Jaspal Singh ( 1 ) ON March 24, 1994 the officers of the bi derate of Revenue Inteligence recovered 250 foreign marked gold biscuits weighing 29. 166 Kgs. valued at Rs. 1,34,16,360. 00 from a blue coloured Maruti Gypsy. It is claimed that the present petitioner and one Nadeem Anwar were its occupants. Both of them in their respective statements under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 allegedly admitted the recovery and seizure. The petitioner now seeks bail on the ground that his trial has not been concluded within aperiod of sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case. In support, he relies upon sub section (6) of section 437 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which reads as under: "437. (6) If, in any case triable by a Magistrate, the trial of a person accused of any non-bailable offence is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case, such person shall, if he is in custody during the whole of the said period be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs. " ( 2 ) ADMITTEDLY, the complaint filed against the petitioner is still at an "inquiry" stage wherein evidence before charge is being recorded. It is also not disputed that if the term "trial" is taken to include "inquiry" also then, in that case, the petitioner would be factually right in his claim that more than sixty days have already elapsed from the first date when the case was fixed for evidence. ( 3 ) THE question which thus needs to be resolved is as to whether, in terms of sub-section 6 of section 437 of the Code the term "trial" would include "inquiry" also or not. This very point arose before a Division Bench of this Court in Robert Lendi v. Collector of Customs 1987 Crl. ( 3 ) THE question which thus needs to be resolved is as to whether, in terms of sub-section 6 of section 437 of the Code the term "trial" would include "inquiry" also or not. This very point arose before a Division Bench of this Court in Robert Lendi v. Collector of Customs 1987 Crl. L. J. 55 which took the view that the expression "the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case" in sub-section 6 of section 437 of the Code would mean the first date fixed for recording evidence after the accused is charge-sheeted and the prosecution is given notice of that date for recording its evidence and therefore the period of sixty days under sub-section (6) of section 437 would start from that date. ( 4 ) FACED with the Division Bench judgment referred to above, it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the view taken there in was not correct and that the term "trial" ought to have been held to include "inquiry" too and in support reference was made to a Supreme Court judgment in State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh AIR 1957 SC 389 . ( 5 ) THE judgihent in the case of Ram Naresh (supra) revolved around section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and while dealing with it, the Supreme Court did hold that the said provision was wide enough to cover every kind of inquiry and trial and that the word "trial" in the section had not been used in any limited sense. Does it mean that the word "trial" wherever and whenever used in the Code of Criminal Procedure must necessarily cover inquiry as well? Surely, the said judgment does not lay down any such preposition. rather it speaks of the "well-known" distinction between inquiry and trial in the scheme of the Code. The learned counsel for the petitioner is thus not correct in saying that wherever the word- trial" is used, it must, in view of the judgment in the case of Ram Naresh, be taken to cover inquiry also. The Supreme Court itself dispels this view by. observing: the words "tried" and "trial" appear to have no fixed or universal meaning. The learned counsel for the petitioner is thus not correct in saying that wherever the word- trial" is used, it must, in view of the judgment in the case of Ram Naresh, be taken to cover inquiry also. The Supreme Court itself dispels this view by. observing: the words "tried" and "trial" appear to have no fixed or universal meaning. No doubt, in quite a number of sections in the Code to which our attention has been drawn the words "tried" and "trial" have been used in the sense, of reference to a stage after the inquiry. That meaning attaches to the words in those sections having regard to the context in which they are used. There is no reason why where these words are used in another context in the Code, they should necessarily be limited in their connotation and significance. They are words which must be considered with regard to the particular context in which they are used and with regard to the scheme and purpose of the provision under consideration. " ( 6 ) IT was argued that the word "trial" if considered in the context in which it has been used in sub-section (6) of section 437 must be taken to cover inquiry also. My attention was particularly drawn to the words "in the case". It was argued that had "trial" been not intended to include "inquiry", the legislature would not have used the words "in the case" but would have used instead the expression "in the trial". However, I find myself unable to subscribe to this view. ( 7 ) LET us recall the first half of sub-section (6) of section 437. It reads: "if, in any case, triable by a Magistrate the trial of a person accused of any non-bailable offence is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case. . . . . . "the words "in any case" have to be read in conjunction with the words "trial by a Magistrate". So read together, these words show that the provision is confined to only such non-bailable cases which are triable by a Magistrate only. . . . . . "the words "in any case" have to be read in conjunction with the words "trial by a Magistrate". So read together, these words show that the provision is confined to only such non-bailable cases which are triable by a Magistrate only. And when the legislature uses the words "first date fixed for taking evidence in the case" then the words "in the case" must be taken to relate to the words "in any case" used in the earlier part of the provision. The words "in thecase have thus nothing to do with inquiry. In Robert Lendi v. Collector of Customs (supra) it was observed: "the expression "from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case", cannot be read in isolation of the expression "if the trial of a person accused of any non-bailable offence is not concluded within a period of sixty days" Both these expressions have to be read together and in harmony. A plain reading of the provision. would clearly go to show that the period of sixty days will start from the date fixed for taking evidence in the case in which the accused has been charged and has pleaded not guilty to the charge, and has asked for being tried. In other words the time spent on recording the pre-tharge evidence which is usually recorded in complaint cases before the charge is framed, will not be counted for purposes of sub section (6) of section 437, Cr. P. C. "with respect, it provides the complete answer and I do feel that the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh affects it in no way. For the reasons recorded above, and as no other point was pressed, I find no force in the petition. The same is hereby dismissed.