Mr. K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. ( 1 ) THERE are three petitioners; the first is theassociation of truck owners, transport operators and goods carriers, the 2nd isa company engaged in the business of carriage of goods and the 3rd is a transporter engaged in the business of giving on hire trucks for the purpose of carriage of goods. ( 2 ). The petitioners challenge Circular No. 681 dated 8/3/1994 issued by thecentral Board of Direct Taxes, directing the application of Section 194-C of theincome Tax Act to several categories of persons, including the carrier of goods,like the 2nd petitioner. Section 194-C provides for deduction of the prescribedpercentage by the payer of the consideration and hand over the same to therevenue. ( 3 ). Mr. Pandey the learned Counsel for the Revenue raised a preliminaryobjection against the maintainability of the writ petition, on the ground that the1st petitioner is not actually carrying on the business and affidavit in support ofthe writ petition is not filed by the 2nd or the 3rd petitioners. ( 4 ). Since, admittedly, the 2nd petitioner is affected by the impugned circular,we reject the preliminary objection; non-filing of an affidavit on behalf of the 2ndpetitioner can be ignored as an irregularity, since, question involved in the writpetition is purely one of law and basic facts are undisputed. ( 5 ). On merits, it was contended, by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that carriage of goods for transportation cannot come within the scope of thewords, "carrying out any work" and therefore. Section 194-C of the Act is notattracted to the payment made for carriage or transport of goods. The word"work connotes the bringing out of a tangible object as in the case of a constructionwork. This apart, the petitioners rely on the earlier circulars issued by the1st respondent, immediately on the enactment of Section 194-C clarifying that transport operation would not be covered by Section 194-C. Petitioners also relyon Section 44ae of the Act, indicating that the subject of transport of goods hasbeen separately dealt with and it is not possible to reconcile Section 44ae withsection 194-C. ( 6 ). This last submissions need not detain us long, because. Section 44ae wasenacted only in the year 1994, while Section 194-C was enacted in the year 1972,though it underwent several changes subsequently. This last submissions need not detain us long, because. Section 44ae wasenacted only in the year 1994, while Section 194-C was enacted in the year 1972,though it underwent several changes subsequently. Further, Section 194-C, admittedly covers the cases of supply of labour for carrying out any work and thesame subject is dealt by Section 44ad also. The purpose of Section 44ae isdifferent from the scope of Section 194-C. Section 44ae provides an alternativemode of computing the income and paying the tax, while Section 194-C providesfor the payer of the consideration to deduct a percentage from it for paying it tothe revenue. If excess amount is realised under Section 194-C, the assessee canalways seek its refund, after computing the tax under Section 44ae. There is noconflict between these two provisions. ( 7 ). The petitioners rely on the doctrine of contemporanea expositio and the exposition received by Section 194-C at the earliest point of time, from the 1st respondent. ( 8 ). In K. P. Verghese v. I. T. Officer, Emakulam; AIR 1981 SC 1922 , the Supreme Court explained the relevant principle at page 1932: "the rule of construction by reference to contemporanea expositio is a wellestablished rule for interpreting a statute by reference to the exposition ithas received from contemporary authority, though it must give way wherethe language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. This rule has beensuccinctly and felicitously expressed in Crawford on Statutory Construction (1940 ed) where it is stated in para 219 that administrative construction (i. e. contemporaneous construction placed by administrative or executive officers charged with executing a statute) generally should be clearly wrongefore it is overturned; such a construction, commonly referred to as practical construction, although non-controlling, is nevertheless entitled toconsiderable weight: it is highly persuasive. "thereafter the Court held: "it is clear from these two circulars that the Central Board of Direct Taxeswhich is the highest authority entrusted with the execution of the provisions of the Act, understood Sub-section (2) as limited to cases where theconsideration for the transfer has been understated by the assessee and thismust be regarded as a strong circumstance supporting the constructionwhich we are placing on that Sub-section". ( 9 ). This doctrine was applied by this Court to the impugned circulars, andthe earlier exposition made by the 1st respondent, in S. R. F. Finance Ltd. v. Centralboard of Direct Taxes, 1994 IV Apex Decisions (Delhi) 489. ( 9 ). This doctrine was applied by this Court to the impugned circulars, andthe earlier exposition made by the 1st respondent, in S. R. F. Finance Ltd. v. Centralboard of Direct Taxes, 1994 IV Apex Decisions (Delhi) 489. ( 10 ). In the aforesaid S. R. F. Finance Limited Case the Bench has referred tothe earlier circular issued by the first respondent. In fact the Board specificallyclarified stating that a transport contract cannot ordinarily be considered as contractfor carrying out any work