JUDGMENT 1. - Brief facts of the case in a nutshell can be recapitulated in short compass. It is alleged by the petitioner that the petitioner was appointed as Telephone Operator w.e.f. 28.10.75 in the Rajasthan Financial Corporation and he was confirmed on the said post on 7.6.77 with retrospective effect from 1.6.77. The petitioner was transferred from the post of Telephone Operator to the post of Assistant by order dated 25.10.78. He was working as a Telephone Operator at Headquarter Office. While an Assistant, he was transferred from Headquarter to Jaipur Branch Office. On receipt of the aforesaid order, the petitioner submitted a protest petition on 26.10.78 against his transfer. Ultimately, the petitioner joined his duties at Jaipur Branch Office on 6.12.78. It is alleged by the petitioner that after a period of about a month, he was served with a charge sheet on 17.1.79 with a copy of memorandum dated 12.1.79. This memorandum was alleged to have been signed by the Assistant Secretary, which has been filed alongwith the writ petition and marked as Annx. 4. It is further alleged by the petitioner that after expiry of 9 days of submitting his reply, the petitioner was again served with an another charge sheet alongwith memorandum dated 16.2.79 which has also been filed alongwith the writ petition and marked as Annx. 7. 2. I have heard Mr. Mahendra Kumar Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Virendra Singh Yadav, learned counsel for the respondents at length and have gone through the material available on record. 3. The main thrust of the argument of Mr. Mahendra Kumar Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner is that in the instant petition, the charge sheet and memorandum were signed by the Assistant Secretary, R.F. C., while as a matter of fact, under the Rajasthan Financial Corporation (Staff) Regulations, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations of 1958'), the powers for disciplinary action vests only in the Managing Director, which cannot be delegated to any other authority. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Regulation 5 of the Regulations of 1958 is quoted below: "Managing Director's power to delegate- The Managing Director, may, subject to such restrictions and for so long, as he may deem fit, delegate to the Secretary or in the absence of the latter any other officer appointed by him in this behalf, any of the powers conferred on him by these regulations, in relation to employee, other than officers except the powers referred to in regulations 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 20, 37, 41, 48, 79(3), 88, 90, 101, 105 and 107." 4. Now, Mr. Mahendra Kumar Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner on the basis of Regulation-5, submits that since under the Regulations of 1958, the provision of penalty is contemplated under Regulation 37, which vests power to punish with the Managing Director and, under Regulation-5, power to impose penalty to a delinquent employee under Regulation-37 cannot be delegated, therefore, initiation of the disciplinary proceedings by the Assistant Secretary vide Annxs. 4 and 7 are void, ab initio. The learned counsel for the petitioner further urged before me that the petitioner is entitled for reasonable hearing and an opportunity of being heard, has been denied to the petitioner in the instant case, against the principles of natural justice. 5. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondents, Shri Virendra Kumar Yadav, invited my attention to para 13 of the additional reply filed to the amended writ petition, wherein it is stated that no objection about competence of Assistant Secretary, R.F.C. was raised by the petitioner at any stage during the pendency of inquiry. The petitioner has preferred an appeal against the order of punishment. Even before the appellate authority no such plea was raised by him. The instant writ petition was filed in the year 1982 but initially no such plea was taken by the petitioner. By way of amendment in the main petition, after expiry of 9 years, this plea is being raised. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that the proposal .to serve a charge sheet on the petitioner was got approved by the competent authority (Managing Director) on the file and the Assistant Secretary, R.F.C. had only communicated the same to the petitioner under his signature. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that the proposal .to serve a charge sheet on the petitioner was got approved by the competent authority (Managing Director) on the file and the Assistant Secretary, R.F.C. had only communicated the same to the petitioner under his signature. Thus, according to learned counsel for the respondents, the Assistant Secretary, R.F.C. was merely a communicating authority. The impugned order, imposing penalty of censure, Annx. 16, under Regulation-37(1)(a) of the Regulations of 1958, was passed by the competent authority, the Managing Director, is not disputed before me. 6. As regard the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Mahendra Kumar Shah, to the effect that initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the Assistant Secretary vide Annxs. 4 and 7 are void ab initio, is not acceptable to me, inasmuch as, in my considered opinion, decision to serve a charge sheet in this case was taken by the Managing Director on the file and, the Assistant Secretary, R.F.C., had only communicated the same to the petitioner under his signature. 7. A close scrutiny of Regulation 37 reveals that penalties are enumerated under Sub-Regulations (1) (a) to (h) and procedure how such penalties are to be imposed are given in Sub-Regulation(2) of Regulation 37. 8. Regulation 37 is also quoted in extenso in order to appreciate the controversy between the parties:- 37. Penalties:- (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Regulations, an employee who commits a breach of Regulations of the Corporation or who displays negligence, inefficiency or intolerance, or who knowingly does anything detrimental to the interest or prestige of the Corporation or in conflict with its instructions or who commits a breach of discipline or is guilty of any other act of misconduct or misbehavior, shall be liable to the following penalties (a) Censure; (b) With-holding or postponement of increments or promotion; (c) Permanent stoppage of increment; (d) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation by negligence or breach of orders; (e) Reduction to a lower post or grades on a fixed pay of a time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale; (f) Fine; (g) Removal; (h) Dismissal. (2) No employee shall be subjected to the penalties in clause (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) of sub-regulation (1) of this regulation except by an order in writing signed by the Managing Director and the Disciplinary Authority empowered to impose such penalty and no such order shall be passed without the charge or charges being formulated in writing and given to the said employee so that he shall have reasonable opportunity to answer them in writing or in person, as he prefers, and in the latter case his defence shall defence shall be taken down in writing and read to him, provided that the requirements of the Regulation may be waived if the facts on the basis of which action is to be taken to have been established in a Court of Law or where the employee has absconded or where it is for any other reason impracticable to communicate with him or where there is difficulty in observing them and the requirements can be waived without injustice to the employee. In every case where all or any of the requirements of this Regulation are waived, the reason for so doing shall be recorded in writing." 