JUDGMENT S. B. Sinha, J. - The primary relief sought for in all these writ applications is payment of salary and other emoluments to the petitioners who are teaching and non-teaching staff of such Sanskrit Schools which were allegedly taken over by the State of Bihar for the period 1st December, 1988 and 31st March, 1989 and also for the subsequent periods as also for payment of dearness allowance etc. since 1983. In some of the writ applications prayer has also been made for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the State and its Officers as also Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board to determine and declare the Service Conditions of the teaching and non-teaching staff of 429 Sanskrit Schools. In C.W.J.C. No. 7844 of 1990, sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 4 of Bihar Ordinance No. 21 of 1990 dated 13th August, 1990 is also in-question. 2. Before adverting to the questions involved in all these writ applications, it is necessary to consider the history of the legislation in the sphere of Sanskrit education by the State of Bihar. 3. In the State of Bihar, and particularly in the districts of Darbhanga and Madhubani, various Sanskrit Schools have been functioning for a long time, the existence of some of the schools goes back to the 20th Century. The imparting of education through the Sanskrit medium was done in tol Vidyalayas from the stage of Prathama up to Acharya. Many of Such tols were recognised by the State of Bihar. The State constituted a body known as Bihar Sanskrit Association which was directly functioning under the control of the State of Bihar and the Directorate of the Public Instructions. The said association further used to grant affiliation to the schools for Acharya examination. There are various correspondences to show that the State had been exercising some kind of control over such schools. This fact will be borne out from a letter dated 11.2.1987 which is annexed as Annexure-1 to the CWJC No. 10786 of 1992. According to the petitioners, the said schools were also being inspected by the authorities of the State of Bihar from time to time. 4. This fact will be borne out from a letter dated 11.2.1987 which is annexed as Annexure-1 to the CWJC No. 10786 of 1992. According to the petitioners, the said schools were also being inspected by the authorities of the State of Bihar from time to time. 4. Provisions had also been made in Chapter II of the Bihar Education Code for control over all types of recognised Sanskrit Institutions namely Sanskrit Tol Vidyalayas in which students were taught from Pratharna to Acharya and in Prathamik Sanskrit Schools, teaching was imparted in Sanskrit in addition to Vernacular curricular up to lower and upper Primary standard. Such schools were under the control of the Bihar Sanskrit Association which also used to conduct examinations. 5. The control of these Vidyalayas was exercised through the said Bihar Sanskrit Association which consisted of two parts; namely the Sanskrit Parishad and the Sanskrit Council; each body having the same President and Secretary. 6. The Parishad was a larger body consisting of 16 members. The functions of the Council amongst others were (i) to conduct examinations, (ii) to issue titles and certificates (iii) to advise Government in regard to (a) the courses of studies for various Sanskrit examinations and in various classes of Sanskrit Institutions (b) The rules to be framed for Sanskrit examinations, (c) matters affecting Sanskrit Education generally and (d) to recognise and to propose for the approval of Government rules regulating their recognition and many other matters which are not relevant for the purpose of the present writ petition. 7. The Kameshwar Singh Darbhanga Sanskrit University Act (Act VI of 1960) carne into force on the 18th March, 1960. This Act defined Bihar Sanskrit Association in Section 2 (d) as the Sanskrit Association, constituted by the State Government for exercising control and superintendence over institutions other than tols imparting instruction in Sanskrit upto the Madhyama standard. By this Act, the University was given the power to award degrees and to hold examinations. Further the University was given the power of affiliation to Sanskrit institutions but it was not given the power of recognition of the same. 7A. By this Act, the University was given the power to award degrees and to hold examinations. Further the University was given the power of affiliation to Sanskrit institutions but it was not given the power of recognition of the same. 7A. Under Section 44 of the Act, the Bihar Sanskrit Association was dissolved and its power and duties were to be exercised and performed by the University or the Board of Sanskrit Education, as the case may be, in such manner as the State Government may be order in writing direct in this behalf. 8. Thereafter the Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board was constituted vide State Government Resolution no. 322 dated 24.1.61 This Board was also known as Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Parishad and it controlled Sanskrit Education upto Madhyama Standard, but the examinations were conducted by the University. 9. The Legislature thereafter enacted Kameshwar Singh Darbhanga Vishwa Vidyalaya Act, 1962 (Act 21 of 1965) in terms whereof the earlier Act of 1960 was repealed. This Act also defined the Bihar Sanskrit Association and the Board of Sanskrit Education (Sanskrit Shiksha Parishad) in the same terms as defined in the earlier Act. By this Act, also the University was not given the power of recognition of the Sanskrit institutions. From Section 43 of this Act it appears that the power of recognition of Sanskrit institutions formerly lay with the Bihar Sanskrit Association and thereafter the same was transferred to the Board of Sanskrit Education. 10. The Bihar State Universities Act being Act No. 23 of 1976 came into effect from 31st December, 1976. This Act repealed the earlier Act of 1965 and has confined the jurisdiction of the Sanskrit University to colleges imparting education above Madhyama standard. As mentioned hereinbefore, thereafter the Government of Bihar promulgated several Ordinances in the years 1980 and 1981 which were cancelled by a legislative Act known as Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board Act, 1981 (Bihar Act XXXI of 1982) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) which came into force with effect from 24.1.1982. 11. The State of Bihar, thereafter, framed Rules known as Bihar State Non-Government Sanskrit High School (Condition of Service) Rules, 1976 but a Division Bench of this Court in Kashi Prasad Vs. 11. The State of Bihar, thereafter, framed Rules known as Bihar State Non-Government Sanskrit High School (Condition of Service) Rules, 1976 but a Division Bench of this Court in Kashi Prasad Vs. State of Bihar being C.W.J.C. No. 2084 of 1982 by a judgment dated 10th August, 1987 held that the said Rules having not been framed under the said Act do not have any statutory force. 13. The said Act was enacted to provide for development and supervision of Sanskrit Education up to Madhyama standard in the State of Bihar. The State however has not yet framed any rule under the said Act. The duties and functions of the Board have been enumerated in Section 6 of the said Act. Section 6, inter alia empowers the Board to grant recognition to Sanskrit Schools up to Madhyama standard with prior approval of the State Government as also to withdraw recognition of recognised Sanskrit institutions. The Board is also required to maintain Register of recognised Sanskrit Schools and tols. 14. Section 13 of the Act provides for constitution of fund known as Sanskrit Shiksha Nidhi which in terms of Section 14(k) thereof has to be utilised for payment of salary and other allowances of the teaching and non-teaching staff. In terms of Clause (Anga) of Section 14 of the said Act the Board has to make payment of contribution towards pension, gratuity, provident fund of the teachers and other employees of recognised Sanskrit Schools. Section 20 of the said Act provides that services of teaching and non-teaching staff of recognised Sanskrit Schools and tols shall be taken over under the Board with effect from the date of the notification by State of Bihar in the Official gazette and teaching and non-teaching staff shall be treated in the services of the Board from that date and their services shall also be treated to be under the Board. 15. It was further directed that in the event such notification is published in the official gazette the services of such person shall be controlled by the Board in terms of the rules which may be framed in that regard. No such notification, however, has been issued by the State of Bihar. 15. It was further directed that in the event such notification is published in the official gazette the services of such person shall be controlled by the Board in terms of the rules which may be framed in that regard. No such notification, however, has been issued by the State of Bihar. Section 28 of the said Act casts a duty upon the State Government to arrange to make appointment and promotion to teachers by notification made in the official gazette and also prescribe Rules and procedures therefor. Section 22(2) (ta) of the said Act empowers the State Government to make rules regarding the service conditions and appointment of teachers and other staff of Sanskrit Schools and tols. In terms of Section 25 of the said Act, Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Parishad stood dissolved. Section 25(4) provides that all recognised schools, tols were deemed to have been recognised under the said Act until the expiration of the period of recognition subject, however, to the power of the Board to withdraw recognition in accordance with the provisions thereof. 16. The State of Bihar, it is not disputed, had adopted a policy decision in terms whereof payment of salary of teaching and non-teaching staff of recognised Sanskrit schools had all along been made by it. However, prior thereto, the State used to pay grant-in-aid to the said Sanskrit schools and later on used to pay deficit grant in the matter of payment of salary. 17. The petitioners have brought on records various documents to show that terms and conditions of the service of the teachers of the recognised schools and the sanctioned strength had all along been determined by it. 18. It may be stated that by letter dated 17th of May 1975, the State Government made it clear that it has undertaken the entire financial burden of payment of salary of the teachers in terms of the revised scales of pay which was to be implemented w.e.f. 1st April, 1973 and such burden was to be shared in respect of such Sanskrit Schools which were approved and recognised w.e.f. 31st March, 1973. By the said letter, allotment of Rs. 65,78,960/- was also made. By a notification dated 11th August, 1976 published in the Bihar Gazette, a list of 17 Government Sanskrit High Schools and 108 non-Government recognised Sanskrit High Schools were circulated. By the said letter, allotment of Rs. 65,78,960/- was also made. By a notification dated 11th August, 1976 published in the Bihar Gazette, a list of 17 Government Sanskrit High Schools and 108 non-Government recognised Sanskrit High Schools were circulated. The State I had also informed the Accountant General Bihar by letter dated 4th May, 1978 with regard to fixation of pay scale of both Governmental and non-Governmental. Sanskrit High Schools and madarsas which was fixed as 4th May 1978 and stood revised by letter no. 298 dated 12th March, 1979. The scales of pay stood revised w.e.f. 1st April, 1978. By a letter dated 12th March, 1979, the State laid down certain more terms and conditions with regard to appointment of teaching and non-teaching staff in the non-Governmental recognised Sanskrit Schools. 19. By reason of the said letter, the State further directed that the dearness allowance which was being paid to the Government Servants would also be paid to the teaching and non-teaching staff of Non-Governmental . recognised Sanskrit High Schools. 20. It may be stated that scales of pay and the D.A. as and when revised had also been made applicable to the Governmental Schools. 21. The petitioners have contended that the Govt. made enquiries with regard to recognised schools and thereafter a decision was taken which was communicated to all concerned by letter no. 204 dated 2nd March, 1981 converting different categories of Sanskrit Institutions. In the said list of Institutions, names of 244 Tols Vidyalayas found place and the same were called Madhyama Vidyalayas. In the year 1983, the total number of recognised Sanskrit Vidyalayas rose to 442 and the payment of salary etc. of the teaching and non-teaching staff of all those schools were to be made by the State Government. The State also implemented the recommendations of 4th Pay Revision Committee in relation to the teachers of the aforementioned 442 non-Governmental Sanskrit Schools. However, the State Government decided to make payment to 224 Tol Vidyalayas of different types of recognised Sanskrit Schools but the salary of teaching and non-teaching staff of remaining non-Governmental recognised Sanskrit Schools was being paid by Bihar Sanskrit Association. 22. A memo. However, the State Government decided to make payment to 224 Tol Vidyalayas of different types of recognised Sanskrit Schools but the salary of teaching and non-teaching staff of remaining non-Governmental recognised Sanskrit Schools was being paid by Bihar Sanskrit Association. 22. A memo. dated 2nd December, 1987 (Annexure-9 to CWJC No. 10786 of 1992) was thereafter placed before the Council of Ministers for consideration as to whether in view of the fact that financial liability of' all the aforementioned 442 Sanskrit Schools was being borne by the Government, an Ordinance should be promulgated for taking over management and control thereof. Thereafter, an inventory was made of all such schools in terms of letter bearing No. 614 dated 28th December, 1987 issued by the Special Secretary of the Education Department to Collectors of different districts. However, from 1987 to 1989 no significant step was taken by the State of Bihar in this regard. By Memo no. 136 dated 25th February, 1989 again the approval of Council of Ministers was sought for with regard to taking over of 429 out of 442 of the non-Governmental recognised Sanskrit Schools as it was stated therein that there had been certain disputes with regard to 13 schools. The council of Ministers allegedly gave its approval to the said proposal of taking over the recognised Sanskrit Schools. 