A. B. SRIVASTAVA, J. This is a tenants petition arising out of proceeding under Section 20 of the Act 13 of 1972 hereinafter referred as the Act. The petitioner has sought quashing of an order dated 7-8-1990 of the J. S. C. C. Varanasi whereby he decreed the suit of the landlord respondent No. 3 for ejectment and arrears of rent against the petitioners and an order dated 14-12-1993 of the Additional District Judge confirming the same in revision. 2. The suit was filed by the respondent No. 3 hereinafter referred as the respondent alleging that she is landlord of house No. CK 63/146, Mohalla Chhoti Piyari, district Varanasi. Mahadeo father of the petitioners was a tenant in two rooms of the same on Rs. 14 per month rent. The rent as and when paid by the tenant was endorsed on the Sarkhat Kirayadari which remained in the possession of the tenant. The tenant fell in arrears of the rent from January 1977 w hereupon a notice of demand and termination of tenancy dated 1-11-1978 was served on him but he failed to comply hence the suit. 3. Mahadeo having died pendents lite, the petitioners were impleaded. The tenant contested the suit and pleaded that he has paid rent upto May 1977 but when the respondent did not issue receipt he sent three months rent from June to August 1977 by money order which was refused and rent from June to October 1977 was deposited under Section 30 of the Act. The learned JSCC held that the payment of rent upto May, 1976 has not been proved. The deposit under Section 30 of the Act, is not proved to have been made prior to the filing of the suit. Consequently, he was a defaulter, the notice served was valid, full deposit on the first date of hearing 9-5-1978 having not been made, the petitioners were not entitled to benefit of Sec tion 20 (4 ). He accordingly, decreed the suit. The learned revisional court confirmed the said finding and order. 4. In this petition affidavit having been exchanged between the parties, it is being finally disposed of in accordance with rules of court, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties. 5. He accordingly, decreed the suit. The learned revisional court confirmed the said finding and order. 4. In this petition affidavit having been exchanged between the parties, it is being finally disposed of in accordance with rules of court, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties. 5. As far as the question of default is concerned, the finding recorded by the learned JSCC is a finding of fact, based on consideration of entire relevant material on record. In coming to his conclusions, he took into account the evidence led by the parties and the permissible inferences, the same has been validly affirmed by the revisional court, and in this proceed ings there is no reason or ground to differ, or interfere, with the same. 6. The main question canvassed in this writ petition however is, regarding benefit of Section 20 (4) of the Act to the petitioners. The contention of the petitioners is that they having deposited the amount admitted to be due with interest, counsels fee and cost on the first date of hearing, are entitled to be relieved of ejectment, the minor discrepancy of Rs. 7 or so, should have been ignored and the proviso to Section 20 (4) is not attracted. The contention of the other side however is that the amount deposited was short, the date of hearing was 9-5-1978, whereas the amount was deposited on 3-10-1978 and the wife of the tenant having acquired residential house, the proviso to Section 20 (4) was applicable. 7. As to the first question regarding the first date of hearing, it would be found on a perusal of the order- sheet of the lower court, Annexure 8, that the summons was issued to the defendant tenant Mahadeo fixing 9-5-1978 for written statement. On the said date and thereafter he sought time and the case was adjourned for filing written statement. As per order-sheet of 13-9-1978 written statement was not filed by the said date and 17-10-1978 was fixed for final disposal. Meanwhile on 19-9-1978, on the application of the defendant 15 days further time was given for written statement. The defendant filed a tender for deposit on 13-9-1978, which was passed on 3-10-1978 on the same day Rs. 383. 10 was deposited. 8. Meanwhile on 19-9-1978, on the application of the defendant 15 days further time was given for written statement. The defendant filed a tender for deposit on 13-9-1978, which was passed on 3-10-1978 on the same day Rs. 383. 10 was deposited. 8. It would thus become clear that the first date of hearing fixed in this case was 17-10-1978, and not 9- 5-1978, while issuing summons, 9-5-1978 was the date fixed for written statement and the usual date for hearing was neither fixed nor indicated. Thereafter the dates fixed were only for written statement and 17-10-1978 was for the first time fixed for final disposal. The deposit on 3-10-1978 thus was even before the first date of hearing in the present case. 9. Now coming to the question of the actual amount deposited, it would be found from a perusal of the judgment of the court below that the interest, lawyers fee and court fee was correctly deposited. The rent of course was short by Rs. 7. 47, the process fee and stamp of vakalatnama was also not deposited. We thus find that the shortage in the deposit was of a very insigni ficant amount, the major part of the amount on all count having been deposited. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that it was a case where the requirement of Section 20 (4) of the Act had not been complied. In Ram Prasad v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Meerut and others, reported in 1992 (2) ARC 220, relied on by the respondents in this regard, the shortage was of the total amount of interest which came to be Rs. 190. It was under these circumstances, that the benefit of Section 20 (4) was denied. In the said case also, there is an observation to the effect that if the deposit falls short by a very small amount, the same may be ignored or the shortage may be condoned on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In the instant case, the shortage being of an insignificant part of the total amount liable to be deposited, deserved to be condoned. The contrary view taken by the courts below thus, is unsustainable. 10. In the instant case, the shortage being of an insignificant part of the total amount liable to be deposited, deserved to be condoned. The contrary view taken by the courts below thus, is unsustainable. 10. Lastly, coming to the question regarding applicability of the proviso to Section 20 (4), it would be found that the said proviso was held to be applicable on the promise that the wife of the tenant purchased a residential accommodation in the same city of Varanasi. The contention of the respondent landlord in this regard, was however denied on behalf of the petitioners tenants. The contention is that the wife of the late Mahadeo, the original tenant, was not proved to have acquired any residential building and as such on the strength of the proviso, the benefit of Section 20 (4) could not be denied to the petitioners. In this regard a perusal of the copy of the sale-deed dated 27-9-1978 in favour of Smt. Bittan Devi, the wife of Mahadeo, would go to show that what was transferred, was a bhumidhari plot No. 290/5, area 33 dismals, in a portion of which, there was a kuchcha house. There is nothing in this sale-deed to show that what Smt. Bittan Devi acquired is a residential building, nor any other documentary of oral evidence was produced to show that it was a residential accommodation. In its very nature, a kuchcha construction made in a bhumidhari plot would ordinarily be taken to be a construction to be used in connection with agricultural and storage of produce etc. There can be no presumption of the same being a residential building, within the purview of the said term relevant for the purpose of Act 13 of 1972, unless established to be so. In the instant case, there is nothing in the judgments of the two courts below to indicate that there was any material worth the name to indicate the same to be a residential building so as to attract the proviso to Section 20 (4) of the Act. The learned J. S. C. C. and as well as the learned revisional court under these circumstances, for all the above reasons, committed a manifest error of law in denying the benefit of Sec. 20 (4) of the Act to the petitioners. The learned J. S. C. C. and as well as the learned revisional court under these circumstances, for all the above reasons, committed a manifest error of law in denying the benefit of Sec. 20 (4) of the Act to the petitioners. The petitioners having complied with the requirements of the said section, were entitled to be relieved of eviction and the suit for the said prayer deserved to be dismissed. The writ petition deserves to be allowed. 11. The writ petition is hereby allowed and the impugned judgments and decree of the two courts below are set aside in respect of the relief of ejectment. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .