JUDGMENT Petitioner has filed this habeas corpus petition against what he alleges to be his son's continuance in illegal custody in the Central Prison, Jabalpur. Two cases were registered against the petitioners son as Crime No. 146/90 and Crime No. 221/91, both of Khurai Police Station. The first case related to offence punishable under sections 394 and 397 read with section 34 I.P.C. and section 450 read with Sec. 34 I.P.C. The second case related to offence under Sec. 326 I.P.C. He could be arrested in both these cases only on 28.6.1991. Since then he has been in judicial custody. In the first case (S.T. No. 311/91), he was convicted on 14.12.91 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Khurai under section 394 read with Sec. 397 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and convicted under Sec. 450, I.P.C. read with Sec. 34 I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. In the second case, on 8.8.1992 he was convicted under Sec. 326, I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo R.I. for three years and to pay fine of Rs. 3,000/- with default sentence of R.I. for one year. He filed Criminal Appeal No. 27/92 against the conviction and sentence in the sessions case and on 30.8.1994, the High Court acquitted him of all the charges. The conviction in the second case has been confirmed in appeal and revision. Petitioner contends that though as a matter of fact his son underwent imprisonment in the first case, since the conviction and sentence therein have been reversed by the High Court and he has been acquitted of the charges, in law it cannot be regarded that he underwent imprisonment in that case and, therefore, the sentence imposed on him in the second case on 8.8.92 must be deemed to have commenced on that day and if he is given set on· permitted under Sec. 428 Cr.P.C. it has to be held that he has undergone imprisonment for over three years. It is stated that he has already deposited the fine imposed in the second case. In these circumstances, petitioner contends that his sons continuance in the prison amounts to illegal detention. It is stated that he has already deposited the fine imposed in the second case. In these circumstances, petitioner contends that his sons continuance in the prison amounts to illegal detention. Section 427 of the Code states, inter alia, that when a person undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment, such imprisonment shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous conviction. It is not the petitioner's contention that the Magistrate directed that the sentence being impugned in the case shall run concurrently with the sentence imposed in the earlier case. Therefore, the question of sentence in the second case running concurrently with the sentence in the first case would not arise. The petitioners son was bound to undergo imprisonment for seven years in the first case and three years in the second case. In other words, if the conviction in both the cases stands, the petitioner son is obliged to undergo imprisonment for a continuous period of ten years. The question is what is the impact of the acquittal in the first case recorded by the High Court on the position referred to above. When an appellate Court reverses a judgment of conviction and acquit the accused of the charge against him, the acquittal will relate back to the date of the judgment of the trial Court. It is as if he earned an acquittal by the trial Court itself. If that be so, in the eyes of law, it cannot be said that he was undergoing sentence of imprisonment when he was convicted and sentenced in the subsequent case. It must be deemed that when the judgment was delivered in the second case, he was in judicial custody in connection with the second case. In this view the sentence imposed on him in the second case would commence from 8.8.1992. He would be entitled to set off from 28.6.1991 under section 428, Cr.P.C. As such, it has to be taken that he had completed the substantive sentence imposed on him in the second case .on 27.6.1994 Since the judgment of acquittal in the first case was delivered on 30.8.1994, his continued incorporation in prison thereafter has no sanction of law. He would be entitled to set off from 28.6.1991 under section 428, Cr.P.C. As such, it has to be taken that he had completed the substantive sentence imposed on him in the second case .on 27.6.1994 Since the judgment of acquittal in the first case was delivered on 30.8.1994, his continued incorporation in prison thereafter has no sanction of law. In the result, we direct the respondents to release the petitioners son Deshraj, forthwith unless his continued incarceration in prison is warranted in connection with any other case. The petition is accordingly allowed.