The array of the parties as well as the matter taken up for consideration present a piquant situation. This courts employees (8 in number) raised a grievance about proposed selection for vacancies in the cadre of Bench Secretary Grade II and challenged this courts measures taken on the administrative side through a writ petition on the judicial side impleadihg this court as opposite party. This is the history of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 20989 of 1993 in which a learned single Judge granted partial relief to the said 8 employees, the administrative side of this Court, therefore, has filed this special appeal before this court which is how this appeal has been posted under orders of the Honble the Chief Justice for hearing before this Court. 2. Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Additional Advocate-General has been heard in support of this special appeal against the aforesaid judgment of learned single Judge, dated 22nd September, 1994 at sufficient length. Sri Ashok Khare has also been heard at great length on behalf of respondent-Employees. 3. Sri Mohd. Hashira Siddiqui, Sri Ishwar Chandra Sharma, Sri Bajrangi Lal Srivastava, Sri Jagat Pal Singh, Sri Mohd. Akram Siddiqui, Sri Ratan Prakash Gupta, Sri P. K. Jauhari and Sri Hira Lal filed the writ peti tion praying that office memorandum, dated 1-6-1992 issued by the Registrar of this Court through which applications were invited from amongst eligible candidates for being brought in the list of approved candidates for appoint ments to the post of Bench Secretary Grade II. Further prayer was that the petitioners be appointed Bench Secretary Grade II because their names found place in the list of 41 (forty-one) candidates prepared by Selection Committee and that ail the vacancies in existence as on 27- 5-1992 be filled in through the unamended procedure and rules, without taking note of subsequent changes in the mode of recruitment. 4. The learned single Judge has held that it was open to the appointing authority to determine the number of appointments to be made and the mere fact that a candidates name appeared in the select- list did not entitle him to a mandamus for being appointed. 4. The learned single Judge has held that it was open to the appointing authority to determine the number of appointments to be made and the mere fact that a candidates name appeared in the select- list did not entitle him to a mandamus for being appointed. The learned single Judge further recorded a finding which for ready reference should be quoted here : "in the present case also the appointments have been made strictly in the order in which the names of the candidates were placed in the approved list. There was no constraint under the rules of 1976 that the appointing authority shall make an appointment of a Bench Secretary Grade-11 either because there was vacancies or because the names of the petitioners are there in the list prepared by the selection committee, though in the present case names of all the candidates therefrom have not been approved by the Chief Justice, and the said list is in existence. " 5. The learned counsel for appellant Sri Dwivedi has objection to the last two sentences occurring in the aforesaid quotation and has challenged its validity on several grounds to be discussed hereinafter. He further argued that the selection committee was constituted properly and the recommenda tions were correctly made. The then Honble the Chief Justice has in his own handwriting made noting Ifs is apparent from the relevant record. It was argued that the Honble the Chief Justice had rightly fixed 40% marks in the examination subsequently reducing it to 33% to enable some more candidates to be absorbed because of the exigencies requirements, It is argued that all the actions are without any blemish and strictly according to rules and that all relevant procedure have been correctly followed. 6. Sri Dwivedi placed the entire record beginning from the year 1989 concerning the vacancies in the Bench Secretary Grade-II cadre which were brought by the officers of the Registry. Each and every document was examined in the presence of Additional Advocate-General and Sri Ashok Khare, both of whom had been shown the record. 7. Sri Ashok Khare, however, admitted that at no point of time there were allegations of any mala fide action or deed- No bias has been pleaded in the appointment of any of the candidates. Each and every document was examined in the presence of Additional Advocate-General and Sri Ashok Khare, both of whom had been shown the record. 7. Sri Ashok Khare, however, admitted that at no point of time there were allegations of any mala fide action or deed- No bias has been pleaded in the appointment of any of the candidates. But he argues strenuously that the vacancies must be filled by the unamended rules because vested rights accrued to the respondents as their names had already come in the select/ approved list. Towards the end of his arguments Sri Ashok Khare has shown to this court a list of some employees who have been appointed ad hoc to the post of Bench Secretary Grade-II during the pendency of the writ petition and on the strength of the said appointment it was strongly contended that the respondents be commanded to follow the rules and be restrained from making ad hoc appointment. In order to judge this part of the argument also, the record was examined. 