Judgment S.K.CHATTOPADHYAYA, J. 1. This application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is directed against the order taking cognizance dated 23-2-1993 against the petitioner under Sections 406 and 420 of the I. P. C. A prayer also has been made to quash the entire criminal case against the petitioner. 2. The facts of the case as alleged in the complaint parties, in brief, can be set forth as follows : "The petitioner approached the O. P. No. 2 for a loan of Rs. 75,000 for completing the construction of Kuppepar Market which was under construction. The petitioner agreed to pay him interest at the rate of 18% p.a. The complainant agreed to give him loan and accordingly on 18-6-1987 a sum of Rs. 15,000 was paid to the petitioner. Again on 19-6-1987, O. P. No. 2 paid Rs. 15,000 and as a token of receipts of the entire amount was prepared on 19-6-1987. On 16-7-1987, another sum of Rs. 30,000 was taken by the petitioner as loan for which another separate receipt was prepared. In the complaint petition, it is alleged that though the complainant waited for the petitioner to return the aforesaid amount but his waiting gone in vein. The complainant reminded the petitioner from time to time for the repayment of the loan or atleast to pay the interest but the petitioner merely gave an assurance that he would not only pay the interest but also the principal amount. In the meantime, it is alleged that petitioner changed the name of his firm from Chandu Lal Devi Prasad to Ghanshyam Das Kuppepar in order to escape his liability. Subsequently, from repeated pressure of common friends and relations, the petitioner on 30-5-1992 and 30-7-1992 granted receipts of the principal amount of Rs. 30,000 each which receipts shows that the petitioner obtained loan from the complainant in the year 1987. In the complaint petition, it is further alleged that though the petitioner went on assuring the O. P. No. 2 but neither any interest nor the principal amount was refunded till the date of filing of the complaint. With this allegation a complant petition was filed under Section 406 and 420 of the I. P. C. alleging that sum of Rs. 1,60f750 is due from the petitioner calculating the principal pmount as well as. the interest thereon. 3. With this allegation a complant petition was filed under Section 406 and 420 of the I. P. C. alleging that sum of Rs. 1,60f750 is due from the petitioner calculating the principal pmount as well as. the interest thereon. 3. From the impugned order dated 23 -2-1993, it appears that the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance only under Section 420 of the I. P. C. and not under Section 406 of the Code. 4. Mr. Sinha, learned senior counsel for the petitioner in support of this petition, has submitted firstly, that from perusal of the allegation made in the complaint petition, it is clear that the case is of a civil nature and as such continuation of criminal proceeding will be an abuse of the process of the court. Advancing his argument, it is submitted that O. P. No. 2 is a moneylender but without any licence and as because he is not a registered moneylender, he cannot bring a civil suit against the petitioner he has taken this course by filing the instant complaint. Secondly, it is submitted that reading the complaint petition as a whole, it appears that no offence under Section 420 of the I. P. C. is made out, inasmuch as, for constituting an offence under Section 420 of the I. P. C. there must be intention of cheating from the very beginning. It is submitted that even admitting the fact that the petitioner had taken a loan with the intention to repay the same with interest but subsequently for some reason or other the said loan could not be repaid but from this fact only initial criminal intention from the date of transaction cannot be derived. Next argument of Mr. Sinha is that when the recovery of the amount through a civil suit became time-barred from 1987, the O. P. No. 2 approached him for fresh receipt for the said amount. On bona fide belief the petitioner gave him two other receipts on 30-5-1992 which have been marked as Annexure-2/B and 2/C respectively. These receipts were given by the petitioner on behalf of the Ghanshyam Das Kuppepar which will show that the petitioner had never any intention not to repay the loan. On bona fide belief the petitioner gave him two other receipts on 30-5-1992 which have been marked as Annexure-2/B and 2/C respectively. These receipts were given by the petitioner on behalf of the Ghanshyam Das Kuppepar which will show that the petitioner had never any intention not to repay the loan. It is further submitted that on the other hand, the malintention of O. P. No. 2 is clear from the facts that though there was no agreement for payment of interest, Annexure-2/D, a chart has been annexed in the supplementary affidavit showing therein calculation of interest @ 18%. It is submitted in this context that if there was any agreement to pay interest as alleged by the O. P. No. 2 then at least in the receipt granted in 1992 (Annexure-2/B and 2/C) the amount ought to have been there not only for the principal amount of Rs. 30,000 each but also interest accrued therein. This shows that there was no agreement for giving interest on the borrowed amount. Lastly, it is submitted that if the petitioner had any dishonest intention to cheat or fraud, the petitioner would not have granted fresh receipts in 1992 only on the request of the O. P. No. 2. In support of his contention, Mr. Sinha has relied in the case of Madhavarao Jiwaji Ram Scindia and another v. Sambhajirao Chandrojiran Angre and others etc., AIR 1988 SC 709 : 1988 East CrC 285 (SC) and in the case of Mahadeo Prarad v. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1954 SC 724 . 5. Mr. Sanjay, learned Counsel for the O. P. No. 2, on the other hand, has submitted that for constituting an offence under Section 420 of the I. P. C. it is not always necessary that such intention should be from the very moment of transction. He submits that petitioner might not have any intention to cheat the O. P. No. 2 at the initial stage when he was not so well to do man but when subsequently petitioner became a wealthy person, this intention night have occurred and for which he did not pay the borrowed amount and on the other hand, trying to canvass that major portion of the amount has already been paid and at present the due is only Rs. 9,000. Refuting the statement of the petitioner that out of Rs. 60,000, Rs. 9,000. Refuting the statement of the petitioner that out of Rs. 60,000, Rs. 51,000 was already paid, Mr. Sanjay has further submitted that it is not believable that while taking loan, the petitioner would have granted a receipt to the O. P. No. 2 but while repaying the amount, the petitioner would not have asked for a receipt from the O. P. No. 2. It is also submitted that it is not a natural human conduct that the petitioner would not take back his receipts ealier given to the O. P. No. 2. It is next contended that allegation made in the complaint cannot be said to be a dispute of civil nature. It is submitted that if in each and every case of such friendly him one has to move the civil court for recovery of money by filing a money suit after payment of court fees and to face the harassment of prolonged litigation then the system of friendly loan as well as the human relation will be at stake. Petitioner has not produced any paper to show that any amount was repaid to the O. P. No. 2 either by way of principal or interest. Lastly, it is submitted that the High Court in exercising its power under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. should be loathe in interfering with the order taking cognizance. In support of his submission, learned Counsel for the O. P. No. 2 has relied in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. and others v. Narendra Kumar Jhanjhri reported in 1990 (1) BLJ 348 : 1989 East CrC 617 (Pat) and in the case of Mahadeo Prasad v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 724 . 