23. On or about 16.12.1989, Governor of Bihar in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Article 213 of the Constitution promulgated an Ordinance known as Bihar Non-Government Sanskrit Schools (Taking over of Management and Control) Ordinance, 1989 (Ordinance No. 32 of 1989). The said Ordinance was succeeded by Bihar Ordinance No. 7/90 and Bihar Ordinance no. 14/90. All the provisions of the aforementioned three Ordinances are identical. The third Ordinance expired on 1.5.1992. Section 3(1) of the said Ordinance provided that with effect from the date of its enforcement management and control of 429 Sanskrit Schools mentioned in Schedule I of the Ordinance stood vested in the State Government. 14/90. All the provisions of the aforementioned three Ordinances are identical. The third Ordinance expired on 1.5.1992. Section 3(1) of the said Ordinance provided that with effect from the date of its enforcement management and control of 429 Sanskrit Schools mentioned in Schedule I of the Ordinance stood vested in the State Government. Section 3(2) further provided that all assets and properties of all the Sanskrit schools mentioned in Sub-Section (i) of Section 3 or of the governing body, or the managing committee, whether movable or immovable including lands, buildings, documents, books and registers, cash balance, reserve fund, capital investment, furniture, fixtures and other things shall on and from the date of taking over stand transferred to and vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Section 4 of the Ordinance provided that with effect from the date of vesting of all such Sanskrit schools, the services of all those teaching and non-teaching staff of the said schools mentioned in Schedule I who had been appointed permanently/temporarily against sanctioned posts in accordance with the prescribed standard and staffing pattern prescribed by the State Government prior to the promulgation of the said Ordinance, shall stand transferred to the State Government with whatsoever designation they held. It was further provided that services of those teaching and non-teaching employees who were in excess of the sanctioned strength or do not possess the necessary fitness and/or qualifications, would automatically stand terminated. Section 4(2) of the said Ordinance provided that the teachers of the Sanskrit Schools taken over by the State Government shall be entitled to the same pay, allowances and pension etc. as are admissible to the teaching and non-teaching employees of the taken over secondary schools of Bihar. Under Chapter III of the Ordinance, the management and control of taken over Sanskrit schools was delegated to the Director and other officers working under him. It further envisaged constitution of a new managing committee for the aforesaid taken over schools. In the managing committees, apart from the Headmaster of the School and a teachers' representative of the concerned school, representation was also given to one member of the Legislature, either of Vidhan Sabha, Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha or Vidhan Parishad and the person who had made donation or contribution for the development and establishment of the school (to be nominated by the State Government). It may be stated that the constitution of new managing committees under the Ordinance was entirely different than the managing committees which were earlier controlling the affairs of the Sanskrit Schools. But the management of the Schools so taken over were to be made in the manner prescribed but no rules therefor have been framed by the State of Bihar in terms of the aforementioned Ordinance. 24. However, the Governor of Bihar promulgated Ordinance No. 21 of 1990 dated 12th August, 1990 which was published in the Bihar Gazette dated 13th August, 1990 wherein a radical departure was made in sections 3 and 4 thereof as compared to the corresponding section of the previous Ordinances. By reason of the provisions of the said Ordinance a proviso was added to section 3 of the Act in terms whereof, the State was empowered to make an enquiry with regard to the existence and other matters relating to a school. In terms of Section 3, the State was empowered to get an enquiry made through the Collector of the District and in the event it was found in such enquiry that any of the School was non-existent, such school could be denotified. Section 4 of the said Ordinance, further provides that the teaching and non-teaching staff of the taken over schools will no longer remain in the services of the School till determination of their cases by the State Government on the basis of an enquiry to be held in terms thereof. Sub-Section (2) of Section 4 of the Act provides that the state shall constitute an Expert Committee which shall make enquiry with reference to biodatas of all teaching and non-teaching staff and also make an enquiry with regard to their qualification, experience and other relevant factors and submit a report to the State of Bihar. It was further provided that the said committee shall also make an enquiry regarding implementation of the reservation policy of the State in the matter of appointment so far as the members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and backward classes are concerned. Sub-Section (3) of Section 4 of the said Ordinance, empowers the State of Bihar to consider on the basis of the said report as to whether the services of any teacher should be taken over or not. Six more Ordinances upto Ordinance No. 71192 were promulgated. Sub-Section (3) of Section 4 of the said Ordinance, empowers the State of Bihar to consider on the basis of the said report as to whether the services of any teacher should be taken over or not. Six more Ordinances upto Ordinance No. 71192 were promulgated. A copy of the said Ordinance is contained in Annexure-14 to CWJC No. 10786 of 1992. After, the aforementioned Ordinance, no further Ordinance was promulgated and thus the said Ordinance lapsed by efflux of time on the expiry of 30th April, 1992. 25. Ordinance No. 21 of 1990 was followed by Ordinance no. 10 of 1991 namely Bihar Arajikiya Sanskrit Vidyalaya (Prabandh and Niyantran Grahan) Ordinance, 1991 which was followed by Ordinance No. 2 of 1992. 26. A writ petition was filed by some of the affected teachers questioning the vires of Bihar Ordinance No. 21 of 1990 being CWJC No. 7844 of 1990 and by order dated 10.4.1991 a Division Bench of this court stayed the operation of Section 4(1), (2) and (3) thereof. Copy of the said order is contained in Annexure-13 to the writ application being CWJC No. 10786 of 1992. 27. At this juncture, it is necessary to mention that despite the fact the operation of sub-section (1), (2), (3) of section 4 of Ordinance no. 21 of 1990 was stayed by this Court in CWJC No. 7844 of 1990 the petitioners thereof were not being paid their salary. 28. The Legislature of the State of Bihar, however, has not passed any enactment in relation to the taking over of the said schools and allowed the stalemate to continue after the expiry of Ordinance No.2 of 1992. It is curious to note that the English version of the 5th Ordinance of 1991 is available and section 4 thereof is in identical terms of the 1st Ordinance which is inconsistent with the Hindi Version thereof. A bill, however, was published wherein drastic changes had been made vis-a-vis the Ordinances. All the aforementioned facts are pointer to the fact that the State deals with a matter of great importance in such a casual or easy manner. 29. It appears that in terms of the provisions of the aforementioned Bihar Ordinance No. 21 of 1990 and other subsequent Ordinances following the same, enquiries had been made by Collector of some of the district and reports prepared in pursuance thereof have been submitted. 29. It appears that in terms of the provisions of the aforementioned Bihar Ordinance No. 21 of 1990 and other subsequent Ordinances following the same, enquiries had been made by Collector of some of the district and reports prepared in pursuance thereof have been submitted. Enquiries had also been made by the Committees constituted under Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Bihar Ordinance No. 21 of 1990. Broadly stated in relation to some Schools 'Anukul' (favourable) reports have come in relation to some of the schools which are said to be not only existing but also fulfil all the criteria of being taken over. Even in relation to teaching and non-teaching staff of such schools, directions have been issued for payment of salary for one year only; but no actual payment has yet been made. In relation to some of the schools, 'Pratikul' (unfavourable) reports have been submitted. The decision of the Committee in relation to the said schools may broadly be classified as follows: 1. Some schools were found to be non-existent. 2. In some schools teachers were found to be in excess of the sanctioned strength, which was 7 teaching staff including Headmaster and two non-teaching staff one clerk and one peon. 3. In relation to some of the schools it was found that they did not fulfill the criteria of accommodation and other conditions, e.g. in place of four class rooms there, only three class rooms had been found or on the date of inspection 70% of the students were not found to be present in the schools. In the counter affidavit filed in CWJC No. 10924 of 1993 it was further stated that sufficient money were not available in the account of the school involved in the said application. 30. Learned counsel for the petitioner, has inter-alia raised the following contentions: (1) The expiry of the Ordinance does not mean that• the schools taken over can again be denotified. As the said provisions were intended to be of permanent nature and not of transitional nature, expiry of the said Ordinance became immaterial and irrelevant. Learned counsel in support of the aforementioned contention relied upon the following case laws : 1. 1841 (151) English Reports 1024 (Steavenson vs. Oliver) 2. AIR 1962 S.C. 945 (State of Orrisa vs. Bhupendra Kumar) 3. AIR 1962 S.C. 1281 (R.C. Jall Vs. Union of India) 4. Learned counsel in support of the aforementioned contention relied upon the following case laws : 1. 1841 (151) English Reports 1024 (Steavenson vs. Oliver) 2. AIR 1962 S.C. 945 (State of Orrisa vs. Bhupendra Kumar) 3. AIR 1962 S.C. 1281 (R.C. Jall Vs. Union of India) 4. 1984 BBCJ 244 (Gopal Krishan Sinha vs. State of Bihar & Ors.) 5. 1952 Calcutta 907 (Ha vs. State of West Bengal) 6. AIR 1933 Calcutta 280 (Jagendra vs. Supdt. Dum Dum Spl. Jail) 7. AIR 1976 Patna 31 (Vidya Nand Sinha vs. State of Bihar) 8. 1949 Privy Council 90 (Gooderham and Worts vs. C. B. Corporation) 9. 1992 (2) PLJR 716 (Daya Nand Mishra and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and others). Reliance in this connection has also been placed upon some unreported decisions wherein the stand of the State was that the schools had been permanently taken over as a result whereof despite expiry of the Ordinance by lapse of time, the managing committee constituted thereunder shall manage the affairs of the schools and seniority lists etc. prepared on the basis of the new ordinances were valid. (2) Ordinance No. 21 of 1990 being inconsistent with the object of taking over of the school must be held to be unconstitutional being hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. (3) In any event, even after promulgation of Ordinance No. 21 of 1990 the teachers of the schools are entitled to payment of salary. (4) Sub-section (2) of section 4 of Ordinance No. 21 of 1990 must be held to be unconstitutional inasmuch as at the time of appointment the petitioners were appointed in privately managed school and, thus the question of following the reservation policy or fulfilling the other terms and conditions laid down by the State Govt. did not arise and thus the said ground was non-est in the eye of law. (5) 1976 Rules having been made for a particular purpose namely for the purpose of grant of recognition and the schools in question having been recognised once, the principles laid down therein cannot be applied for the purpose of taking over of schools which would recognition thereof. (5) 1976 Rules having been made for a particular purpose namely for the purpose of grant of recognition and the schools in question having been recognised once, the principles laid down therein cannot be applied for the purpose of taking over of schools which would recognition thereof. In any, the petitioners having regularly been working in the schools in question, they are entitled to payment of salary as also the arrears of D.A. and the difference in salary in terms of the recommendations of the 4th Pay Revision Committee. 31. Mr. Ram Salak Mahto, learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the Ordinances in question were promulgated in terms of Article 213 of the Constitution and thus the same, having not been placed before both the houses of Legislature within six weeks from the date of re-assembly thereof, lost its force. It was submitted that in any event as the State has the power to make amendment in a statute and thus one Ordinance can be amended by another Ordinance and, thus the right derived of the petitioners, if any stood extinguished upon promulgation of Ordinance No. 21 of 1990. Learned Advocate General further submitted that it could never be the intention of the State to take over the management of such schools which did not fulfil the criteria and thus the Legislature has every right to rectify its mistake either by repealing the existing statute or by making suitable amendments therein or by allowing it to lapse by efflux of time. It was also submitted that the Ordinance in question must be held to have been promulgated by the State of Bihar in exercise of its power conferred upon it under Entry 25 and Entry 42 List III of the Constitution of India. According to the learned Advocate General, properties of third parties cannot be acquired permanently by reason of a temporary statute. He further submitted that taking over of the schools would have no meaning whatsoever unless the assets and liabilities thereof are taken over. In support of his aforementioned contention the learned Advocate General strongly relied upon the decision in the case of Krishnan & Ors. He further submitted that taking over of the schools would have no meaning whatsoever unless the assets and liabilities thereof are taken over. In support of his aforementioned contention the learned Advocate General strongly relied upon the decision in the case of Krishnan & Ors. vs. the State of Madras & another (AIR 1951 Supreme Court 301); Amer-un-Nissa Begum and others vs. Mahboob Begum and others (AIR 1955 Supreme Court 352) and Gopi Chand Versus Delhi Administration (AIR 1959 Supreme Court 609). The learned counsel submitted that only in a case where the right created under a temporary statute is irreversible, the same may continue despite its repeal or coming to an end by efflux of time. 32. In view of the rival contentions of the parties, as noticed hereinbefore, in my opinion, the following question arise for consideration in this application : (A) Whether by reason of the expiry of the Ordinance, the Schools in question stand denationalised? (B) Whether by reason of Section 4 of Ordinance No. 21/90 the petitioners have ceased to be Government Servants which they became in terms of Ordinance No. 32/89 which was promulgated w.e.f.18.12.1989 ? (C) Whether Ordinance No. 21 /90 is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution? (D) Whether the services of the teachers who come within the purview of the 'Anukul' reports must be regularised and they should be treated as Government servants? (E) Whether in any event, the petitioners are entitled to their salaries and other emoluments? 