JUDGMENT 1. - The Petitioner was employed as a conductor in the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (for short 'the Corporation' hereinafter). 2. On June 17, 1982 he was removed from service on the basis of the conviction for an offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code for which he was sentenced to three years imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/-. The conviction was maintained by the High Court in an appeal. In the order removing the petitioner from service, it was observed that a convicted employee cannot be kept in employment under the Orders of the State Government and therefore, the petitioner's services were terminated. 3. The petitioner contends that the order is bad because it has been passed without complying with the provisions of the Standing Order which requires an enquiry to be held before terminating the services of an employee. It is also contended that since the petitioner had not been given any opportunity of hearing before the order was passed, the principles of natural justice were violated. The decision of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Union of India, 1974 RLR 171 , Satya Dev Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (1994 Lab IC NOC 426) and that of the Supreme Court in The Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway v. T.R. Challappan, AIR (1976-I-LLJ-68) , Town Area Committee, Jalalabad v. Jag-dish Prasad ( AIR 1978 SC 1407 ) and Shankar Das v. Union of India, (1985-II- LLJ-184) were cited in support of his case by the petitioner. 4. On the other hand the respondent's contention is that the Standing Order applicable to the petitioner's services specifically provided for dismissal from service of an employee who has been found guilty in criminal proceedings. It was contended that it was a simple discharge and not a punitive order. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, I have reached the conclusion that this petition has no force. It is not disputed that the petitioner was convicted of the offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to three years imprisonment. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, I have reached the conclusion that this petition has no force. It is not disputed that the petitioner was convicted of the offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The Standing Order 36(vi)(c) applicable to the employment of the petitioner provided that if on the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, the workman is found guilty of the charge and it is considered that an order of dismissal may meet the ends of justice, the employer shall pass orders accordingly. 6. It is contended that the word 'considered' in the provision would simply mean consideration after hearing the workman as the ultimate order may affect him prejudicially. 7. In Kuldeep Singh's case, a Division bench of this Court was considering a case of an employee who was convicted but released of probation. Provisions of Article 311(2)(a) also applied to the case and it was in these circumstances decided that where the rule enjoins on punishing authority to consider the circumstances of the case, principles of natural justice would apply. The decision is distinguishable on facts. Here the petitioner has not been released on probation and the rule does not provide that the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit. In the present case, the Standing Order provides that whenever a workman has been found guilty and is convicted and it is considered that an order of dismissal may meet the ends of justice, the employer shall pass the orders accordingly. The Standing Order obviously permits the employer to dismiss a convicted employee if his dismissal is considered to be necessary to meet the ends of justice. The only thing to be considered is whether looking to the conviction, the petitioner should be dismissed or not. It is a policy decision to be taken by the employer whether he would continue such a convicted employee in service or not. 8. In T.R. Challappan's case (supra), again the case was of an employee who was convicted but was granted benefit of probation. It is a policy decision to be taken by the employer whether he would continue such a convicted employee in service or not. 8. In T.R. Challappan's case (supra), again the case was of an employee who was convicted but was granted benefit of probation. The relevant Rules in that case did not provide termination of service on the ground of conviction itself but provided that where any penalty was imposed on a Railway Servant on the ground of conduct which had led to his conviction on a criminal charge, the disciplinary authority might consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deemed fit. Thus the case differs from the case in hand in as much as the dismissal in that case was on the basis of circumstances which led to the conviction of the employee on a criminal charge and in the present case, the conviction itself entitles the employer to consider whether the employee should be continued in service or not. 9. In Jagdish Prasad's case (supra) also the Rule that no officer or servant shall be dismissed, removed or reduced without a reasonable opportunity being given to him of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him was under consideration. It was not a case where the Rule permitted removal of an employee on conviction by the Criminal Court. 10. In Shankar Das's case (supra), Article 311(2) was under consideration but it was held that everi if the provisions did not apply, the right to impose a penalty carries with it the duty to act justly. The penalty was held to be whimsical as it ignored the observations in favour of the accused by the convicting Magistrate himself. 11. Satya Dev Sharma's case (supra) also does not apply because that related to imposition of a penalty on the ground of conduct which had led to the conviction of an employee and not on the basis of conviction itself. 12. Thus, all the aforesaid authorities have no application to the facts of this case. 13. 11. Satya Dev Sharma's case (supra) also does not apply because that related to imposition of a penalty on the ground of conduct which had led to the conviction of an employee and not on the basis of conviction itself. 12. Thus, all the aforesaid authorities have no application to the facts of this case. 13. In the present case the only thing the respondents were liable to consider was whether dismissal would meet the ends of justice, in view of the conviction of the employee under Section 326 IPC, If hearing is provided on the point whether the dismissal would meet the ends of justice or not, it cannot be said that the employee is prejudiced. No enquiry is to be held in to the circumstances which led to the conviction and the only thing which is to be considered is that whether in view of the conviction, dismissal would meet the ends of justice. If the employer decided this himself it cannot be said that he acts in violation of principles of natural justice. After all, the post which was held by the petitioner involved relations with the customers. If the R.S.R.T.C. considered the conviction of an employee who has been convicted under Section 326 Indian Penal Code and decided that his dismissal would meet the ends of justice, no fault can be found with such a decision. More over, when the employee is convicted and sentenced for three years, he is unable to serve the employer for three years and asking the employer not to dismiss such an employee would mean compelling the employer to grant the employee three years leave to enable him to serve his sentence. When the employer is not at all concerned with the circumstances which resulted in the conviction, it would be too much to expect such a charity from him. As conviction has deprived the employee from serving the employer for a period of three years, the employee had to suffer not because of the employer but because of his own misfortune. The employer cannot be punished for something for which he is not at all responsible. As conviction has deprived the employee from serving the employer for a period of three years, the employee had to suffer not because of the employer but because of his own misfortune. The employer cannot be punished for something for which he is not at all responsible. A fair and reasonable opportunity in the matter of employment would not mean a right to continue in employment even if the employee has not been able to serve the employer for a particular period during which he is incarcerated on being convicted by a Criminal Court. 14. For the aforesaid reasons this petition has no merits and it is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.Petition Dismissed. *******