KAPADIA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners who are detenus have filed the present petitions challenging the orders of detention passed against them by the Addl. Chief Secretary to Government of Gujarat, Home Department, Gandhinagar dated 19-7-1993 exercising powers under Sec. 3 of the Conservation of Foreign exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for short the act), on his being satisfied that with a view to preventing them from smuggling goods, it is necessary to detain the petitioners and accordingly the order is passed on 19-7-1993. ( 2 ) THE petitioners were served the orders on the same day along with the grounds of detention. ( 3 ) ON perusal of the grounds of detention, it appears that one vessel named M. S. V. YA-AL-RAZAK-BDI-777 had left Sharjah with cargo robber tyres waste/scrap on 25-9-1992 and was likely to arrive at Mundra Port with gold biscuits secreted in a vessel. On receiving this information, officers of the Customs and D. R. I, kept watch and they were able to locate the said vessel at Mundra Port at about 20-30 hrs. on 30-9-1992. The officers kept a watch on the vessel and in the morning of 1-10-1992 it was rummaged which resulted in the recovery of 150 gold biscuits of foreign origin weighing about 17. 490 kgs. valued at Rs. 72,40,860. 00. It was seized under the Customs act, 1962, after making necessary punchnama. Mamad Abbas Jasraya who is the petitioner in Special Criminal Application No. 1533 of 1993 was one of the members of the crew and Ibrahim Osman Jasraya was tindel of the vessel. On enquiry from both, neither of them could produce any licit documents for the import of the said gold. Both of them have admitted in the presence of panchas about the bringing of contraband gold by way of smuggling. The vessel along with the stores and tackier valued at Rs. 5,94,485. 00 was also seized on 2-10-1992 as it was used for transportation of the contrabands. ( 4 ) SUBSEQUENTLY it appears that statements of Ibrahim Osman Jasraya and mamad Abbas Jasraya were recorded on 2-10-1992 under the Customs Act, 1962, wherein they admitted the facts of recovery of 150 gold biscuits from the said vessel on 1-10-1992 at Mundra port. 00 was also seized on 2-10-1992 as it was used for transportation of the contrabands. ( 4 ) SUBSEQUENTLY it appears that statements of Ibrahim Osman Jasraya and mamad Abbas Jasraya were recorded on 2-10-1992 under the Customs Act, 1962, wherein they admitted the facts of recovery of 150 gold biscuits from the said vessel on 1-10-1992 at Mundra port. The statements of other members of the crew were also recorded and they also admitted the recovery of the gold biscuits from the said vessel. However, they said that they were not knowing about the concealment of the gold biscuits in the vessel by the present petitioners. Subsequently it appears that samples of gold seized in this case were drawn and sent to Government Mint for assay report and according to the report, the gold seized has a purity of. 999 and has also foreign markings. The Detaining Authority was, therefore, satisfied that the gold biscuits seized in this case are smuggled ones and liable for confiscation under the Customs Act. ( 5 ) AFTER taking into consideration the other relevant factors like making of various bail applications and the refusal thereof by the lower court and also the fact that they were in custody and that there was every possibility of applying for bail in the higher Courts, the Detaining authority passed the aforesaid order. It may be mentioned that before passing of the order, in the grounds of detention, the Detaining authority also considered about the departmental adjudication proceedings which have already been initiated against the petitions and prosecution proceedings under the Customs Act, 1962 which will be initiated against them. But with a view to prevent their prejudicial activities, immediate detention under the Act was the only remedy at this stage and hence passed the aforesaid order. In both the cases, the Under Secretary, Home department, Mr. G. K. Mehta has filed affidavit-in-reply supporting the order of detention. ( 6 ) IN these petitions various grounds have been raised challenging the legality and validity of the detention order passed against the petitioners. As common grounds have been raised, they have been dealt with in this common judgment together. Mr. J. B. Pardiwala, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, during the course of argument, pointed out that the date of last bail application in the lower Court was 16-3-1993 and the same was rejected. As common grounds have been raised, they have been dealt with in this common judgment together. Mr. J. B. Pardiwala, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, during the course of argument, pointed out that the date of last bail application in the lower Court was 16-3-1993 and the same was rejected. He also pointed out during the course of argument that bail application was made in the High Court on 11-5-1993, however, the same has been rejected on 17-5-1993 by Mr. Justice R. K. Abichandani. On the basis of the same Mr. Pardiwala submits that the detaining Authority has not applied his mind to the bail application made in the High Court and the order passed thereon, and therefore, the subjective satisfaction is vitiated. However, on this point, Mr. Pardiwala has put in great labour to convince us that when the Detaining Authority was not aware of the application made in the High Court, what is stated in the grounds for detention while considering the bail application in para 12 about every possibility of the applicants applying for bail in the higher Court is a mere surmise without any cogent evidence in support. He has relied on various judgments to point out that even in cases where bail application is rejected, the Detaining Authority must be conscious of the fact that the petitioner is in the custody and it is necessary to detain him