G. P. MATHUR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners seek quashing of the proceedings of a Criminal Case initiated against them under Section 406 I. P. C. and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. ( 2 ) LALITA Mor-Respondent NO. 1 filed a Criminal complaint against the petitioners namely her husband Dinesh Kumar Mor, father-in-law Bhanwar Lal, mother-in-law Smt. Durga Devi, husbands brother Pawan Kumar and his wife Smt. Sushila in the court of VIIth Addi. C. J. M. Allahabad on 6/3/1991. The case of the complainant in brief, is that she was married to Dinesh Kumar Mor on 7/10/1988; that all the accused actively participated in the marriage and demanded dowry; that her parents and relatives gave articles worth Rs. 2,66,400. 00 by way of dowry and the same were entrusted to Dinesh Kumar Mor at the time of Bidait of the complainant and were taken into possession by other accused; that soon after the marriage the husband started beating and harassing her for bringing more dowry; that all the accused bet her and 29/4/1989 they came to Allahabad and left her at her fathers house; that the accused had refused to hand over her stridhan and the same was being illegally retained by them; that a registered notice was sent to Dinesh Kumar Mor on 1/10/1991 requesting him to return the articles but the same had not been returned so far and that all the five accused had dishonestly converted and used the Articles mentioned in the schedule to their own use and thus they had committed offence of criminal breach of trust. The learned Magistrate after recording statements under sections 200 and 202 Cr. P. C. summoned the accused under sections 406 IPC and 34 Dowry Prohibition Act by the order dated 29/4/1991. The present petition has been filed for quashing of the proceedings of the Criminal Case. ( 3 ) THE principal submission of Sri G. S. Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the petitioners is that according to the case of complainant dowry was given at Calcutta as the marriage was performed there and as all the accused are residents that place the articles were also retained by them there and as such the offence, if any, had been committed at Calcutta. The court at Allahabad had, therefore, no territorial jurisdiction to try the offence. The court at Allahabad had, therefore, no territorial jurisdiction to try the offence. ( 4 ) THOUGH it is not mentioned in the complaint as to where the marriage look place and where the articles mentioned in the schedule annexed with the complaint were given by way of dowry to the accused, a perusal of the statement and other material on record leads to the inference that the marriage as well as entrustment of all the articles by way of dowry to the accused took place at Calcutta. This fact is also not disputed in the counter affidavit. However, the further allegation is that the complainant sent a notice through her counsel from Allahabad to her husband Dinesh Kumar Mar at Calcutta asking him to return the articles which are mentioned in the schedule and that the said articles were actually not returned to her. The question to be considered is as to which Court has the territorial jurisdiction to try the offence. ( 5 ) IT is now well settled by the decision of Supreme Court in Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and Ors. that the gifts made at the time of marriage of Hindu woman is her Stridhan property and the husband though living together with his wife is not entitled to convert the property to his own use without her consent, if it was placed in his custody. Therefore, there can be no doubt that if Stridhan property of the complainant was entrusted to the accused and if they dishonestly misappropriated or converted to their own use the aforesaid property, they would be guilty of having committed criminal breach of trust as defined in section 405 IPC and would be liable for punishment u/s. 406 IPC. ( 6 ) THE legislature has enacted a specific provision regarding vanue of trial of an offence of criminal breach of trust. Sub-section (4) of Section 181 Cr. P. C. provides that any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be enquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of property which is the subject matter of offence was received or retained; or was required to be returned or accounted for, by the accused person. Shri Chaturvedi has submitted that the allegations made in the complaint show that entrustment of the property as well as retention of the property by the accused is alleged to have been done at Calcutta and, therefore, the Court at Calcutta alone had the jurisdiction to try1. A. I. R. 1985 S. C. 628. 2. 1992 Alid. Cr1. R. 265. the offence and not that of Allahabad. He has further submitted that last part of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 181 namely-or was required to be returned or accounted for-would be applicable only where there is a prior agreement or contract which has come into existence either before or simultaneously at the time of the entrustment of the property to the effect that the same was to be returned or accounted for at a different place and the provision would not be applicable where subsequent to the entrustment of the property, it was required to be returned or accounted for at another place by the owner thereof. In support of his submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on the Report of Law Commission and also the objects and Reasons for enacting this sub-section in the Code of Criminal (Act No. 2 of 1974) which are as follows:in view of the conflicting decisions of various High Court, we recommend that subsection (2) of 5. 