Judgment :- GOVARDHAN, J. 1. The first applicant in his affidavit contends briefly as follows: The respondent has filed the suit in O.S. No. 5149 of 1983 on the file of the learned XII assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras for declaration that the properties in schedules ‘A’ to ‘D’ are the joint family properties, that the business mentioned in Schedules ‘E’ to ‘H’ are joint family business and for partition and separate possession of the immovable properties in Schedules ‘A’ to ‘D’ and for release of accounts in respect of the business mentioned in Schedules ‘E’ to ‘H’. The applicant contested the suit stating that there was no joint family or joint family properties or joint family business. The learned XII Assistant Judge, dismissed the suit holding that the respondent failed to prove that the properties in dispute were purchased from the joint family nucleus. The learned Judge has granted the relief in respect of the properties purchased by the father of the applicant. The respondent preferred an appeal in A.S. No. 117/19 91 on the file of the III Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. The III Additional Judge has held that the respondent is entitled to a share in almost all the properties except a few. He has held that the properties in dispute were the joint family properties because there was a joint family. As against that said judgment of the learned III Additional Judge, the applicants have preferred the Second Appeal. Pending disposal of the first appeal, the respondent had an interim injunction restraining t he applicant and his agents from disturbing his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the business described in ‘F’ schedule. Under the guise of getting injunction, the respondent refused to permit the applicant to take part in the said business. He has not even permitted the applicant to enter into the business premises. Even assuming he is entitled to 1/7th share. The respondent can prevent the applicant from interfering with the ‘F’ schedule business only to the extend of 1/7th share. There cannot be any injunction against a true owner. Therefore, the applicant filed C.M.P. No. 7095/1993 in S.A. No. 593/1993 for ad-interim injunction and this Court by its order dated 18-5-1993 has granted ad-interim injunction. In C.M.P. No. 7096/1993, the applicants prayed for ad-interim stay and it was also granted by this Court by order dated 18-5-1993. There cannot be any injunction against a true owner. Therefore, the applicant filed C.M.P. No. 7095/1993 in S.A. No. 593/1993 for ad-interim injunction and this Court by its order dated 18-5-1993 has granted ad-interim injunction. In C.M.P. No. 7096/1993, the applicants prayed for ad-interim stay and it was also granted by this Court by order dated 18-5-1993. The respondent filed a petition to vacate the ad-interim orders granted by this Court. In the affidavit, he has admitted that the applicant has got a share in the business. The allegation in the application that the respondent was running the business from 1982 is false. He is preventing the applicants from taking part in the business. The allegation that the applicant has caused disturbance to the smooth conduct of the business is also false. He has been preventing the applicant from taking part in the business by engaging rowdy elements and exerting influence in the Police. It is the duty of the respondent to obey the interim orders granted by this Court whether it is right or wrong. But he has blatantly refused to do the same. The applicant has given a complaint to the police and it has been registered. The respondent who has prevented the applicant from taking part in the business in pursuance of the ad-interim injunction granted, is liable to be punished for contempt. Hence the application. 2. The respondent in his counter contends briefly as follows: The interim orders have been obtained in the vacation Court behind the back of the respondent suppressing true facts. The applicants have admitted that the respondent has been carrying on business at-least from 1982 and hence their case is they are entitled to 1/7th share in the business. Filing of the petition for injunction is therefore not tenable since there cannot be injunction against a co-owner. The business at No. 2, Badrian street, is the exclusive business of the respondent. The respondent filed an application for vacating the injunction. The Honble Mr. Justice Abdul Hadi allowed the said application by order dated 6-7-1993 and vacated the order of interim injunction. It would show that the ex parte order was obtained on untenable grounds. Applicants are doing a business known as ‘Sathiya Agencies’ at No. 5, Badrian Street. The respondent is having a share in it as it was one of the businesses conducted by the joint family. It would show that the ex parte order was obtained on untenable grounds. Applicants are doing a business known as ‘Sathiya Agencies’ at No. 5, Badrian Street. The respondent is having a share in it as it was one of the businesses conducted by the joint family. The respondents have to file a Memo of Cross Objections on the finding of the lower Court that the respondents are not entitled to a share in it. The applicants have high-handedly locked the godown and refused to allow the respondent to do business. It is an abuse of the order of the Court. The respondent did not interfere with the order and until it was vacated by the Court. There is no wilful disobedience of the order obtained. The application is liable to be dismissed. 