to prevent him from carrying on his activities and for that there should be compelling reasons and/or cogent or enough material. In this case, he vehemently submitted that the Detaining Authority has not considered the application made in the High Court which was decided about two months back from the date of the order and it cannot be said that there was cogent material for him to come to the subjective satisfaction that the petitioners are required to be detained; in other words, he submits that there are no compelling reasons. ( 7 ) ON this point, Mr. J. A. Shelat, learned A. P. P. appearing for the respondent-State has stoutly defended the contention raised by Mr. Pardiwala. He submits that it is true that an application which was made before the High Court which has been rejected by Mr. Justice R. K. Abichandani was not placed by the sponsoring authority to the Detaining authority. J. A. Shelat, learned A. P. P. appearing for the respondent-State has stoutly defended the contention raised by Mr. Pardiwala. He submits that it is true that an application which was made before the High Court which has been rejected by Mr. Justice R. K. Abichandani was not placed by the sponsoring authority to the Detaining authority. Still however, he emphatically submits that the subjective satisfaction is not at all impaired, inasmuch as there was sufficient evidence from the record and which has been also disclosed in para 12 of the grounds of detention that these very petitioners had made various applications for bail before the lower Court. Mr. Pardiwala has stated before us that two applications for bail were made before the Judicial magistrate and three applications for bail were made in the Sessions court before making of an application for bail in the High Court in the month of May, 1993. Mr. Shelat further points out that looking to the fact that such a large quantity of gold was seized, the petitioners would move every possible Court for being released on bail, and therefore, it cannot be said that there was no cogent material with the Court for drawing inference that these petitioners would move the higher Courts which would include the high Court as well as the Supreme Court. On this point, the latest judgment which has been brought to our notice by the learned Counsel for the parties in the present case is Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1991 SC 2261 . In the said case, the Supreme Court has reviewed the entire law on the point that after considering the various decisions on the point, they found it appropriate to set down their conclusions. It is in para 12 of the judgment. All the conclusions are not necessary for our purpose, therefore, they are not quoted. Only what is necessary to be quoted are conclusions Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and they are as under :" (I) A detention order can validly be passed even in the case of a person who is already in custody. In such a case, it must appear from the grounds that the authority was aware that the detenu was already in custody. 1, 2 and 3 and they are as under :" (I) A detention order can validly be passed even in the case of a person who is already in custody. In such a case, it must appear from the grounds that the authority was aware that the detenu was already in custody. (2) When such awareness is there then it should further appear from the grounds that there was enough material necessitating the detention of the person in custody. This aspect depends upon various considerations and facts and circumstances of each case. If there is a possibility of his being released and on being so released he is likely to indulge in prejudicial activity then that would be one such compelling necessity to pass the detention order. The order cannot be quashed on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and that if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition the same can be questioned before a higher Court. (3) If the detenu has moved for bail then the application and the order thereon refusing bail even if not placed before the detaining authority it does not amount to Suppression of relevant material. The question of non-application of mind and satisfaction being impaired does not arise as long as the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was in actual custody "in the facts of the present case considering the aforesaid applications, it cannot be said that there was no cogent material with the detaining authority to come to the conclusion that he is likely to indulge in the prejudicial activities if he is released on bail. Further that the detaining authority was also aware of the fact that he was already in custody. Under these circumstances, there was enough material against a person to keep him in custody, and therefore, we do not find any merit in this contention of Mr. Pardiwala. However, before rejecting the contention of Mr. Pardiwala, we would like to point out that mr. Pardiwala has also relied on a judgment reported in the case of Dharmendra suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1196 . Pardiwala. However, before rejecting the contention of Mr. Pardiwala, we would like to point out that mr. Pardiwala has also relied on a judgment reported in the case of Dharmendra suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1196 . We are not specifically dealing with this particularly in view of the fact that in subsequent decision in the case of Abdul Sathar (supra), this case was also considered in para 12 of the judgment and in the said case para 19 of the aforesaid judgment has been quoted as under : necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu is already in detention, and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression "compelling reasons" in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be cogent materials before the detaining authority on the basis of which it must