UKAI PRADESH SAHAKARI KHAND UDHYOG MANDALI LIMITED v. CHHITUBHAI DEVJIBHAI GAMIT — 1994 DIGILAW 93 (GUJ)

THAKKER, J. ( 1 ) IN all these three petitions, common questions of fact and law have been raised and, therefore, it is appropriate to dispose off them by a common order. ( 2 ) TO appreciate the controversy raised in these petitions, it is sufficient if material facts in Special Civil Application No. 3464 of 1994 are stated. They are as under : that petition is filed by Shri Ukai Pradesh Sahakari Khand Udyog mandali Ltd. (society" for short) and others for quashing and setting aside an order passed by the Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal, Ahmedabad ["tribunal" for short] below application Exh. 34 in Election petition No. 1 of 1994 by which the Tribunal overruled the preliminary objection taken by the Society that the petition filed by the first respondent herein was not maintainable at law. ( 3 ) IT is stated in the petition that when the Election petition came up for hearing before the Tribunal, a preliminary contention was raised by the Society regarding maintainability of the petition on the ground that the election petition was not in consonance with the provisions of the Gujarat co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and the Gujarat Specified Co-op. Societies Election to Committees Rules, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules) and hence the petition was liable to be rejected at the threshold. ( 4 ) IT is the case of the petitioner that the Board of Directors was required to be constituted in accordance with law. There were as many as 12 posts of Directors to be elected from the producer members. Election programme was declared by the Collector, Surat who is the competent authority under the Act. After issuance of notification, the first respondent filled in his nomination form which came to be rejected holding that he was a "defaulter" and, hence, was disqualified to contest the election. That action of the Society was challenged by the first respondent by filing a petition before this Court. That petition was, however, dismissed by me and the Letters Patent Appeal also met with the same fate. Thereafter, election took place and the first respondent has filed election petition No. 1 of 1994 before the Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal, Ahmedabad after the result of the election was declared. ( 5 ) IT appears that an application Exh. That petition was, however, dismissed by me and the Letters Patent Appeal also met with the same fate. Thereafter, election took place and the first respondent has filed election petition No. 1 of 1994 before the Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal, Ahmedabad after the result of the election was declared. ( 5 ) IT appears that an application Exh. 34 was filed by the petitioner society contending therein that necessary provisions of the Act and the rules have not been complied with by the first respondent and, hence, the election petition was required to be rejected on that ground alone as being not maintainable at law. The Tribunal settled necessary issues and issue No. 1 was treated as preliminary issue which reads as under :" (I) Whether in view of the provisions of Sees. 145v and 145w and Rule 75. read with Rule 77 (2), the petition is maintainable ?"after hearing the parties at length, the Tribunal by the impugned order dated 3/03/1994 held that the election petition was maintainable and negatived the preliminary contention raised by the society. It is against this order that this petition is filed before this Court. ( 6 ) WHEN the petition came up for hearing on 11/03/1994, I passed following order :"notice returnable on 18/03/1994. Meanwhile, the evidence will not be taken by the Tribunal. The petitioner will file two more petitions in connection with election Petitions Nos. 2 and 3 of 1994. Direct Service permitted. "pursuant to the notice issued by this Court, the respondents appeared. Affidavits were filed and the arguments were heard. ( 7 ) MR. Vakharia, learned Senior Counsel instructed by Mr. S. J. Joshi for the petitioners raised the following contentions : (1) Election petition filed by the first respondent was not maintainable at law inasmuch as the first respondent has not served to the petitioner alongwith petition, a copy of challan of deposit of Rs. 500. 