3. The point for consideration is: Whether the respondent has committed contempt of Court by disobeying the order of this Court dated 18-5-1993? 4. Point : The respondent has filed the suit in the City Court in O.S. No. 5149 of 1983 for declaration, recovery of possession and for rendition of accounts in respect of the joint family properties and businesses mentioned in the Schedules ‘E’ to ‘H’ contending that they are joint family businesses. In the trail Court, the suit was dismissed except the relief of declaration in respect of the properties admitted to have been purchased by the father of the parties. It is to be noted that the first applicant and the first respondent are brothers, and the second applicant is the wife of the first applicant. Against the dismissal of the suit filed by him, the first respondent preferred an appeal to the III Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. The III Additional Judge has allowed the appeal on the ground that the disputed properties are the joint family properties. Aggrieved over the judgment passed in A.S. No. 1171/91, the applicant preferred a second Appeal to this Court during the summer vacation of 1993. On the basis of the averments in the affidavit filed in support of a prayer for ad-interim injuction and ad-interim stay of the judgment of the lower appellate Court, the relief sought for in the above applications were granted. On the basis of the averments in the affidavit filed in support of a prayer for ad-interim injuction and ad-interim stay of the judgment of the lower appellate Court, the relief sought for in the above applications were granted. In particular, in C.M.P. No. 7095/1993, this Court has passed an order to the effect that an injunction do issue to the first respondent, his agents and servants restraining the first respondent from preventing the petitioners from entering into the business. premises clearly described in the petition dealing with the customers and others and connection with the said business and also doing business pending further orders on this petition. In C.M.P. No. 7095/1993, the business referred in ‘F’ schedule is the business in the plaint. The ‘F’ schedule in the plaint is the business carried on under the name and style of “K.S. Ramachandra Rao & Sons” at No. 2, Badrian Street, Madras-1. The order granting ad interim injunction was one g ranted at the time of the admission of the Second Appeal ex parte before hearing the respondent and on the averments made in the affidavit of the applicant. In the affidavit filed in C.M.P. No. 7095/1993, the deponent has stated that even assuming without admitting that there was a joint family, there was no joint family property or business and his contention was accepted by the trial court and the trial court had dismissed the suit and it is in the lower appellate court. The learned III Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras has granted interim injunction restr aining the applicant and his men from disturbing the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the business described in the ‘F’ schedule and that the first respondent under the guise of getting injunction pending disposal of the First Appeal, in the ‘F’ schedule business has refused to permit him to take part in the said business and that he has not even permitted him to enter into the business premises. The applicant has also stated that even assuming without admitting that the respondent is entitled to 1/7th share, he can prevent the applicant from interfering with the ‘F’ schedule business only to the extent of 1/7th share and it is just and necessary for an interim order restraining the respondent from preventing the applicant to deal with the business mentioned in the schedule ‘F’ by entering into the business premises and dealing with the customers. These averments in the affidavit of the applicant in C.M.P. No. 7095/1993, ad interim injunction has been granted in favour of the applicant. 5. The applicant in this application for contempt contends that the finding of the lower Court is in his favour, that the respondent has been preventing him from taking part in the business by engaging rowdy elements and exerting influence in the Police and has blatantly refused to obey the order of this Court with the help of the Police and thereby committed wilful disobedience of the orders of this Court in the injunction application and therefore liable to be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act. The learned counsel relies upon the decision reported in Dipendra Nath v. State of Bihar (A.I.R. 1962 Patna Page 280); Ladies Corner v. State of Karnataka (1987 Crl. L.J. 2078) and would contend that in order to justify the committal of the defendant for contempt of Court, actual service of the order on the defendant is not necessary and it is sufficient if there is proof that the defendant had knowledge of the order ali undi and he knew that it was intended to be enforced. There cannot be two opinions with regard to the claim of the learned counsel appearing for the applicant that it is enough if it is shown that the defendant had knowledge of the injunction order and has wilfully disobeyed the same to make himself liable for contempt. But, we have also to see whether disobedience of the order of the Court by itself would make the person liable for contempt of Court. In the text book on the “Contempt of Court” by Mr. But, we have also to