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1994 DIGILAW 832 (MAD)

Thimman v. Saroja

1994-10-18

GOVARDHAN

body1994
Judgment :- 1. The unsuccessful tenant within the meaning of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act who lost his case in both the Tribunals below, is the petitioner in this Revision. The respondent is the landlady. The landlady sought eviction of the tenant on two grounds, viz., (1) wilful default in payment of rent, and (2) requisition of the premises for her own use and occupation. On the question of wilful default, the landlady has not pressed her claim and hence the question whether the Revision Petitioner was liable to be evicted on that ground was not considered by the Rent Controller and it was not the subject matter of the appeal before the Appellate Authority. 2. The learned counsel appearing for the Revision Petitioner has argued before this Court, that the premises in which the Revision Petitioner is residing is a tenament and the landlady who has got a status in Society may not come and reside in the tenament in the occupation of the tenant. But, the question whether a landlord who has got status in the Society financially or otherwise, would occupy the premises belonging to him in the occupation of a tenant, when the tenant is ordered to be evicted is not a material which has to be considered when the landlord comes forward with an application seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of requirement for own use and occupation. It has held in the decision reported in K.S. Shantilal v. E. Benny Biber (1980 T.L.N.J. 286) at 287, as follows: “The Appellate Authority assumed that because the landlord is a rich man, he cannot requisition the premises in question for his own use and occupation. This reasoning is neither here nor there. If, in fact, the landlord requires the premises for his own occupation, his affluency cannot be stated to be a factor against this requirement of his.” Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the Revision Petitioner that the landlady being a woman of status, may not come and reside in the tenament in the occupation of the Revision Petitioner is not a tenable one. 3. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the Revision Petitioner has further argued that the mother of the tenant was previously the tenant and eviction was sought by the landlady on the ground of wilful default and it was subsequently not pressed and the present application seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of committing wilful default and on the ground of requirement of the premises for own use and occupation throws doubt on the bona fides of the landlady and in an application seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of requirement of own use and occupation, the bona fides of the landlady has also to be considered. According to the learned counsel appearing for the Revision Petitioner, there is no evidence on behalf of the landlady, that the owner of the premises in which the landlady is said to be residing had asked her to vacate and therefore the claim of the landlady cannot be said to be a bona fide one. It has been held in the decision reported in Sitaramayya v. Rajasekhara Reddi (1951-I M.L.J. Short Notes 40) as follows: “If a landlord is living in a rented house and not in a house of his own, he is not compelled by the Act to show more than that he requires a house which belongs to him for his occupation. It is equally not necessary for the owner of a building who happens to be residing in a rented building to prove that he is in danger of being evicted from the rented building, before he can obtain possession of his own building. Nor need he establish any inconvenience caused to him in occupying the rented building.” Therefore, the absence of any evidence on behalf of the landlady that Krishnapa, the owner of the premises in which she is now residing, required her to vacate the premises cannot be a ground to hold that the requirement of the petition mentioned premises by the landlady is not a bona fide one. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to note that it is not the case of the Revision Petitioner that the landlady has got some other premises belonging to her in Uthagamandalam Municipality where the petition-mentioned premises is situated. 4. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to note that it is not the case of the Revision Petitioner that the landlady has got some other premises belonging to her in Uthagamandalam Municipality where the petition-mentioned premises is situated. 4. It is also argued on behalf of the learned counsel appearing for the Revision Petitioner that the landlady has filed an application for eviction of the mother of the Revision Petitioner on the ground of wilful default and later, not pressed it and that the landlady has filed the present application also on the ground of wilful default as well as the requirement of the premises for own use and occupation and not pressed the ground of wilful default and is pressing the ground seeking eviction of the tenant only on the ground of requirement of the premises for her own use and occupation and it would show that there is no bona fide in her requirements and her aim is to vacate the tenant on some ground or other. It cannot be denied that there is some force in this argument of the learned counsel appearing for the Revision Petitioner. In the counter filed by the tenant, she has contended that the earlier application in R.C.O.P. No. 197/1984 has been filed against her as if she was in arrears of rent even after her death and probably that was the reason for not pressing the earlier application filed by the landlady. In the present application, the landlady has chosen to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of wilful default in respect of the period for which she had filed an application earlier as if the mother of the Revision Petitioner was the tenant, and realising the mistake, probably she has not pressed that ground. Therefore, it cannot be stated that the object of the landlady was to evict the tenant on some ground or other and therefore, her requirement cannot be said to be a bona fide one. Having committed a mistake as if the mother of the petitioner was the tenant even after her death, earlier petition has been not pressed. Having not pressed that application seeking eviction on the ground of wilful default for certain period realising that she cannot prosecute the same successfully in this application, the landlady has not pressed on the ground of wilful default. Having not pressed that application seeking eviction on the ground of wilful default for certain period realising that she cannot prosecute the same successfully in this application, the landlady has not pressed on the ground of wilful default. Therefore it is not evidence of any mala fides on the part of the landlady. It has been held in the decision reported in Jagannathan v. A.S. Krishna & Co. , (A.I.R. 1953 Madras 208 = 65 L.W. 92) as follows: “When an application with specific grounds is filed and if some of the grounds are not pressed, the order of the Court dismissing the application on that basis is a final adjudication on the question raised but not pressed.” The ground which was not pressed in the earlier application being wilful default, for a particular period, it is the final adjudication on the question of wilful default raised in the present application also and therefore, it cannot be stated that the application filed by the landlady on the ground of requirement of own use and occupation is not a bona fide one. The requirement of Section 10(3)(a) (i) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, having been satisfied by the landlady the Tribunal has passed the order of eviction which does not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of its powers under Revision. 5. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No Costs.