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1994 DIGILAW 840 (RAJ)

Surendra Singh Rao v. State of Rajasthan

1994-10-26

ANSHUMAN SINGH, G.C.MITAL, RANVIR SAHAI VERMA

body1994
JUDGMENT 1. :- A Division Bench of this Court has doubted the correctness of the views expressed in two other Division Bench decisions of this Court in Dr. Rajiva Mathur v. State of Rajasthan 1991 (2) RLR 113. Dr. Rajeeva Mathur v. State of Rajasthan and others and connected cases, Narendra Kumar Chhangani v. State of Rajasthan 1992 (1) RLR 308 and has referred the matter to Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constitution of a larger bench vide order dated 24.09.1993 in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5088/1993 Surendra Singh v. The State of Rajasthan and others. Consequently this larger Bench has been constituted by Hon'ble the Chief Justice. 2. Following questions have been referred by the aforesaid Division Bench consisting of Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.B. Sharma, as he then was and Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.K. Singhal "1. Whether the Rule making authority can fix any cut-off date prescribing maximum age for a candidate for direct recruitment to the service and merely because a cut-off date has been provided can it be said to be arbitrary ? 2. Whether cut-off date should have been fixed on the last date of receipt of application and if not so fixed, can it be said to be arbitrary ? 3. Whether in Rule 10 of the Rajasthan Panchayat Samities and Zila Parishads Service Rules, 1959 or for that matter any other service Rule making similar provisions, a provision that a candidate for direct recruitment to the service must have attained the age of 31 years on the first day of January following the date of application is arbitrary unreasonable and ultravires ?" 3. Since similar and more or less similar questions have been raised in other writ petitions, particulars whereof have been given in Schedule A annexed to this judgment, all of them have been heard together by common consent and are being disposed of by a common order, photostat copies of which shall be placed on record of all the aforesaid cases. 4. First we may deal with the controversy raised in Surendra Singh (supra). Rule 10 of Rajasthan Panchayat Samities and Zila Parishad Service Rules, 1959 (hereinafter 'Service Rules, 1959) contain provisions with regard to minimum and upper age limits, which an otherwise eligible & qualified candidate should have attained/not attained for being considered for appointment to the relevant post. 4. First we may deal with the controversy raised in Surendra Singh (supra). Rule 10 of Rajasthan Panchayat Samities and Zila Parishad Service Rules, 1959 (hereinafter 'Service Rules, 1959) contain provisions with regard to minimum and upper age limits, which an otherwise eligible & qualified candidate should have attained/not attained for being considered for appointment to the relevant post. Relevant part of this Rule 10, as amended reads as under:- "10. Age. A candidate for direct recruitment must have attained the age of 18 years and must not have attained the age of 33 years on the first day of January following the date of application." 5. An advertisement Ex. 4 (Advertisemnt No. 1 of 1993) was issued by the appropriate authority, inviting applications for appointment to the post of teachers, which inter-alia specified that a candidate to be eligible, must have attained the age of 33 years on the said date. The last date of receipt of applications was 25.05.1993. The petitioner claims to have been born on 31.10.1960 and was admittedly over-age as per the relevant service rule, as also on the basis of stipulation made in the aforesaid advertisement, though was admittedly within prescribed age limits on the last date fixed for receipt of the applications. Hence, the petitioner challenged the legality and the validity of the aforesaid rule and contended that fixing of 1st January following the date of application as the cut-off date was illegal, arbitrary and violative of the provisions of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India and as such the aforesaid Rule may be struck down and the advertisement issued in pursuance thereof may be quashed and the respondent be directed to'consider the candidature of the petitioner and appoint him to the appropriate post. Specific reliance was placed on Dr. Rajiva Mathur (supra) and Narendra Kumar Chhangani (supra) wherein similar Rules had been read in a manner that the cut-off date fixed in the relevant Rules was treated to be the last date for receipt of applications fixed in the concerned advertisement. 6. Learned Judges hearing the writ petition doubted the correctness of the views expressed in Dr. Rajiva Mathur (supra) & Narendra Kumar Chhangani (supra), as stated earlier and made this reference. 