JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the above named petitioner in the matter of violation of his fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution read with Art. 300-A of the Constitution of India and in the matter of Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965, Sugar Undertakings (Taking over of Management) Act, 1978 and in the matter of Rajasthan Relief Undertaking (Special Provisions) Act, 1984, challenging the validity of the orders dated 11.5.1985 and 14.10.1985. 2. The facts giving rise to the filing of this petition, briefly stated, are that respondent-mill, namely, Keshoraipatan Sahakari Sugar Mills Ltd. (A Government of India Undertaking) is a mill registered under the Co-operative Societies Act since been taken over by the Govt. of India and is under the control of Custodian-respondent No. 2 having been declared as a sick unit under the Rajasthan Relief Undertaking (Special Provisions) Act, 1984. As it was declared a sick unit in the year 1984 the management of the said mill was taken over by the State Government and by virtue of the provisions of section 4 of the said Act, complete control of all matters, i.e., financial, administrative etc. was taken over by the State Government of Rajasthan. However, the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts in the matter of disputes concerning the workman and the management has been excluded under the Act. Respondent No.1 , i.e., the Custodian General for Notified Sugar Undertakings, New Delhi is having over all control over the management and affairs of the said Undertaking. The petitioner-mill have been declared as a relief undertaking since 1984, its management and control was taken over by the Central Government under the provisions of Sugar Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1978") and its complete management thereafter vested with the Central Government and consequently Custodian General, i.e., respondent No.1 was appointed by the Central Govt. to take care of the said undertaking. It was only in the year 1984 that the management of the said undertaking was handed over by the Central Government to the State Government of Rajasthan. 3. The petitioner who last served as Personnel Officer, with the respondent undertaking, was served with a purported chargesheet by the respondents on 5.12.1983 vide Anenx. 1. It was only in the year 1984 that the management of the said undertaking was handed over by the Central Government to the State Government of Rajasthan. 3. The petitioner who last served as Personnel Officer, with the respondent undertaking, was served with a purported chargesheet by the respondents on 5.12.1983 vide Anenx. 1. The dispute arose on the basis of an inquiry conducted against the petitioner regarding non-settlement of personal advance in petitioner's account on the basis of which charges were framed against him. The mutation of charges were as follows : "1. During July, 1982 to May, 1983 petitioner's Personal Advance account has been debited by way of recoveries from salary as well as the cash paid by him : (a) July, 1982 Rs. 300.00 (b) August (Cash paid) Rs. 4,689.00 (c) September, 1982 Rs. 991.00 (d) October, 1982 Rs. 927.54 (e) April & May, 1983 Rs. 3,568.74 Total Rs. 10,476.28 Though the amount was deposted by him under protest, it is very strange how that much of amount has been deposited within a period of 10 months. This clearly indicates that he has not spent the money taken as advance for repairs and renewals of the Jeeps but it was in his personal custody and misappropriated the same for personal use. 2. An amount Rs. 3833.75 was outstanding in his account as on 1.7.1979 and he has received the amount of Rs. 17,000.00 for repairs of the jeeps. After the submission of the vouchers Rs. 4975.70 was adjusted and the debit balance was rupees 15858.05 as on 30th June, 1980. 3. During the year 1982-83 he made cash payment as indicated above and adjusted vouchers for Rs. 4351.46 to bring-out the debit balance to Rs. 8929.45. He had claimed a credit balance of Rs. 500/- as on 29.10.83 after adjustment of all the vouchers. This creates a doubt as how and why such an heavy sum of Rs. 10,000.00 should be foregone by him as is evident from the cash deposited by him. This also indicates mis-appropriation of the money advanced to him on personal account. 4. In receipt of the repairs of the jeeps he had submitted the following bills (a) RJG-1713 for Rs. 4458.08 dated 5.11.79 & 16.11.79. (b) RJG-1746 for Rs. 489.50 dated 10.11.79 & 12.1.80. i.e., total Rs. 4947.58. 5. This also indicates mis-appropriation of the money advanced to him on personal account. 4. In receipt of the repairs of the jeeps he had submitted the following bills (a) RJG-1713 for Rs. 4458.08 dated 5.11.79 & 16.11.79. (b) RJG-1746 for Rs. 489.50 dated 10.11.79 & 12.1.80. i.e., total Rs. 4947.58. 5. Jeep No. RJG-1713 was repair in November, 1979 and the Jeep No. RJG-1746 was repaired in January, 1980. He had not submitted the bills for adjustment for a long time. 6. In July, 1980 he had submitted 3 receipts from M/s Bharat Motors, Kota amounting to Rs. 4100.00 relating to the supplies made by the later for Jeep RJG-1713 and RJG-1746 during the month of November, 1979/January, 1980. However, the then Custodian did not accept this and asked him to produce complete set of bills and stamped receipts for the balance of Rs. 847.58 so that a proper adjustment could be made in his account. 7. He was re-instated on 12th September, 1983. Even after resuming office he had not cared to render proper accounts. Only in August, 1982 he had produced the bills dated November, 1979 to 1980 amounting to Rs. 4947.58 issued by M/s Bharat Motor Stores putting revenue stamps on them and crossing the same. The signatures of the driver Shri Rajendra Singh were also made on every bills to signify the actual delivery of the goods. He had also certified on the back side of all the bills dated 24.8.82 that he had paid the amount in cash. There is thus enough time lag between the repairs of the jeeps and submitted all the bills for adjustment. Further, there is no sanction from the then Custodian and also there is no entry in the log-books for the repairs of these jeeps. In the case of Jeep RJG-1713 there is no receipts for the money paid for the repairs of these jeeps at any of the work-shop at Kota or somewhere else. These create a doubt about genuineness of the transaction. The investigating