and assuch no deduction in respect of income tax isrequired to be made from payments made under such a contract. In the year1991 an attempt was made to widen the scope of the provision relating to taxdeduction at source by introducing Section 194h. By this Section payments byway of commission or brokerage were sought to be covered by the proceduresimilar to Section 194-C. But this provision also did not include payments madefor rendering services such as carrying the goods by transport operators. Subsequently Section 194-H was deleted by the Finance Act, 1992. Recently, in adecision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Associated Cementcompany Ltd. v. C. I. T. ; (SC) 201 ITR 435, the Court upheld the applicability ofsection 194-C to the case of the contract for supply of labour. Certain observationmade in the said decision to the effect that "any work" is a word of quiteamplitude, has been taken by the first respondent, as giving a very wide meaningto the provisions of Section 194-C and therefore, the present impugned circularhas been issued. ( 11 ). In the aforesaid S. R. F. Finance Limited case a Bench of this Court, ofwhich one of us (K. Shivashankar Bhat J.) was a member, has referred to thevarious proposals made to enlarge the scope of the procedure similar to the onein Section 194-C. But the Parliament ultimately did not enact any similar provision nor did it enlarge the phraseology of Section 194-C. Therefore, it was heldthat the interpretation given to Section 194-C by the Board at the earliest occasioncould be taken as the proper interpretation of the said provision, by the application of the doctrine of contemporanea expositio . ( 12 ). ( 12 ). Various attempts made to enlarge the scope of such a provision assection 194-C also indicated that Section 194-C is not as wide as is now soughtto be made out by the first respondent in its circular. If Section 194-C actuallygoverned the various cases as referred in the impugned circulars it was unnecessary for the Union Government to proceed to enact provisions like Section 194-H or194-E. ( 13 ). In S. R. F. Finance Limited case this Court was concerned with the applicability of Section 194-C to the business of leasing, hire purchase of articles suchas vehicles, plant and machinery etc. The Bench held that Section 194-C was notapplicable. The Bench held that these activities are activities referred as servicesand not "carrying out any work". A similar view shall have to be taken in the instant case also. ( 14 ). In Bombay Goods Transport Association v. Central Board of Directtaxes and Others; 1994 (76) Taxman 335 a Bench of Bombay High Court also hastaken a similar view that the cases of transportation of goods are not covered bythe language of Section 194-C of the Act. The Bench applied the doctrine of contemporanea expositio to arrive at this conclusion. We respectfully agree withthe said decision. Mr. Pandey, the learned Counsel for the Revenue. contendedthat in the case of services the dominant aspect is intellectual activity as observedin S. R. F. Finance Limited Case. Carriage of goods in no way involves any intellectual activity, it is a physical act of carrying goods. ( 15 ). It is unnecessary to go into the distinction sought to be made out by Mr. Pandey, relying on the decision in S. R. F. Finance Ltd. case. The observationsmade in the context of a particular case cannot be stretched for a purpose forwhich the observation was not aimed at. In fact we find a discussion on thisaspect of interpreting in the very decision rendered by the Court in the saids. R. F. Finance Limited case. The observation made in a decision shall have to beappreciated in the background of the facts of the said case. ( 16 ). In the result, the writ petition is allowed and it is declared that theimpugned circular is ultra vires the provisions of Section 194-C of the Incometax Act insofar as it purports to cover the cases of actual carriage of goods forhire. Mr. ( 16 ). In the result, the writ petition is allowed and it is declared that theimpugned circular is ultra vires the provisions of Section 194-C of the Incometax Act insofar as it purports to cover the cases of actual carriage of goods forhire. Mr. Sharma, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner fairly submitted that in a case where the dominant activity is loading or unloading and thecarriage of goods is only incidental different considerations may apply. Therefore, we confine our declaration as made above to the factual situation where thedominant activity is carriage of goods in which incidentally there may be loadingor unloading of goods. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. Rule madeabsolute. No costs. ( 17 ). I have read the judgment prepared by learned Brother Honlale Mr. Justicek. Shivashankar Bhat. With great respect, I agree with him in the ultimateconclusion arrived at by him. In view of the interesting point involved, I proposeto say a few words of my own with a view to showing that with the help andguidance of my learned Brother I have been able to appreciate the point involvedin its proper perspective. I read the judgment rendered by my learned Brothersitting with Hon ble Mr. Justice D. K. Jain in S. R. F. finance Ltd. v. Central Boardof Direct Taxes; 1994 IV Apex Decisions (Delhi) 489 where the scope of Section194-C of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has beenelaborately and succinctly dealt with by my learned