33. Re. Question No. A & B Both the questions being inter-related, they are taken up for consideration together. Before proceeding to consider the decisions cited at the bar, the scope and purport of Article 213 of the Constitution of India may be considered. Article 123 as also Article 213 of the Constitution empower the President and the Governor to promulgate an Ordinance, inter-alia, in case of emergency when either of the two Houses; be it the Parliament or the State Legislature is not in session. Article 123 as also Article 213 of the Constitution empower the President and the Governor to promulgate an Ordinance, inter-alia, in case of emergency when either of the two Houses; be it the Parliament or the State Legislature is not in session. Article 123 as also Article 213 in no unmistakable terms lay down that such an Ordinance must be laid down before the Parliament or before the Legislative Assembly of the State or where there is a Legislative Council in the State, before both the Houses as the case may be and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the re-assembly of the Legislature or if before the expiration of that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Legislative Council. 34. It is true that although Article 213 implies the words "shall be laid before the Houses", the same is merely directory and not mandatory but the consequences of non-compliance of the said requirement is that such Ordinances would cease to operate at the expiry of six weeks from the re-assembly of the Legislature. 35. There cannot be any doubt however, that if right and obligations conferred or imposed by reason of an Ordinance is irreversible, the effect thereof may continue despite the expiry thereof. 36. In Dr. D. C. Wadhwa Vs. State of Bihar and others (AIR 1987 Supreme Court 579) the Supreme Court has clearly laid down that successive promulgation of Ordinances would be malafide. Following the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court, this court in Citizens Cause, Ranchi and another Vs. The State of Bihar and others ( 1992 (2) PLJR 818 ) held that the successive Ordinance promulgated was bad in law. It further held : "In the instant case, in our opinion, as the conduct of the State in repromulgating the same Ordinance successively despite the fact that the 1985 Ordinance had been struck down by the Supreme Court borders all contempt of the Supreme Court of India. The conduct of the State of Bihar must be deprecated. Apparently the State of Bihar has belied the hopes of the Supreme Court as expressed in Wadhwa's case. It is clear that Ordinance Raj is still prevailing in the State of Bihar. 37. The conduct of the State of Bihar must be deprecated. Apparently the State of Bihar has belied the hopes of the Supreme Court as expressed in Wadhwa's case. It is clear that Ordinance Raj is still prevailing in the State of Bihar. 37. The question which now arises for consideration is whether the nationalisation of School whereby and whereunder the properties of the School are sought to be taken over can be said to have permanently vested in the State of Bihar despite the expiry of the said Ordinance. The answer to the said question, in my opinion, should be rendered in negative inasmuch as if such was the intention of the makers of the Constitution Clause 2(a) of Article 213 would not have been inserted. The matter may further be considered from another angle. If such a construction is put to Article, 213 of the Constitution of India, council of Ministers can get any Ordinance promulgated subject, of course to the satisfaction of the Governor which may not necessitate placing of such Ordinances before the Parliament or the Houses of the Legislature at all, although at the relevant time the Government may be a minority one. Such a situation, in my opinion, was not contemplated by the makers of Constitution of India. 38. The power of the President of India or the Governor of the State is co-extensive with the legislative power. The power has been conferred on the executive for a necessary purpose and is hedged in by limitations and conditions. The conferment of the power is not undemocratic because the executive is already answerable to the Legislature. It therefore, cannot be held to be a rule, but an exception. 39. In fact before promulgation of the Ordinance, the Council of Ministers are not required even to consult the M.L.A.s of the ruling party. In this connection it will be relevant to notice the relevant constitutional provisions. Article 174 (1) of the Constitution of India dealing with the session of the State Legislature, provides that the House or Houses of Legislature shall be summoned twice atleast in every year, and six months shall not intervene between the last sitting in one session and the date appointed for their first sitting in the next session. Article 174 (1) of the Constitution of India dealing with the session of the State Legislature, provides that the House or Houses of Legislature shall be summoned twice atleast in every year, and six months shall not intervene between the last sitting in one session and the date appointed for their first sitting in the next session. Thus the maximum life of the Ordinance promulgated by the State is for seven and half months, unless it is replaced by an Act or disapproved by the Legislature before that period. Article 213 of the Constitution does not either expressly or impliedly empowers the Governor of the State to take any action which may have the effect of extending directly the life of the Ordinance promulgated by him whether directly or indirectly. The life of the Ordinance can be shortened but it cannot be extended. 40. From the debates of the Constituent Assembly in relation to Article 187 of the Draft Constitution of India which later on was engrafted as Article 213 of the Constitution of India, it would appear that Pandit Kunjru wanted that an Ordinance promulgated by the Governor of the State in exercise of the said power may not remain in force for more than 14 days. The other amendment in the Article was proposed by Prof. Shibban Lal Saxena who, inter alia, moved for replacement in clause (1) of Article 187 for the words "for him to take immediate action in promulgating such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require", the words "immediate action be taken and a report be made to that effect to the President who may then promulgate such ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require" to be substituted. After a long debate, however, the aforementioned amendments were not accepted. 41. B. Sooba Rao in his "The framing of Indian Constitution select documents volume II page 638" referring to the documents in relation to the framing of the Constitution of India pointed out that the power of the Governor of a State was first provided in Clause 21 of the Memorandum on the principle of a model provisional constitution. 41. B. Sooba Rao in his "The framing of Indian Constitution select documents volume II page 638" referring to the documents in relation to the framing of the Constitution of India pointed out that the power of the Governor of a State was first provided in Clause 21 of the Memorandum on the principle of a model provisional constitution. As Ordinance making powers of the Governor General of India and a Governor of a province had been subjected to much criticism in the past, the constitutional adviser had appended an explanatory note pointing out the change in the character of the provincial executive which the constitution was being entrusted with the responsibility for the promulgation of the Ordinance, and it was emphasised that the Governor would act on the advise of the Ministers and not of his own, and thus there would not at all be any likelihood of abuse of the Ordinance making power. The executive, was, therefore, empowered to promulgate the Ordinance in good faith. As it appears now, the founding fathers of the Constitution are proved wrong. It is relevant to note that in no other country such a provision exists including the Commonwealth countries. 42. The Ordinance making power of the President of India and the Governor of a State is rather unusual in democracy. Such power was evidently granted to deal with an emergent situations so as to empower the executive to deal with the legislative matter during the recess of the Parliament as situation may suddenly arises for taking such courses. Although the said power was retained in the Constitution as it was capable of abuse it was ensured that the abuse also should be temporary in nature. 43. It is only the extreme emergency that the Ordinance making power is to be taken recourse to. 44. It has to be borne in mind that the exceptional power of law making by the Executive through Ordinance was not meant to be a substitute for the legislative power. In Wadhawa's case (Supra) the Supreme Court invalidated the Ordinances which were promulgated time and again without being brought before the Legislature as required in Clause (2) of Article 213 of the Constitution of India. 45. In Wadhawa's case (Supra) the Supreme Court invalidated the Ordinances which were promulgated time and again without being brought before the Legislature as required in Clause (2) of Article 213 of the Constitution of India. 45. The Supreme Court in the aforementioned decision in sharp departure from its earlier decision, observed that the promulgation of the Ordinance was done on massive scale in routine manner without any consideration whether the circumstances exist which render necessary for the Governor to take immediate action by repromulgation of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court held : "...It is true that, according to the decisions of the privy council and this court, the court cannot examine the question of satisfaction of the Governor in issuing an Ordinance, but the question in the present case does not raise any controversy in regard to the satisfaction of the Governor. The only question is whether the Governor has power to repromulgate the same Ordinance successively without bringing it before the Legislature. That clearly the Governor cannot do. He cannot assume legislative function in excess of the strictly defined limits set out in the Constitution because otherwise he would be usurping a function which does not belong to him. It is significant to note that so far as the President of India is concerned, though he has the same power of issuing an Ordinance under Article 123 as the Governor has under Article 213, there is not a single instance in which the President has, since 1950, till today, repromulgated any Ordinance after its expiry." It was held that executive cannot take over the role of the judiciary. 46. In Wadhawa's & Citizen's cases the Ordinances entitling 'The Bihar Intermediate Council Ordinances' whereby and whereunder a permanent body known as Intermediate Council was set up were struck down. It may be noticed that Intermediate Council holds examination for the students appearing at the Intermediate Examination. After the judgment passed in Citizen's cause, legislative Act has been enacted by the Legislature of Bihar. 47. In this case we are not only concerned with the question of successive promulgation of the Ordinances which in view of the decision in Dr. D. C. Wadhwa & Citizen's Cause case (Supra) must be held to be illegal and invalid, but also concerned with the question of not laying down such an expired Ordinance before both the houses of the Legislature at all. D. C. Wadhwa & Citizen's Cause case (Supra) must be held to be illegal and invalid, but also concerned with the question of not laying down such an expired Ordinance before both the houses of the Legislature at all. The distinction between the legislation by a Legislature of a State and the Legislation by a Governor of a State is clear and significant. The legislation by Legislature is of a permanent character unless otherwise specified therein; whereas the legislation by the Governor of a State had not been given that status. And thus such a course is adopted by way of a temporary measure. Reference in this connection may be made to R. G. Garg vs. The Union of India (1981 Vol. II SCC 675 at 687) and A. K. Raj vrs. Union of India (1982 Vol. I S.C.C. 271 at 290). 48. The idea behind giving the legislation a life of six weeks by way of an Ordinance after the re-assembly of the Legislature evidently is to enable it to convert it into a permanent one, if necessary. The Legislature can reject an Ordinance by a resolution by not approving it for some reason or otherwise. But that rejection has to take place before the expiry of six weeks. Even in a case where the sessions of Legislature is extended for more than six weeks and within that period the Legislature does not convert it into an Act or reject it, the Ordinance ceases to operate. From a plain reading of Article 213 of the Constitution of India it appears beyond any cavil that even the Legislature has no jurisdiction to extend period of six weeks from its re-assembly. The exercise of a legislative power by an executive in exercise of power under Article 213 of the Constitution of India, has to be confined within the four corners thereof. Even if the Legislature intends to exercise its power to do something in the light of an Ordinance it must do so by reason of a fresh legislation and it cannot even approve such an Ordinance which has expired in terms of clause 2 (a) of Article 213 of the Constitution of India. 