8. Before going into the discussions threadbare, it may be mentioned that during the cause of argument the learned counsel for the appellants drew the attention of the court to certain observations of the learned single Judge concerning some of the supposed action of the Registrar. It was argued that the learned single Judge recorded those observations on the allegations in the petition and the arguments advanced though there was no material in existence for making those remarks, and that before making those observations the record may well have been seen which was produced before this court for scrutiny. It was argued that perhaps not a word in the observations of the learned single Judge are justifiable even on material and documents which were placed along with the writ petition and the counter and rejoinder affidavits. It was argued that it was desirable that when more or less it was a domestic matter, the entire record may have been examined to find out whether any officer of the registry or the Registrar himself had committed any default. It was further argued that nothing transpired during the arguments which may have indicated producing the records and, therefore, the entire record was produced before this Court. It was further argued that nothing transpired during the arguments which may have indicated producing the records and, therefore, the entire record was produced before this Court. There appears to be much force in the arguments but this matter will be taken up after examining the merits of the contentions raised in the writ petition. 9. The Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as Rules) have been made applicable to all officers and members of the establishment of the High Court. The appointing authority has been defined in clause (n) of Rule 2 of the Rules. It reads as under : " (n) appointing Authority means the Chief Justice of the court or such other Judge or Officer as he may direct. " By virtue of Rule 3 the strength of the number of permanent post in the various category have to be determined by the Honble the Chief Justice from time to time which the approval of the Governor of the Uttar Pradesh. How ever, temporary posts may be created by the Chief Justice. Rule 4 gives source of recruitment to Class IV posts and Rule 5 talks of the academic quali fication for such posts. Rule 6 relates to the check on powers of the appointing authority, which is quoted below : "6. Appointing authority,-If the appointing authority is other than the Chief Justice the exercise of his power shall always be subject to any general or special order of the Chief Justice," Rule 8 lays down source of recruitment to Class III posts and likewise Rule 9 lays down qualification for various Class III post. 10. Then comes Rule 10 followed by Rule 10-A and Rule 11. Since arguments have been advanced placing reliance on Rules 10 and 11, these two rules are quoted below : "10. Method of selection for the posts of Routine Grade Clerks.- (I) The appointing authority shall ascertain the probable number of vacancies likely to occur in the post of Routine Grade Clerks during the course of the year of recruitment and determine the number of vacancies, if any, to be reserved for candidates belong ing to the Scheduled Castes and others under Rule 23. (2) The procedure and syllabus relating to the competitive examina tion shall be such as may be prescribed by the appointing autho rity from time to time. (2) The procedure and syllabus relating to the competitive examina tion shall be such as may be prescribed by the appointing autho rity from time to time. (3) The candidates who qualify for interview in the written examina tion according to the standard fixed by the Chief Justice will be called for interview before the Selection Committee appointed by the Chief Justice. (4) The total marks obtained by the candidates in the written exami nation and interview will determine their position and the merit list shall be prepared accordingly. If two or more candidates secure equal marks, the candidate securing higher marks in the written examination will be placed above. The select list shall hold good for three years or till the next selection is held which ever is earlier. 10-A. Not quoted here. 11. Method of selection to the post of Bench Secretary.- (I) Whenever it is required to make selection to nil up any vacancy/vacancies in the post of Bench Secretary Grade II, the appointing authority shall invite applications from the eligible assistants as mentioned in clause (e) of Rule 8 for admission to the competitive examina tion. (2) The procedure and the syllabus relating to the competitive exami nation shall be such as may be prescribed by the appointing authority from time to time. (3) The rest of the procedure of selection and the period during which the select list, shall be the same as laid down in Rule 10. " 11. The main argument on behalf of the petitioners before the learned single Judge was that the amendment which was made in the Rules on 28-5-1992 must be restricted for vacancies which would have arisen after 28-5-1992. Sri Ashok Khare in fact did not