00 and, thus, there was non-compliance of Sec. 145v of the Act. (2) Neither election petition nor annexures and documents were attested and verified as required by law. Hence, the petition could not be said to be presented in accordance with law and was not maintainable. Mr. M. H. Joshi, learned Counsel for the first respondent, on the other hand, supported the order passed by the Tribunal. (2) Neither election petition nor annexures and documents were attested and verified as required by law. Hence, the petition could not be said to be presented in accordance with law and was not maintainable. Mr. M. H. Joshi, learned Counsel for the first respondent, on the other hand, supported the order passed by the Tribunal. He submitted that the provisions of Sec. 145v of the Act have been complied with as an amount of Rs. 500/ - had been deposited by the first respondent with the Tribunal and even challan was also produced alongwith the election petition. It was not necessary to supply a copy of challan to the petitioner society who was respondent in the election petition. Requirement regarding attestation and verification was also complied with and after considering the documents on record and after interpreting the relevant provisions of law, the Tribunal rightly held that there was no violation of any provision of the Act and the rules and the election petition was not liable to be dismissed on that ground. ( 8 ) ALTERNATIVELY, Mr. Joshi submitted that even if this Court comes to the conclusion that the provisions of the Act and the rules have not been strictly complied with, there was substantial compliance with the provisions of law, and petition was not liable to be dismissed. He, therefore, submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal is according to law. The Tribunal has not committed any error of law much less an error of law apparent on the face of record which requires to be corrected in exercise of powers under Art. 227 of the constitution of India and the petition requires to be dismissed. ( 9 ) IN other two petitions, I have heard Mr. S. J. Joshi for the petitioners as also Mr. T. H, Sompura Asstt. G. P. for the respondents, ( 10 ) BEFORE dealing with the arguments of the Counsel, it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules. Section 74c provides for conduct of elections to committees of certain specified societies. It is not disputed by and between the parties that the petitioner is a "specified society" within the meaning of Sec. 74c (1) read with Sec. 145b (c) of the act. It is a Co-operative Sugar Factory. Section 74c provides for conduct of elections to committees of certain specified societies. It is not disputed by and between the parties that the petitioner is a "specified society" within the meaning of Sec. 74c (1) read with Sec. 145b (c) of the act. It is a Co-operative Sugar Factory. Election to such society is required to be held in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XIA of the Act. Chapter XIA as inserted by Gujarat Act 6 of 1981 provides for election of committees and Officers of certain societies. Section 145b defines "specified society" as a society belonging to any of the categories specified in Sec. 74c of the Act. Chapter XIA also provides for conduct of elections, costs of elections, disqualifications, corrupt practices, offences and penalties for certain illegalities, etc. Sec. 145u creates forum for settlement of disputes relating to elections by establishing a Tribunal. It reads as under :"145u : (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sec. 96 or any other provisions of this Act, any dispute relating to an Election shall be referred to the Tribunal. (2) Such reference may be made by an aggrieved party by presenting an election petition to the Tribunal : provided that no such petition shall be made till after the final result of the Election is declared and where any such petition is made it shall not be admitted by the Tribunal unless it is made within two ronths from the date of such declaration : provided further that, the Tribunal may admit any petition after the expiry of that period, if the petitioner satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the petition within the said period. (3) In exercising the functions conferred on it by or under this Chapter, the Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a Court in respect of- (a) proof of facts by affidavit; (b) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (c) compelling discovery or the production of documents, and (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. In the case of any such affidavit, an officer appointed by the Tribunal in this behalf may administer the oath to the deponent. (4) Subject to any regulations made by the Tribunal in this behalf, any such petition shall be heard and disposed of by the Tribunal as expeditiously as possible. In the case of any such affidavit, an officer appointed by the Tribunal in this behalf may administer the oath to the deponent. (4) Subject to any regulations made by the Tribunal in this behalf, any such petition shall be heard and disposed of by the Tribunal as expeditiously as possible. An order made by the Tribunal on such petition shall be final and conclusive and shall not be called in question in any Court. " ( 11 ) SECTION 145v obliges the petitioner presenting the petition to deposit the amount mentioned therein towards the costs of hearing. It is relevant to the controversy raised in the petition and, hence, it is appropriate to quote in extenso :"section 145-V : deposit towards cost for hearing and power to award cost :- a petitioner presenting an election petition under Sec. 145u shall pay a deposit not. exceeding Rs, 500/- as the Tribunal may direct towards the costs for hearing the petition. Unless the petitioner deposits the same as aforesaid, the petition shall be summarily dismissed. Subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, at the time of deciding the petition, the Tribunal shall assess the costs of hearing of the petition and shall require the petitioner or the respondents, or both as the case may be to defray the whole or in such proportion as it thinks fit, the costs of the petition, including the deposit so made. Such sum as the Tiibunal may assess as the costs to the Tribunal of bearing the petition but not exceeding Rs. 500. 