9. A conjoint reading of Regulation 5 read with regulation 37 of the Regulations of 1958 leads towards an irresistible conclusion that decision making power to take disciplinary action vests in Managing Director which cannot be delegated but communication of such decision to take disciplinary action against a delinquent employee already taken by the competent authority i.e. Managing Director on the file by a subordinate officer to the delinquent employee does not fall within the ambit delegation of power. In fact decision making power to take disciplinary action is a matter of substance while communication of such decision to the delinquent employee by a subordinate officer of the competent authority is a matter of form which has no nexus or any adverse effect on the decision already taken by the competent authority. Thus I am fully satisfied that in the instant case, the Assistant Secretary, R. F. C. was merely a communicating authority and as such the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner does not hold water and hereby repelled. 10. There is yet another reason not to accept the aforesaid contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. There is yet another reason not to accept the aforesaid contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. No objection regarding competence of the Assistant Secretary, R.F.C. signing the charge-sheet was raised during the pendency of enquiry. No such ground was taken in the memo of appeal filed by the petitioner before the appellate authority. At the time, when the writ petition was filed in the year 1982, neither such foundation was laid in the writ petition nor any such ground was taken. The writ petition was amended after nine years i.e. in the year 1991 and by way of amendment, the said ground was added. Explanation offered by the petitioner is that he is a lay man, therefore, he is not expected to know the law but when he came to a lawman then and then only he is supposed to know the legal aspect of his case. 11. The said explanation offered by the petitioner is not acceptable to me as by legal fiction every literate or illiterate persons of this country is supposed to know the law of the land. A court of law cannot afford to allow anyone to plead ignorance of law. 12. In my humble opinion a disputed question of fact which was not raised during enquiry by the petitioner and was also not taken as ground of appeal before the appellate authority cannot be allowed to be taken in the writ petition. It is well to remember that the disputed question of fact cannot be gone into under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. Now I propose to discuss the second limb of argument of learned counsel for the petitioner. According to Mr. Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner the petitioner has been denied the opportunity of hearing against the principle of natural justice. Although charge-sheet was served, explanation was submitted, enquiry officer was appointed and the petitioner was also present on all the dates before the Enquiry Officer but since the Enquiry Officer did not give reply to the letter dated 5.5.1979 submitted by the petitioner as to why in respect of which charge sheet he was holding the enquiry, therefore, serious prejudice is caused to him. 14. 14. In reply to the aforesaid allegation the respondents in paragraph 17 of their reply clearly stated that the enquiry officer had informed the petitioner on 21.5.1979 that he was the enquiry officer in respect of the charge-sheet dated 16.2.1979 and the same was recorded in the order sheet. The reply given by the respondents inspires confidence therefore it is believed and a contention contrary to it, is not acceptable to me. A close scrutiny of the Regulation 37(1) & (2) reveal that penalties are enumerated under sub-regulation (1)(a) to (h) of Regulation 37 and the procedure to impose such penalties are contemplated under sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 37 of the Regulations of 1958. Sub-regulation(2) of regulation 37 clearly provides that no employee shall be subjected to the penalties in clauses (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) or (h) of sub-regulation (1) of this Regulation except by an order. in writing signed by the Managing Director and the Disciplinary Authority empowered to impose such penalty and no order shall be passed without charge or charges being formulated in writing or in person as he prefers and in the latter case his defence shall be taken down in writing and read to him. 15. Looking to the averments made in the present writ petition as well as counter affidavit and rejoinder, I am satisfied that the Managing Director has not committed any manifest error of law or error of procedure in imposing penalty of 'censure' to the petitioner. Even in absence of the provision of hearing under the Regulations of 1958 before imposing penalty of 'censure', the petitioner has been given fair opportunity of hearing. 16. From the aforementioned discussion it is apparent that penalty of 'censure' is given under sub-regulation(l) of Regulation 37 and service of charge sheet in writing, explanation in writing and other reasonable opportunity of being heard to a delinquent employee in consonance with principle of natural justice are given under sub-regulation(2) of the said Regulation for all penalties except penalty of 'censure' enumerated under sub-regulation (1)(a). 17. 17. Thus in the instant petition this Court is called upon to decide as to whether if statutory regulation as discussed above does not provide for opportunity of hearing i.e. serving a charge in writing receiving explanation in writing or other reasonable opportunity of hearing before imposing penalty of 'censure' yet the petitioner can insist for opportunity of hearing on the basis of principle of natural justice which flow from common law. 18. In my humble opinion where Statutes or Rules are not ambiguous or capable of two interpretation it is hardly necessary to have recourse to rule of construction. In such cases what a court has to do is to see of those words and to give effect to them regardless of consequence that may ensue. Hence the second contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is also not acceptable to me. Except the aforesaid two points, no other points were urged before me. 19. As a result of the aforementioned discussion, the instant writ petition is dismissed. Both the parties are directed to bear their own costs.Petition Dismissed. *******