6. Before going into the contention raised on behalf of the parties, I may usefully refer a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam Khemka v. State of Bihar, reported in (1993) 3 SCC 54 : 1993 (2) BLJR 61 (SC) : 1993 East CrC 542 (SC). The apex court while dealing with the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr. The apex court while dealing with the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. in relation to an offence under Section 405 and 409 of the I. P. C. read with Sections 69 and 73 of the Company Act has observed as follows : "In the facts of the present case itself, the prosecution has to prove that the appellants as promotors or directors, had dishonest intention since very beginning while collecting the money from the applicants for the shares and debentures or that having collected such moneys they dishonestly misappropriated the same. The ingredients of the different offences under the Penal Code need not be proved only by direct evidence ; they can be shown from the circumstances of a particular case that the intention of the promotors or the directors was dishonest since very inception or that they developed such intention at some stage, for their wrongful gain and causing wrongful loss to the investors. All the circumstances and the materials to prove such a charge have to be collected during investigation and enquiry and ultimately have to be produced before the court at the stage of trial for a verdict as to whether the ingredients of offence in question have been established on behalf of the prosecution." Reminding the High Court once again about its earlier decision the apex court has observed further that : "This Court has repeatedly pointed out that the High Court should not while exercising power under Section 482 of the Code usurp the jurisdiction of the trial Court. The power under Section 482 of the Code has been vested in the High Court to quash a, prosecution which amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. But that power cannot be exercised by the High Court to hold a parallel trial, only on basis of the statements and documents cpllected during investigation of enquiry, for purpose of expressing an opinion whether the accused concerned is likely to be punished if the trial is allowed to proceed." 7. On the basis of this authoritative pronouncement of the highest Court of the land let me examine the instant case. As discussed above, the contention of the complainant-O.P. No. 2 in one hand that the petitioner after borrowing a sum of Rs. On the basis of this authoritative pronouncement of the highest Court of the land let me examine the instant case. As discussed above, the contention of the complainant-O.P. No. 2 in one hand that the petitioner after borrowing a sum of Rs. 60,000 with a promise to repay the same with interest @ 18% did not pay the said amount forcing the O. P. No. 2 to move the court by filing a complaint but on the other hand, stand of the petitioner is that there was no such agreement for payment of interest and out of the borrowed sum of Rs. 60,000, a sum of Rs. 51,000 had already been repaid. Further case is that as the O. P. No. 2 is bent upon not to accept the remaining sum of Rs. 9,000 without interest, the same could not be paid. Stand of the petitioner is also to the effect that while admitting that the petitioner had taken a loan of Rs. 60,000 with promise to repay the same but on that very moment he had no dishonest intention of cheating the O. P. No. 2 by not repaying the same. 8. In the case of State of Haryana and others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 , the apex Court has enumerated some of the categories of case in which the High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. can quash the F.I.R. or the complaint. A note of caution has again been given in that case by observing that power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 9. In the case of Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary and others, reported in (1992) 4 SCC 305 , the apex Court has categorically observed : "Section 482 which corresponds to Section 561-A of the old Code and to Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code proceeds on the same principle and deals with the inherent powers of the High Court. The rule of inherent powers has its source in the maxim "Quadolex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videture id sine quo ipsa esse (sic) potest" which means that when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives, also all those things without which the thing itself could not exist. The rule of inherent powers has its source in the maxim "Quadolex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videture id sine quo ipsa esse (sic) potest" which means that when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives, also all those things without which the thing itself could not exist. The criminal courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justiiiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles." 10. On the backdrop of such dictum, in my considered opinion the facts of the present case as to whether there was any promise to pay interest or not, whether out of loan amount something had already been paid or not etc. are all matters to be decided by trial Court on the basis of evidence. This Court cannot and should not go into the matter. In the circumstances I am of the view that where the trial is yet to begin and in which parties will get ample opportunity to place their respective case before the court below, this Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code will not shorten the criminal action. It is well settled that this Court cannot convert itself into a trial Court. 11. Coming to the decisions cited by the learned lawyers for both the parties, in my opinion, those need not be taken note of as those are on the facts and circumstances of particular cases. I have already taken note of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court and in my opinion, the order impugned cannot be interfered with this Court. 12. In the result, this application is dismissed. 13. However, any of my observations should not be taken by the trial court as my observation regarding merit of the case.