be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future, and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities. "now taking this ratio of the judgment and applying to the facts of the present case, it is clear from the grounds of detention itself that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the petitioners were in custody. Further the detaining authority was also aware of the fact that previously the petitioners had made frequent applications for bail in the lower Court and further looking to the nature of the antecedent activity, namely, illegal importing of such huge quantity of contraband gold would clearly indicate that they would certainly make applications for bail to the higher Courts and after their release they would engage in any such activities, and therefore, it was necessary to detain the petitioners in order to prevent them from engaging in such activities. Thus the facts of the present case even comply with the ratio laid down in Chelawats case (supra ). Before we part with this point, Mr. Thus the facts of the present case even comply with the ratio laid down in Chelawats case (supra ). Before we part with this point, Mr. Pardiwala, learned Counsel also relied on a decision in the case of Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, dhanbad, reported in AIR 1986 SC 2090 . The said case has been considered by the Supreme Court in Chelawats case (supra) in para 14 which is quoted as under :"in Binod Singh v. District Magistrate, Dhanbad, Bihar, ( AIR 1986 SC 2090 ) it has been laid down : if a man is in custody and there is no imminent possibility of his being released, the power of preventive detention should not be exercised. In the instant case, when the actual order of detention was served upon the detenu, the detenu was in jail. There is no indication that this factor of the question that the said detenu might be released or that there was such a possibility of his release, was taken into consideration by the detaining authority properly and seriously before the service of the order. A bald statement is merely an ipse dixit of the officer. If there were cogent materials for thinking that the detenu might be released then these should have been made apparent. "looking to the grounds of detention as discussed above, it cannot be said that it is merely a bald statement and/or only ipse dixit of the detaining authority that the said detenu might be released or there was such possibility of his release. As stated above, there is cogent material for arriving at a subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu might be released and that has been made apparent from the antecedents of the petitioners referred to in the grounds as well as the frequent applications made by the petitioners in the lower Court as referred to in para 12 of the grounds, and therefore, they have also been made quite apparent in the grounds of detention. In view of what is discussed above, we do not see any merit in the contention of Mr. Pardiwala, hence it is rejected. ( 8 ) MR. In view of what is discussed above, we do not see any merit in the contention of Mr. Pardiwala, hence it is rejected. ( 8 ) MR. J. A. Shelat, A. P. P. has also cited a judgment in the case of noor Salmon Makani v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1994 SC 75, wherein the contention raised was that when the detenu was already in jail, a bald statement that the possibility that the detenu might be released on bail could not be ruled out. Reliance was placed on the observations made in the case of Binod Singh (supra ). The Supreme Court has considered the said contention in para 5 and ultimately rejected the same by observing that we see no force in this submission. We do not think anything more could have been said by the Detaining Authority in this context. As a matter of fact, the apprehension of the Detaining Authority came to be true as the detenu was released on bail on certain conditions on 25-9-1992. While referring to the present case as stated above, this was not a bald statement made by the detaining authority and as stated above, there is enough material as referred to by the detaining authority in the grounds of detention, and therefore, also Binod Singhs case would not be applicable to the facts of this case. ( 9 ) THE second contention which is raised by Mr. Pardiwala is with regard to the delay in passing the order of detention. He submits that in this case the incident has taken place on 30-9-1992 by which contraband gold valued at Rs. 72 lakhs (approximately) was illegally smuggled and the order of detention has been passed on 19-7-1993. In that view of the matter, on behalf of the detaining authority affidavit-in-reply was filed and the delay has been explained in para 9 of the said affidavit-in-reply. It may be stated at the outset that Mr. Pardiwala has fairly pointed out that recording of statement under Sec. 108 of the Customs Act continued sometime upto December, 1992 and there are nearly 629 pages of documents/ papers and some of them are required to be translated for serving the same to the petitioners-detenus. So doing the work of translation would certainly take some time. Pardiwala has fairly pointed out that recording of statement under Sec. 108 of the Customs Act continued sometime upto December, 1992 and there are nearly 629 pages of documents/ papers and some of them are required to be translated for serving the same to the petitioners-detenus. So doing the work of translation would certainly take some time. However, apart from this, there is an explanation given which shows that the proposal to detain the petitioners was received by cofeposa of the Home Department on 18-2-1993 and there was a proposal for containing detention of 15 persons received prior to this were also pending for consideration. Proposals in the instant case along with voluminous documents was scrutinised simultaneously and some more information required, it was demanded from the Customs Collector on 30- 3-1993. The