A. B. SRIVASTAVA, J.-, J. This is a tenants writ petition against the judgment and decree of the J. S. C. C. , Moradabad, dated 24-4- 1992 whereby he decreed the suit of the plaintiff respondent No. 1 for ejectment, arrears of rent and house tax, and judgment dated 4-10-1994 of the Additional District Judge, Morada bad confirming the same in revision. In this case respondent No. 1 has filed caveat and his counsel stated that he does not propose to file any counter affidavit in view of the material placed on record by the petitioner, hence the petition is being disposed of finally at admission stage after hearing both the parties learned counsel. 2. The suit was filed by the respondent for ejectment, arrears of rent etc. with allegation that he is owner landlord of the house in question which was in the tenancy of the petitioner, on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,500. The building being constructed in the year 1979, the Act 13 of 1972 does not apply, besides the defendant was also in arrears of rent from 1-10-1985 to 31-1-1986. By a notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act, the tenancy was determined and by the same notice rent was also demanded which he failed to comply barring sending rent upto February, 1985, hence the suit. Apart from Rs. 2,300 rent and damages, Rs. 3,500 towards arrears of house tax was also claimed. The suit was contested by the defendant who contended that building in question being old construction, Act 13 of 1972 is applicable and the suit for recovery of arrears of house tax was not cognizable by the Court of Small Causes. 3. Both the courts below, accepting the plea of the respondent decreed the suit as stated above. 4. The first point canvassed in this writ petition on behalf of the peti tioner is, regarding jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes, the contention being that the said court having no jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit for recovery of arrears of house tax, the suit as a whole was not maintainable and should be returned for presentation to the Civil Court of original jurisdic tion, and the decree passed deserves to be set aside. This contention how ever is devoid of force. This contention how ever is devoid of force. Section 7 of Act 13 of 1972 provides subject to any contract in writing to the contrary, for the liability of the tenant to pay to the landlord in addition to and as part of the rent, the water tax and 25% of every such enhancement in house tax made after enforcement of the Act as is not occasioned on account of increase in the assessment of the building or as a result enhancement of the rent under Section 5 of the Act. In the instant case Annexure-1 the agreement, shows that there was also a contract for pay ment of house tax by the tenant. Accordingly the relief for recovery of the amount of house tax was also covered by the provisions of Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, and was well within the cognizance of the Judge Small Causes. 5. In Smt. Rajrani Kapoor v. Bhupendra Singh, 1990 (2) ARC 460, while interpreting Section 7 of Act 13 of 1972, rent has been held to include also house and water tax. 6. In this view of the matter, therefore, the plea that the suit as whole or any part thereof was not cognizable by the Court of Small Causes has to fail. Even in the event of the plea regarding claim for arrears of house tax being not entertainable by the Court of Small Causes being accepted, the suit as a whole would not have failed. Only part of the claim would have been dismissed leaving it open to the respondent to bring action on the said cause of action before the appropriate court, subject of course to the law of limita tion. Under law it is not incumbent in each case where in addition to the subject- matter, cognisable by a Court, such matter is also included, which is not cognizable that the suit as a whole will become non-cognizable by the Court of Small Causes and be returned for presentation before a court of original jurisdiction on the regular side. Where of course, the cause of action relating to two is so intermingled that one cannot be entertained in the absence of the other, such a course will be required to be adopted. 7. Where of course, the cause of action relating to two is so intermingled that one cannot be entertained in the absence of the other, such a course will be required to be adopted. 7. In Manjoorul Haq and another v. Hakim Mohsin Ali, AIR 1970, All 604, the question was whether the decision of a Court of Small Causes in a suit for arrears of rent, will operate as res judicata in a suit filed later in the court of Munsif for recovery of arrears of rent for a different period and for ejectment - prior to the conferment of jurisdiction on the Court of Small Causes to try a suit for ejectment in the year 1972. 8. In Narsingh Roy and another v. Shishu Gyan Mandir, Gorakhpur and another, 1982 (1) ARC 676, it was the suit for recovery of only house tax and water tax and not one where the said was claimed along with the relief of the ejectment and recovery of rent after determination of lease. It was in this context and also in view of the fact that it being a suit for an amount more than Rs. 3,000 which as money suit could not be cognizable by the Court of Small Causes for lack of pecuniary jurisdiction that the plaint was ordered to be returned for presentation to the proper court. This authority also does not support the plea of petitioner regarding lack of jurisdiction. 9. The next contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner regarding finding of the two courts about the building in question being exempt from the operation of Act 13 of 1972 on the date of suit also does not stand scrutiny. According to the explanation I to Section 2 (2) of Act 13 of 1972 the construc tion of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction and in the case of a building subject to assess ment the date on which the first assessment thereof came into being. 10. In the instant case there is concurrent finding of two courts below that the completion of the building was reported by the landlord to the local authority on 24-7-1979 and was received in the office of the Nagar Palika on 25-7-1979. 10. In the instant case there is concurrent finding of two courts below that the completion of the building was reported by the landlord to the local authority on 24-7-1979 and was received in the office of the Nagar Palika on 25-7-1979. As far as first assessment is concerned, admittedly it became effective from 1-8-1979 the earlier of the two dates i. e. 25-7-1986 will thus be the date of completion of the building in question. 11. Reliance has however, been placed in this regard by the petitioner on an endorsement of the Junior Engineer of the Nagar Palika on the sanction order to the effect that the construction had been completed on 21-3-1976. The courts below have found this endorsement not to be genuine. Even if it may be taken to be genuine, it cannot be taken to be the completion having been recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction. As per the provisions of the regulations of the Development Authority filed with supplementary affidavit by the petitioner himself, such power vests in a prescribed authority. There is nothing to show that the prescribed authority authorised the Junior Engineer to submit any report and any order to record completion, was passed by the prescribed authority in this regard. 12. Yet another plea that the completion of the building in 1976 has to be presumed because there is nothing to show that after the expiry of three years from 31-12-1975, the date of sanction of plan, any extension was taken by the respondent, is also not correct, because the mere fact of the extension not having been taken cannot necessarily mean that the building even if it was constructed beyond three years period, will have to be presumed to be constructed within three years period. 13. In the above facts and circumstances, therefore, the conclusion that the building in question was not governed on the date of filing of suit by Act 13 of 1972 cannot be assailed. The tenancy having been determined by means of a notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act the petitioner was liable to ejectment and the suit was rightly decreed by the courts below. 14. The writ petition is devoid of force and is hereby dismissed. There is no order as to costs. W. P. dismissed. .