see whether disobedience of the order of the Court by itself would make the person liable for contempt of Court. In the text book on the “Contempt of Court” by Mr. V.G. Ramachandran 5th Edition at page 192, the learned Author has stated as follows: “In Chandramouli v. K. Apparao it was posited that disobedience of an order of a court whether prohibitive or mandatory, whether made ex parte or upon hearing both parties, or interim or perpetual, amounts to contempt if it is calculated or tends to interfere with administration of justice or brings it into disrespect or disregard though it might not have been intended and though it might not have interfered with the administration of justice. The violation of the Courts order may not be intentional. But to amount to contempt of cou rt, the violation must be wilful The determining factor is not harm done to the individual (i.e., the opposite party, in whose favour the order has been made) but the harm done to the future administration of Justice.” In the same book, at page 376, the learned author while dealing with Section 13 of the Act says as follows: “This provision reiterates the existing law that contempt is not punishable where it does not substantially interfere with the due course of justice. What is a trifling act cannot be magnified into contempt. It is below the dignity of court to take notice of insignificant acts and punish the doer of the act”. Therefore, we have to approach the case on hand bearing the above principle of law in mind and then decide whether the respondent has committed contempt. 6. The learned senior counsel Mr. M.N. Padmanabhan would argue that the act said to have been committed by the respondent is against an interim injunction granted by this Court and when the respondent has filed a counter to vacate the same, it was decided on merits that the applicant is not entitled to injunction and when once the injunction application is dismissed, it dates back to the date of application and therefore, it cannot be stated that there is a wilful violation of the order of this Court in Order to make the respondent liable for contempt. The argument of the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent that when once the injunction application has been dismissed, it dates back to the date of application, and therefore, it cannot be stated that there is any order to which the respondent had violated does not deserve any consideration at all, since the learned counsel has failed to take note of the principle laid down in the text book by the learned author Mr. V.G. Ramachandran when he says that disobedience of an order whether ex parte or after hearing both parties. Interim or perpetual would amount to contempt if it is calculated to interfere with administration of justice or brings it into disrespect or disregard to the administration of justice. Therefore, the subsequent dismissal of the interim injunction application cannot be taken advantage of by the respondent. The interim injunction has been passed on 18-5-1993. The respondent has filed the application for contempt on 23rd June, 1993 and the interim injunction already granted has been modified by the learned judge of this Court only on 6-7-1993 and the order passed by the Honble Mr. Justice Abdul Hadi being subsequent to the filing of the petition for contempt, the contention of the learned council appearing for respondent that the injunction has been vacated by the Honble Mr. Justice Abdul Hadi and therefore it cannot be stated that there is a contempt is without merits. I am of opinion that the modification of the order has to be considered as an order passed without prejudice to this contempt application. 7. The respondent in his counter has denied the allegation that he has disobeyed the order of this Court. The respondent has stated that when the applicant gave a complaint to the police, he gave a written reply that no action was taken and when the ex parte order of injunction was shown to them. They have informed the applicant that they are going to take steps to vacate the ex parte interim order and pursuant to the order of interim injunction, they never interfered with his exercising his right of his 1/7th share in the business. They have informed the applicant that they are going to take steps to vacate the ex parte interim order and pursuant to the order of interim injunction, they never interfered with his exercising his right of his 1/7th share in the business. It is also stated by him that the applicants high-handedly locked the godown and refused to allow the respondent to do business and it is an abuse of the order of this Court and that the order never allowed the applicants to carry on the entire business, and it is only that the respondent should not interfere with his 1/7th share and nothing more. The respondent has also stated that they never interfered with the right until it was vacated by the Honble Judge. It is thus seen that in the counter to the contempt application. The respondent has specifically pleaded that they have not disobeyed the orders of tins Court and they have only stated that they intend to file an application to vacate the order of injunction. Saying that they would take steps to vacate the order of injunction granted by the Court cannot be considered as an act of contempt. In these circumstances, it is expedient to consider the order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Abdul Hadi in the application for interim injunction. His Lordship