officer has also made enquiry from Shri M.L. Gupta who took-over charge from him as Personnel Officer while his services were terminated in the year 1980 and also from Shri G.L. Garg and another officer of the factory. They had explained that none of these bills were kept in drawer and they had no idea about these bills. The investigating officer has also made enquiry from Shri M.L. Gupta who took-over charge from him as Personnel Officer while his services were terminated in the year 1980 and also from Shri G.L. Garg and another officer of the factory. They had explained that none of these bills were kept in drawer and they had no idea about these bills. Thereby his contention that these bills were left-over in the drawer before his termination of the services appears to be false and even after his re-instatement in Sept., 1981 he had sufficient time to submit these bills to the then Custodian and get them adjusted at any early date. This indicates that he never thought of submitting these bills for adjustment and thus again creates doubt that the repairs were not carried out, and the bills for all the repairs accounts are false. In reply to his letter dated 4.10.83 addressed to M/s Bharat Motor Stores that they had issued the receipt for Rs. 857.58 on their letter-head dated 12.1.1980 and regretted for the omission and the resultant inconvenience caused to him as well as the factory. This clearly indicates falsification of trading records by M/s Bharat Motors Stores, Kota and issue of receipt on back dates. Incidentally it may also be mentioned that Shri Chandmal Driver had spent Rs. 7010.19 towards repairs and renewals in respect on jeep No. RJG-1713 during the period from 12.10.79 to 9.2.80, i.e., during the same period as the bills submitted by him. However, Shri Chandmal has not submitted any bills of 15th and 16th November, 1979.Thus between October, 1979 to January, 1980 the jeep repair charges are over Rs. 11,500/- as per the bills submitted by him and Shri Chandmal. It is very strange how in such a short period of three months an amount of Rs. 11,500.00 was spent on the repairs without the sanction from the competent authority when he was Incharge Officer of the vehicle section. This again amounts to misappropriation of money without taking prior permission from the competent authority and not submitting the account for adjustment within a reasonable period. The Chief Director (Sugar), (Custodian General), Government of India, Ministry of Food & Civil Supplies, (Department of Food), Directorate of Sugar, New Delhi has taken a serious view on the matter and called for his explanation immediately. The Chief Director (Sugar), (Custodian General), Government of India, Ministry of Food & Civil Supplies, (Department of Food), Directorate of Sugar, New Delhi has taken a serious view on the matter and called for his explanation immediately. Hence his reply should be reached to the undersigned to the above charges by tomorrow, i.e., 6th December, 1983, positively." 4. Immediately on receipt of the aforesaid purported chargesheet the petitioner submitted his reply in two parts to respondent No. 2 wherein he denied all the charges levelled against him and stated that the charges are baseless and not based on true facts vide Annex. 2. It was contended by the petitioner that there was no drawing or finance officer of the company but only a personnel officer having no concern with either disbursement or with finance. In his reply to the company he explained the entire amount which was given as advance to the petitioner on account of entertainment expenses. Whatever amount was demanded by the company on account of alleged irregularity, was reimbursed to the company by the petitioner notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner had neither received nor spent that amount on account of company and the petitioner refunded the same amount as a protest without prejudice to the rights to claim the same. 5. It will be appropriate to mention that it is not the province of this court to go into all the details regarding the facts since they are not disputed and the function of this court in exercise of writ jurisdiction is only to ascertain as to whether on the basis of facts and circumstances, legal issues arise for consideration of this court on the basis of which-the petitioner should or should not be given the relief in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The real bone of contention between the parties was as to whether the petitioner as a Personnel Officer was justified in incurring certain expenditure on company's jeeps RJG-1713 and RJG 1746 which went out of order while on tours undertaken by the petitioner on behalf of the company and whether the expenditure incurred by the petitioner for carrying out their repairs out of the imprest account, was justified by the petitioner or not? The earlier termination of the petitioner on 1.4.1980 which was subsequently withdrawn by reinstatement of the petitioner on 12.9.1981 was not an the basis of any charge-sheet but entirely on the basis of conjectures and surmises that the petitioner had incurred some expenditure on company's account for which he had not rendered the true account. Neither any formal complaint was lodged against the petitioner by the company nor any FIR was drawn up against the petitioner regarding alleged misappropriation of company's funds. Hence the allegation appears to be without any foundation. 6. It will be significant to mention that in reply to the company's letter, dated 13.2.1984 whereby the petitioner was asked to explain the circumstances by respondent No. 2 under which the alleged irregularities were committed, the petitioner had submitted a detailed reply to the Custodian of the company explaining therein all the details by specifically mentioning therein that he had taken prior approval and permission of the competent authority before incurring the expenditure for the repairs of the jeeps in question and it was further stated that the jeeps were sent to Kota for repairs with prior permission of the competent authority. During the period when the jeeps were under repair at Kota three officials of the company, namely, the vehicle inspector and two drivers remained at Kota on duty and their T.A. bills when presented were passed by the competent authority for their stay at Kota. As the company was not satisfied with the petitioner's reply and wanted to