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1994 DIGILAW 850 (MAD)

Pilominal v. R. Madhana

1994-10-20

ARUNA JAGADEESAN, SRINIVASAN

body1994
Judgment :- 1. The claimants, who are aggrieved by the award have filed this appeal claiming a further amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- by way of compensation. The total claim made by them in the original Petition was 1,50,000/-. The Tribunal has awarded a total sum of Rs. 30,000/-. 2. The evidence of the first petitioner, who is the wife of the deceased, is that her husband is working under a contractor and earning Rs. 1000/- per month. According to her, he used to give the said amount to her. But, the Tribunal has not accepted that version as she has not produced any document in support thereof. She has not examined the employer of her husband. The Tribunal has taken the view that the deceased could have earned Rs. 300/- only per month. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that a minimum which would be earned by a worker under a contractor would be not less than Rs. 15/- per day and the deceased would have earned at least 15/- per day and the deceased would have earned at least Rs. 450/- per month. In the absence of any specific acceptable evidence we are not inclined to interfere with the view taken by the Tribunal, though there is some force in the contention of the appellants counsel. 3. The Tribunal has however deducted a sum of Rs. 150/-, towards personal expenses of the deceased. That is clearly erroneous. The deceased being a worker and having a family of seven persons in addition to himself including the aged mother and five minor children could not and would not have spent half of the income on him-self. In the lower strata of life the bread-winner does not normally spend anything on himself and whatever he earns is handed over to the family for the benefit of the family. The children of the deceased were aged 17, 15, 9, 4 and 2 years respectively. The deceased had to spend for the education of at least three of them, who are claimants 2 to 4. In those circumstances, the deceased would not have spent if at all more than Rs. 50/- for his personal expenses every month. We hold that the contribution by the deceased to his family was at least Rs. 250/- per month. 4. The deceased was aged about 40. In those circumstances, the deceased would not have spent if at all more than Rs. 50/- for his personal expenses every month. We hold that the contribution by the deceased to his family was at least Rs. 250/- per month. 4. The deceased was aged about 40. He would have continued to work at least till he attained the age of 65. The Supreme Court is Jyotsa Dev v. State of Assam (1987 ACJ. 172(SC) held that the longevity of an Indian is generally 70 and compensation could be worked out on that basis. However, we prefer to take the view that the deceased would have earned upto the age of 65 and work out the compensation accordingly. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents contends that a multiplier of 25 cannot be adopted because of uncertainty of life. According to him, if the Court is to take the view that the deceased would have worked upto 65, a sum must be deducted for uncertainty of life from the total amount arrived at. We are unable to accept the argument in view of the fact that there is not even a suggestion that the deceased was suffering from any infirmity or illness during his lifetime. It can be normally presumed that workers like the deceased would have maintained good health and in the absence of any evidence that the deceased was suffering from any illness, the Court can proceed on the footing he would have lived upto the full normal longevity of an Indian to 70 years and there is reason whatever to deduct any amount on the ground of uncertainty of life. In the circumstances, we prefer to adopt a multiplier of 20 in view of the fact that the income of the deceased would have increased in course of time gradually. We are adopting the uniform figure of Rs. 250/- per month for entire period of 20 years without giving any credit to the future increases in the income. In those circumstances, we are of the view that a multiplier of 20 is quite reasonable. 6. Learned Counsel for the respondents places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in General Manager, Kerala Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas and Others (1994 ACJ 1). In those circumstances, we are of the view that a multiplier of 20 is quite reasonable. 