has extracted paragraph 9 of the affidavit of the respondent in detail which would show that the respondent allowed the applicant to sit in the business premises and it was the applicant who took the key bunch of the godown and started giving trouble in conducting his business. It would also show that when the respondent questioned about the key bunch taken by him, the applicant lodged a police complaint and that sons of the applicant tried to remove the stock in trade from the business premises to which the respondent had objected and that they threatened to kill him and his brother. It is further stated by the respondent in his counter that suddenly on 4-6-1993 the first appellant entered into his business premises and demanded him to give the keys of the cash box to which he objected and thereafter the first appellant behaved rudely and fisted him causing bleeding injuries to his lips and he gave a police complaint. It is further stated by the respondent in his counter that suddenly on 4-6-1993 the first appellant entered into his business premises and demanded him to give the keys of the cash box to which he objected and thereafter the first appellant behaved rudely and fisted him causing bleeding injuries to his lips and he gave a police complaint. It is also stated by him that he was sent for medical examination by the police to the General Hospital to take treatment. After extracting all these averments made by the respondent in the counter, the learned Judge has observed that as against these several allegations, there is no specific denial in the reply affidavit and the learned judge has observed in the next paragraph that, in the light of these features, there is no justification for granting an interim injunction that is asked for in the C.M.P. 7095 of 1993. From the above order of the learned Judge, it is apparent that the learned Judge has accepted each and every averment made by the respondent in his counter to the injunction application and that on that ground alone came to the conclusion that there was no justification for granting an interim injunction that was asked for in the C.M.P. No. 7095 of 1993. This conclusion of the learned Judge has become final and the earlier order passed by this Court was also modified by the learned Judge directing the respondent to submit accounts once in two months. It has to be noted that there is a dispute between the parties with regard to the running of the business in ‘F’ schedule viz., shop at No. 2, Badrian Street. The request of the plaintiff viz., the respondent herein for declaration and other reliefs in so far as this property were not granted to him by the trial Court. The same were given to him in pursuance of the order passed by the lower appellate Court. The applicant who has got an interim order in his favour in C.M.P. No. 7095 of 1993 is said to have been permitted to sit in the business by the respondent against whom the stay order has been issued and he is said to have taken advantage of the order in his favour and cause some trouble to the respondent which has been taken note of by the Honourable Mr. Justice Abdul Hadi in order to modify the order. It would indicate that the order passed by this Court on 18-5-1993 has been complied with by the respondent against whom, it has been issued. No doubt, there are complaints against each other. It is in this background, the whole matter has to be approached when we consider this Contempt Application. The learned counsel appearing for the applicants has requested this Court to consider all the other applications filed in this suit viz., C.M.P. Nos. 8437, 14476, 14477 and 14478 of 1993 as part of this Contempt Application, including the application for appointment of Receiver and decide the same in his favour. I am of opinion that the request by the learned counsel appearing for the applicant to consider all the other applications viz., C.M.P. Nos. 8437, 14476, 14477 and 14478 of 1993 would show that the applicant wants to achieve things which have been denied to him on account of the modification of the interim order by the Honourable Mr. Justice Abdul Hadi and in my opinion, it is not an indication of upholding the dignity and decorum bf the Court but, the applicant wants, to vindicate his right somehow or other. It is needless for me to point out that contempt proceedings are mainly to uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court and not to vindicate the rights of the parties. When we consider the scope of Section 13 of the Act, we have to hold that it is only a wilful and deliberate violation of the Courts Order and the contumacious conduct on the part of condemner, which is to be condemned in contempt proceedings and no Court shall impose a sentence for contempt unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such nature that it substantially interferes with the due course of justice. A wilful and deliberate violation of the order of Court must be shown to interfere with the due course of justice before such conduct can be punished for the contempt. The version of the respondent that the petitioner has been permitted to sit and do business along with the respondent as per the direction given by this Court in the interim order and the petitioner taking advantage of the same has attempted to interfere with affairs of the business conducted by respondent has been upheld by the Honourable Mr. The version of the respondent that the petitioner has been permitted to sit and do business