challenge the finding of the learned single Judge refusing to grant relief to the petitioners claim of appoint ment for being in the select list. He confined his argument to support the findings in the second part of the impugned judgment whereby the petitioners were granted partial relief. The learned counsel stressed that since it has been held by the learned single Judge that the amendment would apply prospectively, i. e. the old rule has to apply for selection for vacancies prior to 28-5-1992 ; the petitioner may get appointment for having been included in the select list. The learned counsel stressed that since it has been held by the learned single Judge that the amendment would apply prospectively, i. e. the old rule has to apply for selection for vacancies prior to 28-5-1992 ; the petitioner may get appointment for having been included in the select list. In the alternative the argument is that even if it be assumed that the petitioners would not get automatic appointment, why cannot they say that vacancies which existed on 28-5-1992 must be filled in from out of persons Qualifying under old Rules. This argument cannot be accepted because the peti tioners did not acquire right to appointment merely because their names were in the list drawn by Selection Committee. If this was the legal position, there was no occasion for examining the second argument as to whether the amend ment 28-5-1992 should be applicable retrospectively or prospectively. This argument has been unnecessary dragged into this litigation which has absolu tely no basis to be raised. In this connection the factual position may have to be examined here before the question of prospectively of the rule is answered because the learned single Judges judgment has primarily rested on his view in this regard. 12. Once it is held that the Selection Committee had met and it had prepared a list of candidates in pursuance of the advertisement which was issued by the Registrar, the effect is that the list was to continue for three years. This means that whenever a list is drawn up, it is not for existing vacancies but for future, probable vacancies which may not be definitely known when the list is drawn up. If Mr. Khares argument is taken to mean that the list was for existing vacancies, then the very existence of the list for suppose in future vacancies would be illegal and meaningless. Leaving aside the argument as to what is the effect of the amendment made on 28-5-1992 it may be again mentioned that Honble the Chief Justice had fixed 40% marks on the basis of which initially 26 candidates were appointed on 5-2- 1990 while subsequently this 40% pass marks requirement was reduced by the Honble Chief Justice to 33%. By this method the Honble the Chief Justice could get 6 more candi dates who were appointed soon thereafter. By this method the Honble the Chief Justice could get 6 more candi dates who were appointed soon thereafter. It is not in dispute that none of the petitioner have obtained marks more than 33%. The finding of the learned single Judge is also specific that on the basis of the marks fixed by the Honble the Chief Justice, none of the petitioners could get appointment. In this view of the matter the question remains only academic whether the amendment would apply to the then vacancies, or not, yet it has to be dealt with because the learned single Judge has decided this matter in favour of the respondents. 13. The Honble the Chief Justice has complete control over the High Court and every action even of an "appointing authority" regarding filling up vacancies has always to be subject to any general or specific order of the Chief Justice. It is thus always open to the Honble the Chief Justice to expand or enhance the sources of recruitment and make an amendment so that better persons and candidates may be selected and better choice is available for selecting candidates for appointment as Bench Secretary Grade-II. 14. On the facts of this case it appears that after the rules were amended on 28-5-1992 fresh advertisement was issued on 1-6-1992. There is some wrong dates mentioned in some of the paragraphs under consideration and correct date is 1-6-1992 which has been checked up from the original record. Even this advertisement had not made any announcement of the number of vacancies. The present discussion, therefore, establishes that if the petitioners lost right to be appointed on the basis of the marks fixed by the Chief Justice they cannot claim any advantage for having been shown in the select list prepared by the selection committee even if the learned single Judges view was correct that the amended rules would apply prospectively. 15. The argument of Sri Khare may be judged from yet another angle. Can it be said that because of the amendment made by the notification dated 28-5-1992 the respondents have lost chance for ever to compete ? The answer is emphatic no. The respondents right to compete for selection is as much secure now as it was before. 