Customs Collector was reminded on 8-4-1993 and 4-5-1993 to forward the same, Customs Collector forwarded the required information on 27-5-1993, 3-6-1993, 9-6-1993 and 25-6-1993. It is also explained that some other detention order was passed on various dates - 5-4-1993, 10-6-1993, and 15-6-1993, but due to some technical lacuna, the detention orders were required to be revoked and fresh orders were required to be issued and revocation of the order was done on 17-4-1993. They have given the account that they were busy for the said work. Again in the light of the information received from the Customs Collector, further information was required to be obtained from D. S. P. , Jamnagar and Bhuj Jail, and thereafter, the file was cleared and was placed before the Dy. Secretary on 14-7-1993 and then put up to the Addl. Chief Secretary i. e. the detaining authority and orders were passed on 15-7-1993. When such huge voluminous documents were there and when time is taken, it cannot be said that there is unreasonable delay in passing the detention order. However, the question to be considered would be whether time-lag is so large as stated in the case of Rajendrakumar v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1288. When such huge voluminous documents were there and when time is taken, it cannot be said that there is unreasonable delay in passing the detention order. However, the question to be considered would be whether time-lag is so large as stated in the case of Rajendrakumar v. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1288. In the said case it is observed by the Supreme Court as under :"viewed from this prospective, we wish to emphasise and make it clear for the guidance of the different High Courts that a distinction must be drawn between the delay in making of an order of detention under a law relating to preventive detention iike the copeposa Act and the delay in comply in with the procedural safeguards of Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. It has been laid down by the Court in a series of decisions that the rule as to unexplained delay in taking action is not delay in making of an order of detention under a law like the COFEPOSA Act enacted for the purpose of dealing effectively with persons engaged in smuggling and foreign exchange recketeering who, owing to their large resources and influence have been posing a serious threat to the economy and thereby to the security of the nation, the courts should not merely on account of delay in making of an order of detention assume that such delay, if not satisfactorily explained, must necessarily give rise to an inference that there was no sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority or that such subjective satisfaction was not genuinely reached. Taking of such a view would not be warranted unless the Court finds that the grounds are stale or illusory or that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. "now examining the delay in this point of view, it may be stated that there were certain public holidays referred to in the affidavit-in-reply and even taking into consideration other facts, the delay has been well explained. The question to be considered would be from the point of view of the nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. Looking to the facts of the present case as stated earlier, the ground is that there was illegal smuggling of gold worth Rs. 72 lakhs (approx ). The question to be considered would be from the point of view of the nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. Looking to the facts of the present case as stated earlier, the ground is that there was illegal smuggling of gold worth Rs. 72 lakhs (approx ). and the order of detention is passed in the month of July 1993. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no real nexus between the two, inasmuch as that such large quantities cannot be imported every day or every week or month, it takes time because in such cases, many personalities work as they have to make out conspiracy for illegal import of the gold or contraband articles, and therefore, it cannot be said that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention or it cannot be said that the grounds have been stale or illusory in the present case. Thus, on examining the case from the guidance given by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid rajendrakumars case (supra), we are unable to uphold the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner on the point of delay, and therefore, we cannot say that merely because there was delay, there was no sufficient material for subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and/or such subjective satisfaction was not genuinely reached. Accordingly we reject that contention also. ( 10 ) IT may also be mentioned that the judgment in the case of Abdul salam alias Thiyyan v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1446 was cited by Mr. J. A. Shelat, learned A. P. P. appearing for the respondents. In the said case, the, aforesaid case of Rajendrakumars case (supra) was also considered, wherein the ratio of the said case would summarise to the effect that merely delay in passing the detention order is not vital unless the Court finds that the grounds are stale, illusory, or there is no nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. We have considered the present case in the light of the observations made in the aforesaid judgment and we are unable to hold that looking to the facts and circumstances of this case and the satisfactory explanation given on behalf of the detaining authority, the order of detention cannot be struck down merely on the ground of delay. ( 11 ) MR. ( 11 ) MR. Pardiwala, learned Counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that certain documents which are furnished to him at the time of serving the grounds for detention are illegible. He has taken this point at page 15, para 13 of the