6. Learned Counsel for the respondents places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in General Manager, Kerala Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas and Others (1994 ACJ 1). He points out that the Supreme Court has in that case decried the method of adopting multiplier on the basis of the longevity of life and preferred to adopt a multiplier on the basis of capitalisation of the income. But, it should not be forgotten that in that case the Supreme Court, having found that the income of the deceased at the time of the accident was only Rs. 1032/- per month, estimated the gross income of the deceased at Rs. 2000/- per month and then applied the multiplier of 12, which is the capitalising of income which he would have earned. Instead of doing so we are adopting the uniform rate of income of Rs. 250/- per month for a period of 20 years and in our opinion that is quite reasonable in the circumstances. This can also be cross-checked by working out the interest that the amount will earn if deposited in a bank. By adopting the multiplier of 20 we arrive at a figure of Rs. 60,000/-. If the amount is deposited in a nationalised bank the annual interest will be Rs. 6000/- and the monthly income would be only Rs. 500/- If the deceased had been alive and earning till the age of 65 or 70 he would have certainly earned more than Rs. 500/- per month. Hence we are of the opinion that the adoption of multiplier of 20 is reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 7. In additions to the sum of Rs. 60,000/- as arrived at above the claimants are entitled to a sum of Rs. 15,000/- as fixed by the Tribunal for loss of consortium and guidance of the deceased to the family besides Rs. 300/- for transport expenses incurred when the deceased was in the hospital. The Tribunal has negatived the claim for pain and suffering at Rs. 49,000/- we are of the view that the Tribunal is in error in not granting any amount at all for pain and suffering of the claimants. 300/- for transport expenses incurred when the deceased was in the hospital. The Tribunal has negatived the claim for pain and suffering at Rs. 49,000/- we are of the view that the Tribunal is in error in not granting any amount at all for pain and suffering of the claimants. We must take note of the fact that there are five minor childrens and an aged mother whose mental agony is beyond measure in terms of money. In those circumstances, it is quite reasonable to grant a sum of Rs. 15,000/- for mental agony and suffering. Thus a total of Rs. 90,300/- is arrived at. Rounding it off to Rs. 90,000/- we are of the opinion that the same can be granted as compensation. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondents contends that a deduction should be made for lump sum payment. There is no merit in this contention. The Supreme Court has considered this question in Harueo Karu v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (1992 ACJ 300). Dealing with this question the Supreme Court said thus: “We are of the view that deduction of 1/3rd out of the assessed compensation on account of lumpsum payment is not justified. The accident took place in July, 1977 and the litigation has come to an end, hopefully today, 15 years thereafter. This Court in Motor Owners Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi , 1981 ACI 507 (SC), held that the delay in the final disposal of motor accident compensation case, as in all other classes of litigation, takes a sting out of the laws of compensation and added to that the monstrous inflation and the consequent fall in the value of rupees makes the compensation demanded years ago less than quarter of its value when it is received after such a long time. In Manjushri Raha v. B.L. Gupta , 1977 ACJ 134 (SC), this court awarded compensation by multiplying the life expectancy without making any deductions. With the inflation, there is no justification for making deduction due to lumpsum payment. We, therefore, held that the courts below were not justified in making lump sum deduction in this case.” The principle laid down in that case is clearly applicable to the facts of this case. 9. Consequently we hold that the claimants are entitled to a compensation of Rs. 90,000/- in all. We, therefore, held that the courts below were not justified in making lump sum deduction in this case.” The principle laid down in that case is clearly applicable to the facts of this case. 9. Consequently we hold that the claimants are entitled to a compensation of Rs. 90,000/- in all. The said amount will bear interest at the rate of 16% per annum from the date of the Original Petition till date of deposit in the Tribunal. Out of the compensation amount, the first claimant will be entitled to Rs. 20,000/- and the 7th claimant is entitled to Rs. 5000/-. The balance of Rs. 65,000/- shall be divided equally among the five minor children each being entitled to Rs. 13,000/-. Each of the claimants is entitled to proportionate interest on the amount awarded to him or her. The appeal is allowed as indicated above. There will be an award in substitution of the award passed by the Tribunal in M.C.O.P. No. 253 of 1986 in the following terms. “The respondent shall pay a sum of Rs. 90,000/- as compensation to the claimants with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the Original Petition i.e. 8.9.1986 to the date of deposit. The claimants are entitled to get the respective amount as mentioned earlier in this Judgment”. 10. It is represented by learned counsel for the respondents that they have deposited the amount as awarded by the Tribunal already. The respondents are liable to deposit only the balance worked out as per the directions in this Judgment. There will be no order as to costs.