00 in any case, shall be credited to the Government. " ( 12 ) SEC. 145w enacts as to what material facts and particulars should be mentioned in the petition and the manner in which such petition should be signed and verified. This provision is also equally material and must, therefore, be quoted. 500. 00 in any case, shall be credited to the Government. " ( 12 ) SEC. 145w enacts as to what material facts and particulars should be mentioned in the petition and the manner in which such petition should be signed and verified. This provision is also equally material and must, therefore, be quoted. It reads as under :"section 145w : contents of petitions :- (1) An election petition shall: (a) contain in concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies; (b) set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and (c) be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil procedure, 1968 for the verification of pleadings : provided that. where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. (2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. "in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 168 of the Act read with other relevant provisions of Chapter XIA, the Government of Gujarat framed Rules known as the "gujarat Specified Societies Election of Committees Rules, 1982". It is not necessary for me to deal with them in detail but a reference may be made of some of them. Rule 74 states that no election shall be called in question except by any election petition presented to the Tribunal in accordance with Sec. 145u of the Act and the Rules. Rule 75 lays down procedure for presentation of election petition. It reads as under :"75. Presentation of Election petition : (1) An Election petition calling in question any Election may be presented by any candidate or any voter within two months from the date of declaration of the result of the Election. Rule 75 lays down procedure for presentation of election petition. It reads as under :"75. Presentation of Election petition : (1) An Election petition calling in question any Election may be presented by any candidate or any voter within two months from the date of declaration of the result of the Election. (2) Every Election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and one spare copy for the use of the tribunal and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. " ( 13 ) RULE 76 states as. to who would be parties to the petition. Rule 77. provides for trial of election petitions. This rule is also equally relevant and it reads thus :"77. Trial of Election petition : (1) Every Election petition shall be tried by the Tribunal: provided that, the Tribunal shall have the discretion to refuse for reason to be recorded in writing, to examine any witness or witnesses if it is of the opinion that evidence of such witness or witnesses is not material for the decision of the petition or that the party tendering such witness or witnesses is doing so on frivolous ground or with a view to delay the proceedings. (2) The Tribunal may dismiss an Election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Rule 75. (3) Any candidate not already a respondent shall, upon aplication made by him to the Tribunal within fourteen days from the date of the commencement of the trial and subject to the provisions of Rule 91, be entitled to be joined as a respondent. (4) The Tribunal may, upon such terms as to costs and otherwise as it may deem fit, allow the particulars of any corrupt practice alleged in the petition to be necessary for ensuing a fair and effective trial of the petition, but shall not allow any amendment of the petition which will have the effect of introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. " ( 14 ) RULE 78 enables the Tribunal to pass order of expenses and costs of the witnesses, etc. Rule 80 empowers the Tribunal to pass order at the conclusion of the trial of an election petition. " ( 14 ) RULE 78 enables the Tribunal to pass order of expenses and costs of the witnesses, etc. Rule 80 empowers the Tribunal to pass order at the conclusion of the trial of an election petition. ( 15 ) IT was the grievance of the petitioner society that the first respondent (election petitioner) has not served a copy of challan of deposit of Rs. 500. 