15. The argument of Sri Khare may be judged from yet another angle. Can it be said that because of the amendment made by the notification dated 28-5-1992 the respondents have lost chance for ever to compete ? The answer is emphatic no. The respondents right to compete for selection is as much secure now as it was before. Assuming that after amendment all the assistants having 10 years experience have become eligible for selection for the post whereas prior to 28-5-1992 only permanent U. D. A. and permanent L. D. A. with 10 years experience were eligible to compete, the respondents right to compete has not been taken away. None can have grievance in the appointing authority or, for that matter, the Honble the Chief Justice, prefers to have a larger selection base from out a of larger section of employees for appointing larger number of better candidates, 16. It has to be noticed that by virtue of the provision contained in sub-rule (3) of Rule 11 only the rest of the procedure of selection (emphasis added) would be made applicable for selecting candidate for the post of Bench Secretary as existed in Rule 10 of the Rules. Sri Khare, however, intelligently argued that sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 would also be applicable and since it provides that the appointing authority "shall ascertain the probable number of vacancies he wanted to develop the argument by saying that no choice was left with the appointing authority to prepare the select list and yet not conform to it for filling the number of vacancies which must have to be ascertained before hand. It may be noticed that in view of the language used in sub-rule (3) of Rule 11, the sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 would not be attracted for selecting Bench Secretary Order-II. 17. For another reason the argument is unacceptable. The probable number of vacancies cannot be interpreted to mean the exact number of vacancies. Ascertain meat of vacancies is also a guess work anticipating some contingencies which may necessitate the appointing authority to make selec tion. Moreover, there may be so many developments and reasons as a result of which the vacancies may have to increase. They may not be conclusively ascertainable. Ascertain meat of vacancies is also a guess work anticipating some contingencies which may necessitate the appointing authority to make selec tion. Moreover, there may be so many developments and reasons as a result of which the vacancies may have to increase. They may not be conclusively ascertainable. Therefore, in view of the provisions in sub-rule (1) of Rule 10, the select list will always be expected to take note of vacancies which may arise subsequently though not correctly ascertainable when Selection Committee is made. In fact, this alone appears to be the purpose of preparing a select list. As noted above, the Honble the Chief Justice applied 33% pass marks rule and therefore, the respondents would not get a chance of appointment to the post of Bench of Secretary Grade II even if the old Rule is held to apply to the respondents. 18. Coming to the two authorities on the basis of which the learned single Judge has upheld the argument that the amendment, dated 28-5-1992 will apply prospectively it may be stated that neither of them support the pre position sought to be convassed. 19. In Y. V. Rangaiah and others v. J. Srinivasa Rao and others, AIR 1983 SC 852 , on which Sri Khare placed reliance before the learned single Judge and it found favour with His Lordship, the facts were that there used to be prepared an annual panel and all transfers or promotions to the post of Sub- Registrar Grade-H was to be made out of that panel. (See paragraph 9 of the above noted rulings ). In this connection it was observed by their Lordship J- "in that event the petitioners in the two writ petitions who ranked higher than the respondents Nos. 3 to 15 would not have been deprived of their right of being considered for promotion. . . . " 20. In the aforesaid decision their Lordships were, therefore, consider ing a case where the concerned employees were deprived of the right of being considered for promotion. 21. In the instant case as noted above none of the petitioners has been deprived from competing for being selected to the post of Bench Secretary Grade-II. Therefore, the aforesaid decision is wholly unapplicable. 22. 21. In the instant case as noted above none of the petitioners has been deprived from competing for being selected to the post of Bench Secretary Grade-II. Therefore, the aforesaid decision is wholly unapplicable. 22. The other case which was cited by Shri Khare and accepted by learned single Judge is reported in A. A. Calton v. The Director of Education and another, AIR 1983 SC 1143 . In that case procedure for selection of principal of a minority college had commenced in 1973 but the recommendation of the Selection Committee was disapproved by the Deputy Director. In the meantime there was a change in the law in the year 1975 relating to declaration of vacancies. It was held that the earlier vacancy for which Selection Committee had made recommendation could not have been changed by the later amendment. The narration of the events in the said decision does not support the preposition sought to be canvassed on behalf of the respon dents. Reliance on the said case is also ill placed. 23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the learned single Judge was wrongly persuaded to apply the said two authorities on the facts of the present case and no relief could be granted to the petitioners on the strength of the observations contained therein. 