along with the respondent as per the direction given by this Court in the interim order and the petitioner taking advantage of the same has attempted to interfere with affairs of the business conducted by respondent has been upheld by the Honourable Mr. Justice Abdul Hadi and it would indicate that the application has not been filed by the applicant to uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court but to vindicate his right, in which case it cannot be stated that the applicant has made out a case against the respondent. It is not as if the respondent has disobeyed the orders of this Court on the ground that it is an erroneous one on account of the modification of the same since the modification is subsequent to the alleged act of contempt. Both the first applicant and the respondent contend that the other person is entitled to 1/7th share and the other cannot claim the remaining 6/7th. The Honourable Mr. Justice Abdul Hadi has given a direction to the respondent to render accounts. The learned counsel appearing for the applicants would argue that the Honourable Mr. Justice Swamidurai has given interim injunction restraining the respondent from alienating any portion of the subject matter of the suit and the Honourable Mr Justice Abdul Hadi has granted a direction to the respondent to render accounts once in two months and these two orders were passed when the Contempt Application is pending and he does not want to say anything further, meaning that those orders should not have been passed on account of the pendency of the Contempt Application. This argument would also indicate that the applicant wants to vindicate his right rather than uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court which is an essential thing to find a person guilty of Contempt of Court which is a quasi criminal proceeding. It is more so when both the above applications have been filed by the applicant himself. 8. This argument would also indicate that the applicant wants to vindicate his right rather than uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court which is an essential thing to find a person guilty of Contempt of Court which is a quasi criminal proceeding. It is more so when both the above applications have been filed by the applicant himself. 8. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant would argue that along with the injunction application the applicant has filed an application for stay and obtained stay of the operation of the lower courts order and it is still in force and therefore refusing to permit the applicant to participate in the business in the ‘F’ schedule would amount to an act of contempt since the respondent has got the right to do the business in the ‘F’ schedule only as per the judgment of the lower appellate Court whic h has been stayed by this Court in C.M.P. No. 7096/1993. The order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Abdul Hadi in modifying the earlier order of ad interim injunction was only on account of the satisfaction of the Honourable Judge about the allegations made against the applicant who is said to have been permitted to sit in the business premises along with the respondent. If it were so, he cannot have any grievance. The applicant, therefore, cannot claim immunity on the acts of commission complained against him on the ground that the order of the lower appellate Court has been stayed by the order passed by this Court, and then complain that the respondent has committed contempt. This contention of the applicant and also the request of the applicant for appointing a Receiver to take over the business in the ‘F’ schedule only shows that the applicant wants to vindicate his rights through this Contempt Application and this application has not been filed to uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court. I am of opinion that the Court cannot encourage such an attempt by the litigant simply because it is stated that the respondent has wilfully disobeyed the order of this Court and thereby committed an act of contempt. I have already referred to the commentary under Section 13 of the Contempt of Court Act by Mr. I am of opinion that the Court cannot encourage such an attempt by the litigant simply because it is stated that the respondent has wilfully disobeyed the order of this Court and thereby committed an act of contempt. I have already referred to the commentary under Section 13 of the Contempt of Court Act by Mr. V.G. Ramachandran at page 376 that what is a trifling act cannot be magnified into contempt and that it is below the dignity of Court to take notice of insignificant acts and punish the doer of the act. When the interm injunction order has been modified by the Honourable Judge of this Court, to hold the respondent as having committed contempt on the ground that the stay granted by this Court is still in force is in my opinion an insignificant fact, for which the respondent cannot be found guilty of contempt and punished. Therefore, I am of opinion that the applicant has not made out a case for finding the respondent guilty of Contempt of Court and punish him thereunder and therefore, the application is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. 9. Before parting with this application, I wish to observe that any observation made in this order cannot be taken advantage by either party during the arguments in the second appeal. 10. In the result, the application is dismissed. Contemner is discharged. No. costs.