases Legal Assistants are appointed as Officer-incharges of cases in which Government is a party In our opinion, neither Exhibit I /A nor appointment of some of the Legal Assistants as Officer-incharges of the cases render the experience of a Legal Assistant comparable to that of a practising lawyer. It was submitted that in some cases Legal Assistants are appointed as Officer-incharges of cases in which Government is a party In our opinion, neither Exhibit I /A nor appointment of some of the Legal Assistants as Officer-incharges of the cases render the experience of a Legal Assistant comparable to that of a practising lawyer. A practising Lawyer has not only to advise his client but has to face with Court craft. lie is required at times to examine witnesses, at other times to cross-examine them. He is required to address oral arguments to the Court; he has to interact with the litigants. The experience gained by an advocate is thus essentially different from the experience gained in discharge of duties by a Legal Assistant. Actually the Government had recognised what sort of duties were being actually taken from Legal Assistants in its circular Ex. 2, dated 14.1 1.90. The circular, inter alia, states "In some Departments the Legal Assistants are being used for the job of Ministerial staff and they are assigned the work of entries in the receipt and despatch registers. We do not mean to say that we approve that job of Ministerial staff should be taken from Legal Assistants; rather we would say that if it is done it may amount to wastage of their talent and Government should devise ways and means to ensure that they render such services as are required to them in accordance with the Annexure Exhibit I /A. In our opinion, petitioner cannot claim by virtue of Exhibit 1 1/A that he has acquired experience akin to that of a practising lawyer or that his "I experience should be deemed equivalent to that of practice at the bar. 15. A reference was made to a judgement of the Apex Court in J.K. Aggarwal v. Haryana Seeds Development Corporation Ltd., ( AIR 1991 Supreme Court 1221 ) wherein following observations were made: "Legal Adviser and a lawyer are for this purpose somewhat liberally construed and must include whoever assists or advises on facts and in law must be deemed to he in the position of a Legal adviser." In our opinion this observation does not advance the case of the petitioner at all. In that case a domestic enquiry was being held and the relevant rule gave discretion to the disciplinary authority to permit the delinquent officer to avail of the services of a lawyer. The presenting officer was an experienced officer and the delinquent officer requested that he may be permitted the use of a lawyer to defend him. The permission was refused. This was held to be bad and it was in this context that the aforesaid observations were made. To our mind, those observations are neither here nor there for the purpose of the present petition. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that under proviso (i) to Rule 10 of the R.J. S. Rules the petitioner was entitled to relaxation of age and, therefore, it must be held that he was entitled to appear as if he possessed qualifications wider the unamended Rule 11 The argument is fallacious. Rule 10 pertains to age and the Rule alongwith its proviso (i) reads as follows: "(i) That barring the first examination to be held under the provisions of these rules, if a candidate would have been entitled in respect of his age to appear at an examination in any year in which no such examination was held he shall be deemed to be entitled in respect of his age to appear at the next following examination." To our mind, this Rule cannot come to rescue of the petitioner in any way. 17. We may revert to the All India Judges Association case (supra) wherein following observations were made by the Apex Court: "Any clarification that may be required in respect of any matter arising out of this decision will be sought only from this Court and from no other Court." Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that petitioner had earlier filed an application for clarification before the Supreme Court of India and the same was disposed of by an order dated 21.1.1994 (Ex.1). It is submitted that in the aforesaid interim application No. 7/93 the Apex Court made the following observations and hence this Court should render a decision on merits: "Learned counsel for the applicant makes a submission that it will be appropriate for the applicant to pursue other substantive remedies, as may be available to him at law and that permission be granted to withdraw this application. We place this submission on record. We place this submission on record. The application is dismissed as withdrawn." In our opinion, in view of the aforesaid order of the Apex Court, it was just and proper for us to enter into the merits of the controversy notwithstanding the observations made in All India Judges ' Association v. Union of India (supra) , reproduced above. 18. In the aforesaid premises we find no merit in this writ petition and dismiss the same. Before parting, we may add that reference to Hon'ble Mr. Justice Y.R. Meena was absolutely uncalled for and we deprecate this action of the petitioner. Hon'ble Justice Meena is not a party to this case and he could not have explained any of the averments made by the petitioner. In future, learned Members of the Bar should avoid making reference to persons who are not parties to a lis. 19. The writ petition is, thus, dismissed as being devoid of merit.Petition dismissed. *******