Brother. As I said before,in view of the fact that I was very much absorbed, I am tempted to write a fewlines of my own. The facts of the case which are necessary for the purpose of the presentdiscussion are as follows :- ( 18 ). The first petitioner is Delhi Goods Transport Association. It consists ofmembers who are carriers and one of the members of the first petitioner-Association, who is the second petitioner, M/s. South Eastern Carriers Limited. Thesecond petitioner carrying on business as carrier for doing its business gets vehiclesfrom truck owners like the third petitioner, A. S. Nanda and other truck owners,the owners may be either societies or association of persons or companies. Thesecond petitioner carrying on business as carrier for doing its business gets vehiclesfrom truck owners like the third petitioner, A. S. Nanda and other truck owners,the owners may be either societies or association of persons or companies. Thethree petitioners have tried to expose a common cause by stating that the activities done by the second petitioner by carrying goods would not come within themischief of Section 194-C of the Act mainly on the ground that the departmentitself had understood it that their activities are outside the purview of Section194-C of the Act and incidentally getting clue from the analysis made by mylearned Brother and making a distinction between, for the purpose of appreciating the scope of Section 194-C of the Act for carrying out work is different fromrendering services, that cannot becharacterised as carrying out the work and,therefore, the rendering of such services would be outside the ambit of Section194-C of the Act, the petitioners contended that the activities done by the secondpetitioner would be rendering services and, therefore, they are not carrying outany work and, therefore, they are not governed by Section 194-C of the Act. Therevenue contended that the position taken by the petitioners is not tenable in lawand the transport contractors are only carrying out work and their activitiescannot be equated to rendering any service in the sense in which it was appredated in S. R. F, Finance Limited s case (supra) and regarding the main contentionthe Revenue contended that after the judgment of the Supreme Court in Associated Cement Company case the Revenue has taken a different view and, therefore, the petitioners cannot rely upon the circulars issued by the Central Boardof Direct Taxes and putting forth a plea that the Revenue itself had understoodthe term in a particular way in favour of the petitioners and, therefore, the Revenuenow cannot turn round and bring them into the tax net. It was further contendedthat a new provision has been introduced as Section 44 (a) (e) in the Act with effectfrom 1st of April 1994 and, therefore, when a specific provision has been enactedand the transport operators are obliged to file returns there is no point in applying Section 194-C of the Act to such cases. It was further contendedthat a new provision has been introduced as Section 44 (a) (e) in the Act with effectfrom 1st of April 1994 and, therefore, when a specific provision has been enactedand the transport operators are obliged to file returns there is no point in applying Section 194-C of the Act to such cases. In other words, the contention onbehalf of the petitioners is after the enactment of Section 44 (A) (e) with referenceto the petitioners Section 194-C cannot be made applicable to them at all and,therefore, according to the petitioners, when they are obliged by virtue of Section44 (A) (E) to pay tax if they receive income more than the limit prescribed underthe Act, there is no purpose in making third parties from whom monies arepayable to the transport operators to deduct as per Section 194-C of the Actwhich would cause hardship. The petitioners also tried to demonstrate by referring to certain hypothetical data how Section 194-C of the Act is wholly unworkable in the case of transport operators. So far as this aspect is concerned, evenat the time of arguments we indicated our view that we are not going to touchupon this aspect because applicability of a law to a given situation cannot bedecided on the basis of any hardship that may be caused to a few individuals. Any law is bound to cause hardship to a Section of a society. ( 19 ). Any law is bound to cause hardship to a Section of a society. ( 19 ). Section 194-C of the Income Tax Act reads thus:"payments to contractors and sub-contractors.-194-C. (1) Any personresponsible for paying any sum to any resident thereafter in this Sectionreferred to as the contractor) for carrying out any work (including supplyof labour for carrying out any work) in pursuance of a contract between thecontractor and(A) the Central Government or any State Government: or (b) any local authority; (e) any corporation established by or under a Central, State or provincialact; or (d) any company (or) (e) any co-operative (society or) (f) any authority constituted in India by or under any law, engagedeither for the purpose of dealing with and satisfying the need forhousing accommodation or for the purpose of planning, development or improvement of cities, towns and villages, or both; or (g) any society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (2) of1860 or under any law corresponding to that Act in force in any partof India; or (h) any trust; or (i) any University established or incorporated by or under a Central,state