conduct an inquiry into the matter, the company appointed its own advocate Shri R.K. Gupta who was also the legal advisor of the respondent-mill as an inquiry officer vide order, dated 8.9.84. It is contended by the petitioner in the writ petition that the petitioner had made an application to the inquiry officer on 13.9.1984 wherein he had requested for making available to him certain documents which were directly related to the charges levelled against the petitioner but unfortunately the same were not provided to the petitioner and further more the inquiry officer in gross violation of the principles of natural justice had not allowed the petitioner to cross-examine any of the prosecution witness. The petitioner was further not allowed to adduce his own evidence in defence notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner had moved an application before enquiry officer on 13.9.1984 in this regard. The petitioner was further not allowed to adduce his own evidence in defence notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner had moved an application before enquiry officer on 13.9.1984 in this regard. Thus the inquiry was held in arbitrary, baised and cryptic manner with the sole intention of punishing the petitioner. 7. Subsequently on 18.4.1985 the petitioner was served with a show-cause notice by respondent No. 2 by which the petitioner was asked to deposit the amount of Rs. 9429.45 without serving a copy of the inquiry report and consequently the petitioner denied in categorical terms regarding the receipt of the above amount which was shown outstanding against him. The petitioner submitted a detailed account of the aforesaid amount in his reply. The petitioner also made a request for referring the matter for arbitration to the Joint Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Kota under the provisions of section 75 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 which reads as under : "Sec. 75-Disputes which may be referred to arbitration- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute touching constitution, management, or the business of a cooperative society arises (b) between a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the society, its committee or any officer, agent or employee of the society : such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision and no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute. (3) If any question arises whether a dispute referred to the Registrar under this section is a dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society, the decision thereon of the Registrar shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court". In utter disregard of the submissions made by the petitioner in his reply to the show-cause, respondent No. 2 passed an order on 11.5.1985 whereby the services of the petitioner were terminated w.e.f. the said date and his request for arbitration for settlement of the dispute was declined since the management of the respondents-mill was bent upon punishing the petitioner by terminating his services. 8. On 13.5.1985 the petitioner made an application to respondent No. 2 that he was prepared to deposit the amount of Rs. 8. On 13.5.1985 the petitioner made an application to respondent No. 2 that he was prepared to deposit the amount of Rs. 9429.45 notwithstanding the fact that it was not due from the petitioner and further requested for revocation of his termination order. On the basis of this request, respondent No. 2, the Custodian of the mill had forwarded a letter to Custodian General, New Delhi (resptd. No. 1) whereby the said respondent had requested that the punishment was not commensurate with the alleged irregularity and that a lenient view may be taken in favour of the petitioner by allowing the petitioner to continue in service but no action was taken by the company in favour of the petitioner notwithstanding the request of the Custodian. 9. Thereafter the petitioner made a representation to respondent No. 1 on 10.10.1985 wherein he submitted that he had already rendered complete details of the amount in question to respondent No. 2 but the same had not been credited to the personal account of the petitioner. It will be significant to mention that in identical cases of four employees of the company, namely, serva Shri Ramchandra Lakshar, G.L. Joshi, N.C. Agrawal and S.P. Gupta, the company had referred the dispute to arbitration under the provisions of section 75 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 and the same was amicably settled by the arbitrator; whereas the petitioner's request for arbitration was not only declined but the petitioner was grossly victimised by the managment resulting in termination of his services, thus making out a case of gross discrimination in the matter of reference of the dispute to arbitration. 10. During the course of hearing it was contended by Shri K.K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the punishment of dismissal inflicted on the petitioner by the company was not commensurate with the alleged misconduct inasmuch as the petitioner had rendered the accounts of the alleged irregularities and notwithstanding the fact that any amount was due from the petitioner, the petitioner had voluntarily deposited the amount in question to the company which was accepted by the company by rendering complete details of the amount in question. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the malafides and biased attitude of the company in passing subsequent order of dismissal of the petitioner on 11.5.1985 was clearly apparent from the termination inasmuch as the termination of the petitioner was done without any charge-sheet or show-cause notice nor giving any opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself by leading evidence in defence before the inquiry officer and the entire procedure adopted by the inquiry officer was in violation of the principles governing the disciplinary inquiries. The malafides are further apparent from the fact that the earlier termination of the petitioner was done without serving any charge-sheet on 1.4.1980 which was subsequently withdrawn by reinstating the petitioner on 12.9.1981 and hence there was no justification to pass the subsequent termination order. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that section 75 of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 (for short "Act of 1965") specifically provides for settlement of such dispute through arbitration which procedure was grossly over-looked and violated by the company by not referring the matter to arbitration. The inquiry was held in total breach of the principles of natural justice, i.e., audi-alteram-partem rule which implies that a person against whom an order is passed affecting his civil rights should be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard which was violated by the inquiry officer by committing its breach. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order, dated 11.5.1985 is vitiated for the reason that neither the inquiry report nor the copy of the statements of the witnesses examined by the inquiry officer were supplied to the petitioner despite request and hence the petitioner was prevented from meeting out the findings of the inquiry officer with a view to prepare his defence and thus there was sufficient cause to set aside the termination order, dated 11.5.1985. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that apparently on filing of the reply by the petitioner prior to his termination in reply to the purported charge-sheet dated 5.12.1983, the company was satisfied with the explanation given by the petitioner in respect of the allegations made in the purported charge-sheet which is clearly reflected from the fact that on 13.2.1984, the respondent-mill had issued a notice to the petitioner vide Annex. 3 to explain the circumstances in which the alleged irregularities were committed, i.e., (i) prior permission of the competent authority was not obtained, for the amount spent on repairs of Jeeps, (ii) that the bills regarding repairs submitted after a very long time and the amount was not adjusted in personal advance account in the year 1979-80, 80-81 and 81-82 and (iii) amount of advance outstanding in the petitioner's name on 30.6.1980 had not been adjusted so far. The petitioner had submitted his reply denying all the allegations vide Annex. 4 and the company was apparently satisfied with the explanation given by the petitioner except regarding one aspect concerning the adjustment of the pending bills for vehicle repairs. The petitioner has thus challenged the impugned orders, dated 11.5.85 and 14.10.85 being illegal, arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice and contrary to the provisions of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India in view of the fact that section 11 of the Act of 1978 does not contemplate termination of the services of an employee by way of penalty as a disciplinary measure in such like circumstances. Section 11 of the Act reads as under : "Section 11 - If the Custodian or Custodian General is of opinion that any contract of employment entered into by any owner or member of a notified Sugar Undertaking or its agent in relation to the said Undertaking, at any time before the date of vesting, is unduly onerous, he may, be giving to the employee one month's notice in writing or the salary or wages for one month in lieu thereof, terminate such contract of employment". A perusal of the said provision clearly reveals that a contract of employment can be terminated only if the custodian is of the view that the continued employment of an employee would be unduly onerous and then in that event the services of the employee may be terminated by giving one month's notice or salary in lieu of one month's notice but it does not contemplate termination of service as a disciplinary measure and therefore, the termination should not have been done by taking recourse to the said provision. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order of termination was passed on the basis of inquiry report submitted by Company's Advocate since he was not independent and impartial inquiry officer and there was total violation of the principles of natural justice, equity and fair play. In the absence of charge-sheet and purported charges levelled against the petitioner, the petitioner was not in a position to defend himself before the inquiry officer and the allegations were totally vague and indefinite. 11. In support of his above contention advanced at the bar, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the following authorities: As regards the first contention it was submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the inquiry proceedings were held on the basis of purported charge-sheet, dated 5.12.1983, which cannot be considered to be a charge-sheet and is merely a notice by which the petitioner was asked to explain certain circumstances. In this context reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of D.D.A. v.H.C., 1993 (3) SCC 196 , Khurana wherein the Apex Court held that charge-sheet cannot precede the decision to hold an inquiry and necessarily has to be subsequent to taking such a decision to hold an inquiry. It was further contended that at the most the purported charge-sheet could only be said to be a notice requiring an explanation of the delinquent employee to explain certain irregularities which was furnished by the petitioner to the company by submitting his detailed reply as referred to above. 12. In support of his 2nd contention that the inquiry held against the petitioner was contrary to the principles of natural justice, reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the following judgments of the Apex Court and other High Courts: Khem Chand v.Union of India & Ors., AIR 1958 SC 300 , Suratchandra Chakrawarti v.State of West Bengal, 1971 (2) SLR 103 (SC) , Ramanand v.Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Northern Railway, Bikaner and Anr., AIR 1962 Raj. 265 , State of U.P. v.Vashistha Narain Singh & Anr., 1973 (2) SLR 297 All.) and A.K. Naraina Rao v.General Manager, Southern Railway and others, 1969 SLR 479 . 13. 265 , State of U.P. v.Vashistha Narain Singh & Anr., 1973 (2) SLR 297 All.) and A.K. Naraina Rao v.General Manager, Southern Railway and others, 1969 SLR 479 . 13. In support of his 3rd contention regarding non-supply of documents to the petitioner by the inquiry officer, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the following judgments of the, Apex Court and this court in the matter of Triloknath v.Union of India, 1967 SLR 759 (SC) , State of M.P. v.Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan, AIR 1961 SC 1623 , Krishanlal Godara v.State of Rajasthan, 1969 RLW 579 . 