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1994 DIGILAW 88 (GAU)

Jnanendra Kumar Paul Choudhury v. General Insurance Corporation of India

1994-05-12

M.SHARMA

body1994
This application for contempt of Court has been filed by the petitioner for non compliance of the judgment and order dated 8.9.88 passed by the Division Bench of the Court in Civil Rule No. 241 of 1979. 2. The writ petitioner in the said Civil Rule was the Branch Manager of one of the Insurance Companies (M/s Howrah Insurance Company Ltd), Nagaon which ceased to exist after enactment of General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972. After the nationalisation, the petitioner was declared as Field Worker and thereafter promoted as Inspector Grade II and then as Inspector Grade I. In the writ petition the allegation was that he was categorised without jurisdiction as Field Worker by the Lower Management Service Committee appointed by the Chairman of the New India Assurance Co. Ltd meant for the development staff as a consequence of which the peti­tioner being placed at the bottom of the development staff of the business suffered both in pay benefit as well as in promotion. As his representation had not been attended to by the concerned respondents he filed the writ petition being Civil Rule No. 241 of 1979 and this Court by judgment dated 8.9.88 directed the respondents to reconsider the petitioner's categori­sation and expressed Court's view that the petitioner may be considered at least as a Junior Officer as the Court was not inclined to issue Mandamus and refer the matter for reconsideration of the respondents. After this judg­ment, the writ petitioner issued notices to the respondents contemners for compliance of the order. Alleging that the petitioner's case was not considered as per direction of this Court, the petitioner filed petition praying before the Court to draw an appropriate contempt proceeding against the contemners for their wilful delay and latches in reconsidering the categorisation of the petitioner. The contemners filed affidavit countering the allegations of wilful disobedience of the order of the Court. In defence of their stand the contem­ners contended that on the nationalisation of the General Insurance Business the General Insurance Corporation of India and its four subsidiary companies, namely, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd, National Insurance Company Ltd, United India Insurance Company Ltd and New India Assurance Company Ltd were formed taking in their folds the various insurance companies in existence prior to such nationalisation. After such nationalisation by notification dated 8th May, 1972 a committee was appointed called 'General Insurance Service Integration Committee', commonly known as "Mathrani Committee' and the said committee submitted recommendation in respect of categorisation of emp­loyees only at the senior most level and for the lower category employees the Board of Directors of the Corporation in its 34th meeting held on 27th May, 1974 passed resolution constituting a 'Lower Management Service Committee' for each of its subsidiary companies to recommend the names of persons suitable to hold the post at the Lower Management Level in order to make provisional appointments and to prepare provisional seniority list for the said level, but not authorised to categorise the incumbent as an officer or a member of the development staff. Accordingly under the said process the petitioner was categorised as member of the development staff on the basis of norms evolved in the said post. Against this petitioner preferred appeal before the appellate committee constituted for the purpose but the same was rejected. 3. This aspect was placed before the writ Court at the time of hearing and considering this, Court held as follows : "As a writ Court we cannot decide to which category of officers the peti­tioner belongs and to direct the respondents to categorise the petitioner as such. We can only direct the appropriate authority to reconsider the question of categorisation of the petitioner." It is further held that : "We may further state that according to us the claim of the petitioner to categorise him at least as a Junior Officer has appeared as justified and so we hope he would be classified at least as Junior Officer inasmuch as the petitioner could not have been reasonably regarded to belong to Class II cadre of development staff." 4. Apparently the respondents constituted a committee to consider the petitioner's case as per direction of the said judgment. A committee was constituted for the purpose and petitioner was heard at length and the earlier decision of categorisation of the petitioner had been upheld on the reasons given in the report of categorisation committee (Annexure III to the show cause reply of the respondents). 5. A committee was constituted for the purpose and petitioner was heard at length and the earlier decision of categorisation of the petitioner had been upheld on the reasons given in the report of categorisation committee (Annexure III to the show cause reply of the respondents). 5. In his contempt petition the petitioner challenged the authority and jurisdiction to constitute the categorisation committee as this committee was formed with the Chairman cum Managing Director of its subsidiary, namely, the New India Assurance Company Ltd. According to the petitioner the committee should have been constituted exclusively with the Board of Directors of the General Insurance Corporation and not with the Chairman cum Managing Director of the subsidiary the New India Assurance Company Ltd. Petitioners stand was that to consider the categorisation of the petitioner the authority was only with the committee constituted by the Board of Directois of the Corporation. The reply of the contemners to the allegation is that the categorisation of the petitioner alongwith others was done initially by the Lower Management Service Committee constituted by the Board of Directors of the Corporation. The petitioner was categorised by the said committee as a member of the development staff inaceordance with the norms evolved for the said purpose. The subsequent categorisation of the petitioner as Field Worker in Class II category was done by the committee duly consti­tuted under the 1976 scheme and on completion of the process of categorisa­tion the said committee was dissolved and the members thereof retired in due course. It was, thetefore, not possible to have the said committee reconstitu­ted for reconsideration of the question of categorisation of the petitioner. There was also no specific order in the judgment that the said committee has to reconsider the question of categorisation of the petitioner which is beyond the control of the contemners/respondents. The judgment specifically stated that the matter was left to be decided either by the committee of the Board or any other appropriate authority (underline supplied) and in compliance to the direction the Chairman cum Managing Director of the company constituted a committee for reconsideration of the question of categorisation of the petitioner. 