49. The courts of law although has no jurisdiction to compel the executive to legislate or compel the Legislature to legislate, but it can declare usurpation of the legislative power of the executive as void. 49. The courts of law although has no jurisdiction to compel the executive to legislate or compel the Legislature to legislate, but it can declare usurpation of the legislative power of the executive as void. At the cost of repetition it may be emphasised that the democracy in India is based on three pillars, namely, the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. The functions of each wing of the State, although separate, the judiciary is the watch dog to see that neither the Legislature nor the Executive exceeds its constitutional or statutory limits. The intention of the founding fathers of the Constitution in this regard is absolutely clear and explicit. 50. The words used in clause 2 (a) of Article 213 of the Constitution is so clear and unambiguous that it is not capable of two interpretations. The object of Article 213 of the Constitution is also to provide the Executive with the power of legislation only for a limited and short period, it cannot be interpreted in a way so as to give a wider meaning to the said provision. The aforementioned provisions in no unmistakable term casts a constitutional obligation upon the State to lay before the Legislature the Ordinance within a time frame. Failure to do so entails the consequences laid down thereunder. It is in this backdrop the word 'shall' has to be construed which in our opinion is mandatory in character. Further it is well known that even when the discretion cast on an authority is coupled with duty, the same is construed as 'must'. 51. Only, thus in certain exceptional cases, where the position becomes absolutely irreversible, an Ordinance continue to remain in force despite expiry. The effect of expiry of a temporary statute is a matter of construction and it is unsafe to lay down inflexible rules in relation thereto. 52. In Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edition in paia 978, the law has been stated thus: "978. Effect of expiry of a matter of construction. - The effect of the expiry of a temporary statute is in each case a matter of construction. There is no presumption that a statute is to be treated on expiry as dead for all purposes. Effect of expiry of a matter of construction. - The effect of the expiry of a temporary statute is in each case a matter of construction. There is no presumption that a statute is to be treated on expiry as dead for all purposes. Moreover, the most important of the general statutory saving provisions do, since, 1978, apply to the expiry of temporary Acts and Subordinate legislation passed or made after 1978" Francis Bennion in Article 187 of the Statutory Interpretation states: "187. Expiry of an enactment. - Unless the contrary intention appears, where a temporary enactment expires the effect is the same as if it had been repealed by an Act. However, the general savings set out in 182 of this Code apply to the expiry of a temporary enactment only where it is contained in an Act passed after 1978. Commentary. Apart from differences created by statute, the jurisdiction effects of repeal and expiry are identical. (See Moakes Vs. Balckwell Colliery Co. (1925) 2 KB 64 at p. 70). In each case the 1egal floodlight is switched off. (As to this metaphor See pp. 99 ff above). The only difference between a permanent and a temporary enactment is that with the latter the floodlight is on a time switch. Even so, a temporary enactment may be renewed (as by the annual Expiring Laws Continuance Act.) All this does not mean that a reference in an enactment to 'repeal' will apply without more to expiry. For this reason 16 (2) was added to the Interpretation Act, 1978 so that the general "savings which by statute applied to a repeal would also extend to an expired Act." In Crawford's Statutory Construction, it has been stated : "323. Expiration, suspension, and Desuetude: Many laws are of a temporary nature, and obviously such laws expire of their own force when the time arrives for their expiration. Even statutes of this type are not without their problems of construction. For instance, can a statute be operative for a specified period and then inoperative for a specified period and then become operative again? Such an enactment was involved in Stevens vs. Dimond where the legislative Act provided that if 'any horse etc. Even statutes of this type are not without their problems of construction. For instance, can a statute be operative for a specified period and then inoperative for a specified period and then become operative again? Such an enactment was involved in Stevens vs. Dimond where the legislative Act provided that if 'any horse etc. shall be found going at large from and after the first day of April until the last day of October, in any street, highway or common in said town, the owner thereof shall for each and every offence forfeit and pay the sum of four dollars with costs of suit to any person who may sue for the same' said the Court in deciding the case : "The question then, is did the byelaw in this case cease to be in force after the year, so that no action for a penalty incurred under it can now be maintained?" There is nothing in the bye-law itself which, in express terms, declares it shall not be in force after the year when the period it was intended to regulate expired, it without doubt, ceased to be a rule to regulate what was done afterwards. But did it cease to be a law of that period? 53. In Craies on Statute Law 7th Edition, it has been stated : "Expiration is a general rule, and unless it contains some special provision to the contrary, after a temporary Act has expired, no proceedings can be taken upon it and it ceases to have any further effect. The difference between the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act and the repeal of a perpetual Act is pointed out by Parke B in Steavenson Vs. Oliver. There is a difference between temporary statutes and statutes which are repealed; the latter (except so far as they relate to transactions already completed under them) become as if they had never existed; but with respect to the former, the extent of the restrictions imposed, and the duration of the provisions are matters of construction." The case related to 6 Geo. 4, C 133.4 (Apothecaries) which enacted that every person who held commission as surgeon in the aroy should be entitled to practice as an apothecary without having passed the usual examination. 4, C 133.4 (Apothecaries) which enacted that every person who held commission as surgeon in the aroy should be entitled to practice as an apothecary without having passed the usual examination. This Act was temporary expiring on August, 1, 1826; and it was contended that a person who under the Act was entitled to practice as an apothecary would lose his right after August, 1, 1826 but the Court held that such a person would not be so deprived of his right, and Lord Abinger C.B. in giving judgment said "It is by no means a consequence of an Act of Parliament expiring that right acquired under it should likewise expire. The Act provides that persons who hold such commissions should be entitled to practice as apothecaries, and we cannot engraft on the statute as new qualification limiting that enactment." 54. As noticed hereinbefore, the leading case in this subject as Steavension vs. Oliver 1841 (151) English Reports 1024 wherein Lord Parke B. state the law thus : "There is a difference between temporary statutes and statutes which are repealed; the latter (except so far as they relate to transactions already completed under them) become as if they had never existed; but with respect to the former, the extent of the restrictions imposed and the duration of the provisions are matters of construction. We must therefore look at this Act and see whether the restriction in the 11th Clause, that the provisions of the Statute are only to last for a limited time, is applicable to this privilege. It seems to be that the meaning of the Legislature was that all Assistant Surgeons, who were such before the 1st of August, 1826, should be entitled to the same privilege of practice as such on the 1st of August, 1815 and that• their privilege as such was of an executory nature capable of being carried into effect after the 1st of August, 1826." Alderson, B. was of the opinion : "I am of the same opinion. With respect to the difference between the 5th and 1st of August, supposing the latter to be the correct date, still the objection would not be good, for the alternation effected in this respect by 6 Geo. With respect to the difference between the 5th and 1st of August, supposing the latter to be the correct date, still the objection would not be good, for the alternation effected in this respect by 6 Geo. 4 e. 133 is one of a permanent nature, and the objection could only be rendered valid by holding that statute as one in all respects of a temporary character. But I apprehended that on the true construction of these acts of Parliament, those parts of the 6th Geo. 4 which explain the provisions of the 55 Geo 3 are in their own nature permanent and effectual, notwithstanding the final clause, which makes the Act temporary. Independently, however, of his consideration I agree in the opinion already expressed by my Brother Parke. It seems to me that those persons who during the year for which the last Act was to continue in force, or previous to that period had obtained rights, under it, had obtained rights, which were not to cease by the determination of the Act, any more than where a person commits an offence against an Act of a temporary nature, the party who has disobeyed the Act during its existence as a law is to become dispunishable on its ceasing to exist." Steavension's case (Supra) was dealing with a matter of granting privilege to the subjects, which was irreversible and thus despite expiry of the statute was interpreted to have a permanent effect so far as the beneficiaries thereunder are concerned. 55. The leading judgment pronounced by the Supreme Court on this subject is to be found in State of Orissa versus Bhupendra Kumar Bose and others reported in AIR 1962 S.C. 945 . The Supreme Court followed Stevenson's case (Supra) as also Wicks vs. Director of Public Prosecutors reported in 1947- 1 All ER 205 and held as follows : "In our opinion, it would not be reasonable to hold that the general rule about the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act on which Mr. Chetty relies is inflexible and admits of no exceptions. It is true for instance that offences committed against temporary Acts must be prosecuted and punished before the Act expires. If a prosecution has not ended before that day, as a result of the termination of the Act, if will ipso facto terminate. But is that an inflexible and universal rule? Chetty relies is inflexible and admits of no exceptions. It is true for instance that offences committed against temporary Acts must be prosecuted and punished before the Act expires. If a prosecution has not ended before that day, as a result of the termination of the Act, if will ipso facto terminate. But is that an inflexible and universal rule? In our opinion what the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act would be must depend upon the nature of the right or obligation resulting from the provisions of the temporary Act and upon their character whether the said right and liability are enduring or not." (underlining is mine for emphasis) 56. In the aforementioned case the Supreme Court was considering the effect of validating Ordinance being Orissa Municipal Election Validation Ordinance (1 of 1959) and in that context it was held : "In our opinion, having regard to the object of the Ordinance and to the rights created by the validating provisions, it would be difficult to accept the contention that as soon as the Ordinance expired, the validity of the elections came to an end and their invalidity was revived. The rights created by this Ordinance, are, in our opinion, very similar to the rights with which the court was dealing in the case of Steavenson and they must be held to endure and last even after the expiry of the Ordinance. The Ordinance has in turn provided that the order of the Court declaring the elections to the Cuttack Municipality to be invalid shall be deemed to be and always have been of no legal effect whatever and that the said elections are thereby validated. That being so, the said elections must be deemed to have been validly held under the Act and the life of the newly elected municipality would be governed by the relevant provisions of the Act and would not come to an end as soon as the Ordinance expires." 57. That being so, the said elections must be deemed to have been validly held under the Act and the life of the newly elected municipality would be governed by the relevant provisions of the Act and would not come to an end as soon as the Ordinance expires." 57. In R. C, Jail Parsi versus Union of India and another reported in AIR 1962 S. C. 1281, it was held: "On August, 26, 1944 the Governor General of India in exercise of the powers vested in him under Section 72 of the Ninth Schedule to the Government of India Act 1935, read with India & Burma (Emergency provisions) Act, 1940 promulgated the Coal Production Fund Ordinance, 1944 (39 of 1944) to constitute a fund for the financing of activities for the improvement of production, marketing and distribution of coal and coke. This court in Hansraj Moolji Vs. State of Bombay 1957 SCR 634 ; (S) AIR 1957 SC 497 ) held that the deletion of the words 'for the space of not more than six months from its promulgation from S.72 of the 9th Schedule of the Government of India Act, 1936, by S. 1 (3) of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940 had the effect of equating Ordinances which were promulgated between June, 27, 1940 and April, 1, 1946 with Acts passed by the Indian Legislature without any limitation of time as regards their duration and therefore continuing' in force until they were repealed. It follows from this decision that the Ordinance promulgated on August 26, 1944 was a permanent one and would continue to be in force till it was repealed." 