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1994 DIGILAW 864 (DEL)

ANIL KUMAR KHURANA v. UNION OF INDIA

1994-12-20

B.K.RAMAMOORTHY, K.S.BHATT

body1994
K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. ( 1 ) THESE eight writ petitions are connected and properties are situated in the area called Pusa Road, in Karol Bagh, New Delhi. The petitioners seek an order restraining the respondents from demolishing the buildings put up on the re spective plots. Initially, we thought of hearing the entire writ petition and dispose of the writ petitions on merits because the respondents had taken notice and in one of the matters counter affidavit was also filed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi which was adopted by the Delhi Development Authority. The arguments were addressed by both the learned counsel and in the course of the rejoinder Mr. Lekhi submitted that he was under the impression that the arguments were heard only on the question of issuing the Rule. We made the position clear that we in * tend to hear the entire matter having regard to the general importance and the nature of the litigation, and the counsel thereafter were permitted to address us further. We have heard the matter for several days. Since the court is closing for the winter vacation and the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that he may take a few more days, we thought it more proper to formally issue Rule D. B. in all these cases and post the writ petitions for hearing once again, before an appropriate Bench, without treat- ing these matters as part-heard. Consequently, we direct in all these cases issuance of Rule D. B. The respondents are permitted to file further counter affidavits if necessary within 3 weeks from today with liberty to the petitioners to file rejoinder, if any, within a week thereafter. The writ petitions shall be listed for final hearing immediately in the after Notice Matters before any appropriate Bench subject to orders of Hon ble the Chief Justice on 30. 1. 1995. Subject to further to the posting of Letters Patent Appeal filed against order dated 5. 12. 1994 made by Usha Mehra,j. in a few suits. ( 2 ) WE have to consider the question of interim order to be made. The demolitions of the buildings are ordered on the ground of unauthorised construction by the builders and the user of the buildings for non-residential purposes. 12. 1994 made by Usha Mehra,j. in a few suits. ( 2 ) WE have to consider the question of interim order to be made. The demolitions of the buildings are ordered on the ground of unauthorised construction by the builders and the user of the buildings for non-residential purposes. The main contention of the petitioners is that Delhi Municipal Corporation has no jurisdiction over the area and if at all it is Delhi Development Authority that could take action. ( 3 ) ADMITTEDLY, in all these cases the builders obtained sanction from the Municipal Corporation before putting up the construction. The sanctioned plan permitted putting up of two and a half floors. The sanction was obtained by the builders for putting up residential premises. This apart the respondents contend that the area is set apart as residential area. The respondents contend that the builders have filed suits against the demolition orders and recently Usha Mehra,j. by order dated 5. 12. 1994 vacated all the interim orders of injunction. We may also note that Letters Patent Appeal seems to have been filed but the appeal has not yet been posted. We, therefore, make it clear that any order made by us hereinafter will not be taken as a precedent for the orders to be made in the Letters Patent Appeal against the order dated 5. 12. 1994 made in Suit No. 159/1994 etc. ( 4 ) ALL the petitioners admitted that the builders obtained sanction for putting up residential buildings. The petitioners purchased some space in the buildings without looking into the sanctioned plan. All these premises are in the area called Karol Bagh, New Delhi. Petitioner in C. W. 4545/1994 (Shri Anil Kumar Khurana) states that he purchased a space in the building put up on plot No. l l/5-B, Pusa Road, Western Extension Area, under four agreements of sale dated 4. 7. 1994 (obviously during the pendency of the suits before Usha Mehra,j. referred above ). The petitioner purchased a built up area measuring 1560 Sq. Ft. on the 4th floor of the building. Petitioner in C. W. 3740/1994 states that he purchased some space in the building put up on plot No. 5 of the aforesaid road. The petitioner purchased some space under a sale deed dated 6. 7. 1994. Similarly, the second petitioner also purchased some space on the same date. Ft. on the 4th floor of the building. Petitioner in C. W. 3740/1994 states that he purchased some space in the building put up on plot No. 5 of the aforesaid road. The petitioner purchased some space under a sale deed dated 6. 7. 1994. Similarly, the second petitioner also purchased some space on the same date. Similar is the case with petitioners 3 and 4. It is clear that the purchase is only of a small portion in the building put up on plot No. 5. In C. W. 4547/1994, by Ved Parkash Chawla, the situation is not different. He purchased a portion of the space in the building put up in plot No. l7 of the same area under four different agreements of sale dated May and June 1994. The built up area purchased by the petitioner is 1150 Sq. Ft. on the ground floor of the building. The petitioner in C. W. 4546/1994, Devender Kumar, purchased a space in the building put up on plot No. l8 under four different agreements dated 15. 7. 1994. Even he admits that the builder actually got permission to put up only the residential building. The petitioner in C. W. 4957/1994, Mohan V. Kale, purchased a space in the building put up on plot No. 17, Pusa Road on the first floor measuring 1250 Sq. Ft. under the agreement of sale dated 21. 6. 1994. The petitioner in C. W. 4956/1994, Amarjeet Singh Aneja, also purchased some space in the building constructed on plot No. 17 and the petitioner purported to purchase the space in this building on 1. 