Judgment :- When the C.M.P. No. 3320 of 1993 came up for argument, the C.R.P. itself was heard. Revision petitioner is the 4th defendant in O.S.No. 474 of 1993 of the Additional Munsiffs Court, Irinjalakuda. He filed I.A.No. 3406 of 1993 for amending the written statement. The lower court dismissed the said petition. This revision is directed against the said order. 2. It is argued by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the amendment sought was to incorporate a contention that the petitioner has only a limited liability. The suit was one for recovery of money. It is pointed out by the learned counsel that the lower court dismissed the petition solely on the ground that the petition is belated. The amendment was sought at the time when the case came up for hearing. It is contended by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner hat it was a wrong exercise of jurisdiction to dismiss the petition under O.VI R.17 C.P.C. & n the ground of mere delay. With due regard to the liberal construction that O.VI R.17 CPC should receive, the petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of mere delay, if otherwise, the petition is maintainable. He relied on the decision in Shambliu Nath Seth v Madan Lal and another (AIR 1976 All. 220) wherein held that "amendments cannot be refused merely on the ground of delay unless there is strong reason to think that the amendment was mala fide and was sought to be made in order to delay proceedings or prolong litigation". The nature of the amendment sought is such that the same does not introduce an entirely new case. 3. But the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the C.R.P. is not maintainable as an order dismissing a petition for amendment of the written statement is not a "case decided" within the meaning of S.115 of the C.P.C. The learned counsel also contended that there being no case for the revision petitioner to the effect that the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the revision petition on that ground also the revision is not maintainable. As regards the said contention it has to be noted that in the very statement of facts in the revision petition it is alleged that the order has caused irreparable injury, great hardship and loss to the petitioner. As regards the said contention it has to be noted that in the very statement of facts in the revision petition it is alleged that the order has caused irreparable injury, great hardship and loss to the petitioner. Therefore, the said argument of the learned counsel for the respondent cannot stand scrutiny. 4. As regards the contention that the refusal to allow the petition for amendment is not a "case decided" within the meaning of S.115 of the C.P.C. the learned counsel for the respondents relied on the decision in Dassninal Bulchand v. Kundanmal Clioilliram and others (AIR 1946 Sind. 36). On the other hand, the Full Bench decision in Desai Narshiprasad Lakshmi Prasad v. Desai Vidulray Yashwantprasad and others (AIR 1954 Saurashtra 66) held that the general trend of the decisions is that the interlocutory orders are revisable by the High Court under S.115 and that an order refusing an amendment of a pleading is revisable by the High Court. The decision in Smt.Olga Scco Gomes v. Kashinath Shankar Naik (AIR 1978 Goa 47) also relied on the decision in Desai Narshiprasad's case (AIR 1954 Saurashtra 66) to hold that, order refusing amendment is revisable under S.115 C.P.C. Allahabad High Court in Kisan Co-operative Sugar Factory Ltd. v. Mis. Rajendra Paper Mills and others (AIR 1984 All. 143) also look the view that the order allowing or refusing amendment is "case decided" within the meaning of S.115 CPC. With respect I agree with the view expressed by the Full Bench of the Saurashtra High Court in Desai Nars/iiprasad's case (AIR 1954 Sau. 66). The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent in this regard is not sustainable. 5. The order of the lower court is infirm as the same is laconic in the sense it only states that the case stood posted for hearing and that the application is highly belated. As noticed, the amendment since does not seek to introduce an entirely new case and there being nothing to show that the same is not supported by the bona fides, the -amendment ought to have been allowed. In view of the said discussion, the order under attack is liable to be set aside. In the result, the order under attack is set aside and I.A.No. 3406/93 in O.S. No. 474/ 93 is allowed. The C.R.P. is allowed.