or Provincial Act and an institution declared to be a Universityunder Section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (3 of1956) shall, at the time of credit of such sum to the account of thecontractor or at the time of payment thereof in cash or by issue of acheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, deductan amount equal to two per cent of such sum as income tax onincome comprised therein. (2) Any person (being a contractor and not being an individual or a Hinduundivided Family) responsible for paying any sum to any resident (hereafter in this Section referred to as the sub-contractor) in pursuance of acontract with the sub-contractor for carrying out, or for the supply of labourfor carrying out, the whole or any part of the work undertaken by thecontractor or for supplying whether wholly or partly any labour which thecontractor has undertaken to supply shall, at the time of credit of such sumto the account of the sub-contractor or at the time of payment thereof incash or by issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever isearlier, deduct an amount equal to one per cent of such sum as income taxon income comprised therein. (Explanation.-For the purposes of this Section, where any sum referred toin Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) is credited to any account, whethercalled "suspense account" or by any other name, in the books of account ofthe person liable to pay such income to the account of the payee and theprovisions of this Section shall apply accordingly ). (3) No deduction shall be made under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2)from- (i) any sum credited or paid in pursuance of any contract the consideration for which does not exceed (ten) thousand rupees; or (ii) any sum credited or paid before the 1st day of June, 1972; (or) (iii) any sum credited or paid before the 1st day of June, 1973, in pursuance of a contract between the contractor and a co-operative societyor in pursuance of a contract between such contractor and the subcontractor in relation to any work (including supply of labour forcarrying out any work) undertaken by the contractor for the cooperative society. (4) Where the Assessing Officer is satisfied that the total income of thecontractor or the sub-contractor justifies the deduction of income-tax at anylower rate or no deduction of income tax, as the case may be, the Assessingofficer shall, on any application made by the contractor or the sub-contractor in this behalf, give to him such certificate as may be appropriate. (5) Where any such certificate is given, the person responsible for payingthe sum referred to in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) shall, until such certificate is cancelled by the Assessing Officer, deduct income tax as the casemay be. "in S. R. F. Finance Ltd. s case (supra) the petitioner is a financing companyengaged in the business of leasing hire purchase of articles such as vehicles, plantand machinery etc. The petitioner gets finance by getting deposits. These fixeddeposits are secured through various brokers who are paid brokerage at particular rates depending upon the scheme and duration of the deposits. The impugned circulars purport to explain the scope of Section 194-C of the Act anddirect the authorities under the Act to give effect to the provisions of Section 194-C of the Act as against the commission agents, brokers, lawyers, chartered accountants and others. The impugned circulars purport to explain the scope of Section 194-C of the Act anddirect the authorities under the Act to give effect to the provisions of Section 194-C of the Act as against the commission agents, brokers, lawyers, chartered accountants and others. The main submission in that case was that Section 194-Cof the Act did not govern the amounts payable to the brokers and in elaboratingthe point, the submission was that Section 194-C of the Act would be applicableonly to the payments made to any person for any work and not the paymentsmade as if for services rendered or commission paid to commission agents. Asin this case and also in that case the Revenue contended that Associated Cementco. v. C. I. T. , (201) I. T. R. 435 (SC) would take in professional services also withinthe term any work mentioned in Section 194-C of the Act. At para 4. 16 mylearned Brother, while dealing with the submission made, has pointed out thedistinction in a very beautiful manner and that paragraph reads as follows: "mr. Syali is right in pointing out the qualitative differences between thesubject, referred as work and the subject referred as service . The twowords convey different ideas. In the former (i. e. work the activity ispredominantly physical; it is tangible. In the activity referred as "services dominant feature of the activity is intellectual, or at least, mental. Certainly work also involves intellectual exercise, to some extent. Even a gardenerhas to bestow sufficient care in doing his job; so is the case with a mason,carpenter or a builder. But the physical (tangible) aspect is more dominantthan the intellectual aspect. In contract, in the case of rendering any kindof service , intellectual aspect plays the dominant role. The vocation of alawyer, doctor, architect or a Chartered Accountant (there are other similarvocations also) involves deep intellectual exercise any physical skill involvedin their vocational activities is minimal. A dancer s performance no doubtinvolves