181 (now sub-section (4) be amended thus (same as sub-section (4 ). We do not think it necessary to limit the additional alternative venue, namely, the local area where the Property was required (by law or contract) to be returned or accounted for by the accused persons, to cases where there is no evidence of the offence other than the failure to return or account for the property. Reference has also been made to a decision by a learned Single Judge of this Court in-Hansraj Chaudhary v. Smt. Savita in support of the submission that for the application of last part of this sub-section, there should be a prior agreement or contract for returning the property at a particular place in order to clothe the court of that place with territorial jurisdiction to try the offence. ( 7 ) IN the present case, we are concerned with criminal breach of trust of Stridhan-property. ( 7 ) IN the present case, we are concerned with criminal breach of trust of Stridhan-property. When articles are given by way of gifts to a bride at the time of marriage, no one can contemplate that a, situation would arise in future when a demand for return of stridhan-property from the husband or his other relations would be made and in the event of articles not being returned, a criminal prosecution would be launched. In fact, at the time of marriage everyone wishes and prays that the new couple would lead a long and happy married life. Therefore, the existence or coming into being of a prior agreement or even understanding that in the event of break up of marriage or for some unforeseen circumstances, the articles given by way of gifts would be required to be returned at a particular place is an almost impossible situation. The relations and friends who give gifts to the bride would shudder at the very idea that a contingency may arise when the lady would be asking for the return of the articles from his husband or his other relations. Therefore, so far as an offence of criminal breach of trust regarding stridhan-property is concerned, there cannot be any prior agreement for return thereof at a particular place. If the last clause of sub-section is interpreted in the manner suggested by the learned counsel, it will become redundant in so far as the offence of criminal breach of trust of stridhan-property is concerned. ( 8 ) IT is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside the words of statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in the circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. It is incumbent on the court to avoid a construction, if reasonably permissible on the language, which would render a part of statute devoid of any meaning or application (See Aswani Kumar Ghosh v. Arbinda Bose and Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of U. P. ). The Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. The Courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. The legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain and a constrution which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons (See J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills v. State of U. P. and State of U. P. v. Radhey Shyam ). 3. A. I. R. 1952 S. C. 369. 4. A. I. R. 1953 S. C. 394. 5. A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 1170. 6. A. I. R. 1989 S. C. 682. Therefore, the last part of the sub-section namely was required to be returned or accounted for- has to be given some meaning even where the territorial jurisdiction of a Court is to be ascertained with regard to an offence of criminal breach of trust of stridhan-property is concerned. Another settled principle is that in selecting out of different interpretations the Court will adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of these things as it may be presumed that the Legislature has used the words in that sense which least offends our sense of justice. If the grammatical construction leads to some absurdity or some repugnance or in consistency with the rest of the instrument, it may be departed from so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency (See Holmes v. Bradifield Rural District Council and Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal ). Therefore, in order to give full meaning and sense to the last part of sub-section (4) of Section 181, it will be proper to hold that without there being any prior agreement to that effect the Court at the place where the property is required to be returned will also have territorial jurisdiction to try the offence. Section 6 of Dowry Prohibition Act provides that where any dowry is received by any person other than the woman in connection with whose marriage it is given that person shall transfer it to the woman within, a specified period and the failure to do so makes the person liable for punishment. Section 6 of Dowry Prohibition Act provides that where any dowry is received by any person other than the woman in connection with whose marriage it is given that person shall transfer it to the woman within, a specified period and the failure to do so makes the person liable for punishment. In P. T. S. Sai Baba v. P. Mangatayaru, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that a woman can file complaint under section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act at the place where she is residing on the ground that it was the duty of her husband to return the dowry, after the specified period at the place where she was residing and the contention that the complaint can only be filed at the place where the dowry was given was repelled. Similarly in Bhim Singh v. State of Punjab and Surendra Kumar v. Suman Arora, it has been held that the Court of the ilace where the woman7. (1994) 1 All. E. R. 381. 