6. The judgment specifically stated that the matter was left to be decided either by the committee of the Board or any other appropriate authority (underline supplied) and in compliance to the direction the Chairman cum Managing Director of the company constituted a committee for reconsideration of the question of categorisation of the petitioner. 6. Annexure 3 to the show cause reply clearly indicates that the contempt petitioner did not contend the factual position but represented that he was working in different area and his business performance should be evaluated in this context and on that basis the committee found the categorisation of the petitioner justified on the basis of his business performance set out in his bio data. It is further contended that as understood by the contemners the judgment of this Court did not direct the respondents to categorise the peti­tioner as Junior officer but left it to be decided by the appropriate authority entrusted with the duty to reconsider the question of categorisation of the petitioner and on the materials available on record and the norms evolved for the purpose and uniformaly applicable to all similarly situated employees of the company came to a definite finding that the categorisation of the petiti­oner as a member of the development staff and as a Field Worker was correct and justified. 7. From the above discussion it emerges that as per the direction of the judgment the respondents contemners constituted the committee to reconsider the petitioner's categorisation and arrived to a certain finding. Now the question before this Court is whether this finding amounts to wilful disobedi­ence of the Court's order. Contemners categorically contended that there is no intention on the part of the respondents to deliberately disobey any direction of this Court, that respondents were under the impression that process of reconsideration of the question of categorisation of the petitioner was complete on affording him an opportunity of personal hearing and the matter was done within the extended time by the order of the Court. Lastly the respondents contemners submitted that if the order of the Chairman cum Managing Director, confirming the categorisation of the petitioner as member of the development staff and as a Field worker is held by this Court as wilful disobedience and not in conformity with the direction of this Court the contemners tender unconditional and unqualified apology for the same. 8. 8. In catena of decisions of the High Courts the position of law is that resort to contempt proceeding for the purpose of securing execution of the Court's order for the benefit of a private litigation is not to be encouraged and that the contempt proceedings are not substitute for proceeding with enfor­cement of private legal rights. The purpose of the contempt proceeding is not to execute any order for which aggrieved party shall nave recourse to other proceedings known to law. 9. In the instant contempt petition the petitioner challenged the consti­tution of the committee for categorisation as not valid and without jurisdiction to consider the case of the petitioner. Apparently this stand has set out a new case for the petitioner for which he cannot get relief on execution of the earlier order on the strength of a contempt petition as the purpose of contempt is not to execute its judgment or order. Contempt of Court signifies wilful disregard or disobedience of Court's order. It also signifies such conduct as stand to bring the authority of the Court and the administration of law into disrupt. Inability to comply an order, as directed by the Court, under some reasonable circumstances, cannot amount to a contempt. It is also a settled position of law that there is no contempt in inability to obey orders of the Court where the party charged with contempt, without fault on his part, is beyond its control to comply with the order. The criteria to understand whether contempt of Court has been made by contemners Court has to exa­mine the conduct of the contemners which attributed the effect of contumacy to the prestige and authority of the Court and which is likely to lower the esteem of the Court in the mind of public. To constitute the contempt essential, ingredient is wilful disobedience and 'wilful' connotes 'purposeful and clear intention to flout' (1986 Patna LJR (HC) 933). Every infraction of the Court's order does not amount to contempt of Court until and unless wilful and deliberate violation of the Court's order is proved. To constitute the contempt essential, ingredient is wilful disobedience and 'wilful' connotes 'purposeful and clear intention to flout' (1986 Patna LJR (HC) 933). Every infraction of the Court's order does not amount to contempt of Court until and unless wilful and deliberate violation of the Court's order is proved. In 1987 Crl LJ 1845 (Ahmed All vs. The Superintendent, District Jail, Tezpur & others) which was relied in (1988) 1 GLR 352, it was held : ''One of the essential attributes of a Court of a Record is to exercise an inherent power in itself to protect and foster the administration of justice. It is essential to safeguard the dignity of the Court and protect it from any attack any one which would undermine this dignity and lower the Court's prestige in the eyes of the common man. So what would offend this dignity and lower the Court's prestige is a matter for the Court to determine. A fortiori what is contumacious is for the Court to decide. Its discretion cannot be confined within the four walls of a definition." It was further held : "It is settled that mere unintentional disobedience is not enough to hold one guilty of contempt. Although contempt may be committed, in the absence of wilful disobedience on the part of the contemner, he will not be held guilty unless the contempt involves a degree of fault or miscon­duct. Thus accidental or unintententional disobedience is not sufficient to justify one's being held guilty of contempt." 10. As it appears for an amicable settlement an ex gratia payment of Rs. 30.000/- was made to the contempt petitioner by order dated 19.1.90 and the same was accepted with protest that he is entitled to payment as a Junior Officer. It is the stand of the contemner that the ex gratia payment was offered as desired by the Court for an amicable settlement and not as a payment to which the petitioner is entitled. From the above discussion I hold that there was no deliberate wilful vialation of the Court's order. It is the stand of the contemner that the ex gratia payment was offered as desired by the Court for an amicable settlement and not as a payment to which the petitioner is entitled. From the above discussion I hold that there was no deliberate wilful vialation of the Court's order. The contemners after giving opportunity to the petitioner, as per direction of this Court, found the petitioner not entitled to his claim and petitioner's challenge of the constitution of the committee for categorisation cannot be decided in the contempt petition which apparently is a separate cause of action and for which petitioner has recourse through other proceedings known to law. 11. In the result the contempt petition is dropped.