physical movement; but all the movements are projections of thetalent which is natural or acquired by training. A surgery certainly involvesphysically visible and tangible work; bit, inherently, it is the mental skilldeveloped by the intellectual exercise that permits the operation. A dancer s performance no doubtinvolves physical movement; but all the movements are projections of thetalent which is natural or acquired by training. A surgery certainly involvesphysically visible and tangible work; bit, inherently, it is the mental skilldeveloped by the intellectual exercise that permits the operation. "the learned Judge also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in K. P. Verghese v. I. T. O. ; A. I. R. 1981 SC 1922 for the doctrine of contemporanea expositio and applied the doctrine in the context of the circulars issued by the Revenue. Eventually the learned Judge speaking for the Bench concluded by saying: "section 194-C does not govern the payments of fees towards professionalor technical services. The term any work in Section 194-C is aimed at thetype of work resulting in tangible material and by virtue of the specialinclusion, supply of labour to carry out any work also is brought into thenet of tax deduction at the source. This inclusive clause ropes in theconsideration for the supply of labour . The word supply connotes themeaning of procuring , securing or bringing in and not rendering ofone s own professional or technical services. "in my humble view that the view taken by the learned Judge may not beconclusive answer in all cases. The learned Counsel for the petitioners broughtto our notice (1994) Vol. 76 Taxman 334, Bombay Goods Transport Associationv. Central Board of Direct Taxes. The judgment of the Division Bench of Bombayhigh Court. Para I itself is very important to appreciate the ratio of the decision. It reads as follows: "this writ petition filed by the Bombay Goods Transport Association andits honorary general secretary raises an important question as to whether acontract for mere carriage of goods which does not include any other services like loading or unloading and is not in any way connected with any work to be performed by the carrier can be said to be a contract for carrying out any work within the meaning of Section 194c of the Income-Taxact, 1961 ( the Act ). Though Section 194c is in the statute book right from1/4/1972, there was no controversy about the fact that payments made totransport contractors do not fall within the purview of the said Section. Thecontroversy has arisen recently with the issuance of circular by the CBDTbeing Circular No. 681, dated 8/3/1944 - (1994) 73 Taxman 277 (St. ). Though Section 194c is in the statute book right from1/4/1972, there was no controversy about the fact that payments made totransport contractors do not fall within the purview of the said Section. Thecontroversy has arisen recently with the issuance of circular by the CBDTbeing Circular No. 681, dated 8/3/1944 - (1994) 73 Taxman 277 (St. ). Theuncontroverted position is that prior to the issuance of the above circularthere were circulars and clarifications from the CBDT to the effect thatsection 194c was not applicable to payments made for carriage of goods tothe transport operators. "on 29/5/1972 in Circular No. 86, the Deputy Secretary to the Government ofindia soon after the enactment of Section 194-C issued a circular stating that thededuction of income-tax should be made from sums paid for carrying out anywork or for supplying labour for carrying out any work and it was stated thatprovisions of Section 194c would apply to only in relation to the works contract. and the labour contracts and will not cover contracts for sale of goods. Varioustrades associations and members of the public sought after clarifications on severalpoints relating to the scheme of tax deduction at source from payments made tocontractors and sub-contractors incertain cases. One of the points on whichclarification was sought for related to transport contractors. The following clarification was issued by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in Circularno. 93 dated 26/9/1972. It reads as follows: "a transport contract cannot ordinarily be regarded as contract for carrying out any work and, as such, no deduction in respect of income-tax isrequired to be made from payments made under such a contract. In thecase of acomposite contract involving transport as well as loading andunloading, the entire contract will be regarded as works contract andincome-tax will have to be deducted from payments made thereunder. Where, however, the element of labour provided for loading and unloadingis negligible, no income-tax will be deductible. "the Bombay Goods Transport Association itself by its letter dated 8/9/1972wanted clarification from the Commissioner of Bombay. The Commissioner ofbombay by his letter dated 13/10/1972 informed the association thus: "with reference to your letter No. BGTA/2/72/1361 dated 8/09/1972, I have been directed to state that provisions of Section 194c are notapplicable in respect of transport contractors". "the Bombay Goods Transport Association itself by its letter dated 8/9/1972wanted clarification from the Commissioner of Bombay. The Commissioner ofbombay by his letter dated 13/10/1972 informed the association thus: "with reference to your letter No. BGTA/2/72/1361 dated 8/09/1972, I have been directed to state that provisions of Section 