8. A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 331. 9. 1978 Cr. L. J. 1362. 10. 1990 Puj. Law Reporter 187. 11. (1991) 2 Rec. Cr. R. 245. was residing and had demanded return of her Stridhan-property would have territorial jurisdiction to try the offence of criminal breach of trust. Hansraj v. Smt. Savita 1992 All. Cr. R. 265 cited by the petitioners has no bearing on. the point in issue as challenge to the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of an offence under section 406 IPC at the place where marriage was performed and dowry was given was repelled on the ground that entrustment of property hag been done at that place. ( 9 ) LEARNED Counsel has urged that on the view taken the wife can demand return of the property any where in India and file a complaint there which would cause great harassment to the husband and his relations. In my opinion the difficulty posed is more imaginary than real. The wife is not likely to demand return of the property at a place where she is not residing as it will be equally inconvenient and difficult for her to prosecute a criminal case at a third place. In my opinion the difficulty posed is more imaginary than real. The wife is not likely to demand return of the property at a place where she is not residing as it will be equally inconvenient and difficult for her to prosecute a criminal case at a third place. In view of the reasons discussed earlier the irresistible conclusion is that the place where the wife demands return of her Stridhan-property will also have territorial jurisdiction to try the offence of criminal breach of trust. ( 10 ) SHRI Chaturvedi has next submitted that the petitioners have committed no offence of criminal breach of trust and the complaint is, therefore, liable to be quashed. It is now well settled by a catena of decisions of Supreme Court, the latest being that of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal that the High Court can exercise powers under section 482 Cr. P. c. to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and that such power should be exercised sparingly and in rare cases. One of the grounds on which the power can be exercised is that the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not make out a case against the accused. The material on record has, therefore, to be examined in order to ascertain whether a prima-fade case has been made out against all the accused. It is mentioned in the complaint that and notice was sent on 1. 2. 199 1 asking for return of ( 11 ) A. I. R. 1992 S. C. 604. the property. Copy of this notice has been filed as Annexure-6 to the petition and its correctness is not disputed in the counter affidavit. The notice was sent by an Advocate on behalf of the complainant and was addressed to petitioner No. 1 Dinesh Kumar Mor alone. In the notice it is mentioned that the articles given at the time of the marriage were entrusted to petitioner No. 1 and were taken away by him alongwith his family members and are still in his possession. In the notice it is mentioned that the articles given at the time of the marriage were entrusted to petitioner No. 1 and were taken away by him alongwith his family members and are still in his possession. Para-12 of the notice reads as follows: That in the process, you retained all her belonging as stated in Annexuret A and B. It is important to note that in the notice the complainant asserted entrustment of the property to petitioner No. 1 alone. Para-5 of the complaint reads as follows: That the aforesaid articles were entrusted to accused No. 1 on 8. 2. 1988 at the time of Bidai of the complainant in the presence of accused Nos. 2 to 5 which were taken into possession by them". However, in paras 10 and 12 of the complaint, there is a general allegation that the articles given to the complainant by petitioner No. 1 and his relatives and friend in the marriage have been illegally retained by the accused persons and that the accused Nos. 1 to 5 have dishonestly used and converted the articles to their own use. Though, this is not the function of this Court to weigh or scrutinise the evidence in a petition under section 482 Cr. P. C. , however, the version of the complainant as given in he notice cannot be lightly brushed aside as the same was given by a person who is well versed in the field of law namely an advocate and that too almost two years after the complainant had been turned out of her matrimonial home which shows that considerable time had elapsed to enable her to consider and decide against whom to proceed. The clear allegation of entrustment of the property being only against petitioner No. 1 and there being no allegation of demand of dowry against remaining petitioners, in my opinion, it will not be proper to prosecute them, for the offence for which they have been summoned. The proceedings of the case should, therefore, continue only against petitioner No. 1 and not against the remaining accused. The proceedings of the case should, therefore, continue only against petitioner No. 1 and not against the remaining accused. ( 12 ) IN the result, the petition is partly allowed and the proceedings of Criminal Case No. 1746 of 1991 pending in the Court of VIlith A. C. J. M. , Allahabad as against petitioners No. 2 to 5 namely Bhanwar Lal Mor, Smt. Durga Devi, Pawan Kumar and Smt. Sushila are quashed. Learned Magistrate concerned shall proceed against petitioner No. 1 Dinesh Kumar Mor expeditiously and shall decide the same in accordance with law. Petition allowed partly. .