petition. The first complaint is with regard to documents in the form of summons issued under Sec. 108 of the Customs Act and the English version of it are absolutely illegible. It may be stated that the present petitioners do not know English and he was furnished Gujarati translation also. When that is so, when the documents were furnished to him in the language known to him and when it is treated as a basic fact in the ground for detention, then also, it is communicated in the language known to the detenu, and therefore, also this contention would not survive as it would not have come on his way in making effective representation. The second fold of his argument is that the pages No. 485, 487, 489 and 491 of the compilation which is the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate are also not legible. We have personally gone through those pages and in the open Court, in the presence of the learned counsel we could read those documents. It may be stated that it is rather a little difficult to read, and that does not mean that they are illegible. In that view of the matter, we are unable to agree with this contention of Mr. Pardiwala. ( 12 ) THE last contention which is raised by Mr. Pardiwala is that of the aspect of initiation of criminal prosecution on which the detaining authority has not properly applied its mind and therefore, the subjective satisfaction is vitiated. On this point, it may be stated that so far as the grounds of detention are concerned, in para 14 of the grounds of detention, the detaining authority has already stated as under :"i am aware that departmental adjudication proceedings have already been initiated against you and others and prosecution proceedings under the Customs act, 1962 would be initiated against you in due course by the appropriate authority separately to decide your penal liability. These proceedings would be punitive in nature and as a number of witnesses are to be examined etc. , these proceedings will consume considerable time. These proceedings would be punitive in nature and as a number of witnesses are to be examined etc. , these proceedings will consume considerable time. However, to prevent your prejudicial activity, your immediate detention under the COPEPOSA Act, 1974 is the only remedy at this stage. "when this point is raised at page 70, i. e. , in the affidavity-in-reply, it is clearly stated that there is no substance in the contention as the Detaining Authority was aware of the Criminal prosecution to be launched against the detenus, and therefore, the detaining authority has clearly stated that the proceedings would take considerable time, and therefore, during that period to prevent him from the prejudicial activities, immediate detention under the COFEPOSA Act was the only remedy and he has passed the order of detention only to bypass criminal prosecution. ( 13 ) MR. Pardiwala has strongly relied on the judgment reported in 1986 GLH 1145 in the case of Zarin N. Kasam v. State of Gujarat. In the said case, relying on the observations made in Hemlata Kantilal v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1982 SC 8 , it was held that on the facts of the case that no other material or nothing has been pointed out from which it could be shown that all the relevant aspects which would have a bearing on the question of sufficiency of prosecution are gone into. This can hardly be said to be a proper consideration of the relevant facts. It is not merely the mechanical consideration of the alternative course that the authority has to bear in mind as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Hemlatas case (supra ). The precise obligation of the detaining authority is to satisfy itself that it had in mind the question whether the prosecution launched against the detenu was or was not sufficient on the facts and in the circumstances of the case as illustrated in Hemlatas case (supra), namely; the prosecution was not sufficient having regard to the fact that the detenu may be a member of the international smuggling where it would be difficult to establish by evidence, the guilt of the accused. It may not be sufficient in some cases where the activities of the detenu would be so large enough and carried on over substantial period that the detaining authority may have the prognosis that having regard to the volume, the number of years during which the detenu carried on the smuggling activities, antecedents, etc. , that the prosecution is not sufficient in the very nature of the things. However, in the said case in para 13, it has been observed that "in our opinion, therefore, merely because the prosecution may take some more time, the detaining authority would not be justified in supplanting their powers by resorting to detention. " In that case it was held that the detention was vitiated as the detaining authority has not applied his mind to the relevant question in its proper perspective. On this point, Mr. J. A. Shelat has also drawn our attention to the case of State of punjab v. Sukhpal Singh, reported in AIR 1990 SC 231 . In the aforesaid case Hemlatas case (supra) has also been considered in paras 9, 10 and 11 of the judgment. In the said case it has been observed in para 10 that the learned Attorney General refers us to Giani Bakshish Singh v. Govt. of India, AIR 1973 SC 2667 : ( 1973 SCR 662 ), Smt. Hemlata v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1982 SC 8 (supra) and Rajkumar Singh v. State of Blhar, AIR 1986 SC 2173 : 1986 (4) SCC 407 , submitting that the possibility of criminal prosecution was no bar to order any preventive detention and that the Court should not substitute its decision or opinion in place of decision of the authority concerned on the question of necessity of preventive detention. "possibility of prosecution or the absence of it is not absolute bar to an order of preventive detention, the authority may prosecute the offender for an isolated act or acts of an offence for violation