R. D. SHUKIA, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C. has been filed for quashing the order taking cognizance of offence under section 7/16 (1) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act against the accused petitioner. ( 2 ) THE brief history of the case is that Shri G. K. Shrivastava, Food Inspector, Dhar took a sample of turmaric powder after giving notice from one Deoram Joshi. After observing the formalities of notice and payment of price a panchnama for the same was prepared. The petitioner Onkarlal was also among the person who witnessed the proceedings and signed the panchnama. Thereafter, the sample was sent to public Analyst who found it to be substandard. As such after obtaining the permission from Local Authority and issuing the notice to Deoram Joshi a complaint under Section 7 (i) (iii)/16 (1-A) (i) (ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was filed against Deoram Joshi. During proceedings the Food Inspector, G. K. Shrivastava was examined. He admitted during cross-examination that Onkarlal (petitioner) was present at the time of preparation of Panchnama. It was also admitted that Deoram Joshi disclosed at the time of taking of the sample that the turmaric powder was purchased from Onkarlal, present accused (petitioner ). On the basis of this evidence of Food Inspector learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence against the petitioner Onkarlal vide order dated 22. 4. 1987. The petitioner made appearance before the Court. The Food Inspector was again subjected to cross-examine. Thereafter charge under section 7/16 (1-A) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was framed against the accused-petitioner. He filed revision against, framing of charge. The 1st Addi. Sessions Judge, Dhar dismissed the revision vide order dated 23. 3. 1993, passed in Criminal Revision No. 144/9 1. Hence, this petition for quashing the issuance of process including the charge against the accused-petitioner. ( 3 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Food Inspector took the sample from Deoram Joshi on 30th Dec. 1984. This was disclosed by Doeram on that very day that he purchased turmaric powder from accused (petitioner) and same has been mentioned in the last portion of the panchnama. ( 3 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Food Inspector took the sample from Deoram Joshi on 30th Dec. 1984. This was disclosed by Doeram on that very day that he purchased turmaric powder from accused (petitioner) and same has been mentioned in the last portion of the panchnama. The petitioner, Onkar lal has signed as a witness, but nothing was done against Onkar Lal by the Food Inspector and therefore, it was not proper to have taken the cognizance after a lapse of nearly three years i. e. on 22. 4. 1987. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that had the Food Inspector proceeded against him he could demonstrate it to the Local Authority that he is not guilt and could have persuaded him not to accord sanction from the prosecutions. The third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that no sanction has been accorded under Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and therefore the accused (petitioner) could not be prosecuted, and as such taking of the cognizance without observing such formalities is bad in law. ( 4 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the State is that the Court was competent to take cognizance in view of Sec. 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and Section 319 of the Cr. P. C. secondly, he has submitted that the Magistrate took cognizance immediately after the fact was disclosed to him during evidence and mere delay of 21/2 years is not sufficient to quash the issuance of process and framing of charge. It has also been submitted that this petition amounts to a second revision which is barred under sec. 397 (3) of Cr. P. C. ( 5 ) SECTION 14 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act provides that the manufactures, distributors and dealers should give warranty to any vendor. Section 14-A of the Act provides that the vendor is required to disclose the name etc. of the person from whom the article food was purchased. Deoram Joshi complied with this requirement and he disclosed the name at the time of preparation of panchnama. ( 6 ) THE report of Public Analyst shows that the turmaric powder was sub-standard as such adulterated in view of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Section 319 of Cr. of the person from whom the article food was purchased. Deoram Joshi complied with this requirement and he disclosed the name at the time of preparation of panchnama. ( 6 ) THE report of Public Analyst shows that the turmaric powder was sub-standard as such adulterated in view of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Section 319 of Cr. P. C. provides that if in the course of enquiry or trial of offence it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed an offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused. The court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. Section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act also empowers the Court to implead manufacturer etc. , which reads as follows: 20-A. Power of Court to implead manufacturer, etc.