7. In most of other cases also the fixing of the cut-off date has been challenged on the aforesaid grounds. 6. Learned Judges hearing the writ petition doubted the correctness of the views expressed in Dr. Rajiva Mathur (supra) & Narendra Kumar Chhangani (supra), as stated earlier and made this reference. 7. In most of other cases also the fixing of the cut-off date has been challenged on the aforesaid grounds. In a particular case ( S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4593/94 Smt. Satyabhama v. State & others) the fixing of minimum age has been challenged. 8. In all the cases, the learned Advocate General assisted by Sarva Shri J.M. Jain, B.L. Avasthi, S.B. Mathur, K.N. Gupta, B.C. Chirania, B.L. Gupta & Sudhir Kumar Tewari and Shri Ashok Parihar Standing counsel for the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (for short 'the RPSC') has opposed the writ petitions and has supported the order of reference and has supported the view taken by the learned Judges making the reference. 9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have considered the rival contentions. At the out set, we may state that the courts lean in favour of the constitutionalty of a legal provision and heavy burden would lie on him, who challenges the provision to be unconstitutional. Once a statutory rule is constitutionally valid, this Court would not be justified in striking it down because in its opinion, it would have been more desirable to have the provision couched in a more appropriate manner or in a different language. 10. In matter of recruitment of employees, it has been traditional to fix a minimum age as well as a maximum age. What shall be the cut-off date for computation of such minimum age and of the maximum age, is usually in the discretion of the employer or the rule making authority or its delegate. When it is seen that a line or point there must be, but there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing such a line or point in a precise manner, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide of any reasonable mark. Such a view was expressed by Justice Holmes in Louseville Gas Co. v. Coleman 1927 (227) U.S. 32 . This view was cited with approval in Union of India and another v. Parmeshwaran Match Works etc. AIR 1974 SC 2349 . Such a view was expressed by Justice Holmes in Louseville Gas Co. v. Coleman 1927 (227) U.S. 32 . This view was cited with approval in Union of India and another v. Parmeshwaran Match Works etc. AIR 1974 SC 2349 . In this very case, relying upon certain previous decisions, the Apex Court said that a classification can be founded on a particular date and yet be reasonable (see para 10). Thus, it could be seen that merely because, classification has been made by fixing a cut-off date, it would not be per se unreasonable, arbitrary and invalid. In such cases, it shall have to be demonstrated by the person challenging the validity of the cut-off date that it is highly unreasonable and arbitrary and would render classification with reference to the cut-off date as wholly bad. To our mind, this would be the correct basis on which the validity of fixation of a cut-off date shall have to be judged. 11. In Union of India and another v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal 1994(4) SCC 212 the crucial date for determining the age of eligibility was fixed at 1st of August of the year in which the examination was to be held. At the time this cut-off date was fixed, there used to be only one examination for recruitment to India Administrative Service and allied services. Later on a preliminary examination was also introduced yet the cut-off date was not modified. The cut-off date of 1st August of the year in which the examination was to be held continued to be the crucial date. This was a subject matter of challenge before the Allahabad Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal. The particular Bench felt inclined not to follow its previous decisions on this point and took the view that since a preliminary examination had been introduced, which was held prior to August 01, of the year concerned, continuation of the 1st August as the cut-off date was arbitrary. This decision was assalied before the Apex Court. The Apex Court cited with approval the view expressed by Holmes J. in Louseville Gas (supra) and followed the reasoning adopted in Parameshwaran (supra). It was conceded that no administrative authority could act arbitrarily. It was further recognised that no administrative authority had absolute discretion and relying upon Dr. This decision was assalied before the Apex Court. The Apex Court cited with approval the view expressed by Holmes J. in Louseville Gas (supra) and followed the reasoning adopted in Parameshwaran (supra). It was conceded that no administrative authority could act arbitrarily. It was further recognised that no administrative authority had absolute discretion and relying upon Dr. Nim v. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 1301 , it was observed that insofar as fixation of cut-off date is concerned, the same can be regarded as arbitrary by a Court, if the same be one about which it can be said that it has been 'picked out from a hat', as held in that case. 12. In D.R. Nim (supra), the facts were quite peculiar. The petitioner-appellant belonged to U.P. Police Service and was promoted to Indian Police Service on an officiating basis w.e.f. 25th June, 1947. However, the Government of India took a decision that seniority of promotee officers would be reckoned only w.e.f. 19th May, 1951. There was no valid reason to fix such a date, which in a highly arbitrary manner, wiped off the officiating services of the petitioner-appellant from 25.06.1947 to 19.05.1951. In this back ground, the Apex Court found that fixation of 19th May, 1951 was an artificial and arbitrary date, having nothing to do with the application of the relevant provisions of the concerned service Rules. It was observed, "The Central Government cannot pick out a date from a hat and that is what seems to have been done in this case and say that a period prior to that date would not be deemed to be approved by the Central Government within the second proviso." 13. In A.P. Public Service Commission Hyderabad and another v. B. Sarat Chandra and others 1990(2) SCC 669 , the relevant service Rule stipulated that a candidate for the post of Dy. Superintendent Police must have completed the age of 21 years and must not have completed the age of 26 years on the first day of July of the year in which the selection is made. For other posts, it was stipulated that he should have completed the age of 18 years on the said date. Respondent was, by 19 days underage for the post of Dy. SP though was eligible for other posts. For other posts, it was stipulated that he should have completed the age of 18 years on the said date. Respondent was, by 19 days underage for the post of Dy. SP though was eligible for other posts. Since it was a combined competitive examination and the respondent qualified at the same, he was considered for the other posts, but was not considered for the post of Dy. SP by the Public Service Commission. Respondent challenged the cut-off date and contended that the cut-off date should be the date of preparation of the select list. It was contended that on such date, he had attained the eligibility with regard to age. He, accordingly, sought a direction for appointment on the post of Dy. SP. The Administrative Tribunal accepted the contention and directed the State Government to create an additional post of Dy. SP for the respondent and appoint him to the post. 14. Aggrieved, the Public Service Commission approached the Apex Court. The Apex Court considered the various steps required for holding such a selection and over-ruling the decision of the Tribunal observed : "When such are the different steps in the process of selection, the minimum or maximum age of suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon fluctuating on uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determinate, as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinise the applications." (Emphasis ours) The Apex court in the result accepted the appeal and set aside the order of the Tribunal. 15. The principle which emerges is that the date of eligibility must be specific and determinate and should not be allowed to fluctuate or to be uncertain. To our mind, the principle is unexceptionable and rules out arbitrariness in executive action. The judgment proceeds on a wholesome principle that cut-off date should be determinate and specific. It enables a candidate to know in advance whether he would be eligible to take a particular examination in a particular year or not. This enables him/her to plain his/her career. To our mind, the principle is unexceptionable and rules out arbitrariness in executive action. The judgment proceeds on a wholesome principle that cut-off date should be determinate and specific. It enables a candidate to know in advance whether he would be eligible to take a particular examination in a particular year or not. This enables him/her to plain his/her career. This is quite necessary in this age of keen competition, when against every single post, there is a gib queue of asprining candidates. To our mind, this should be the rule to apply to service rules/notifications, whereby a cut-off date is fixed to compute minimum and maximum age on a particular