58. In R. C. Jail vs. Union of India (AIR 1962 S. C. 1281) the Supreme Court while considering the Rules framed under the Coal Production Fund Ordinance, 1944 held: "But the life of the repealing Ordinance had expired on November, 1, 1947. What was the effect of the expiry of the repealing Ordinance on the said liability continued after repeal in respect of past transactions? The repealing Ordinance, being a temporary one, expired after it fulfilled its purpose. As it had continued the life of the original Ordinance, which was a permanent one, in respect of past transactions, the expiry of the life could not have any effect on that law to the extent saved." 59. The repealing Ordinance, being a temporary one, expired after it fulfilled its purpose. As it had continued the life of the original Ordinance, which was a permanent one, in respect of past transactions, the expiry of the life could not have any effect on that law to the extent saved." 59. In the aforementioned case, the Supreme Court was considering an Ordinance promulgated under the Government of India Act. The aforementioned decisions are thus not applicable to the facts of the present case. 60. In Gopi Krishan Sahu Vs. State of Bihar and others reported in 1984 BBCJ 245 a Division Bench was considering an Ordinance known as Sachidanand Sinha Library Ordinance 1983 whereby a Library known as Sachidanand Sinha library was taken over. However, the operation of the said judgment has been stayed by the Supreme Court of India and it has been stated before us by the learned Advocate General that the said Library is still being managed by the erstwhile owners. 61. In T. Venkata Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1985 Supreme Court 724) the Supreme Court was considering the validity of Andhra Pradesh Abolition of Posts of Part-time Village Officers Ordinance, 1984 (1 of 1984). The said Ordinance was promulgated in view of the policy decision of the State Government to abolish the posts of Part-time Village Officers in the State of Andhra Pradesh on the ground of administrative necessity. The Supreme Court in the aforementioned case held as follows : "It is seen that Article 213 of the Constitution does not say that the Ordinance shall be void from the commencement on the State Legislature disapproving it. It says that it shall cease to operate. It only means that it should be treated as being effective till it ceases to operate on the happening of the events mentioned• in Clause (2) of Art. 213. Secondly the Ordinance deals with two separate matters. By S. 3 of the Ordinance it abolishes the posts of Part-time Village Officers on the commencement of the Ordinance and it further declares that every person who held the post of a Part-time Village Officer would cease to hold that post with effect from that date. Secondly the Ordinance deals with two separate matters. By S. 3 of the Ordinance it abolishes the posts of Part-time Village Officers on the commencement of the Ordinance and it further declares that every person who held the post of a Part-time Village Officer would cease to hold that post with effect from that date. By S. 4 and other allied provisions the Ordinance has provided regarding the creation of posts of village Assistants and appointment and condition of service of village Assistants who are full-time employees of the Government. There is no doubt that a separate provision is made in S. 5 of the Ordinance for payment of some amount to ex-Part-time Village Officers. Now by virtue of S. 3 of the Ordinance all the posts of Part-time Village Officers stood abolished on January, 6, 1984 and the petitioners ceased to be employees of the State Government. These two matters became accomplished facts on January, 6, 1984 irrespective of whether the holders of these posts were paid any amount under S. 5 or whether the new posts of village Assistants were filled up or not. Even if the Ordinance is assumed to have ceased to operate from a subsequent date by reason of clause (2) of Art. 213, the effect of S. 3 of the ordinance was irreversible except by express legislation. (Underlining is mine for emphasis) 62. It is, therefore clear that in that case also, Section 3 of the Ordinance was found to be irreversible. 63. In Collector Akola and others vs. Ramchandra and others (AIR 1968 Supreme Court 244), the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of Bombay Land Acquisition Act which was extended to Vidarbha area by Bombay Land Requisition (Extension and Amendment) Act 33 of 1959. The Supreme Court in that case only held that although Section 5(1) of the said Act confers a temporary life to the Act but thereby limitation cannot be read that the purpose contemplated by it was also temporary and is to confound the temporary life of the statute with the character of the purpose for which the power thereunder can be exercised, in that case the lands were acquired for setting a new gaothan where the victims of the flood could be resettled. The State Government had initiated a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 in respect of those very lands and issued a notification under section 4 thereof. In that context the Supreme Court held that the exercise of power under the Requisitioning Act does not exhaust or make incompatible the exercise of power under the Land Acquisition Act. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that power of Requisitioning Act can be exercised where the public purpose is not temporary or that the exercise of that power for the purpose of rehabilitation of flood sufferers was either in abuse of or unjustified under the Act. 64. In Ram Nagina Singh vs. S. V. Sohni (AIR 1976 Patna 36) this court was considering the appointment of Bihar Lokayukta for a period of five years by reason of Bihar Lokayukta (Second) Ordinance, 1973. However, in that case, upon expiry of second Ordinance, a third Ordinance was promulgated and thereafter the Act also came into force. 65. In Gooderham and Worts versus C. B. Corporation reported in 1949 Privy Council 90, the Privy Council was considering the provisions of the effect of repeal of statute. 66. In Daya Nand Mishra and others vs. The State of Bihar and others ( 1992 (2) PLJR 716 ) a learned single Judge of this court held as follows : "In my view, Section 4 of the Act cannot be read and understood de hors the question of legitimacy. The provision contained therein does not intend that whosoever is seen, by the sun rising in the morning of December, 18, 1989, occupying the chair of the Headmaster would be confirmed as the Headmaster of the school irrespective of the question whether he occupied the chair authorisedly or otherwise. The provision is not intended to confer any right upon a usurper or a pretender notwithstanding that such a person was in physical occupation of the post on the relevant date. Legitimacy, to my mind, is the cornerstone of all rights and no one can be heard in a court of law to say that the court must come to his claim or even though his claim might not be legitimate at all. Legitimacy, to my mind, is the cornerstone of all rights and no one can be heard in a court of law to say that the court must come to his claim or even though his claim might not be legitimate at all. I am, therefore, very clear in my mind that Section 4 of the Act does not speak of mere physical presence but requires lawful and legitimate presence on the date the Ordinance came into force." The said decision, therefore, cannot have any application in the fact and circumstances of the case. 67. In Ram Nagina Singh vs. S. V. Sohni & Ors (AIR 1976 Patna 36) case (Supra) a Division Bench of this court laid down the law in the following terms : "The contention that the appointment of respondent No. 1 would lapse on the expiry of the Ordinance, being a temporary legislation was adequately met by demonstrating that there is contrary intention in the Ordinance itself. Section 5 of the Ordinance contemplates appointment for five years enduring even after the expiry of the Ordinance. The right so created cannot be taken away because the law which created it has expired. (See AIR 1962 S.C. 945 State of Orissa Versus Bhupendra Kumar). Moreover, this aspect is not of much importance in view of the section 23 of the Third Ordinance and the Act. No infirmity in the appointment of respondent No. 1 having been established, it is clear that the effect of section 23 is to anti-date the third ordinance to the date of appointment of respondent No.1. It has also the effect of converting appointment made under the second Ordinance to an appointment under the Third Ordinance." (Underlining in mine for emphasis) Ram Nagina's case, therefore, stands absolutely on a different footing. In Jagendra Chandra Roy vs. Superintendent of the Dum Dum Special Jail reported in AIR 1933 Calcutta 280 the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court while dealing with the Ordinance promulgated under the Government of India Act, 1890 the Court merely held the penalties those have been incurred while statute was in force are not acted upon by mere fact of the statute having ceased to have effect by express repeal or be expression by efflux of time. The Court observed : "The principle underlying their decision appears to have been that transactions that have been completed, rights not have been acquired and penalties that have been incurred while a statute is in force, are not (in the absence of an express provision to the contrary) affected by the mere fact of the statute having ceased to be in force, a principle which has since received statutory recognition in the Interpretation Act of 1889 in the case of express repeal, though not as yet in the case of expiration by effluxion of time." (underlining is mine for emphasis) This decision, therefore, also recognised that the rights granted in a temporary statute may be taken away by another statute and that expiration of statute by afflux of time stands on a different footing than a case where statutes has been repealed expressly. 68. In Haran Chandra Dutt and another Vs. The State of West Bengal and others reported in AIR 1952 Calcutta page 907 the court was again considering an Ordinance promulgated under the Government of India Act, 1935. The Court observed that the legislative power conferred on the Government U/s 88 is very wide and the Ordinance passed is as effective as an enactment of the provincial Legislature, as no restriction was put on this legislative power except as to its duration. The Court dealing with the contention of expiry of statutes observed that as the dissolution of the old District Board was complete before the expiry of West Bengal Ordinance 3 of 1948, its expiry could not have the effect of nullifying the dissolution and revising the old District Board. No exception be taken to aforementioned preposition of law. In S. Krishnan and ors. versus the State of Madras and another (AIR 1951 Supreme Court 301) it was held: “…….The general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as statute expires. Preventive detention which would but for the Act authorising it, be a continuing wrong, cannot therefore, be continued beyond the expiry of the Act itself…….” The decision was referred to in Bhupendra Kumar (1962 S.C. 945) and Qudrat Ullah vs. Bareily Municipality reported in 1974 S.C. 396 at 404. 69. Preventive detention which would but for the Act authorising it, be a continuing wrong, cannot therefore, be continued beyond the expiry of the Act itself…….” The decision was referred to in Bhupendra Kumar (1962 S.C. 945) and Qudrat Ullah vs. Bareily Municipality reported in 1974 S.C. 396 at 404. 69. In Ameer-U-Nissa Begum versus Mahboob Begum and ors., (AIR 1955 Supreme Court 352), the Supreme Court held as follows : "The result will be the same even if we proceed on the footing that the various 'Firmans' issued by the Nizam were in the nature of legislative enactments determining private rights somewhat on the analogy of private Acts of Parliament. We may assume that the 'Firman' of 26.6.1947 was repealed by the Firman of 24.2.1949, and the latter 'Firman' in its turn was repealed by that of 7.9.1949. Under the English Common law when a repealing enactment was repealed by another statute, the repeal of the second Act revived the former Act 'ab initio'. But this rule does not apply to repealing Acts passed since 1850 and now if an Act repealing a former Act is itself repealed, the last repeal does not revive the Act before repealed' unless words added reviving it : vide Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, P 402 (10th Edition). It may indeed by said that the present rule is the result of the statutory provisions introduced by the Interpretation Act of 1889 and as we are not bound by the provisions of any English statute, we can still apply the English Common Law rule if it appears to us to be reasonable and proper. But even according to the common Law doctrine, the repeal of the repealing enactment would not revive the original Act if the second repealing enactment manifests an intention to the contrary. In the present case the 'Firman' of 24.2.1949, 'Simplicitor but makes a further provision providing for fresh enquiry and report which presupposes the continuance of the repeal of the original 'Firman' of 26.6.1947. In the present case the 'Firman' of 24.2.1949, 'Simplicitor but makes a further provision providing for fresh enquiry and report which presupposes the continuance of the repeal of the original 'Firman' of 26.6.1947. This being the position, we are constrained to hold that there was no final or effective decree in existence subsequent to the issuing of the Firman of 7.9.1949, and the execution of proceedings started by the respondents, are therefore, untenable in law In the view that we are taking it becomes unnecessary to discuss the third point raised by the Attorney-General, namely whether the City Civil court has jurisdiction to execute the decree." 70. In Gopi Chand versus Delhi Administration ( AIR 1959 S.C. 609 ) the Apex Court held as follows : "Then it is urged that the Act which came into force on March, 29, 1940 was due to expire and did expire on August, 14, 1951 and so the proceeding taken against the appellant under the summons procedure after the expiration of the temporary Act were invalid." 