194c are notapplicable in respect of transport contractors". It was again clarified by the Secretary to the Government of India by letterdated 3/2/1982 in reply to a query from some of the transporters staling that if thecontracts are purely transport contracts involving only transportation of goodsentrusted for carriage to the transport operators, the provisions of Section 194cwould not be applicable to such payments and if the contract involves executionof work including supply of labour, it may turn out to be a works contract andprovisions of Section 194c will be applicable to it. Therefore, the Bombay Highcourt concluded that there was no controversy at any point of time about the factthat the provisions of Section 194c were not applicable to payments made totransport operators for carriage of goods from one destination to the other. ( 20 ). The Bombay High Court noted that it was for the first time on 8/10/1993that the Central Board of Direct Taxes by its circulars sought to clarify in the lightof the decision of the Supreme Court in Associated Cement Company s case 1993vol. 201 I. T. R. 435 that any work in Section 194c has to be understood in its natural meaning , i. e. , any work means any work and not only a works contractwhich has a special connotation in the tax law. According to the Revenue, theseobservations of the Supreme Court would make the contracts for carrying outany work such as transport operators, transport contracts, service contracts, labourcontracts, material contracts, as well as works contracts etc. come within theambit of Section 194c. In para 11 the Bombay High Court noted two facts in theassociated Cement Company s case (supra ). There the contractor was to be paidat a flat rate for loading packed cement bags into wagons or trucks. This rate wasfixed on the basis of daily basic wages, dearness allowance, etc. , and the clausedealt with in the agreement between the parties stipulated reimbursement by theappellant to the contractors in case of certain increase in the dearness allowanceetc. , payable by the contractor to the workmen employed by him. This rate wasfixed on the basis of daily basic wages, dearness allowance, etc. , and the clausedealt with in the agreement between the parties stipulated reimbursement by theappellant to the contractors in case of certain increase in the dearness allowanceetc. , payable by the contractor to the workmen employed by him. The Cementcompany paid the contractor the amount stipulated at a flat rate as well asamounts by way of reimbursement under Clause 13 of the agreement. It wasfound out that the deduction of tax at source made by the appellant under Section194c (1) fell short of the deductions required to be made thereunder. When ashow cause notice was issued, the stand taken by the Cement Company was thatit was not liable to deduct any amount as the payments were not in respect ofworks contract. The Supreme Court observed: "there is nothing in the sub-Section which could make us hold that thecontract to carry out a work or the contract to supply labour to carry outa work should be confined to works contract as was argued on behalf ofthe appellant. We see no reason to curtail or to cut down the meaning ofthe plain words used in the Section, any work means any work and nota works contract , which has a special connotation in the tax law. Indeed,in the Sub-section, the work referred to therein expressly includes supplyof labour to carry out a work. It is a clear indication of the Legislature thatthe work in the Sub-section is not intended to be confined to or restrictedto works contract . work envisaged in the Sub-section, therefore, has awide import and covers any work which one or the other of the organisations specified in the Sub-section can get carried out through a contractorunder a contract and further it includes obtaining by any of such organisations supply of labour under a contract with a contractor for carrying outits work which would have fallen outside the "work but for its specificinclusion in the Sub-section". Therefore, in the light of the above observations, the contention on behalf of thecement Company that payments made on account of loading packed cementbags into wagons or trucks were not coming under Section 194c was turneddown by the Supreme Court. Therefore, in the light of the above observations, the contention on behalf of thecement Company that payments made on account of loading packed cementbags into wagons or trucks were not coming under Section 194c was turneddown by the Supreme Court. In para 15 of the judgment, the Bombay Highcourt said that "we are of the clear opinion that the provisions of Section 194care not applicable to Contract that do not include any other goods loaded orunloaded". Therefore, in the light of the discussion above, I am of the view thatthe case of the petitioners that they are merely carrying out the transportationonly and loading or unloading was only incidental and, therefore, they are outsidethe penumbra of Section 194-C has to be accepted. ( 21 ). In fine, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that a ratio laid down by this Court in S. R. F. Finance Ltd. s case (supra) would completely govern this case and, therefore, the writ petition is allowed and the Circular No. 681 dated 8/3/94, issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, is quashed, in so far as the petitioners are concerned. However, there will be no order as to costs.