Judgment : Plaintiff is the appellant. 2. The suit filed by the plaintiff was to recover the plaint property on the basis of possessory title. .3. According to the appellant, she occupied one cent of “natham” poramboke in S.F.No. 149 A/1 in Veerapandi Village 15 years ago and constructed a building at a cost of Rs.500. Under Act 3 of 1905, her occupation was brought under B. Memo by the Revenue Authorities. She was served with Sec.5 Notice, and she paid prohibitory assessment for the suit property. 4. According to the appellant, the defendant (respondent) were occupying a building belonging to one Ponniah and A.D.S. Mani. They filed a suit O.S. No.305 of 1962, on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Gobichettipalayam, for eviction of the defendants. The suit was decreed, and the defendants were directed to be evicted. It was at that time, the defendants pleaded before the plaintiff that they may be permitted to occupy the scheduled building as a temporary accommodation till they secured some other suitable accommodation. 5. Taking into consideration their helpless condition, the appellant permitted the respondents (defendants) to occupy the house temporarily. 6. According to the appellant, she demanded the defendants to surrender vacant possession. But the defendants refused to vacate, and, on enquiry, it is understood that they are making attempts to get the land and building registered in their name. She has sought for recovery of the building with mesne profits at Rs.10 per mensem. 7. In the written statement filed by the defendants, it is admitted by them that it was the plaintiff who inducted them into the building. But it is averred by them that they have purchased the superstructure for a consideration of Rs.300 from the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has also issued a receipt for the same. According to them, they are in occupation of the building as owners. The land is a poramboke land, and the Government has accepted the occupation of the Scheduled building by the defendants. They further say that considering their occupation in the building, the Government gave compensation to them when a portion of it was destroyed by flood. The Government has also issued B Memo to the defendants. In view of the said Memo, they say that the plaintiff has no title, and the Government is a necessary party to the suits. .8. They further say that considering their occupation in the building, the Government gave compensation to them when a portion of it was destroyed by flood. The Government has also issued B Memo to the defendants. In view of the said Memo, they say that the plaintiff has no title, and the Government is a necessary party to the suits. .8. The trial court, by its judgment dated 21. 1981, held that the oral sale alleged by the defendants was not true. The lower appellate court further found that since the defendants have also no title, and the land where the building is situated is a Government land, the plaintiff as a person having previous possession, is entitled to recover possession of the plaint property from the defendants, the mesne profits sought for was also granted. Ultimately, the suit was decreed as prayed for. .9. The defendants filed A.S.No.l2of 1981 before the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Gobichettipalayam. In the appeal, the finding that the claim of the defendants that they have purchased the building for Rs.300 was found to be not correct, and the finding of the District Munsif that the defendants have not purchased the property, was confirmed. But the lower appellate court held that there is no allegation of dispossession and hence it cannot be said that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the property on the basis of prior possession. The suit was, therefore, dismissed, and the appeal was allowed. The plaintiff has preferred this second appeal is which the following substantial question of law has been raised. .“Whether the view of the lower appellate court that the plaintiffs suit is based on possessory title and as such he ought to have filed the suit within six months from the date of dispossession, is correct?” 10. According to me, when once it has been found that the defendant’s case of purchase of the building is incorrect and false, the plaintiff’s case of permissive possession has to be accepted. According to the plaintiff, the defendants were allowed to occupy the building temporarily till they secured another accommodation. The fact that the building originally belonged to the plaintiff is admitted, and it is also admitted that the plaintiff was in possession before 1971. It is from the plaintiff, the defendants say, they have purchased the building. According to the plaintiff, the defendants were allowed to occupy the building temporarily till they secured another accommodation. The fact that the building originally belonged to the plaintiff is admitted, and it is also admitted that the plaintiff was in possession before 1971. It is from the plaintiff, the defendants say, they have purchased the building. Both the courts below have found that the said claim of the defendants is not true. 11. In this case, the question whether the plaintiff was dispossessed, and whether she is entitled to claim possession on the basis of prior possession really does not arise for consideration. .12. The plaintiff says that on the basis of her permission, the building was occupied by the tenants, and the defendants’ case has not been accepted. The plaintiff is entitled to recover the building once she has withdrawn the permission. Even if there is any dispossession, it was the plaintiff who has given the consent to occupy, and the defendants are estopped from denying her title. The plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to recover the building from the defendants. 13. The question of law raised is, whether a suit should have been filed within six months from the date of dispossession. Once it is found that there is no dispossession, the question does not arise. But I am bound to answer the question. 14. In Nair Service Society v. K. C. Alexender, A.I.R. 1968 S. C. 1165, it has been held that a suit need not be filed within six months. In that case, it was held as follows: “Provisions of Secs.8 and 9 of Specific Relief Act are not mutually exclusive so that after the period of six months is over it cannot be said that a suit based on prior possession alone is not possible. Sec.8 of the Specific Relief Act does not limit the kinds of suit but only lays down by Civil Procedure Code must be followed. This is different from saying that a suit based on possession alone is incompetent after expiry of six months. The correct position is that if Sec.9 of the Specific Relief Act is utilised the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defendant does not avail him. This is different from saying that a suit based on possession alone is incompetent after expiry of six months. The correct position is that if Sec.9 of the Specific Relief Act is utilised the plaintiff need not prove title and the title of the defendant does not avail him. When however the period of six months has passed question or title can be raised by the defendant and if he does so the plaintiff most establish a better title or fail. In other words, the right is only restricted to possession only in a suit under Sec.9 of the Specific Relief Act but that does not bar a suit on prior possession within 12 years and title need not be proved unless the defendant can prove one. The present amended Arts.64’and 65 of the Limitation Act bring out this difference. Art.64 enables a suit within 12 years from dispossession, for possession of immovable property based on possession and not on title, when the plaintiff while in possession of the property has been dispossessed. Art.65 is for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title. The amendment is not remedical but declaratory.” In view of the law enunciated by the Apex Court, the suit based on possessory title need be filed only within 12 years from the date of dispossession. In view of the finding that the defendants are in permissive possession and the permission has been withdrawn by the plaintiff, I hold that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the property from the defendants as owner of the building. The decision of the lower appellate court is, therefore, set aside, and the judgment of the trial court is restored. The second appeal is accordingly allowed with costs throughout.