24. In the case of P. Murugasan and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 1993 (2) SCC 340 the facts indicate that under the relevant rule promo tion was attainable by petitioner when it was amended and promotion was denied. Therefore, in that case promotion alone was to be made and consi dered and it was not a case of selection. In fact, challenge to the method of changing qualification being violative of the principles enunciated by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, has been specifically negatived by the Honble Supreme Court. Therefore, the aforesaid decision is also clearly distinguishable. 25. Before drawing curtain on this part of the discussion regarding decisions of courts, Sri Khare has placed reliance on two rulings of this court also. 26. In the case of Sultan Ahmad v. State of U. P. and others, 1983 AWC page 86, it was held that select list prepared under the old rule should continue in spite of coming into force of the new rules creating new method for new select list. 26. In the case of Sultan Ahmad v. State of U. P. and others, 1983 AWC page 86, it was held that select list prepared under the old rule should continue in spite of coming into force of the new rules creating new method for new select list. In Paragraph 16 of the reported case their Lordships have referred to the peculiar facts of the said case and proceeded to hold the aforesaid view because of the finding recorded that the Commissioner was required to call for name of 5 senior most assistants of category b of the district where the vacancies were expected to occur. The words expected to occur was held in this ruling to apply only in respect of vacancy occurring after commencement of the rule and not vacancy which had occurred prior to that. This case law, therefore, has also no application to the facts involved in the instant appeal. 27. The last case law relied upon is the decision of Jai Nath Singh and others v. State of U. P. and others, 1987 UPLBEC 308. For the facts stated in the reported judgment in Paragraph 10 the aforesaid case, it is also clearly distinguishable. The relevant paragraph is extracted below ; "on reading the 1983 Rules, which amend the Rules 1966, it should be clear that these are made applicable to cases of substantive vacan cies, which arise on or after May 3, 1983 the date when the 1983 Rules came into force. The case before us being of vacancies arising in 1976, on this ground also it may be legitimately main tained that the selection bad to take place in the light of the provi sions earlier in force. It is not a case where it could be said that the filling of the pre-existing vacancies under the rules would amount to retractive operation of the rules because the use of the words "on the occurrence of substantive vacancies" exclude the application of the rules. " 28. Having dealt with by the arguments advanced on behalf of the appel lant and the counter arguments of the respondents, it appears that the view taken by the learned single Judge that the amendment, dated 28-5-1992 would apply prospectively is not sustainable in law but on fact also. " 28. Having dealt with by the arguments advanced on behalf of the appel lant and the counter arguments of the respondents, it appears that the view taken by the learned single Judge that the amendment, dated 28-5-1992 would apply prospectively is not sustainable in law but on fact also. The rule was properly amended and it will apply to vacancies existing on the date of amend ment as to future vacancies. 29. After this conclusion this judgment should have ended. But there still remains to be decided the justification or validity of the remains that the learned single Judge has made while referring to the registry or the Registrar of this Court. The anguish of the learned single Judge starts by adversely commenting on the fact as to why an Upper Division Assistant in the Registry was deputed to file reply of the court through counter affidavit in the instant case and this was according to the learned single Judge highly unjustified. The single Judge felt that the Registrar of this Court "should have considered the seriousness of this case". Thereafter the learned single Judge has commented about the Registrar, various officials who are working in the Registry and felt that some High Officer should have been asked to put in counter-affidavit. The learned Judge observes that this act of the Registrar to file an affidavit of the U. D, A. in this case on behalf of this Court despite availability of number of officers of the rank of Deputy Registrar, Joint Regis trar, Additional Registrar and himself "is highly deprecated. " 30. Sri Rakesh Dwivedi, Additional Advocate-General argued for expunging the remark with regard to the supposed action or inaction of the Registrar. He argued that litigation involving administrative action of this Courts or orders and action of registry is in the charge of an Additional Regis trar (Litigation) who looks after all such matters as the one giving rise to this appeal. It is his duty to prepare narrative, nominate a person for looking after the case and for filing counter-affidavit in reply on behalf