00 along with the copy of the petition to the society. The petition filed by him was, therefore, not maintainable at law. The Tribunal considered the said contention and rejected it holding that it was not incumbent upon the election petitioner to serve a copy of the challan to the society. According to the Tribunal, requirement regarding deposit of Rs. 500. 00 was mandatory and, therefore, it was obligatory on the part of the election petitioner to deposit the said amount. The Tribunal recorded a finding which is not challenged before me by the learned Counsel for the society that the said amount bad been deposited by the election petitioner. The Tribunal also recorded a finding that a challan was also produced showing that the amount was so deposited by the election petitioner. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, is that a copy of challan of such deposit must be served to the society alongwith the copy of the petition and that it is the requirement of law. It was submitted that if the provisions of Sec. 145v are held to be mandatory by the Tribunal, deposit of the amount itself is not sufficient. Such deposit must be made by the election petitioner, and a challan must be produced to show that such payment has been made and a copy of such challan must also be served to the opposite party. Unless and until such a copy is produced alongwith the petition and the society is served with such copy, there is non-compliance with the statutory provisions. Only if such a document is supplied to the society, the society can dispute that fact and can satisfy the tribunal as to whether the requirement of Sec. 145v had been complied with by the election petitioner. According to Mr. Vakharia, a copy of challan should be treated as an integral part of the election petition itself. Only if such a document is supplied to the society, the society can dispute that fact and can satisfy the tribunal as to whether the requirement of Sec. 145v had been complied with by the election petitioner. According to Mr. Vakharia, a copy of challan should be treated as an integral part of the election petition itself. The Counsel, however, submitted that even if this Court takes the view that a copy of the challan cannot be said to be an integral part of the election petition, sec. 145v as it stands, imposes a duty on the election petitioner to serve a copy of Chilian to the society and also confers corresponding right on the society so that the society can satisfy the Tribunal about the noncompliance with Sec. 145v by the petitioner. According to him, once it is held that the provision is mandatory in nature, the society can always complain to the Tribunal that mandatory requirement has not been complied with and election petition was liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. ( 16 ) MR. Joshi, on the other hand, submitted that the requirement regarding deposit of an amount of Rs. 500. 00 has been complied with. He conceded that Sec. 145v is mandatory but according to him, the mandatory requirement is about the deposit of Rs. 500. 00. It is not the requirement of law that the election petitioner must inform the opposite party that he has made such deposit and serve a copy of challan to the other side. He, however, submitted that in this case, in para 11 of the election petition, the said fact has also been mentioned by the election petitioner (page 33 of the paper book ). He argued that duty is cast on Tribunal to satisfy itself as to whether deposit of Rs. 500. 00 has been made by the election petitioner. As soon as the Tribunal is satisfied about making of deposit by the petitioner, the matter must end the election petition thereafter cannot bedismissed for non-compliance of Sec. 145v of the Act. I find considerable force in the argument of Mr. Joshi, learned Counsel for the first respondent. 500. 00 has been made by the election petitioner. As soon as the Tribunal is satisfied about making of deposit by the petitioner, the matter must end the election petition thereafter cannot bedismissed for non-compliance of Sec. 145v of the Act. I find considerable force in the argument of Mr. Joshi, learned Counsel for the first respondent. In my opinion, Sec. 145v does not require the election petitioner to serve a copy of challan to the opposite party and to satisfy him that a deposit as required under Sec. 145v has been made by the election petitioner. Duty imposed on the election petitioner is to make deposit and to satisfy the tribunal about it. The Tribunal also mut exercise its power in accordance with Sec. 145v of the Act as to whether such deposit is made by the petitioner and to dismiss election petition if the deposit is not made. ( 17 ) IN my opinion, Mr. Joshi is also right that even if the provisions are held to be mandatory and it was necessary for the election petitioner to inform the other side over and above the Tribunal that he has made the deposit as required, in the instant case, even that has been done. The fact of deposit is stated in the petition, a copy of which is served to the other side. In para 11, it was stated that the election petitioner has deposited the amount and has also produced challan alongwith the election petition. Thus, there is