JUDGMENT 1. : The instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by petitioner seeking the relief to include his name in the impugned order dated 23.6.86 (Annx. 3). The petitioner also prayed that the respondents may be directed to treat him in continuous service as Teacher grade III from 18.5.86 and make payment of salary and other consequential bents from that date as have been given to other similarly circumstanced teachers. 2. Brief facts of the case can be recapitulated in short compels. The petitioner possesses the requisite qualification for the appointment to the post of Teacher Grade III and according to the averments made in the writ petition, the petitioner has obtained B.A. B. Ed. Degree. 3. It is asserted that the petitioner was appointed as Teacher Grade III in Panchayat Samiti, Dausa on 15.9.82. He stood regularly selected and appointed on the said post after regular selection made by the District Establishment Committee, Zila Parishad, Jaipur on 17.7.85. 4. The petitioner in pursuance of the Advertisement for selection and appointment in the Government School, applied for service to the District Education Officer, Jaipur by appending certificate of service in Panchayat Samiti given by the Vikas Adhikari, Panchayat Samiti, Dausa. A photostat copy of the said certificate is filed as Annex. 1 to the writ petition. 5. It is averred that the petitioner was selected by duly constituted committee as Teacher Grade III after interview on 31.8.85. The petitioner was given appointment in the reserve quota since he belonged to Scheduled Caste gar Community). The aforesaid appointment was given till end of the academic Session but it was made clear that the petitioner will be entitled to the salary of Summer Vacation also. The petitioner placed photostat copy of the appointment letter dated 31.8.85 as Annx. 2 along with the writ petition. 6. It is also averred in the writ petition that the petitioner after resignation from Panchayat Samiti's Service where he was regularly appointed as Teacher Gr. III, Joined Government Service on 10.9.85. The petitioner worked till end of the Session i.e. 17.5.86 and he was paid salary upto 17.5.86 but the salary for Summer Vacation was not paid to him. 7. The respondents have filed return denying the averments made in the writ petition. III, Joined Government Service on 10.9.85. The petitioner worked till end of the Session i.e. 17.5.86 and he was paid salary upto 17.5.86 but the salary for Summer Vacation was not paid to him. 7. The respondents have filed return denying the averments made in the writ petition. According to the contesting respondents, the payment was made to the petitioner upto 17.5.85 but the petitioner was not given salary of the Summer Vacation. It is further alleged by the contesting respondents that the Joint Director, Ajmer Range, Jaipur issued an order dated 16.6.86 to the District Education Officer concerned that extension may not be granted to some of the Teachers whose list was made available to the District Education Officer, Jaipur. It is also alleged that since the name of the petitioner was included in the list sent by the Joint Director, Ajmer Range, Jaipur to the District Education Officer, Jaipur, therefore, on this ground, the petitioner was not given re-appointment while other similarly circumstanced teachers, were given re-appointment vide order dated 23.6.86 (Annex. 3). 8. The return filed by the respondents further reveals that the petitioner was the teacher prior to his induction in the services of the respondents. His services were not extended because his application for appointment was not sent through Employment Exchange or through the Social Welfare Department, which was contrary to the terms of the Advertisements issued in this regard. According to the respondents, for the reasons stated above, the petitioner is not entitled to:-be allowed to continue in service as similarly circumstanced teachers were allowed to continue vide order dated 23.6.86 (Annx. 3). 9. A bare perusal of the averments made in paragraph I of the rejoinder to the writ petition leads towards an irresistible conclusion that a similarly circumstanced teacher Shri Yogendra Kumar Pandey had filed a D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 740 of 1987 Yogendra Kumar Pandeyv. State of Rajasthan & Anr. , which had been decided by the Division Bench of this Court on 30.9.1988. In this paragraph, the petitioner has enclosed a communication dated 16.5.86 along with reply to show cause notice filed by the contesting respondents in similar D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 740 of 1987 Yogendra Kumar Pandey v. State of Rajasthan & Anr . 10. Mr. Man Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the initial appointment order dated 31.8.85 (Annx. 10. Mr. Man Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the initial appointment order dated 31.8.85 (Annx. 2), there was a clear stipulation that the petitioner would be entitled for the salary of Summer Vacation. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also submitted before me that it is a clear case of hostile discrimination against the petitioner as his other colleagues have been given appointment to the post of Teacher Grade III vide order dated 23.6.86 (Annx. 3) but without assigning any reason, the petitioner has been singled out and has been discriminated. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner from the order dated 23.6.86 (Annx. 3) amounts to hostile of discrimination and flagrant violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 11. Mr. J.M. Saxena, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has strongly supported the act of the authorities excluding the name of the petitioner from order dated 23.6.86 (Annx. 3). 12. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions raised before me at the Bar. I have an opportunity to go through the judgement rendered by the Division Bench in the case of Yogendra Kumar Pandey (supra), wherein similar controversy of exclusion of the name of Yogendra Kumar Pandey from order dated 23.6.86 (Annx. 3) has been depricated and it has been held that exclusion of the name of Yogendra Kumar Pandey amounts to hostile discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 13. Taking the aforesaid view, the Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble S.N. Bhargava, J (as he then was) and Hon'ble P.C. Jain, J. allowed the writ petition and directed the respondents to pay the salary to the petitioner for the period of Summer Vacation i.e. from 18.5.86 to 30.6.86 and the petitioner Yagendra Kumar Pandey was found to be entitled for salary w.e.f. 1.7.86 till 30.6.87 according to the facts of that case. The Division Bench in the case of Yogendra Kumar Pandey (Supra) further directed the respondents to pay arrears of salary within a period of two months. 14. The Division Bench in the case of Yogendra Kumar Pandey (Supra) further directed the respondents to pay arrears of salary within a period of two months. 14. In my humble opinion, the present controversy between the parties is squarely covered by the aforesaid decision rendered by the Division Bench in Yogendra Kumar Pandey's case (supra) and the petitioner is also entitled to his salary for the period of Summer vacation from 18.5.86 to 30.6.86 and he also be entitled for the arrears of salary w.e.f. 1.7.86 till 3.4.89 since he has been appointed and joined his services as Government School's Teacher on 4.4.89 having been regularly selected and functioning as Teacher Grade III in the Panchayat Samiti. 15. I am constraint to observe that similar controversy between the parties was settled and finally decided on 13.9.88 by the Division Bench of this Court in Yogendra Kumar Pandey's case (supra). It is also brought to my notice that no Special Leave Petition has been preferred by the State against the aforesaid judgement rendered by the Division Bench in Yogendra Kumar Pandey's case (supra), therefore, the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench has attained finality and the respondents had submitted to the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court. The instant petition was filed on 19.2.90 on the same ground challenging the same arbitrary order, which has been declared by the Division Bench of this Court against the mandatory provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, of India even then the respondents almost on the same ground on which they have contested the earlier petition of Yogendra Kumar Pandey's case (supra) which was decided against them, started to contest the present petition which is to be deprecated. The Apex Court as well as this Court at several occasions instructed the State Government and its instrumentalities not to contest the case in the Courts of law like ordinary litigants, which has not been followed religiously in the instant case by the respondents. 16. In case of Yogendra Kumar Pandey (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has given detailed reasons in rejecting the plea of the respondents that the name of Yogendra Kumar Pandey was excluded from the subsequent order dated 23.6.86 (Annx. 3) because his name was not sent through the Employment Exchange. 16. In case of Yogendra Kumar Pandey (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has given detailed reasons in rejecting the plea of the respondents that the name of Yogendra Kumar Pandey was excluded from the subsequent order dated 23.6.86 (Annx. 3) because his name was not sent through the Employment Exchange. In that case also, the Division Bench of this Court recorded a categorical finding that petitioner Yogendra Kumar Pandey had sent his application through proper channel as he was in the employment, therefore, it was not possible for him to send his application through Employment Exchange. In this case also, the petitioner was already in service as Teacher Gr. III in Panchayat Samiti Dausa on 15.9.82 and he was functioning as such as he was regularly, selected and appointed on the said post after regular selection made by the District Establishment Committee, Zila Parishad, Jaipur on 17.7.85. Thus, there was no question of sending his application through Employment Exchange or through the Social Welfare Department as he was not an unemployed. I respectfully agree and concur with the reasons given by the Division Bench in the case of Yogendra Kumar Pandey rather the reasons given by their Lordships are binding on me while sitting Singly. 17. In addition to the reasons given by their Lordships in the case of Yogendra Kumar Pandey (supra), I would like to add few lines of my own as to how the act and omission of the respondents in excluding the name of the petitioner from order Annx. 3 would amount to hostile discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and also run counter to the spirit of Article 21 and it would lead to analogous result i.e. the petitioner who was a permanent Teacher Gr. III in Panchayat Samiti, Dausa on 15.9.82 and who had seen his application through proper channel alongwith certificate of service in Panchayat Samiti, Dausa by the Vikas Adhikari, was made unemployed. 