14. In support of his 4th contention regarding denial of opportunity to the petitioner to lead evidence in defence and to cross-examine the witnesses of the management, learned counsel placed reliance upon the following judgments : Union of India v.T.R. Verma, AIR 1957 SC 882 , State of U.P. and another v.C.S. Sharma, AIR 1968 SC 158 , Union of India v.Harcharan Singh, 1974 (1)SLR 349 , Phani Babu Pathak v.Union of India, 1979 (3) SLR 12 (Cal) & Surya-Prakash Gothwal v.State of Raj., 1981 (1) SLR 767 (Raj.) . 15. In support of his 5th contention it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even a copy of the inquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner which is mandatory requirement of law thus violating the principles of natural justice, since the petitioner did not have the knowledge as to what evidence has been recorded against him; what is the nature of evidence that has been considered by the inquiry officer; how and in what manner the explanation has not been accepted; how the evidence of the management has been held sufficient to prove the charges and whether or not the charges are proved or whether the findings of the inquiry officer are perverse ? All these aspects cannot be looked into or examined without supply of copy of inquiry report to the delinquent employee which is a sine-quo-non under the service rules. In respect of this contention reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Union of India v.Mohd. Ramjan Khan, 1991 (1) SCC 588 , L.R Pitti v.State of Raj., WLR 1992 (S.) Raj. 44 and Randhirmal Lodha v.The State of Raj. & Ors., WLR 1992 (S) 390 . 16. In respect of this contention reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Union of India v.Mohd. Ramjan Khan, 1991 (1) SCC 588 , L.R Pitti v.State of Raj., WLR 1992 (S.) Raj. 44 and Randhirmal Lodha v.The State of Raj. & Ors., WLR 1992 (S) 390 . 16. In support of his 6th contention, it was further contended by the learned counsel that the termination order passed by the disciplinary authority is non-speaking order and, therefore, suffers from non-application of mind, since no reasons have been mentioned in the termination order except the amount of Rs. 9429.45 which was shown outstanding against the petitioner and since the reply of the petitioner had not been considered objectively and no reasons have been mentioned by the disciplinary authority, the order suffers from non-application of mind. In this connection reliance was placed upon the judgment of this court in Raj Kishore Sharma v.Keshoraipatan Sahakari Sugar Mills & others, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7643/92 decided on 17.11.1993 and Hiraprasad v.State Bank of India & others, 1993 (2) SCC 418 . 17. In support of his 7th contention it was contended by the learned counsel that a perusal of the show cause notice, dated 13.2.1984 would reveal that there is no charge regarding misuse of funds, since the petitioner was asked only to explain circumstances resulting in commission of alleged irregularities. Further more the dispute was only with regard to pending bills of Rs. 10,000/- and there was no allegation regarding misuse of funds whatsoever. It was argued in this context that if the management was aggrieved, then nothing prevented the management to file either a regular complaint in a court of law or F.I.R. with the police against the petitioner regarding misappropriation of funds or criminal breach of trust which was not done in the instant case and on the contrary the management adopted the recourse of punishing the petitioner without holding a proper departmental inquiry or without giving opportunity to the petitioner to lead evidence in defence and it was infact a dear case of victimisation of the petitioner by the management at the instance of the appointing authority in gross violation of the principles of natural justice as referred to above. It will be pertinent to mention that the inquiry was held by Shri R.K. Gupta Advocate who being the legal advisor of the respondent-mill was biased towards the petitioner and this fact is high-lighted from the language of the impugned order of termination itself in which there is clear reference to the inquiry officer as 'our legal advisor' which clearly reflects the purpose for which the said inquiry officer was appointed. It was further contended (8th contention made by the learned counsel) that even on merits the management has no case whatsoever inasmuch as the petitioner has explained the entire circumstances and the entire amount of controversy pertained to alleged financial irregularities which, in any case, were washed off by reimbursing the management by the petitioner by depositing the entire amount which has rightly been accounted and having been accepted by the management of respondent-mill and hence there was no justification for passing the termination order. The word 'misconduct' is absolutely absent in any of the communications which have been placed on the record and there is only mention of the word 'irregularities' which are curable and consequently it was submitted that the termination was absolutely illegal being contrary to law and petitioner has accordingly prayed for reinstatement in service with all back wages and consequential benefits. 18. In reply to the writ petition filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 & 3 the following preliminary objections have been taken:- (a) that Kesheoraipatan Shakari Sugar Mill Ltd. is a society registered under Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act and as such the writ petition is not maintainable against the society; (b) that the petitioner has not impleaded Keshoraipatan Sahakari Sugar Mill Ltd. as a party to the writ petition, hence the writ petition is not maintainable; (c) that the writ petition is not maintainable against the orders passed by the Custodian of the notified Sugar Industry. The writ petition should not have been filed in view of the bar created by Section 7 of the Amending Act of 1979; (d) that the petitioner has challenged the order of termination of his services and this court cannot entertain the question regarding re-appreciation of evidence led by the management and the petitioner before the inquiry officer and which is not to be decided by this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India; (e) that the enquiry was conducted in consonance with principles of natural justice and hence the order of punishment is not justiceable; (f) that the petitioner was earlier dismissed from service on 4.4.1980 and the dismissal order was subsequently revoked on 24.3.1981 and the petitioner was reinstated in service and was simultaneously placed under suspension and an inquiry was conducted for disobedience. 