substantial compliance with Sec. 145v of the Act. When no direct duty is cast on the election petitioner to supply a copy of challan to the opposite party either under the Act or under the Rules and the requirement regarding deposit and production of challan in the Tribunal has been complied with by the petitioner and that fact has been reflected in the election petition, it cannot be said that there is non-compliance with the provisions of Sec. 145v of the Act. The contention of the society, therefore, cannot be upheld. ( 18 ) ANOTHER argument which was advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that election petition and annexures and schedules were not in accordance with Sec. 145w read with Rule 75 (2) of the Rules. The contention of the society, therefore, cannot be upheld. ( 18 ) ANOTHER argument which was advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that election petition and annexures and schedules were not in accordance with Sec. 145w read with Rule 75 (2) of the Rules. Looking to the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that verification and attestation should be made in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") relating to verification of pleadings. Rule 15 of Order 6 of the Code reads as under :"15. Verification of Pleadings : (1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. (2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information and believed to be true. (3) The verification shall be signed by the person making it and shall state the date on which and the place at which it was signed. " ( 19 ) RELYING upon Sec. 145w of the Act read with Rule 75 (2) of the rules, Mr. Vakharia submitted that an election petition shall be signed and verified in accordance with Order 6, Rule 15, of the Code. If there is any defect in not properly signing, attesting and/or verifying the petition, the petition cannot be said to be presented in accordance with law and requires to be dismissed. The Counsel submitted that election laws cannot be construed on the basis of equitable or common law rights. The rights are statutory, pure and simple, Statutory provisions must, therefore, be complied with. Again, a statutory provision must be construed literally, non-compliance of which will render the action illegal. Since the provisions of the Act and the Rules were not complied with, the Tribunal had no option but to dismiss the election petition. In this connection, my attention was invited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to certain provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Since the provisions of the Act and the Rules were not complied with, the Tribunal had no option but to dismiss the election petition. In this connection, my attention was invited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to certain provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Reliance was also placed on some decisions of the Honble Supreme Court wherein such questions came to be considered by the Apex Court. In K. A. Mani v. P. J. Antony and Ors. , AIR 1979 SC 234 , it was held by the Honble Supreme Court relying upon its earlier decision in Virendrakumar Saklecha v. Jagjivan, AIR 1974 SC 1957 , that the affidavit filed alongwith the petition must be in confirmity with the requirement of law. In Rajendrasinh v. Usha Rani, AIR 1984 SC 956 , it was contended that the mandate contained in Sec. 81 (3) of the Representation of the People Act must be complied with since it was a mandate by the legislature. In that case, correct as well as incorrect copies of the petition were filed. It was argued on behalf of the election petitioner that the other side could have verified the entire record in order to find out which was the correct copy. Negativing the contention and upholding the objection of the opposite party and dismissing the petition, the Court held that the Act never contemplated filing of incorrect petition and if the election petitioner disregarded the mandate contained in Sec. 81 (3) by filing incorrect copies, he took risk of the petition being dismissed in limine under Sec. 86 of the Act. It was not the duty of the respondents to weigh through the entire record in order to find out which was the correct copy. If out of the copies filed, respondents copy was found to be incorrect one, it amounted to non-compliance with the provisions of Sec. 81 (3) which was sufficient to entail dismissal of the election petition at the threshold. In f. A. Sapa v. Singora and Ors; AIR 1991 SC 1557 , a number of leading decisions were referred to by the Supreme Court and it was held that the requirement of law should be complied with. Submission of the learned Senior Counsel is that if supply of incorrect copy entails into dismissal of election petition, non-supply of challan must result into dismissal of petition. Submission of the learned Senior Counsel is that if supply of incorrect copy entails into dismissal of election petition, non-supply of challan must result into dismissal of petition. Thus, the ratio in F. A. Sapas case (supra) applies with full force to the present case. ( 20 ) THE above proposition of law as an abstract proposition cannot be disputed and indeed was not disputed by the respondents. What is, however, submitted is, that in this case, a copy of election petition has been supplied with annexures and schedules duly signed and verified. Supply of copy of challan was not necessary and hence the principles laid down by the supreme Court in above cases cannot be pressed into service. It was further submitted that an election petition cannot be dismissed merely on the ground that attestation and/or verification of petition was not strictly in accordance with the provisions of Order 6 of the Code. Ultimately, underlying object of attestation is to certify or to affirm that the document is true or genuine. When the said object was fulfilled, the election petitioner cannot be nonsuited on the ground that the attestation was not in a particular form. In this connection, my attention was drawn by Mr. Joshi on Dictionary meaning of the word "attest". In the Blacks Law Dictionary, (1979 Edition) 117, the word attest" is defined as "to affirm to be true or genuine". . ( 21 ) LIKEWISE, according to the "oxford Concise Dictionary", 1990, "attest" means "certify the validity of". Thus, "to attest" means "to certify, to affirm or to authenticate" that a document in question is true, genuine and valid. When the election petitioner has attested a copy of petition as well as annexures and documents and has put his signature, it cannot be said that the copies were not duly attested. A similar question arose before the Honble Supreme Court in Subbarao v. Member, Election Tribunal, hyderabad and Ors. , AIR 1964 SC 1027 . In that case, certain "technical objections" were raised by the opposite party against the petition filed by the election petitioner. It was inter alia contended that there was noncompliance with the requirement of Sec. 81 (3) of the Representation of the people Act, 1951 and on that count, the election petition was liable to be dismissed. In that case, certain "technical objections" were raised by the opposite party against the petition filed by the election petitioner. It was inter alia contended that there was noncompliance with the requirement of Sec. 81 (3) of the Representation of the people Act, 1951 and on that count, the election petition was liable to be dismissed. Without expressing final opinion as to whether the provisions were mandatory or directory, the Court held that the election petition cannot be dismissed if there is substantial compliance with the requirement of law. In para 26, their Lordships observed as under : 1994 (2) U. P. S. K. U. M. LTD v. C. D. GAMIT (Spl. C. A.)-Thakker, J. 1161"if the signature of the petitioner whose name is set out in the body of the petition is appended at the end, surely, it authenticates the contents of the document. Now, in regard to this the learned Judges of the High Court themselves observed after referring to the terms of Sec. 81 (3) : no doubt what is necessary is a substantial compliance with the requirement of attestation. For instance, if it is proved that the Election petitioner has signed animo atlestandi, and omitted the words "true copy" by mistake or inadvertantly, there is a substantial requirement of the compliance of Sec 81 (3 ). The same may be said if the relative positions of the words "true copy" and of the signature one below the other are not correct. They, however, held that as there was no evidence of the signature having been appended animo attestandi, there was non-compliance with Sec. 81 (3 ). The learned solicitor General while not disputing the correctness of the observations of the learned judges just extracted pressed upon us that the signature at the end of the copy was meant only as a copy of that in the original petition and could not satisfy the requirement as to attestation of the copy. He also submitted that the position would have been different if there were two signatures instead of one at the end of the copy, even if the words true copy were omitted to be put down. He also submitted that the position would have been different if there were two signatures instead of one at the end of the copy, even if the words true copy were omitted to be put down. In that case, he said, one signature could be treated as representing the copy of the signature on the original and the other might be taken to have been made animo attestendi We do not, however, consider that there is really need for so much refinement when one has to look at whether there is a substantial compliance with the requirement of this provision. If the signatures not found on the document to which it is appended, viz. , the copy, it would only mean that the copy did not reproduce the signature in the original. " ( 22 ) SIMILAR view has taken by the Honble Supreme Court in Jagat Kishore prasad Narain v. Rajendra Kumar Poddar, AIR 1971 SC 342 and Mithilesh kumar Pandey v. Baidyanath Yadav and Ors. , AIR 1984 SC 305 . Special reference may be made to a decision