-Where at any time during the trial of any offence under this Act alleged to have been committed by any person, not being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food, the Court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is also concerned with that offence, then, the court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in section 20 proceed against him as though a prosecution had been instituted against him under Section 20. ( 7 ) THOUGH it is correct that no prosecution for offence under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of the Government of person authorised in this behalf by general special order of the Central or State Government, as the case may be. Here in this state the Local Authorities have been empowered to accord sanction, but in view of the provisions of Section 20-A of the P. F. A. Act if the cognizance has been taken by the Court during enquiry or trial, the absence of sanction under Section 20 would not be necessary or in other words the Courts are not precluded from taking cognizance in exercise of power under section 20-A of the Act for pausity or sanction if it is disclosed in the evidence-adduced before it that some such person has committed an offence. ( 8 ) IT has also been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the requirement of Secs. 11 and 13 of the P. F. A Act have not been complied with in the case of petitioner (accused) and therefore the prosecution would be bad. This court is not in agreement with this contention as special provision for taking cognizance under Section 20-A of the P. F. A. Act has been made and therefore it will have a super seeding effect to that extent. ( 9 ) MERELY because the Food Inspector has not taken action against the petitioner (accused) immediately after the preparation of the panchnama or atleast after the receipt of report of Public Analyst the court would not be precluded from taking the cognizance. Even otherwise the appreciation and evaluation of evidence cannot be done at this stage. If the evidence prima facie discloses the involvement of the accused (petitioner) in the offence the court has power to take cognizance and frame charges if the evidence adduced shows prima facie case against him. ( 10 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has referred to a case reported in Udal v. Vinod Kumar Saxena. In that case two persons Udal and Shivkumar were prosecuted. The panchnama showed that the milk was purchased from Shivkumar. Money was also paid to him and therefore the prosecution of Udal was quashed. The facts of that case are absolutely different from the facts of the case in hand. ( 11 ) LEARNED counsel, then, referred to a case reported in Pothuri Ananda Venkata Subha Rao Gupta v. State of A. P. , a decision of single Bench of Andhra Pradesh. The following observation in para13 of the judgment is relevant for the purpose of this case: It is also open to the person from whom food sample is taken to implead the said person u/s. 20-A of the Act as ample power is given to the court to implead such person. Therefore from a reading of Ss. 19 and 20-A of the Act it is evident that the burden is on the accused to produce the warranty and prove that he purchased the food article under warranty for a particular person. Therefore from a reading of Ss. 19 and 20-A of the Act it is evident that the burden is on the accused to produce the warranty and prove that he purchased the food article under warranty for a particular person. From the above it is evident that the burden of showing exception as provided under Sec. 19 lies on the accused and in that process he can make a request making the person accused from whom he has purchased the commodity which is found adulterated subsequently. ( 12 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner, thereafter, referred to a case reported in 1990 Cr. L. J. 713 (D. B. Decision of Kerala High Court) and submitted that the present petitioner could not be prosecuted. In that case what has happened was that the original accused was discharged and thereafter other person was substituted as accused in exercise of powers under sec. 391 Cr. P. C. and section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and it was rightly observed in that case that power under Section 319 of Cr. P. C. and 20a of the P. F. A. Act cannot be exercised before the commencement of the trial. That power vests in the Magistrate only on the basis of evidence produced before that Magistrate. In this case learned Magistrate has taken cognizance on the basis of evidence produced before him and therefore this case law also does not help the petitioner. ( 13 ) FROM the discussions above it is evident that there is no error of jurisdiction. There is prima facie evidence for proceeding against the accused (petitioner ). The evaluation and appreciation of evidence cannot be done by this court in exercise of powers under section 482 Cr. P. C. and the present petition also amounts to a second revision which IS barred under Section 397 (3) of Cr. P. C. As a result, the petition fails and is dismissed accordingly. The petitioner is directed to appear before the J. M. F. C. , Dhar on 3. 3. 1994. Petition dismissed. .