18. Now, it is well settled by a decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors., ( AIR 1986 SC 180 ) where their Lordships ruled that the right to life includes the right to livelihood. 18. Now, it is well settled by a decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors., ( AIR 1986 SC 180 ) where their Lordships ruled that the right to life includes the right to livelihood. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. Here in this case, by act and omission, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had made the petitioner unemployed and arbitrarily and illegally against the mandatory provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India deprived him from the source of livelihood, which cannot be justified by any stretch of imagination. 19. In view of the facts that Articles 39(a) and 41 requires the state to secure to the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life. It is true that the State may not by affirmative action, be compellable to provide adequate means of livelihood or work to the citizens. But any person, who is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law, can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In case of Yogendra Kumar Pandey (supra), the Division Bench of this Court declared the act of respondents No. 1 and 2 to be in utter violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India on the ground that in pursuance of the Advertisement, it was not necessary for Shri Yogendra Kumar Pandey to apply through Employment Exchange as he was not unemployed. I would like to add few lines more in support of this Court in the case of Yogendra Kumar Pandey (Supra) to the effect that the act of the respondents are also against the mandatory provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. I would like to add few lines more in support of this Court in the case of Yogendra Kumar Pandey (Supra) to the effect that the act of the respondents are also against the mandatory provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The procedure prescribed by the department to apply for the post of Teacher Grade III through Employment Exchange even by employed teacher is most unjust and unfair procedure. 20. The procedure prescribed by law for the deprivation of the right conferred by Article 21 must be fair, just as a mala fide act has no existence in the eye of law, even so, unreasonableness vitiates law and procedure alike. It is, therefore, essential that the procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his fundamental right must conform to the norms of justice and fair play. Procedure, which is unjust or unfair in the circumstances of a case, attracts the vice of unreasonableness, thereby vitiating the law which prescribed that procedure and consequently, the action taken under it. Any action taken by a public authority, which is invested with statutory powers has, therefore, to be tested by the application of two standards; the action must be within the scope of the authority conferred by law and secondly, it must be reasonable. If any action, within the scope of the authority conferred by law, is found to be unreasonable, it must mean that the procedure established by law under which that action is taken is itself unreasonable. The substance of the law cannot be divorced from the procedure which it prescribes for, how reasonable the law is, depends upon how, fair is the procedure prescribed by it. 21. Due to act and omission of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 the poor petitioner has suffered an agony for such a long time, which is unbearable for a person belonging to the Status of the petitioner. Respondents No. 1 and 2 are supposed to know that Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment, which has been denied to the petitioner in the present case. Respondents No. 1 and 2 are supposed to know that Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment, which has been denied to the petitioner in the present case. The aforesaid Article 14 and 16 further require that the State action must not be arbitrary but must be based on some rational and relevant principle, which is non-discriminatory; it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant consideration because that would be denial of equality. The principle of reasonableness and rationality which is legally as well as philosophically an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness is projected by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India in the State Employment. 22. As a result of the afore-mentioned discussion, the instant writ petition is hereby allowed with costs, which is assessed to be Rs. 2000/-. The respondents are directed to pay the entire arrears of salary with effect from 1.7.86 to 3.4.89 including the salary of Summer Vacation from 18.5.86 to 30.6.86 within two months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the j udgement of this Court. The respondents are further directed to compute the seniority of the petitioner from his initial appointment dated 31.8.85 (Annx. 2) to the writ petition along with other consequential benefits for which other teachers similarly circumstanced who have been appointed on 23.6.86 (Annx. 3) are entitled and are getting on day of the judgement of this Court.Petition allowed. *******