71. This aspect of the matter has again been considered by the Supreme Court in T. Venkata Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1985 S.C. 724 ). In that case also a contention was raised that upon expiry of the provisions of Ordinance, the same position is brought back as the Ordinance had not been promulgated. Repelling the said contention the apex court held: "The next question is whether the posts of Part-time Village Officers revive as the Ordinance is not replaced by an Act of the Legislature of the State. This contention of the petitioner is based on clause (2) of Article 213 of the Constitution. It is argued on their behalf that on the failure of the State Legislature to pass an Act in terms of the Ordinance it should be assumed that the Ordinance had never become effective and that it was void ab initio. This contention overlooks two important factors namely the language of Cl. (2) of Art. 213 of the Constitution and the nature of the provisions contained in the Ordinance. Cl. This contention overlooks two important factors namely the language of Cl. (2) of Art. 213 of the Constitution and the nature of the provisions contained in the Ordinance. Cl. (2) of Article 213 says that an Ordinance promulgated under that Article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor but every such Ordinance (a) shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State, or where there is a Legislative Council in the State, before both the Houses and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature or if before the expiration of that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Legislative Council, if any, upon the passing of the resolution, or as the case may be on the resolution being agreed to by the council and (b) may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor, it is seen that Article 213 of the Constitution does not say that the Ordinance shall be void from the commencement on the State Legislature disapproving it. It says that it shall cease to operate. It only means that it should be treated as being effective till it ceases to operate on the happening of the events mentioned in clause (2) of Art. 213. Secondly the Ordinance deals with two separate matters. By section 3 of the Ordinance it abolishes the posts of Part-time Village Officers on the commencement of the Ordinance and it further declares that every person who holds the post of a Part-time Village Officer would cease to hold that post with effect from that date. By S. 4 and other allied provisions the Ordinance has provided regarding the creation of posts of Village Assistants and appointment and conditions of service of Village Assistants who are fulltime employees of the Government. There is no doubt that a separate provision is made in S.5 of the Ordinance for payment of some amount to the ex-Part-time Village Officers. Now by virtue of S.3 of the Ordinance all the posts of Part-time Village Officers stood abolished on January, 6 1984 and the petitioner ceased to be employee of the State Government. There is no doubt that a separate provision is made in S.5 of the Ordinance for payment of some amount to the ex-Part-time Village Officers. Now by virtue of S.3 of the Ordinance all the posts of Part-time Village Officers stood abolished on January, 6 1984 and the petitioner ceased to be employee of the State Government. These two matters become accomplished facts on January, 6, 1984 irrespective of whether the holders of these posts were paid any amount under section 5 or whether the new posts of Village Assistants were filled up or not. Even if the Ordinance is assumed to have ceased to operate from a subsequent date by reason of clause (2) of Art. 213, the effect of section 3 of the Ordinance was irreversible except by express legislation. (Underline is mine for emphasis) 72. From the conspectus of the decision referred to hereinbefore it is clear that where an Ordinance had been promulgated in terms of the provision of Government of India Act 1919 and Government of India Act, 1935, the position is different. 73. As indicated hereinbefore Article 213 of the Constitution of India was enacted after a great deal of deliberations. The said provision was meant to be taken recourse to in an exceptional situation and in case of extreme urgency. The Supreme Court of India in Wadhwa's case has in no uncertain term described the Ordinance Raj. 74. Article 213 (2) (a), lays down a rule as to the consequence of expiry of the Ordinance by afflux of time. It has further to be borne in mind that beginning from the 2nd Ordinance the earlier Ordinance were repealed except those Acts which were done in exercise of power thereunder. The repeal clause provides that any action done or any proceeding taken under the preceding Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done to taken in terms of the said Ordinance. The effect of repeal by an Ordinance by another Ordinance also depends upon the extent thereof. 75. In M/s Rayala Corporation (P) Ltd and another Vs. The repeal clause provides that any action done or any proceeding taken under the preceding Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done to taken in terms of the said Ordinance. The effect of repeal by an Ordinance by another Ordinance also depends upon the extent thereof. 75. In M/s Rayala Corporation (P) Ltd and another Vs. The Director of Enforcement, New Delhi reported in AIR 1970 Supreme Court 494 which has been followed by the Supreme Court in Lennart Schusslar and another vs. Director of Enforcement and another reported in AIR 1970 Supreme Court 549 at 553; Wick's case (1974 Volume 1 of E.R. 205) was distinguished and it was held that initiation of a proceeding under Rule 132A of the Defence of India Rules 1962 would not be a thing done or omitted to be done under the Rule but a new Act of initiating a proceeding after the rules had ceased to exist. The Supreme Court observed that in Wick's case (Supra) the operation of the earlier Act was also saved besides; acts or thing previously done or omitted to be done. 76. In Gopi Chand vs. Delhi Administration, reported in AIR 1959 Supreme Court 609 the Supreme Court clearly held that when under the general law the case was triable as warrant case, it could not be tried as summon case in terms of the statute after the expiry thereof although trial had begun during the period when the statute was effective. In Spencer vs. Shooten, reported in 1937 T.L.R. 280 it was held that an appeal under a temporary statute pending at the time when the same was in force statute for the same logic automatically terminated. 77. The decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner have been decided on construction of statutes which fell for consideration before the Court. The general principles of law evolved in the aforementioned cases applied to the fact thereof keeping in view the nature of legislation. Keeping in view the nature of the ordinances vis-a-vis the subsequent. Ordinance promulgated by the Governor the said decision cannot be held to have an application in the instant case. 78. The general principles of law evolved in the aforementioned cases applied to the fact thereof keeping in view the nature of legislation. Keeping in view the nature of the ordinances vis-a-vis the subsequent. Ordinance promulgated by the Governor the said decision cannot be held to have an application in the instant case. 78. It is well known as was observed by Lord Halsbury in Quinn vs. Leathem reported in 1900-1 All England Law Reports (reprint) page 1 to page 6 that a decision is an authority for what it decided and not what logically can be deduced therefrom. It is also well known that a judgment of the Supreme Court has to be read in a reasonable manner and like any other documents in its entirety. See General Electric Co. vs Renusagar Power Co. reported in (1987) 4 Supreme Court Cases 137 and Central Coalfields Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar, reported in 1993 (1) PIJR 617. In the cases relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner on construction of the provisions of the temporary statute or an Ordinance it was held that the same would continue to operate despite expiry thereof. In the unreported decisions cited by the learned counsel for the parties, the issues were completely different. In none of the cases aforementioned the learned single Judge had an occasion to consider the points which have been raised herein. In these cases, the purpose, and object of the Article 213 (2a) has not been considered nor the argument which have been advanced in the cases, have been advanced. For the reasons aforementioned, it is held that the Ordinances re-promulgated by the State again and again are illegal and thereby the petitioners cannot be said to have derived any legal right to continue in the State Service. 79. In this view of the matter this question has to be answered against the petitioners. 80. Re. Question No. B: There cannot be any doubt that it is for the State either to take over the services of an employee when nationalising school or any industry or take over their management. Such a right of the State, subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act is an absolute right. No citizen of India has any fundamental right to be appointed by the State. He has merely a right to be considered therefor. Such a right of the State, subject to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act is an absolute right. No citizen of India has any fundamental right to be appointed by the State. He has merely a right to be considered therefor. Thus, when a school is taken over by the State ipso facto, the teaching and non-teaching staff thereof cannot claim themselves any constitutional or statutory right to become the Government Servant. There cannot, however, be any doubt that the converse is also true. If by reason of a valid law, the service of the employees of the School are taken over, those concerned employees would become government servant subject to any condition or limitations imposed thereby. 81. Learned Advocate General, however, submitted that from a bare perusal of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the First Ordinance, it would appear that no permanent right is vested in teaching and non-teaching staff of the school to become the servants of the State. This contention of the learned Advocated General cannot be accepted. A bare perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the First Ordinance clearly demonstrates that teaching and non-teaching staff, who come within the purview thereof became Government servants as their services stand transferred to the State. This, however, is only with regard to the fulfilment of the conditions laid down therein. Once it is held that a person was eligible as teaching and non-teaching staff of a taken over Sanskrit School fulfil the conditions laid down in subsection (1) of Section 4, he acquired a right in relation thereto. However such a right would be subject to any subsequent statute. In T. Venkata Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1985 S.C. 724 ) it has been observed : "We do not however, mean to say here that Parliament or the Stale Legislature is powerless to bring into existence the same state of affairs as they existed before an Ordinance was passed even though they may be completed and closed matters under the Ordinance. That can be achieved by passing an express law operating retrospectively to the said effect, of course subject to the other constitutional limitations. A mere disapproval by Parliament or the State Legislature of an Ordinance cannot, however, revive closed or completed transactions." What, therefore, could be achieved by statute can also be achieved by promulgation of an Ordinance. 82. That can be achieved by passing an express law operating retrospectively to the said effect, of course subject to the other constitutional limitations. A mere disapproval by Parliament or the State Legislature of an Ordinance cannot, however, revive closed or completed transactions." What, therefore, could be achieved by statute can also be achieved by promulgation of an Ordinance. 82. Thus if a right can be conferred by a statute, the same is capable of being taken away by another statute. Further as discussed hereinbefore Section 16 of the Ordinance No. 21 of 1990 saves the action taken under the previous Ordinance only in a limited sphere, i.e. only such action which could be taken under the said Ordinance. The repeal and saving clause contained in Section 16 of Ordinance No 21 of 1990, therefore do not save all actions which could be taken under the First Ordinance of 1989 and Second and Third Ordinance of 1990. Although in terms of Section 30 of the General Clauses Act, the provisions thereof apply in relation to the Ordinance as well, recourse of the said provisions can be taken only when there is no repeal and saving clause. Once the legislation contains a repeal and saving clause, no recourse can be taken to the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Thus, a bare perusal of Section 16 of the Ordinance No. 21 of 1990 demonstrates end of controversy that it has been saved from such actions which could be done only thereunder and not under previous Ordinance. In that sense the Ordinance No. 21 of 1990 and the subsequent Ordinance would have retrospective operation. 83. It is now well settled that an Act is presumed to be constitutional. The burden of proving that the said Act is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India is on the petitioners. It is further well settled that in order to arrive at true intendment of a statute, the Court should pose to itself the questions : (1) What was the situation prior to the provision under construction? (2) What mischief or defect was noted before introduction of the provisions? (3) Whether it was remedial, and (4) The reason for the remedy. Reference in this connection may be made to K. Parameswaran Pillai vs. K. Sumathi reported in 1994 S.C. 191. (2) What mischief or defect was noted before introduction of the provisions? (3) Whether it was remedial, and (4) The reason for the remedy. Reference in this connection may be made to K. Parameswaran Pillai vs. K. Sumathi reported in 1994 S.C. 191. It is, therefore, clear that by amending section 4 of the Ordinance the Legislature wanted to remedy the mischief or defect which was prevailing immediately prior thereto. As would appear from the discussion following hereinafter, the said course of action becomes a factual necessity. Further as noticed hereinbefore the first three Ordinances were repealed by the fourth Ordinance and succeeding Ordinance. 