date, whether it precedes the last date of submission of applications, or is subsequent to such a date. 16. It was strenuously urged that last date of receipt of applications should be such a cut-off date. To our mind such a cut-off date would very much suffer from the vice that has been pointed out by the Apex Court in B. Sarat Chandra (supra). The date would not be well known in advance and would fluctuate every year, depending upon the date fixed each year by some minor minion in the administrative hierarchy, charged with the issuance of the advertisement inviting the application. The fluctuation would depend upon whims and caprices of such an agency and would differ with each advertisement inviting applications. As against this, when the cut-off date is fixed by the concerned service rule, it is known in advance to all and one; is not likely to fluctuate for any reason and gives full scope to each candidate to plan his/her career in advance. 17. Strong reliance was placed on behalf of the Petitioners on Mrs. Rekha Chaturvedi v. University of Rajasthan & others 1993(1) JT (SC) 220. In that case, the relevant statute or ordinance did not fix a cut off date at all. Hence, the cut-off date had been given in the notification inviting applications by fixing a last date for submission of applications. Qualifications of the candidates had to be examined with reference to such date. In the circumstances, the contention was that the required qualifications should be examined with reference to the date of selection. Hence, the cut-off date had been given in the notification inviting applications by fixing a last date for submission of applications. Qualifications of the candidates had to be examined with reference to such date. In the circumstances, the contention was that the required qualifications should be examined with reference to the date of selection. Negativing this contention, the Apex Court said:- "The contention that the required qualifications of the candidates should be examined with reference to the date of selection and not with reference to the last date for making applications has only to be stated to be rejected. The date of selection is invariably uncertain. In the absence of knowledge of such date the candidates who apply for the post would be uanble to state whether they are qualified for the posts in question or not, if they are yet to acquire the qualifications. Unless the advertisement mentions a fixed date with reference to which the qualifications are to be judged, whether the said date is of selection or otherwise, it would not be possible for the candidates who do not possess the requisite qualifications in praesenti even to make applications for the posts. The uncertainty of the date may also lead to a contrary consequence, viz., even those candidates who do not have the qualifications in praesenti and are likely to acquire them at an uncertain future date, may apply for the posts thus swelling the number of applications. But a still worse consequence may follow, in that it may leave open a scope for malpractices. The date of selection may be so fixed or manipulated as to entertain some applicants and reject others, arbitraily. Hence, in the absence of a fixed date indicated in the advertisement/notification inviting applications with reference to which the requisite qualifications should be judged, the only certain date for the scrutiny of the qualifications will be the last date for making the applications. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that when the Selection Committee in the present case, as argued by Shri Manoj Swarup, took into consideration the requisite qualifications as on the date with patent illegality, and on this ground itself the selections in question are liable to be quashed. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that when the Selection Committee in the present case, as argued by Shri Manoj Swarup, took into consideration the requisite qualifications as on the date with patent illegality, and on this ground itself the selections in question are liable to be quashed. Reference in this connection may also be made to two recent decisions of this Court in A.P. Public Service Commission, Hyderabad v. B. Sarat Chandra [ 1990(2) SCC 669 ] and District Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society, Vizianagaram v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi [ 1990(3) SCC 655 ]. " 18. To our mind, this precedent cannot be construed to lay down a proposition that even when the relevant service rule lays down a cut off date, the eligibility should be judged not with reference to the cut-off date so fixed, but with reference to the last date of submission of the application. In fact, it does not lay down such a proposition at all. We may state