of the court and registry, as the case may be. It was further argued that as of rule and practice, prior approval of the Honble Chief Justice is obtained before filing counter-affidavit in a matter pending on the judicial side. 31. It was further argued that as of rule and practice, prior approval of the Honble Chief Justice is obtained before filing counter-affidavit in a matter pending on the judicial side. 31. In order to examine the aforesaid argument the entire record was thoroughly scrutinised. It transpires that at no point of time was this litigation entrusted to the Registrar. There are notings on the file made by the Addi tional Registrar about the facts on the basis of which counter-affidavit was required to be prepared. He had prepared narrative for placing the facts through counter-affidavit. He reposed confidence in one of the Assistants working in the office for filing the affidavit. The record reveals that the draft affidavit to be sworn by Shri Harun Ahmad an Office Assistant, was approved by the Honble the Chief Justice. Under the circumstances it is over vehe mently established that at no point of time did the Registrar come into the picture at all. It was not at the instance of the Registrar that the affidavit was filed by Shri Harun Ahmad an Office Assistant. The Additional Registrar Incharge Litigation Department obtained approval of the Honble Chief Justice before filing the counter-affidavit in court. As to the contents of the counter-affidavit, it may be specifically stated here that its contents are neither vague nor incorrect nor misleading. We are sure that had these facts been examined from the record by the learned single Judge. His Lordship may not have proceeded to make the aforesaid remarks. 32. Therefore, not only that there was no occasion for making those remarks in the judgment, the record indicates that the draft affidavit of the clerk concerned had the approval of the Honble the Chief Justice, and conse quently the adverse remarks have to be expunged. It was further rightly argued that highly placed judicial officers do not normally involve themselves person ally in petty matters and particularly in this case the Registrar was already tendered wholly ineffective to work for or against the interest of the respondents as none of them could secure appointment because of having secured less than 33% of marks. Therefore, it also rightly argued by Sri Dwivedi that existence of these remarks of the learned single Judge may affect the career of the officers of the Registry, those may be expunged. We find force in the argument. Therefore, it also rightly argued by Sri Dwivedi that existence of these remarks of the learned single Judge may affect the career of the officers of the Registry, those may be expunged. We find force in the argument. It may be again pointed out that Shri Ashok Khare never argued any mala or bias and, to be fair to him, did not advance any argument supporting the said remarks of the learned single Judge. 33. As stated and noted above, so long as true facts are stated through an affidavit, it matters little whether it is sworn by a highly placed officer or a middle order officer or an office assistant. May be that since the learned Judge was about to take the view that the number of existing vacancies before 28-5- 1992 should have been specified, perhaps the aforesaid anguish was expressed. We are sure that bad the record of the case been seen by the learned single Judge, the factual position would have been clear to him. We are not able to share the anguish of the learned single Judge for the factual non-existence of the reasons for the said anguish. Those lines should thus be expunged. 34. Shri Khare had lastly argued that fresh representation of respondents may be considered by the Honble The Chief Justice as some ad hoc appoint ments were made in the meantime. The record reveals that ad hoc appoint ments have been made as selection process had been stayed due to the pendency of the litigation. This was necessary for working of the Court. However, should the respondents make afresh representation, the Honble The Chief Justice may consider the same. 35. Therefore, the following sentences appearing in the typed certified copy of the judgment filed with this appeal marked with blue pencil are directed to be expunged : Page 16, 3rd paragraph beginning with the words "filing of an affidavit" all the 33 lines of page 17, and, first 11 lines of the typed copy of the judgment at page 18 ending with words ". . . . and himself is highly depricated. " 36. This special appeal is allowed. . . . and himself is highly depricated. " 36. This special appeal is allowed. The learned single Judges order calling upon the respondent to fill up the vacancies of the Bench Secretary in existence up to 27-5-1992 in accordance with the provision of Allahabad High Court Officers and Staff (Conditions of Service and Conduct) Rules, 1976 before notification, dated 28-5-92 (Annexure 6) to the writ petition is quashed and the judgment of the learned single Judge, dated 22-9-1994 is set aside. Parties are directed to bear their costs. The selection may proceed in accord ance with the amended rules, if possible obviating the necessity of making ad hoc appointments. Appeal allowed. .