19. On merits it has been contended that the society is not a State Under Art. 12 of the Constitution and as such the writ petition is not maintainable against the society registered under the Cooperative Societies Act. At present the mill is being managed by the Administrator and Managing Director appointed by the Government of Rajasthan. Further the mill has been declared as sick Undertaking and with regard to the termination order it has been contended by the respondents that the order dated 13.2.1984 was issued as the authorities were not satisfied with the reply submitted by the petitioner and a further opportunity was provided to him to substantiate the averments made in the reply. It has been contended by the respondents that the petitioner had not taken prior permission of the competent authority while taking the advances from the concerned officers for the years 1979-80, 80-81, 82-83 and a bare perusal of the charge-sheet and the enquiry report shows that the charges are of serious nature as the petitioner had embezzled an amount of Rs. 9429.45. 20. With regard to giving of opportunity to the petitioner for cross-examining the witnesses of the management it has been contended in the reply that opportunity was given to the petitioner which he did not avail and further that the petitioner had voluntarily not produced any evidence to rebut the charges notwithstanding the fact that no material has been placed on the record of this court to justify this contention of the management. If such opportunity was given to the petitioner, then nothing prevented the management from placing the said material on the record of this court alongwith the reply filed in answer to the writ petition by respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Even the record of the proceedings conducted before the inquiry officer was not made available for perusal of this court despite the fact that the same was called upon so as to substantiate the allegations the petitioner that he was not given sufficient opportunity, both to cross-examine the witnesses and also to lead evidence in defence before the inquiry officer which has not been done by the respondents in the instant case. In this respect I am of the opinion that a mere bald assertion by the management without any documentary evidence on the record would not justify the stand of the management that such opportunity was provided to the petitioner. In this context the respondents have taken the stand that there is no requirement of any rule to submit the inquiry report alongwith the charge-sheet. This is contrary to the well settled proposition of law that the inquiry report must be made available to the delinquent employee so as to enable him to know as to what is exactly the case of the management against the delinquent employee in order to further enable him to make his defence which has not been done in the present case in gross violation of the principles of natural justice, equity and fair play. 21. As regards first objection taken by the respondents in their reply to writ petition that the respondents-mill is a society registered under the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1963 and as such not emenable to writ jurisdiction of this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, I am of the opinion that the State Government which has 40% shares in the said society and the mill at present is regulated by the Rajasthan Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions) Act, 1961 since 1984 when the mill was declared sick unit and taken over by the State Government, the mill automatically has become an instrumentality of the State and hence it is a 'State' within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India and as such amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this court. I am further of the opinion that since both the Administrators of the mill as well as the Managing Director of the said mill have already been impleaded as respondent Nos. 2 and 3 respectively pursuant to the directions of this court, dated 23rd of January, 1986 and were substituted as respondents in place of the existing respondents, the writ petition is maintainable against the orders passed by the Custodian as well. I am further of the opinion that Section 7 of the Sugar Undertakings (Taking over of Management) Act, 1978 (for short "Act of 1978") which has been relied upon by the respondents is not a bar to the maintainability of the writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution as it is an extraordinary remedy. In this context it may be mentioned that the provisions of the Act of 1978 have ceased to apply and the mill has been handed over to the State Government and is no more in the custody and control of the Central Government. 22. This court has ample jurisdiction to examine the merits of the dispute and also refer to the material available before the inquiry officer and appreciate the same to consider an important aspect of the matter as to whether the inquiry was conducted by the inquiry officer of the mill in accordance with law and the principles of natural justice. 23. With regard to the first contention advanced at the Bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I am of the opinion that the inquiry proceedings which were held by the inquiry officer on the basis of the purported charge-sheet dated 5.12.83 were not in accordance with law since the mere statement of allegations contained in the officer order do not by itself constitute the same as a charge-sheet against the delinquent employee. I am further of the opinion that the said office order was merely a notice by which the petitioner was asked to explain certain circumstances and, therefore, the inquiry stands vitiated as the very foundation of the inquiry was not in accordance with law. I am further of the opinion that the said office order was merely a notice by which the petitioner was asked to explain certain circumstances and, therefore, the inquiry stands vitiated as the very foundation of the inquiry was not in accordance with law. I am fortified in my opinion from the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of D.D.A. v.H.C. Khurana (supra) wherein the Apex Court held that charge-sheet cannot precede the decision to hold an inquiry and necessarily has to be subsequent to taking such a decision to hold an inquiry.The Apex Court further held as under : "Thus the service of charge-sheet on the Government servant follows the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings, and it does not precede or coincide with that decision. The delay, if any, in service of the charge-sheet to the Government servant after it has been framed and despatched, does not have the effect of delaying the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings, inasmuch as information to the Government servant of the charges framed against him by service of charge-sheet, is not a part of decision making process of the authorities for initiating the disciplinary proceedings". The ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court has not been followed by the respondents in this case. 24. I am further of the opinion that the impugned order terminating the service of the petitioner has been passed in violation of section 11 of the Act of 1978 and is too harsh and excessive as it does not contemplate termination of service of an employee by way of penalty as a disciplinary measure. The provisions of section 7 have already been referred into foregoing para hence very basis of the termination is absolutely illegal. I am further of the opinion that the termination order which has been passed on the basis of inquiry report submitted by the inquiry officer Shri R.K. Gupta Advocate cannot be said to be a proper order inasmuch as the special inquiry officer was himself legal advisor of the company and hence not an impartial and independent officer. I am further of the opinion that the inquiry was held in total breach of the principles of audi-alterm-partem being contrary to the principles of natural justice, the charges levelled against the petitioner being indefinite and vague. 25. I am further of the opinion that the inquiry was held in total breach of the principles of audi-alterm-partem being contrary to the principles of natural justice, the charges levelled against the petitioner being indefinite and vague. 25. In Khemchand v.Union of India & others : (supra) the Apex Court held : "The reasonable opportunity envisaged to the Govt. servant by the provision contained in Art. 311(2) includes (a) an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told that the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based; (b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defence; and finally (c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the inquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the Government servant tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to the Government servant". 26. In Surat Chandra Chakrawarti v.State of West Bengal (supra) the Apex Court fortified its earlier view by observing that where the delinquent had been supplied with a bare statement of allegations and the material facts and particulars were not supplied to the delinquent employee it amounts to violation of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution of India and fundamental rule 55 of the C.C.A. Rules inasmuch as the sub-rule lays down in almost mandatory terms that the charges must be accompanied by a statement of allegations so as to enable the delinquent to meet his defence and where the charges are vague and indefinite, the whole object of the enquiry will stand frustrated as the same would be in violation of principles of natural justice. 27. In Ramanand v.Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Norther Railway, Bikaner and another (supra) this court had occasion to deal with the above principles in the matter of disciplinary inquiry against a railway servant. 27. In Ramanand v.Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Norther Railway, Bikaner and another (supra) this court had occasion to deal with the above principles in the matter of disciplinary inquiry against a railway servant. This court held that where a charge against a Government servant is sought to be founded substantially on some documentary material against him, such material must be made available to him during the course of the inquiry, and it would be no answer to this that it was unnecessary to make such material available to the servant concerned because he was already aware of it at some earlier stage. 28. This view was also followed by Allahabad High Court in State of U.P. v.Vashistha Narain Singh & Anr. (supra) wherein it was held that where the charge-sheet did not disclose information about the evidence to be proved against the delinquent officer, it amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity as contemplated under Art. 311(2) of the Constitution which envisages the opportunity to deny the guilt and establish innocence which the charged officer can do only if he is informed of the accusation made against him. 29. In A.K. Naraina Rao v.General Manager, Southern Railway and others (supra) Mysore High Court held that a Government servant against whom charges are framed is, as of right, entitled to be supplied with the copies of the prior statements of the witnesses examined during the disciplinary proceedings and that if those statements were not supplied, it would amount to deprivation of the reasonable opportunity of which Art. 311 of the Constitution speaks. In the above context I am of the opinion that the purported charge-sheet on the basis of which the disciplinary inquiry was held against the petitioner is absolutely vague, indefinite, non-specific and as a matter of fact it is not a charge-sheet in the eye of law and, therefore, alleged inquiry being contrary to the principles of natural justice, cannot be said to be an inquiry in accordance with law. 30. As regards the next contention regarding non-supply of documents in the matter of Triloknath v.Union of India (supra) it was held by the Apex Court that non-supply of copies of the documents relied upon by the inquiry officer amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity in violation of mandatory rule 55 of the C.C.A. Rules, 1930. 31. 30. As regards the next contention regarding non-supply of documents in the matter of Triloknath v.Union of India (supra) it was held by the Apex Court that non-supply of copies of the documents relied upon by the inquiry officer amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity in violation of mandatory rule 55 of the C.C.A. Rules, 1930. 