that B. Sarat Chandra was cited with approval in this case. It does not appear that the relevant Service Rules had fixed any cut-off date. Hence we do not think that this precedent is of any help to the petitioners in any way. 19. Case of Alpana [ Public Service Commission Allahabad and another v. Alpana 1994(2) SCC 723 , was pressed into service in support of the proposition that cut-off date should be the last date by which applications were to be submitted. It does not appear that in that case, any cut-off date had been prescribed under the relevant Service Rules. Last date of submission of application was fixed at August 20, 1988. Alpana had appeared at her LL.B examination but was still awaiting her result on August 20, 1988. She was however, provisionally allowed to take the examination. Later on, she cleared the LL.B. examination and meanwhile also qualified at the competitive. However, since she was not eligible on 20.08.1988, she was not called for interview. She challenged this action of the Public Service Commission before the Allahabad High Court. The High Court in writ petition No. 1898 of 1991 mandated the Public Service Commission to interview her but directed to withhold the result until further orders. However, since she was not eligible on 20.08.1988, she was not called for interview. She challenged this action of the Public Service Commission before the Allahabad High Court. The High Court in writ petition No. 1898 of 1991 mandated the Public Service Commission to interview her but directed to withhold the result until further orders. In obedience to the directive of the High Court the Public Service Commission interviewed her but her result was kept in abeyance. Thereafter, the High Court disposing of the matter finally directed the Public Service Commission to declare her result and, if successful, to forward her name for appointment. The High Court even went to the length of ordering the creation of a supernumerary post to accommodate her. The matter was taken to the Apex Court and the said court observed : "This approach of the High Court cannot be supported on any rule or prevalent practice nor can it be supported on equitable considerations. In fact there was no occasion for the High Court to interfere with the refusal of the Public Service Commission to interview her in the absence of any specific rule in that behalf. We find it difficult to give recognition to such an approach of the High Court as that would open up a flood of litigation. Many candidates superior to the respondent in merit may not have applied as the result of the examination was not declared before the last date for receipt of applications. If once such an approach is recognised there would be several applications received from such candidates not eligible to apply and that would not only increase avoidable work of the selecting authorities but would also increase the pressure on such authorities to withhold interviews till the results are declared, thereby causing avoidable administrative difficulties. This would also leave vacancies unfilled for long spells of time. We, therefore, find it difficult to uphold the view of the High Court impugned in this appeal. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition of the respondent will stand dismissed. However, if the respondent has been appointed in obedience to the High Court's order her appointment shall not be cancelled, but if she is not appointed she will not be entitled to appointment on the basis of the High Court decision reversed hereby. However, if the respondent has been appointed in obedience to the High Court's order her appointment shall not be cancelled, but if she is not appointed she will not be entitled to appointment on the basis of the High Court decision reversed hereby. There will be no order as to costs." 20. To our mind, this precedent is also not an authority for the proposition that where a statutory rule fixes a cut off date, yet the last date of submission of an application should be held to be such a cut-off date. This and Rekha Chaturvedi's cases are not authorities for the proposition that if a cut-off date is fixed by a service rule or regulation, such date should be ignored and last date of submission of application should be treated as a crucial date. Nor are these cases authorities for the proposition that fixing a cut-off date in service rules, whether preceding or following the last date of submission of application, would be arbitrary and invalid merely on that account. 