84. Following D. C. Wadhwa's case as also the Citizen Cause (Supra) it has to be held that promulgation of such Ordinance were invalid in law. 85. It may be noticed here that in T. Venkata Reddy (Supra) the Supreme Court observed as under : "We do not, however, mean to say here that Parliament or the State Legislature is powerless to bring into existence the same state of affairs as they existed before an Ordinance was passed even though they may be completed and closed matters under the Ordinance. That can be achieved by passing an express law operating retrospectively to the said effect, of course subject to the other constitutional limitations. A mere disapproval by Parliament or the State Legislature of an Ordinance cannot, however, revive closed or completed transactions." (Underline is mine for emphasis) 86. The power to issue an Ordinance is not an executive power but is legislative in character, as is evident from the heading of Chapter VI of part VI of the Constitution of India. There is no limitation upon the power except those of which the State legislative power is subject. Thus an Ordinance can be invalidated for contravention of the constitutional limitation, if the same is a fraud on the Constitution. 87. As section 3 of the First Three Ordinances was substantially amended by reason of the 4th Ordinance which is a law within the meaning of the provisions of Article 213 (4) of the Constitution, the first three Ordinance would be deemed to have given way to the subsequent Ordinances insofar as thereby it was declared that the services of the teachers were not to be automatically taken over. 88. 88. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, however submitted that section 4 of the Ordinance No. 21 of 1990 is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India as it is contrary to the object and purport of the Ordinance, namely, improvement of Sanskrit Education in the State of Bihar. It was further submitted that if it is held that the teachers who had been serving in the schools in question would no longer be the Government Servant, the same would lead to an absurd position as in that case there will be no teaching and non-teaching staff to run the school nor any education can be imparted to the students thereof. It was further submitted that the action on the part of the respondent-State in inserting Section 4 in Ordinance No. 21 of 1990 must be held to be arbitrary as the teacher had already worked for more than a year as Government Servant. 89. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. As indicated hereinbefore a right created by a Statute can be taken away by another statute. It is also well known that if a power to enact exists the statute cannot be invalidated by holding that the same is a colourable exercise of power nor can any inconvenience caused to a person be said to attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In T. Venkata Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in AIR 1985 Supreme Court 724 the apex court while considering the validity of abolition of post of Part-time Village Officer vide Ordinance 84 held that such an Ordinance is not open to challenge on the ground of non-application of mind or malafide. It was further held that abolition of post did not violate the right under section 3 of the Ordinance as being violative of Article 21 of holders of those post. 90. Even in such cases the principles of natural justice have no application whatsoever. Application of principles of natural justice would not be attracted inasmuch as thereby no stigma is cast. Reference in this connection may be made to Baikuntha Nath Das and another Vs. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and another reported in (1992) 2 Supreme Court Cases 299. 91. A Government servant under Article 310 of Constitution of India holds office during the pleasure of the Governod. Reference in this connection may be made to Baikuntha Nath Das and another Vs. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and another reported in (1992) 2 Supreme Court Cases 299. 91. A Government servant under Article 310 of Constitution of India holds office during the pleasure of the Governod. The office can be thus abolished by reason of a provision of statutes unless the same contravene the provision of Constitution of India. 92. As indicated hereinbefore, by reason of inserting section 4 by Ordinance No.21 of 1990, the object of the first Ordinance has not been taken away altogether. The State in terms of the provisions of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act as also under the Constitution of India must be held to have the power to de-requisition the property requisitioned and de-notify the acquired property. By reason of section 4 of the Ordinance No. 21 of 1990 the State has merely made an enabling provision to eliminate bogus and non-existent schools as also to screen out those teachers whose services can be taken over, regard being had to the fact as to whether he possessed the minimum qualification, nature and legality of his appointment, the sanctioned strength of teaching and non-teaching staff of the school concerned, staffing pattern and other relevant factors, Such an enquiry was necessary in public interest. The State while carrying its benevolent activities and particularly its duty to impart education cannot afford to squander the public money by paying salary to such teachers who are not eligible therefor as they do not fulfil the criteria prescribed by it so as to maintain the standard of education, The State can make a legislation under Entry 25 List III of the Constitution of India even in relation to, a private school at the time of recognition thereof, Such provisions are regulatory in nature and even applies to all types of non-Government jurisdiction including the minority institution. It is true that whereas by reason of section 4 of the First Ordinance the teaching and non-teaching staff who came within the purview thereof became government servants subject to fulfilment of the conditions prescribed thereunder, in terms of section 4 of the Ordinance No. 21 of 1990, it was provided that they will not be so treated. It is true that whereas by reason of section 4 of the First Ordinance the teaching and non-teaching staff who came within the purview thereof became government servants subject to fulfilment of the conditions prescribed thereunder, in terms of section 4 of the Ordinance No. 21 of 1990, it was provided that they will not be so treated. But in view of the fact that the schools in question were taken over in terms of section 3 of the First Ordinance subject to the provisions appended to sub-Section 3 thereto and thus, all the schools which have been taken over were to be maintained in terms of the said Ordinance and consequently the teaching and non-teaching staff who have been working therein would be entitled to their salary, once it is found that they are bonafide teachers and fulfil all the conditions required therefor. Read Dickerson in his Book, 'The Interpretation and application of Statutes' (1975) at page 95 has said. : "On the necessity of legislative purpose to legislate interpretation, Leewellyan has said, 'If a statue is to make sense. It must be read in the light of some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is nonsense. Hart and Sakcs have inquired whether it is not true that 'The meaning of statute is never plain unless it fit's with some intelligible purpose." The learned Author at page 103 while dealing with the importance of context, said; "The essence of a language is to reflect, express, and perhaps even effect the conceptual matrix of established ideas a value identifies the culture to which it belongs. For this reason, language has been called a 'conceptual map of human experience.' As with any map, it has little or no significance apart from what it mirrors." Section 4 of Ordinance No. 21 of 1990, therefore, has to be viewed in the context that the State Government must have found out that many teachers who do not fulfil the criteria have become government servants in view of the provisions of Section 4 of Ordinance No. 32 of 1989. The State, in our opinion, could make necessary amendments keeping in view the facts that might have come to its notice subsequently. It for its own reasons could also change its policies. The State, in our opinion, could make necessary amendments keeping in view the facts that might have come to its notice subsequently. It for its own reasons could also change its policies. It has not and could not have been suggested that the State had no legislative competence to amend an earlier Ordinance by promulgating a subsequent Ordinance. 93. A statute is presumed to be constitutionally valid unless it is held otherwise. See State Bank of India Staff Association vs. Election Commission reported in 1994 BBCJ 155 . It is true that when the language of provision is clear and unambiguous recourse to the doctrine of reading up or reading down the statute may not be resorted to as to uphold its constitutionality as has been held by the Supreme Court in Delhi Transport Corporation versus D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, reported in AIR 1991 S.C. 101 . It is also well settled principle of law that it is the job of the court to interpret the intention of the Legislature by the words used, the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the Legislature is by exploring its intention at the time when the law was made by signs, the most natural and probable. These signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequences, or the spirit and reason of law. See State of U.P. versus Radhey Shyam Nigam reported in (1989)1 S.C.C. 591 and Mohan Kumar Singhania & Ors. Vs. Union of India, reported in 1992(1) Suppl. S.C.C. 594. It is also a well settled principle of statutory interpretation that the court has no power to add words. Reference in this connection may be made to Gouri Shankar Gaur vs. State of U.P. reported in 1993(3) Supreme Court Journal Page 489. 94. But in this case we are not concerned with the construction of Section 4 but merely the consequence arising therefroin. In my opinion, it is, therefore, possible to hold that those teachers who pass the rigorous of the test laid down would become Government Servant. In terms of such of the Ordinance, the other teachers who were all along getting salary were also to continue to get the same till the determination is made that their services cannot be taken over, as even such teachers have been getting their salary since 1980 from the Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board. In terms of such of the Ordinance, the other teachers who were all along getting salary were also to continue to get the same till the determination is made that their services cannot be taken over, as even such teachers have been getting their salary since 1980 from the Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board. Thus findings of ours, however, are subject to the our findings in relation to question No.A. 95. Re. Question No.D & E : - In these cases, the main relief sought for by the petitioners is payment of salary. No salary has been paid to most of the teachers from 1.12.1988 to 31.3.1989 although payment had been made to them by Sanskrit Shiksha Board since 1.4.1980 under 1981 Act. Petitioners have also not been paid their salary since the promulgation of the First Ordinance which came into force with effect from 18.12.1989 nor have they been paid the dearness allowance from 1.8.1983. It further appears strange that although more than three years have elapsed since promulgation of Ordinance No. 21 of 1990, the enquiries in relation to all the schools have not been completed. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, however, has produced before us a chart in respect of some of the schools wherefrom it appears that some schools have been found to be genuine (Anukul) and some have• been found to be non-genuine (PRATIKUL). In the report where schools have been found to be genuine, directions have been issued to pay the salary in relation to such teaching and non-teaching staff who were within the sanctioned strength and specified standard (MANAK) laid down by the State. It is conceded at the Bar that in relation to High School seven teaching posts and two non-teaching posts i.e. one of clerk and another Office Peon were sanctioned. It is further contended on behalf of the petitioners that the State later on created additional posts, as for example, creation of the posts of Science teacher in particular school or sanction of the teaching staff have been increased in view of Elementary section with the High School Sections of the said School as also in some case additional posts were created in respect of the Government subsidized schools. It has, therefore, been contended that although the posts of teachers in those schools would be deemed to have been sanctioned, they have not been paid their salaries. It has, therefore, been contended that although the posts of teachers in those schools would be deemed to have been sanctioned, they have not been paid their salaries. It has further been contended that in a case where the teachers come within the purview of the sanctioned strength they have only been paid their salary for a period of one year 96. So far as the schools which had not been found to be genuine School (PRATIKUL) different reasons have been assigned in relation to different schools; some of which are as follows : (1) On the date of inspection the attendance of the students was less than 70%. (2) The number of rooms of the said school was not as per specification laid down in the guidelines. (3) Sufficient money is not available in the Accounts of the School. (4) Land/Library as per guidelines are not available. (5) The number of students are such that they do not justify taking over of school. 