31. In State of M.P. v.Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan (supra) the Apex Court held that right to cross-examine the witnesses against the delinquent is a very valuable right and if it appears that effective exercise of this right has been prevented by the inquiry officer by not giving relevant documents to which he is entitled, the logical conclusion would be that inquiry had not been held in accordance with the principles of natural justice. 32. In Krishanlal Godara v.State of Rajasthan (supra) this court held that if an authority while dealing with the matter before it has committed any illegality or has not observed the principles of natural justice, then such errors can certainly be corrected by this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India by issuing an appropriate writ, direction or order. 33. In Raj Kishore Sharma v.Shri Keshoraipatan Sahakari Sugar Mill Ltd. & others: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7643/92 decided on 17.11.93 by learned Single Judge (Singhvi J.) this court while placing reliance on the judgment of Apex Court in S.N. Mukharjee v.Union of India, 1990 (4) SCC 594 , held that every quasi-judicial authority is bound to record reasons in support of its conclusions. Mere recording of conclusions cannot be treated as a sufficient compliance of principles of natural justice. Consequently the order passed by the disciplinary authority was set aside as it suffered from non-application of mind and passed in violation of principles of natural justice. I am consequently of the opinion that the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority was in gross violation of principles of natural justice and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 34. Consequently the order passed by the disciplinary authority was set aside as it suffered from non-application of mind and passed in violation of principles of natural justice. I am consequently of the opinion that the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority was in gross violation of principles of natural justice and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 34. As regards the next contention of the petitioner regarding denial of opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses of the management and to lead evidence in defence, in Union of India v.T.R. Verma (supra) the Apex Court held as under : "Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examination the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them". 35. In S tate of U.P. & anr. v.C.S. Sharma (supra) the Apex Court fortified the above view by observing that where there has been omission to give opportunity to the delinquent to produce his witnesses and lead evidence in defence, whole proceedings would stand vitiated. 36. In Union of India v.Harcharan Singh (supra) this court while placing reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Khemchand v.Union of India (supra) held that the proceedings must disclose that statutory rules governing the inquiry were in essence and that the govt. servant has had an adequate opportunity to meet the charges with which he was faced and all the material on which the department seeks to rely should be placed before the inquiry officer and the delinquent govt. servant should have an opportunity of explaining such material. The evidence should be recorded in his presence and he should have an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. 37. Thus, I am of the view that since the petitioner was denied the opportunity, both to cross-examine the witnesses of the management as well as to lead evidence in defence, entire inquiry stands vitiated. The evidence should be recorded in his presence and he should have an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. 37. Thus, I am of the view that since the petitioner was denied the opportunity, both to cross-examine the witnesses of the management as well as to lead evidence in defence, entire inquiry stands vitiated. I am further of the opinion that even the basic norms which govern the conducting of departmental inquiries against the delinquent without supplying the copy of inquiry report or the documents has also been violated in this case and as such the inquiry stands vitiated. I am fortified in my view by the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Union of India v.Mohd. Ramjan Khan (supra) wherein the Apex Court held that non-furnishing of the report to the delinquent would be violative of the principles of natural justice rendering the final order invalid. I am further of the opinion that the termination order passed against the petitioner by the disciplinary authority suffers from non-application of mind inasmuch as no reasons have been assigned by the disciplinary authority for arriving at such decision. 38. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and also having perused the documents on the record and after examining the rival claims and contentions advanced at the bar, I am consequently of the opinion that the impugned order of termination of the service of the petitioner, dated 11.5.1985 and the order, dated 14.10.1985 directing the petitioner to remit or deposit the amount of Rs. 9429.45 shown as outstanding against the petitioner by the management are hereby quashed and set aside being void-ab-initio and non-est in the eye of law. In my opinion this action of the respondents does not stand to reason since on the one hand the respondents are deemed to have impliedly conveyed their assurance to the petitioner of his continuity in service with the respondents-mill by calling upon the petitioner to deposit the disputed amount, while on the other they took the drastic action of terminating the services of the petitioner on the said deposit having been made by the petitioner and by not referring the matter to arbitration as referred to above. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner w.e.f. 11.5.1985 with all consequential benefits and such other dues to which he may be legitimately entitled in accordance with rules.The respondents are further directed to refund the amount of Rs. 9429.45 deposited by the petitioner pursuant to the order, dated 14.10.1985.In view of the observations made above, this writ petition succeeds and the same is allowed with costs.Petition allowed with costs. *******