21. Now, we may deal with the Rajasthan cases having a bearing on the subject. In Shyam Singh v. State etc.S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 216 of 1969 decided on 06.10.1969 , a learned Single Judge, inspite of the service Rules containing a stipulation that the candidate must have attained the minimum age on the first day of January, next following the date of commencement of examination, treated the petitioner, who had become over-age, as within the prescribed age limit because examination continued beyond the year beyond which examination was held. A Division Bench of the Court in State of Rajasthan v. Shyam Singh 1971 Lab. I.C. 394, held that this was not permissible. It may be stated that the vires of the relevant service Rules were not challenged in that case. The decision of the learned Single Judge and of the Division Bench entirely proceeded upon the construction of the provisions of the service Rules. 22. In D.B. Civil Writ Retition No. 3355 of 1988 Narayan Singh v. State of Rajasthan and another 1990(1) RLR 137 , to which one of us (Verma, J.) was a party, the petitioner was within prescribed age limits, when he made the application. A select list was prepared. It remained operative for a year. 22. In D.B. Civil Writ Retition No. 3355 of 1988 Narayan Singh v. State of Rajasthan and another 1990(1) RLR 137 , to which one of us (Verma, J.) was a party, the petitioner was within prescribed age limits, when he made the application. A select list was prepared. It remained operative for a year. When the turn of the petitioner came to be appointed, he had become over-age and he was refused appointment. He challenged this refusal and the refusal was held to be bad. It may be stated that the relevant service Rules for different posts in the same service, prescribed two different dates for reckoning eligibility and the same was held to be discriminatory. The question if a cut-off date could be fixed for reckoning age limit independently of the service rules was not at all considered. Hence, this judgment, which proceeded on peculiar facts, is of no assistance of arriving at a correct conslusion on the points posed for our decision. 23. Now, we may refer to Dr. Rajeev Mathur v. State of Rajasthan and connected writ petitions, decided by a Division Bench of this Court and reported in 1991(2) RLR 113 (erroneously mentioned as a Single Judge decision in the order of reference). In that case, the cut-off date was first January following the last date of receipt of the applications. The contention was that the fixing of such a date was arbitrary and had no nexus with the object to be achieved. The learned Advocate General countered the argument by submitting that the cut-off date could not be dubbed as arbitrary even though no reasons were assigned by the State and the petitioners had to show that the fixing of the date was capricious or whimsical. The argument of learned Advocate General was rejected and the cut-off date fixed under the Rules was held to be arbitrary, not having any relationship with the object to be achieved namely, selection of best available candidates. We may state that the ruling of the Apex Court in B. Sarat Chandra (supra), which had a direct bearing on the question, was cited before the Division Bench but with utmost respect, the learned Judges failed to appreciate the correct import of the rule laid down in that case, which we have already extracted elsewhere and, therefore, to our mind, the ruling does not lay down correct law. 24. 24. To our mind, the fixing of a cut-off date in a service Rule is to ensure that all candidates eligible on such a date may be considered and the best candidates amongst them may be selected and appointed. The fixing of a cut off date eliminates the uncertainty in the minds of prospective candidates about their eligibility. Moreover, fixing of such a date would no longer be open to challenge in light of Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal's case (supra) particularly when fixing of such a date could not be dubbed as capricious, whimsical or very much wide of the mark. Maybe by fixing of such a cut-off date, some candidates would be eligible and some would be ineligible. But this would happen in every case, where a cut-off date is fixed, whether by way of last date on receipt of applications or as on the date of the application. As stated elsewhere, when the date is fixed by the Rule, itself, it is known well in advance to every body; on the other hand if the date of notification or advertisement or last date of receipt of applications is fixed as a cut-off date, it would always be fluctuating according to whims and caprices, of the person charged with the duty of fixing such a date. We, therefore, find that fixing a cut off date in the Service Rules is not bad constitutionally. It cannot be said that the cut-off date fixed by the rule has been picked from a hat or is quite wide of the mark. 25. Dr. Rajeev Mathur's case (supra) was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Ashok Kumar Tiwari v. State of Rajasthan and others D.B. C.W.P. No. 2897/92 dated 1.12.92. The relevant rule fixed the cut-off as first day of January, following the last date fixed for the receipt of the application. In this case, the petitioner was qualified to be appointed on the last date of receipt of application. He was duly given appointment but the same was cancelled with reference to the provisions of the Service Rules, since according to the same, he was over-age. The cancellation of appointment was held to be bad. We may state that the judgment does not refer to the case of P. Saratchandra at all but merely relied upon Dr. Rajeev Mathur (supra). 