6. 1994, of an area measuring about 800 Sq. Ft. on the third floor. The petitioner in C. W. 4959/1994, Raj Kumar Arora, is the alleged purchaser of a space measuring 800 Sq. Ft. on 4th floor of premises No-6/33 in the same area, on 25. 5. 1994. It is stated that the said building is erected on plot No. 33, block No. 6. The petitioner in writ petition No. 4958/ 94, is Anurag Khurana, who claimed to have purchased a space measuring 800 Sq. Ft. on 4th floor of premises No-6/32, in the same area on 25. 5. 1994. The building seems to have been put up in Block No. 6, plot No. 32, as stated in the writ petition. The petitioner in writ petition No. 4958/ 94, is Anurag Khurana, who claimed to have purchased a space measuring 800 Sq. Ft. on 4th floor of premises No-6/32, in the same area on 25. 5. 1994. The building seems to have been put up in Block No. 6, plot No. 32, as stated in the writ petition. ( 5 ) IN the matter of granting aninterim relief court is concerned mainly with the prima facie case and the balance of convenience. In the instant case, while appreciating the prima facie case of the petitioners, the court cannot close its eyes to the fact that these petitioners purchased space in buildings for which admittedly sanctions were granted by the Municipal Corporation only for residential purposes and the permitted floors were only 2-1/2. It is not open to the petitioners, prima facie, to contend that they were unaware of the sanctioned plan. They should have looked into the sanctioned plan, because for a building put up in a city like New Delhi the conditions under which a building is permitted to be put up shall have to be verified by any purchaser and the sanctioned plan cannot in any way be considered as irrelevant while examining the title of the seller. Secondly all these alleged purchases were recently made during the pendency of civil suits concerning the very buildings, filed by the promoters or the builders, and these. petitioners derive their title from those promoters/builders, even according to the petitioners. ( 6 ) THE respondents contend that the area is not notified as a development area under Section 12 of the Delhi Development Act and the petitioners have not placed before us any notification notifying the area as a development area. If so, prima facie the licensing authority or the authority to sanction the plan will be the Municipal Corporation. Without expressing a final opinion on the question argued by Mr. Lekhi, it is also necessary to point out that section 12 of the Delhi Development Act referred just now cannot be reconciled with the contention of Mr. Lekhi that by virtue of the U. P. Town Improvement Act the municipal powers have been vested in the Delhi Improvement Trust, succeeded by the Delhi Development Authority. It is also doubtful whether the leases granted by the DDA can be equated to the "crown Grant". Lekhi that by virtue of the U. P. Town Improvement Act the municipal powers have been vested in the Delhi Improvement Trust, succeeded by the Delhi Development Authority. It is also doubtful whether the leases granted by the DDA can be equated to the "crown Grant". Obviously there is also an order in respect of each of the building for demolition under Section 343 of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. It is too late for the petitioners to contend that they were not parties thereto, having purchased the said properties subsequent to such orders. ( 7 ) THE balance of convenience however, lies in not directing the demoli- tion of the buildings because if we direct demolition of the buildings nothing remains for consideration further. At the same time permitting the petitioners to use the building which was constructed beyond the permitted limits and used in contravention of the sanctioned plan will be extending the equitable jurisdiction of this Court to aid the petitioners to commit violations of the law. ( 8 ) IN the circumstances, we direct the respondents not to proceed with the demolition of the buildings in question, subject to the condition that the petitioners shall not use the premises in question for any purpose during the pendency of these writ petitions. ( 9 ) MR. Lekhi contended that in several cases this court permitted the user of the premises under similar circumstances for residential purposes. It should be noted that we are making this order after hearing the learned counsel for several days, and further that the facts of these cases reveal that these petitioners purchased the properties in question at a time when the suits filed by the builders against the Corporation were pending. ( 10 ) IN the result, we make the following order:- (I) The respondents are restrained from demolishing the respective portion of the buildings alleged to have been purchased by the petitioners in these writ petitions. Without affecting the spaces purchased by them, if the demolition operation can be proceeded with they are free to do so. (II) The above is again subject to the condition that the petitioners shall not use the building for any purpose. The petitioners are granted 15 days time from today to vacate the premises, if they think it is necessary to shift their materials. But they shall cease to operate from these buildings forthwith. (II) The above is again subject to the condition that the petitioners shall not use the building for any purpose. The petitioners are granted 15 days time from today to vacate the premises, if they think it is necessary to shift their materials. But they shall cease to operate from these buildings forthwith. In case the petitioners disobey this order, this court would proceed to vacate this order to enable the respondents to seal or demolish the building. It is ordered accordingly. We are told that Letters Patent Appeal has been filed against the order dated 5. 12. 1994 passed by Usha Mehra,j. in the suits involving these buildings. It is advisable to club these matters with the said appeal (s) and the date for hearing on 30. 1. 1995 given earlier by us, may be altered to suit the convenient hearing of the aforesaid LPA (s ).