S. B. MAJMUDAR, C. J. ( 1 ) THERE is no substance in these appeals. The appellants are spinning mills and some of them are composite mills and all of them are situated in Bangalore District, except appellant No. 2 in W. As. 853 to 859 of 1994, which is situated in the District of dharwad. ( 2 ) THE first respondent The Textile Commissioner, actingunder the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948 (for short, 1948 order') had issued a notification calling upon all the producers of 'yarn' to comply with the provisions of the notification dated 30th march, 1985 in No. CER/17/85/1 as amended from time to time, to pack 'yarn' for civil consumption in the form of 'hank' in each half yearly period in proportion of not less than 50% of the total 'yarn' packed by a producer. ( 3 ) THE appellants contended, by filing the writ petitions, thatthe said notification was ultra vires on various grounds. These writ petitions were filed in the year 1986. Now, during the pendency of these writ petitions, the Supreme Court decided the validity of this very notification by its Judgment in G. T. N. Textiles Ltd. v Assistant Directors, Regional Office of the Textile commissioner and Others. The Supreme Court took the view that the impugned notification directing the manufacturers to pack the 'yarn in hank form, issued under Clause 21 (5) of the 1948 Order, was not violative of Articles 14 and 19 (l) (g) of the constitution, and upheld the Constitutional validity of Clause 16 (1) of the Textiles (Control) Order, 1986 (for short, 1986 order') and the notification issued thereunder, as amended from time to time. The decision was rendered by the Supreme Court, in connection with appeals on Special Leave granted against the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing such writ petitions. In paragraph 12 of the Judgment, Kuldip Singh, J. , speaking for the Supreme Court, held that the impugned notification has been made applicable uniformly to all the producers of yarn and that the appellants therein were required to pack yarn in hank form in the proportion as provided in the notification keeping in view the total yarn packed by the mill concerned. In view of this decision, therefore, it becomes obvious that all manufacturers of yarn are bound to comply with the notification. In view of this decision, therefore, it becomes obvious that all manufacturers of yarn are bound to comply with the notification. The appellants submitted before the learned single judge that the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in g. T. N. Textiles Ltd. 's case (supra), was rendered in the light of articles 14 and 19 (l) (g) of the Constitution, but the appellants wanted to raise a new ground viz. , that the Textiles (Control) order itself was ultra vires and was beyond the competence of the Parliament; and therefore, the notification would fall through on that ground alone and would not bind the manufacturers of yarn. The learned single Judge, before whom these submissions were made, rightly took the view that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of G. T. N. Textiles Ltd. (supra), this argument may not survive for consideration. However, a Division Bench decision of this Court in Ferro Concrete Company of India (Steels) Ltd. v State of karnataka , was pressed into service, under which the Division bench had taken the view that there was a difference between a point and an argument and if a new point is raised, which is not considered by the Supreme Court, such challenge would be permissible by way of a separate writ petition. The learned single Judge went into the merits of the matter and repelled this objection even on merits by taking the view that the impugned order was within the legislative competence of the Parliament and the result was that the writ petitions were dismissed. The appellants are before us against the said decision. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the appellants vehementlycontended that the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in g. T. N. Textiles Ltd. 's case (supra), having not spoken on the question of legislative competence of Parliament for enacting this Textiles (Control) Order, that contention can be agitated by the appellants and the same can be considered by this Court. We are afraid, it cannot be done. The reason is obvious. We are afraid, it cannot be done. The reason is obvious. If we accept this contention of the appellants and on merits if we agree with the appellants and take the view that the Textiles (Control) order was ultra vires and was beyond the competence of the parliament and therefore the notification issued under that order must fall through, our conclusion would necessarily conflict with the decision of the Supreme Court on the point, namely, that all the manufacturers of yarn in the country will have to pack yarn as per the said notification. Therefore, even if this new ground is considered and allowed, it will ultimately result in a decision which may conflict with the main decision of the Supreme Court on the validity of the notification though upheld under Articles 14 and 19 (l) (g) of the Constitution. It is now well-settled by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court that the decision rendered by the Supreme Court is binding on all concerned under Article 141 of the Constitution, whether they were the parties before the Supreme Court or not. It is true that the present appellants functioning in Karnataka State were not the parties before the Supreme Court as the matter arose out of the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, but the challenge was to the very same notification and that challenge was repelled by the Supreme Court under Article 19 (l) (g) and article 14 of the Constitution. Legislative competence question was not raised, for reasons best known to the appellants, before the Supreme Court. Now the challenge is mounted on this new ground. ( 5 ) IT has been laid down by the Supreme Court in M/s,shenoy and Co. v Commercial Tax Officer, Circle II, Bangalore , that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all the concerned whether they were parties or not before the Supreme court. It is also laid down by the Supreme Court that fresh grounds cannot be allowed to be raised, once the Supreme Court has spoken on the main question. (See: B. M. Lakhani v malkapur Municipality ; D. C. and G. Mills v Shambu Nath ; and Anil Kumar Neotia v Union of India ). It is also laid down by the Supreme Court that fresh grounds cannot be allowed to be raised, once the Supreme Court has spoken on the main question. (See: B. M. Lakhani v malkapur Municipality ; D. C. and G. Mills v Shambu Nath ; and Anil Kumar Neotia v Union of India ). In view of this settled legal position, therefore, we cannot hold that this new contention challenging the very same notification which is upheld by the supreme Court, can be gone into by the High Court. It may be noted that these petitions were of the year 1986. All these contentions were open earlier, but once the Supreme Court spoke on the point of legality of the very same notification by the decision in G. T. N. Textiles Ltd. 's case (supra), thereafter the matter should end and the High Court cannot go into the additional ground, the result of which would, if accepted, be to cut cross the final decision rendered by the Supreme Court which is binding on the High Courts under Article 141 of the Constitution. On this short ground alone, these appeals must fail and are dismissed. ( 6 ) IN view of the aforesaid settled legal position laid down bythe various decisions of the Supreme Court, the observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in Ferro Concrete company's case (supra), would not survive. In view of our aforesaid conclusion, it must be held that the observations of the learned single Judge on merits would not survive and have to be treated as obiter and would not bind either side. ( 7 ) IN the result, these appeals fail and are dismissed. --- *** --- .