26. The cancellation of appointment was held to be bad. We may state that the judgment does not refer to the case of P. Saratchandra at all but merely relied upon Dr. Rajeev Mathur (supra). 26. We have already referred to the ratio of P. Sarat Chandra and in our opinion, the ratio was not correctly followed in Dr. Rajeev Mathur's case (supra) and consequently, Ashok Kumar Tiwari was also not correctly decided. 27. Hence we could answer question No. 1 by saying that the rule making authority was competent to fix a cut-off date prescribing maximum age of direct recuitment and merely because such a cut-off date has been fixed, it could not be said to be arbitrary or capricious. On a parity of reasoning, we hold that likewise fixing of a cut-off date for reckoning minimum age for recruitment in a service rule could not be dubbed as arbitrary or capricious so as to enable the court to strike it down. 28. We have already said that a cut-off date with reference to last date of receipt of application, when a service rule already fixes such a date, would be improper. Such a date could always be manipulated and would be uncertain and would fluctuate with the individual whim and caprice of the person charged with the fixing of the date. Such a date could not in any way be equated with a statutory cut-off date fixed by the relevant service rule, which will always be known in advance. 29. Now, it may be stated that whether the statutory cut-off date precedes the last date fixed for inviting the application or succeeds such a date, would always be immaterial and would always provide a fixed point with reference to which the minimum and maximum age would be reckoned. All those who are eligible within such parameters would form one class and the classification cannot be said to be violative of the equality clauses of the Constitution of India. Hence the third question is answered accordingly. 30. The petitioners in various writ petitions are admittedly either over-age or under-age and thus are not eligible to be considered in accordance with relevant service Rule. This position has been detailed below with reference to each case. Hence, they are not entitled to claim that their candidature be considered in spite of the service rule. 31. 30. The petitioners in various writ petitions are admittedly either over-age or under-age and thus are not eligible to be considered in accordance with relevant service Rule. This position has been detailed below with reference to each case. Hence, they are not entitled to claim that their candidature be considered in spite of the service rule. 31. In view of what we have stated above, we are unable to strike down the relevant service Rules and we uphold its validity. We over-rule decisions rendered in Dr. Rajiva Mathur v. State of Rajasthan [1991(2) RLR 113] & Narendra Kumar Chhangani v. State of Rajasthan [1992(1) RLR 3081 (supra). In the aforesaid permises, these 29 writ petitions mentioned in Schedule A to this judgment are devoid of merit and are dismissed. Interim orders, if passed in any of these writ petitions, shall authomatically stand vacated. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs. Schedule-A S. No. No. of Writ Petition Name of Petitioner Name of respondent-Department Name of relevant Service Rules challenged Remarks 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 5088/93 Surindra Singh Rural Development & Panchayati Raj. Interim orders, if passed in any of these writ petitions, shall authomatically stand vacated. In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs. Schedule-A S. No. No. of Writ Petition Name of Petitioner Name of respondent-Department Name of relevant Service Rules challenged Remarks 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 5088/93 Surindra Singh Rural Development & Panchayati Raj. Rajasthan Panchayati Samitis & Zila Parishads Service Rules, 1959 Referred to Full Bench 2 2336/83 Ram Singh -do- -do- 3 2337/83 Amilal Yadav -do- -do- 4 2338/83 Phula Ram Saini -do- -do- 5 3450/88 Roshanlal -do- -do- 6 4043/89 Manohar Lal Sharma -do- -do- 7 3550/93 Durga Prasad Swami -do- -do- , 8 4151/93 Hanuman Sahai