of Criminal law, but if it is satisfied that the offender has a tendency to go on violating laws, then there will be no bar for the State to detain under a Preventive Detention Act in order to disable him to repeat such offences. The detaining authority is not the sole judge of what national security or public order requires. But neither is the Court the sole judge of the position. The detaining authority is not the sole judge of what national security or public order requires. But neither is the Court the sole judge of the position. When the power is given to an authority to act on certain facts and if that authority acts on relevant facts and arrives at a decision which cannot be described as either irrational or unreasonable, in the sense that no person instructed in law could have reasonably taken that view, then the order is not bad and the Court cannot substitute its decision or opinion in place of the decision of the authority concerned on the necessity of passing the order. " In para 11 it is farther observed that following Hemlatas case (supra) it could be said that in this case of prosecution it may not be possible to bring home the offender to book as witnesses may not come forward to depose against him out of fear, or it may not be possible to collect all necessary evidence without unreasonable delay and expenditure to prove the guilt of the offender beyond reasonable doubt. ( 14 ) AFTER referring to the aforesaid observations made in Hemlatas case (supra) as well as in the case of State of Punjab (supra) referring to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the incident has taken place on 30-9-1992 and the statements were required to be recorded upto December, 1992, and thereafter the proposal for detention was made. After the enquiry made by the Customs Officers, a complaint under Sec. 135 of the Customs act has been filed and thereafter the aforesaid detention order was passed. ( 15 ) NOW the question is when the trial will be over. It is a mere ground that the trial is likely to take a longer time by itself, it may not be a ground to by-pass criminal prosecution, by passing detention order. But at the same time, it cannot be ignored that delay in the Court of law is the order date and when such cases are to be tried certainly it would consume lot of time and when the trials are lengthy, they are also to be taken up only when there is convenient time, inspite of all efforts for expediting the same. Therefore, what worries us is not merely the long time to be taken in the prosecution of the criminal cases but what would happen in the intervening period, if he is not kept under Preventive detention. If he is not kept under Preventive Detention Act and in custody, it is likely that he may continue his nefarious activities of illegal smuggling and it is the satisfaction of the detaining authority to be considered and not that of the High Court. Here in the present case, the grounds given by the detaining authority have already been considered. We have to read the ground as a whole jointly with the order of detention with a view to see as to how he has arrived at his subjective satisfaction for detaining the petitioners. Then, when we read the grounds as a whole, it is clear that he was indulged in nefarious activities of smuggling on large scale, they had applied for bail, the bails have been refused and thereafter the aforesaid orders have been passed. Along with these facts the aspect of the prosecution likely to take more time is considered, and therefore, to prevent them from continuing the nefarious activities, they are required to be detained immediately. ( 16 ) IN that view of the matter, it cannot be said that in this case merely because the prosecution is going to take a longer time is the only ground for detaining a person. Certainly, it cannot be said that these detention orders are a by-pass to the criminal prosecution, inasmuch as criminal complaint is already filed. It is to be noted that the very object of Preventive Detention is to afford protection to the society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something, but to intercept before he does it and prevent him from doing it. The justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability and not criminal conviction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. As discussed above, there are grounds for detaining the petitioners. The Court cannot question the sufficiency of the grounds of detention while considering the subjective satisfaction of the authority as pointed out in the case of Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, reported in AIR 1982 SC 1143 . As discussed above, there are grounds for detaining the petitioners. The Court cannot question the sufficiency of the grounds of detention while considering the subjective satisfaction of the authority as pointed out in the case of Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, reported in AIR 1982 SC 1143 . Here in this case we have seen that voluminous evidence was required to be gathered, and therefore, at the time of trial also that evidence will also be required to be proved in a lengthy trial and when the general guidelines are given that the detaining authority must be satisfied that it is not possible or adequate to prosecute a person proposed to be detained in order to see that the link with the obnoxious activities at least for a period for which he is under detention. Here in this case, the detaining authority has considered this aspect and only with a view to prevent the obnoxious activities of the petitioners that the detention order is passed though there was possibility of initiating criminal prosecution in future. ( 17 ) IN that view of the matter, we do not find any substance in this contention also. Accordingly none of the contentions raised by Mr. Pardiwala appeals to us. Hence all of them are rejected. In result, the petitions fail and they are hereby dismissed. Rule discharged. .