Judgment : A complaint was filed before a Judicial Magistrate of First Class alleging that a public servant (Municipal Commissioner) and two other persons jointly committed offences falling within the purview of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short ‘the Act’). The complainant prayed to the Magistrate to forward the complaint to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, under Sec. 156(3)oftheCodeofCriminalProcedure (for short ‘the Code’) with a direction to start investigation. Learned Magistrate on receipt of the complaint passed the order accordingly and directed the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance to register a case and investigate the same. State of Kerala has now challenged the said order. Two persons arrayed in the complaint as accused (other than the Municipal Commissioner) have also challenged the action of the Magistrate. 2. Pursuant to the direction issued by the Magistrate a crime was registered by the vigilance cell and an First Information Report was prepared for the offence under Sec. 13(1)(d)(i) of the Act. Here the contention is that a Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass such an order under Sec.156(3) of the Code in respect of offences falling within the ambit of the Act. 3. Under Sec. 156(1) of the Code the officer-in-charge of a police station has power to investigate a cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area would have power to inquire into or try under Chapter XIII of the Code. Sub-sec.(3) says any Magistrate empowered under Sec.190 of the Code may order such an investigation as above mentioned. Sec. 190 of the Code empowers a Magistrate of First Class to take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence or upon a police report of such facts etc. The said power is subject to the provisions of Chapter XIV of the Code. Sec.193 of the Code contains a restriction that no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate. But the restriction does not apply to a Special Judge appointed under the Act since Sec.5 of the Act empowers a Special Judge to take cognizance of the offences under the Act “without the accused being committed to him for trial”. 4. But the restriction does not apply to a Special Judge appointed under the Act since Sec.5 of the Act empowers a Special Judge to take cognizance of the offences under the Act “without the accused being committed to him for trial”. 4. The only court which has jurisdiction to try the case involving offences under the Act is the Special Judge’s court. This is clear from Sec.4 of the Act which says that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code the offences specified in the Act shall be tried only by a Special Judge. The Act provides that only a person who is or has been a Sessions Judge shall be qualified for appointment as a Special Judge. The cumulative effect of such provisions is that only a Special Judge is competent to take cognizance of the offences specified in the Act. No Magistrate can therefore take cognizance of such offences. If a Magistrate cannot take cognizance of certain offences, he has no power to order investigation under Sec. 156(3) of the Code in respect of such offences. 5. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held in A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Srinivas Nayak, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 718: (1984) 2 S.C.C. 500 : (1984) 1 Crimes 547: 1984 Crl.L.J. 647: (1984) 2 S.C.C. 500 : 1984 S.C.C. (Crl.) 277, that the Special Judge alone is competent to take cognizance of the offence specified in the Act. The bench was considering Sec.8 of Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 which is identically worded. In paragraph 18 of the decision Desai, J. who spoke for the bench has stated that under Sec.8(1) the Special Judge shall not take cognizance on commitment of the accused. “It positively conferred power on Special Judge to take cognizance of offences and it negatively removed any concept of commitment”. 6. Legal position being such, a Magistrate has no power to take cognizance of the offences which a Special Judge is specified to try under the Act. Thus in turn would lead to the conclusion that a Magistrate cannot pass an order under Sec. 156(3) of the code in respect of any offence which a Special Judge alone is competent to try. Hence, the order impugned cannot be sustained. For the aforesaid reasons, I quash the impugned order and the criminal miscellaneous cases are disposed of accordingly.