Sharma Education & Zila Parishad do & Rajasthan Education Subordinate Service Rules, 1971 9 4186/93 Hari Ram Jangid -do- Rajasthan Panchayat Samities & Zila Parishads Service Rules, 1959 10 4223/93 Mufid Ahmed R.D. & Panchayati Raj -do- 11 4224/93 Satendra Kumar -do- -do- 12 4232/93 Purshottam Sharma -do- -do- 13 3249/94 Randheer Singh -do- -do- 14 3377/94 Mahavir Prasad -do- -do- 15 3504/94 Tej Singh Sisodia -do- -do- 16 3505/94 Narendra Soni & Irfan Khan -do- -do- 17 3693/94 Ghanshyam Dutt -do- & Education Officer, Alwar -do-, 18 4025/94 Ashok Kumar Sharma Rural Development & Panchayati Raj -do- 19 4090/94 Raghuraj Singh -do- -do- 20 4327/94 Ashok Vijay -do- -do- 21 4471/94 Ram Kumar Chhipa -do- -do- 22 4502/94 Gajendra Singh -do- -do- 23 4691/94 Vikram Singh -do- -do- 24 4737/94 Ashwani Mohan Sharma -do- -do- 25 4748/94 Govind Prasad Chaturvedi -do- -do- 26 4734/94 Prahlad Rai Mali -do- & Education -do- not challenged as ultra vires but prayer for cut- off date 19.06.94 & not as 1.1.95 in An.14 Cut-off dated 1.1.94 27 3295/93 Sunil Verma Forest Department R.10 of Raj. Forest Service Rules 1962 & Forest Subordinate Service Rules challenged 28 4593/94 Smt. Satyabama Education Department Rule 10 of Rajasthan Educational Service Rules 1970 challenged 29 1835/90 Mod Singh Kashyap Education Department Rule 9(9) of Education Service Rules for considering age on 1st day of January following the last date for application sought to be challenged as ultra vires. Annexure-A S.No No. of Writ Petition Name of Petitioner Cut-off date in service Rules Service Rules Last date for receipt of application with Ex/Ann. Annexure-A S.No No. of Writ Petition Name of Petitioner Cut-off date in service Rules Service Rules Last date for receipt of application with Ex/Ann. No Date of Birth Period by Which short of over-age Minimum age/Maximum age Remarks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 5088/93 Surendra Singh 01/01/84 Zila Prishad Rules 25.05.93 Ann. 4 31.10.60 Over-age 18/33 Reply not filed. 2 2336/83 Ram Singh 01/01/84 -do- 10.05.1993 Ann. 3 16.12.50 15 days short 18-31 -do- 3 2337/83 Amilal Yadav 01/01/84 -do- -do- 01/08/50 4 Months short 18-30 -do- 4 2338/83 Phularam Saini 01/01/84 -do- -do- 01/09/50 3 months short 18-30 -do- 5 3450/88 Roshanlal,01.01.1989 do- 25.04.88/2 09/07/57 over-age 18-31 -do- 6 4043/89 Manoharlal Sharma 01/01/89 -do- 15.04.88/2 24.07.57 -do- 18-31 Reply/Rejoinder 7 3550/93 Durga Pd. 3 16.12.50 15 days short 18-31 -do- 3 2337/83 Amilal Yadav 01/01/84 -do- -do- 01/08/50 4 Months short 18-30 -do- 4 2338/83 Phularam Saini 01/01/84 -do- -do- 01/09/50 3 months short 18-30 -do- 5 3450/88 Roshanlal,01.01.1989 do- 25.04.88/2 09/07/57 over-age 18-31 -do- 6 4043/89 Manoharlal Sharma 01/01/89 -do- 15.04.88/2 24.07.57 -do- 18-31 Reply/Rejoinder 7 3550/93 Durga Pd. Swami 01/01/94 -do- 05.05.93/2 05/03/60 -do- 18-33 Reply filed-No. 8 4151/93 Hanuman S. Sharma 01/01/94 -do- 15.05.93/3 07/07/60 -do- 18-33 Reply not filed 9 4186/93 Hariram Jangid 1.0.994 -do- 11.6.93/3 16.06.60 -do- 18-33 Reply filed 10 4223/93 Mufid Ahmed 01/01/94 -do- 10.05.93/4 01/01/61 -do- 18-33 Reply filed 11 4224/93 Satendra Gupta 01/01/94 -do- 05.05.93/4 28.07.60 -do- 18-33 Reply filed 12 4232/93 Purshottam Sharma 01/01/94 -do- 05.05.93/1 24.07.60 -do- 18-33 Reply filed 13 3249/94 Randhir Singh 01/01/95 -do- 30.05.94/3 01/09/61 -do- 18-33 Reply not filed 14 3377/94 Mahavir Prasad 01/01/94 -do- 30.05.93/2 23.10.60 -do- 18-33 -do- 15 3504/94 Tej Singh 01/01/95 -do- 31.05.94/1 15.07.61 -do- 18-33 -do- 16 3505/94 Narendra Soni 01/01/95 -do- 31.05.94/1 05/07/61 -do- 18-33 -do- Irfan Khan 01/01/95 -do- 30.05.94/2 01/08/61 -do- 18-33 -do- 01/01/95 -do- 30.5.94/3 -do- -do- 18-33 , 17 3693/94 Ghanshayam Dutt 01/01/95 -do- 05.05.94/6 10/07/61 -do- 18-33 -do- 30.05.94/7 15.05.94/8 18 4025/94 Ashok Kumar Sharma 01/01/95 -do- 30.05.94/3 01/10/61 -do- 18-33 -do- 19 4090/94 Reghusingh Jodhana 01/01/95 -do- 31.05.94/3 25.07.61 -do- 18-33 -do- 20 4327/94 Ashok Vijay 01/01/95 -do- 18.06.94/2 07/07/61 -do- 18-33 -do- 21 4471/94 Ram Ku.Chhipa 01/01/95 -do- 31.05.94/1 12/08/61 -do- 18-33 -do- 22 4502/94 Gajendra Singh 01/01/95 -do- 18.06.94/1 04/08/61 -do- 18-33 -do- 23 4691/94 Vikram Singh 01/01/95 -do- 30.05.94/1 01/07/61 -do- 18-33 -do- 24 4737/94 Ashwani Mohan 01/01/95 -do- 30.05.94/1 30.08.61 -do- 18-33 -do- 25 4748/94 Govind Pd.Srivastav 01/01/95 -do- 31.05.94/0 25.09.61 -do- 18-33 -do- 26 4734/94 Prahlad Mali 01/01/95 -do- 18.06.94/14 09/07/61 -do- 18-33 -do- 27 3295/93 Sunil Verma 01/01/94 (No-rest Rules) 31.05.93/2 01/10/60 -do- 18-33 Reply filed 28 4593/94 Smt. Satya Bama 01/07/94 Educational Service Rules 23.07.93/5 10/07/70 Underage 24-33 Reply not filed 29 1835/90 Mod Singh Kashyap -do- 26.04.57 Over-age 18-33 Reply filed Petitions dismissed. *******