97. Sri Vishwanath Sinha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in some of the writ petitions, inter alia, submitted that even if it be held that Ordinance No. 21 of 1990 was valid, all the teachers were entitled to salary up to 12.8.1990 as they were employees of the State of Bihar but even such salary has not been paid. He further submitted that even on the basis of the reports of the Collector or the High power committee the teachers who have been found to be working in a recognised existing school and within the sanctioned strength, have not been paid their entire salary except for a period of one year. It was further submitted that such teachers who are also within the sanctioned strength have not been paid their entire salary except for a period of one year. It was further submitted that such teachers who are also within the additional strength created by the State they would be entitled to salary. So far as those schools where adverse reports were submitted (namely PRATIKUL SCHOOL); our attention has been drawn to two circulars one being dated 18.9.1976, whereby conditions have been laid down for grant of sanction and another of dated 29.6.1981 whereby certain other conditions with regard to payment of salary etc, have been laid down. 98. Mr. So far as those schools where adverse reports were submitted (namely PRATIKUL SCHOOL); our attention has been drawn to two circulars one being dated 18.9.1976, whereby conditions have been laid down for grant of sanction and another of dated 29.6.1981 whereby certain other conditions with regard to payment of salary etc, have been laid down. 98. Mr. Sinha submitted that those two circulars have lost their force after promulgation of the Ordinance as the same were issued laying down the conditions for grant of approval, recognition and once the schools were recognised, the same could not be re-opened. It has been stated that even there are schools in relation whereof approval has been granted prior to coming into force of the said aforementioned 1976 Rules. 99. It was further submitted that so far as the sanctioned strength is considered (MANAK), the same provides for the minimum number of teachers to be appointed in a recognised school and did not contain any upper limit. Our attention has been drawn to clause (3) of 1976 Rules wherefrom it appears that in elementary schools at least two teachers were to be appointed. Similarly in relation to secondary schools clause 3 (ka) provides that there should be minimum four posts and clause 8 (ka) provides the number of teachers to be limited was one Headmaster + 6 teachers. 100. Learned counsel further drew our attention to the circular letter dated 29.6.1991 for the purpose of showing that similar provisions existed for providing minimum number of teachers. According to the learned counsel the circular had to be issued in view of the fact that scales of pay and qualifications of the teachers to be appointed were not fixed and as such, as the same was necessary to be provided for, the aforementioned circular has to be issued. 101. It has further been submitted that there has been different classification of schools and in many cases approval for amalgamation of the elementary section to the higher section has been granted and an additional post of science teacher in many cases have been created. 101. It has further been submitted that there has been different classification of schools and in many cases approval for amalgamation of the elementary section to the higher section has been granted and an additional post of science teacher in many cases have been created. It has further been submitted that, in some cases direction for payment of salary have been given recently even after take over of the said school, in relation to such schools also which come within the purview of 'PRATIKUL' Schools but no such order has been passed in the case of the petitioner and thus, there has been a clear violation of their fundamental right as enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 102. Learned Advocate General, on the other hand, has drawn our attention to the supplementary counter affidavit that in view of the fact that the Ordinance have lapsed and the enquiry has not yet been completed, funds are being released to the Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board for payment of salary to the teachers in terms of 1982 Act. The question as to whether the school should be taken over or not depends on various factors. The State has no doubt a constitutional obligation to impart basic education to the citizens of India, but imparting of education through the medium of Sanskrit stand on a different footing. Imparting education through the media of Sanskrit no doubt has some nexus with the development of such language but normally Sansksrit is also taught in general schools. It is not disputed that in relation to all Sanskrit Schools the sanctioned strength of teachers and non-teaching staff are 7 and 2 respectively and only in some cases an additional post of Science teacher has been created. The State in its counter affidavit has categorically stated that on an enquiry 305 schools were found to be genuine and in relation to teacher of such schools a direction has also .been issued for payment of salary to the teachers thereof. It has also been stated that at least 101 schools do not fulfil the criteria of being taken over. No report is, however, available in relation to two schools. 103. Along with counter affidavit, a list of such schools which have been found to be genuine has been annexed. It has also been stated that at least 101 schools do not fulfil the criteria of being taken over. No report is, however, available in relation to two schools. 103. Along with counter affidavit, a list of such schools which have been found to be genuine has been annexed. The State has also annexed a copy of the minutes of meeting dated 29.7.91 of the members of the Committee constituted for that purpose in the district of Saharsa. From a perusal of the said minutes of the meeting it appears that in relation to some of the schools it was found that the schools do not have enough land or buildings. In some of the schools even genuinity thereof is disputed. In some of the schools title of lands on which the school building is situated is itself disputed. In Debi Balika Sanskrit School Sewa Sadan Patodi the School building is found to be in a dilapidated condition. In some of the schools even no adequate fund was found to be existing. So far as Janak Lal Mahto Sanskrit Primary School is concerned, the said school is said to be a disputed one. In Sosmi Devi Primary School only two rooms were found and it was found that number of students were also meagre. It may be noticed that the reports are based upon the criteria for recognition of the school laid down in 1976 Rules. It, however, appears that only such schools which were recognised were directed to be taken over by reason of aforementioned Ordinances. It is true that it was open to the Sanskrit Shiksha Board to pass order of derecognition in terms of the provision of 1982 Act, but in our opinion, no exception can be taken if the Government adopted the same criteria, which were necessary for the purpose of grant of the recognition of the schools. The criteria adopted by the State Government, in our opinion, cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational inasmuch as if the schools do not fulfil the criteria for grant of recognition, the State may not find enough justification for taking over of its management. The criteria adopted by the State Government, in our opinion, cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational inasmuch as if the schools do not fulfil the criteria for grant of recognition, the State may not find enough justification for taking over of its management. The statements made in the counter affidavit clearly go to show that the State Government was correct in coming to the conclusion that it may not be proper to take over of the management of all Schools which even do not satisfy the criteria for grant of recognition as laid down under 1982 Act and the Acts preceding thereto. The enquiry report reveals that a large number of schools namely 110 schools have been found to be such which were not even fit to be recognised at all. If such schools were not found to be entitled to be recognised, applying the criteria for grant of recognition thereof, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that such recognitions have been wrongly granted or improperly obtained. 104. Learned counsel for the petitioner have also tried to show before us that the findings arrived at by the Inspection Committees are not correct. It is neither advisable nor possible for us at this juncture to deal with individual cases. It goes without saying that remedy of teachers of such schools against whom unfavourable reports have been submitted and those teachers who have been found to be working in excess of the sanctioned strength, lies in filing proper representation before the State of Bihar. Such a thicket of disputed questions of fact, in our opinion, are beyond the purview of our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 105. However, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that despite lapse of the Ordinance by efflux of time, the petitioners would be entitled to their salary which they have been getting prior to promulgation of Ordinance. However, the petitioners are also entitled to get the salary as Government servant till 31.4.1992 i.e. so long Ordinance No. 14 of 1990 was valid. However, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that despite lapse of the Ordinance by efflux of time, the petitioners would be entitled to their salary which they have been getting prior to promulgation of Ordinance. However, the petitioners are also entitled to get the salary as Government servant till 31.4.1992 i.e. so long Ordinance No. 14 of 1990 was valid. As indicated hereinbefore that although in the counter affidavit the State has clearly come out with the statement that the petitioners of the writ application hold the same position as existed prior to promulgation of the Ordinance on 18.12.1989 and despite assertion to the effect that directions have been issued to Sanskrit Shiksha Board for 'payment of salary to all teachers who satisfy the requirements thereof. We have been informed that no salary has yet been paid to the petitioners. The assertions of the petitioners if correct and we have no reason to .disbelieve the same keeping in view the conduct of the State of Bihar in general and this case in particular, least that can be said is that the action of the State is condemnable. 106. There is absolutely no justification for non-release of the salary of the teachers who had been getting the same, in view of the fact that even according to the State of Bihar they were entitled to the payment of salary in the same manner which was being paid to them when the Ordinance 32 of 1989 did not come into force. Even so far as teachers for such schools against whom 'Pratikul' reports have been submitted would be entitled to salary in the same manner unless schools are derecognised or some other suitable orders in accordance with law are passed. 107. We may reiterate that in terms of the policy decision of the State of Bihar adopted in the year 1983 it undertook the financial liability to pay the salary to all the teaching and non-teaching staff who had been working within the sanctioned strength and staffing pattern of the school, unless it is held that salary paid to any of the teachers was illegal as they have been working beyond the sanctioned strength and/or were not entitled to the salary from the State. But others .were certainly entitled thereto. But others .were certainly entitled thereto. We are not aware as to whether staffing pattern of all such schools have been determined by the State or not keeping in view the student-teacher ratio. Probably such action is now necessary. We, however, express no opinion in this regard. We further make it clear that the Ordinance did not envisage enforcement of the reservation policy of the State. In view of our findings aforementioned, these writ applications are allowed to the extent mentioned hereinbefore and the State of Bihar is hereby directed to pay all lawful dues to the petitioners with utmost expedition but not later than two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment if not already paid. It is desirable that the State should see to it that atleast 25% of the salary payable to the eligible teachers be paid forthwith preferably within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 108. In view of our findings aforementioned, the management of schools would be governed in the same manner as prevailing prior to promulgation of Ordinance No. 32 of 1989. The State as also the Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board and other concerned must take steps in this regard forthwith. 109. We further hope and trust that action on the part of the State of Bihar to continue to govern the State through Ordinance Raj would attract the attention of the members of the Legislature forthwith inasmuch as in a democratic country like ours it is only the Legislature who can take necessary steps in this regard. 110. It is useful to note that in R. K. Garg v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1981 Supreme Court 2138, the Supreme Court observed confinement of such power is not undemocratic because Executive is clearly answerable to the Legislature and if the President on the aid and advice of the Executive promulgate an Ordinance in misuse or abuse of this power. Legislature cannot only pass a resolution disapproving the Ordinance but can also pass vote of no confidence in the executive. 111. Legislature cannot only pass a resolution disapproving the Ordinance but can also pass vote of no confidence in the executive. 111. We may further reiterate the anguish expressed by the Supreme Court of India in Wadhwa's case (Supra) which is in the following terms : "In future whatever the Ordinance is made on Government wishes to continue the provision of the Ordinance in force after the assembling of the Legislature a bill will be brought before the Legislature enacting this provision into an Act. 112. These applications are allowed in part and to the extent mentioned hereinbefore. In the facts and circumstance of the case, it is directed that all the teachers who are entitled to receive salary will be entitled to simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the outstanding dues. The petitioners shall also be entitled to costs on these applications quantified at Rs. 1000/- in each case. Ram Nandan Prasad, J. - I agree.