Judgment A.B. Srivastava, J. 1. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner landlord has sough quashing of an order, dated 23-7-1980 of the prescribed authority, Bareilly rejecting his application for release of the accommodation in the tenancy of the respondents Nos. 3 to 6, and the order, dated 15-7-1981 of the Additional District Judge Bareilly, dismissing his appeal. 2. Release application was filed by the petitioner under Section 21 of Act 13 of 1972 on the ground that while working as a contractor from 1971 in District Shahjahanpur, the petitioner along with his family has been residing in a rented accommodation No. 14 Subhash Road, Shahajahanpur Cantonment. The landlord of the said house filed release application which was allowed despite the petitioner contesting upto High Court stage, the judgment of the High Court being, dated 9-4-1979, the petitioner thereupon had to shift with his family to Bareilly and is living in a portion of the same house which is in the tenancy of the respondents. The petitioner maintains a car, servant and also cattle and requires the accommodation in the tenancy of the respondents to live according to his status. The accommodation being situated in cantonment area, the original unamended provisions of Act 13 of 1972 regarding release of the accommodation which is part of building occupied by the landlord is applicable. The respondent Nos. 3 and 6 are the tenants of a portion of first floor, the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 are the tenants of a portion of the ground floor, the remaining portions of the two floors being in possession of the petitioner, the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 in fact now (sic) not reside in this accommodation rather are residing in New Delhi where respondent No. 3 is employed The release application was resisted by the respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 6 on the ground that the need set up by the petitioner is not bona fide or genuine. 4 and 5 in fact now (sic) not reside in this accommodation rather are residing in New Delhi where respondent No. 3 is employed The release application was resisted by the respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 6 on the ground that the need set up by the petitioner is not bona fide or genuine. The petitioner is in the habit of making such a move merely with a view to increase the rent, the respondents are tenants in this premises since more than 30 years, the respondent No 4 is personally occupying her portion and respondent No. 5 also often comes and stays in this house, the petitioner has not correctly shown the various portions of the house and that great hardship will be caused to the petitioners if the release is allowed. 3. Rejecting the plea of landlord regarding application of explanation (iv) to Section 21 as contained in unamended Act 13 of 1972 to be applicable, the prescribed authority held that the landlord does not bonafide require the accommodation in the tenancy of the respondents for his personal occupation rather, he needs for commercial purpose which is not permissible. The needs of the respondent tenants is hard pressing. He accordingly rejected the release application. The appellate authority dismissed the petitioner's appeal. 4. Learned Counsel for the parties have been heard. The question raised at the outset on behalf of the petitioner is regarding the applicability of explanation (iv) to Section 21. It is contended that the provisions of Act 13 of 1972 as they stood on the date of its application to the cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh, would continue to apply despite subsequent deletion of the said explanation by U.P. Act 28 of 1976. 5. When the provisions of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 were made applicable to the cantonment areas by the Central Government vide S.R.O. 259, dated 1-9-1973 published in the Gazette of India, dated 29-9-1973, it was an instance of legislation by reference and not by incorporation. Here the Act No. 13 of 1972 was as a whole adopted as the statute governing regulation of letting and eviction in respect of cantonments in the State. Being a legislation by reference the provisions of Act 13 of 1972 as in force from time to time would thus be the law applicable to cantonment areas also. 6. Here the Act No. 13 of 1972 was as a whole adopted as the statute governing regulation of letting and eviction in respect of cantonments in the State. Being a legislation by reference the provisions of Act 13 of 1972 as in force from time to time would thus be the law applicable to cantonment areas also. 6. The reasonings of the two courts below that the release application having been filed before an authority appointed by the District Judge in accordance with amended provisions, and not before the authority appointed by the District Magistrate under unamended provisions, it shall be presumed that the amended Act has been made applicable to the cantonment areas is also weighty. The petitioner's plea that part of the building being in the occupation of the landlord, shall be conducive to prove that the building is bona fide required by him, was thus rightly rejected. In Mahindra and Mahindra vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1979 SC 798 , cited by the petitioner, the amendment to Section 100, Cr. P.C. was held not applicable to a case under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practice Act 1969 being an instance of legislation by incorporation. Here it is not so, rather the Act No. 13 of 1972 as a whole was adopted as the statute governing the regulation of letting, rent and eviction in respect of cantoments in the State of U.P. 7. As an alternative to the above plea, it has also been contended on behalf of the petitioner landlord that even if the amended Section 21 of Act 13 of 1972 is applicable, on the facts of the present case, there is no escape from the conclusion that the requirement of the petitioner for additional accommodation is bona fide and pressing. This contention appears to have force. There is no denial of fact that the petitioner who was residing as tenant in a house at Sahajahanpur was ordered to be vacated by him on a release by the landlord of the said house. This contention appears to have force. There is no denial of fact that the petitioner who was residing as tenant in a house at Sahajahanpur was ordered to be vacated by him on a release by the landlord of the said house. The prescribed, as well as appellate authority, under these circumstances were not justified in ignoring, the fact that the petitioner had himself been ordered to be evicted from the building, he was occupying as a tenant in Shahjahanpur by a release order affirmed by this Court, shortly before filing of the present release application, while determining the question of bona fide need of the petitioner. In the nature of vocation of the petitioner and the strata of society to which he belongs, his need for additional accommodation for safe keeping of his car for servants, and proper living for his family members, could not be said to be fanciful, merely because he stated to be requiring some part of the accommodation for storing some of his good s in connection with his work of military contract, it does not mean that he required the release of the building for business purposes It would have been so, is some manufacturing, sale or display of goods, was intended to be done. Simply because a person engaged in a particular profession keeps, or intends to keep, some implements, furniture's or other articles necessary, in his house, in connection with this professional work done else-where, it cannot be said that he is using or intends to use a residential accommodation for business purposes, so as to defeat his release application. 8. In view of these above facts it is quite clear and obvious that the prescribed authority, as well as appellate authority, committed manifest error of law in rejecting the claim of the petitioner of bona fide need for additional accommodation, ignoring the legal position and facts on record before them. To this extent their findings and conclusions are unsustainable. The question, however, still remains about the extent of additional accommodation required. Relevant in this connection will be a reference to Rule 16 (d) framed under the Act which enjoins upon the prescribed and the appellate authority, to consider whether the landlord's need would be served by releasing only portion of the building. The question, however, still remains about the extent of additional accommodation required. Relevant in this connection will be a reference to Rule 16 (d) framed under the Act which enjoins upon the prescribed and the appellate authority, to consider whether the landlord's need would be served by releasing only portion of the building. The authorities below have not considered this aspect of the matter, and as it involves factual assessment the case has to be remanded for the said limited purpose to the appellate authority. 9. It may not be out of context to mention that both the authorities below being observed with their view negativing the plea of the landlord of bona fide need, did not consider in proper prospective, the question of comparative hardship. This will also have to be done pursuant to the remand. 10. The writ petition thus deserves to be allowed in accordance with what has been stated above. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The finding of the authorities below on the question of bona fide need is set aside, and it is held that the landlord petitioner has a bona fide and pressing need of additional accommodation for occupation by himself and his family members. The order of the appellate authority, dated 15-7-1981 dismissing the petitioner's appeal is quashed. The appeal is remanded to the learned appellate authority to decide in accordance with law the question of comparative hardship in the light of legal position as stated in paragraphs 12 and 13 above and dispose of the appeal on merit. Since the matter has become quite old, P.A. case having been filed in the year 1979, the learned appellate court is directed to dispose of the appeal positively within three months from the date a certified copy of this order is presented before him. There is no order as to costs. Petition allowed.