in Sahodrabai Rai v. Ramsing Aharvar and Ors. . AIR 1968 SC 1079 . In that case also, reliance was placed on Secs. 81, 83 and 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and on Orders 4, 5 and 6 of the Code and it was contended that since the copies of documents were not supplied with the election petition as per the requirement of law, the petition was liable to be dismissed. Considering the provisions of the Code as well as the relevant provisions of the Representation of the People Act, the Court held that unless a document is an integral part of the election petition, non-compliance or non-supply of copy thereof would not result into dismissal of the petition. Similarly, no petition could be dismissed if there is substantial compliance with the requirement of attentation and verification even if there was no strict compliance with the provisions of the Code. The Court drew the distinction between integral part of the petition and the evidence in support of such petition. In the former case, it is necessary to see that there is strict compliance with the provisions of law but in the latter case, it is sufficient if there is a substantial compliance. The Court drew the distinction between integral part of the petition and the evidence in support of such petition. In the former case, it is necessary to see that there is strict compliance with the provisions of law but in the latter case, it is sufficient if there is a substantial compliance. ( 23 ) SIMILARLY, the ratio laid down by this Court in Becharbhai madhabhai Palsana v. Dilipsinh Sanghani, Election Petition No. 1 of 1991 decided by my learned brother K. G. Shah, J. on 28/04/1993 also cannot help the petitioners. In that case, video cassette said to be covering the proceedings of the meeting at which Sadhwi Rutambhara Devi made speech which according to the petitioner was highly fiery and inflammatory and attempted to create hatred among electorate on communal lines was not supplied to the other side. Holding that the video cassette formed an integral part of the petition, this Court held that the non-supply of the cassette was fatal to the maintainability of the petition and the petition was liable to be dismissed. The question, therefore, which arises for my consideration is whether or not a copy of challan is integral or essential part of the election petition. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it is integral and essential part of the petition and, hence, a copy of such challan must be supplied by the election petitioner to the other side. According to the other side, it is merely an evidence in support of payment of deposit amount and cannot be said to be integral part of the petition. In my opinion, challan cannot be said to be essential or integral part of the petition. Looking to Sec. 145v read with Rules 75 and 76 a duty is cast on the election petitioner to make deposit and by producing challan, he must satisfy the Tribunal that such a deposit is made. If the election petitioner deposits the amount and produces a copy of challan in the Tribunal, it is not obligatory to supply a copy of challan to the other side. If the election petitioner deposits the amount and produces a copy of challan in the Tribunal, it is not obligatory to supply a copy of challan to the other side. ( 24 ) I am also not impressed by the alternative argument advanced by the learned Counsel that even if it is held that a copy of challan is not an integral part of the petition, such a copy must be supplied to the opposite party so as to enable him to contend before the Tribunal that no such deposit is made and the election petition is liable to be dismissed on that ground. In my considered view, it is merely an evidence to show that such a deposit has been made by the election petitioner. If the opposite party doubts that fact, he can very well inquire from the Tribunal as to whether such deposit was in fact made by the election petitioner as mentioned in the petition (vide madan Mohan v. Kalukunta Chandrashekhara, AIR 1984 SC 871 ). Thus, taking any view in the matter, the contention cannot be accepted. There is, in any case, substantial compliance with the requirement of law. The requirement regarding deposit and production of challan is a mandatory one and it has been complied with. Hence, supply of copy of challan, even if it is held to be the requirement of law, it must be held to be directory one. It is well settled that a mandatory requirement of law must be strictly and exactly complied with but it is sufficient if a directory requirement is complied with substantially. Hence, non-supply of copy of challan to the other side cannot result into dismissal of petition particularly when a statement is made in the petition that such deposit was made and challan was produced in the Tribunal. Since there was substantial compliance, objection raised by the opposite party must be held to be of a "technical nature" as held by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions and the petition cannot be dismissed on that ground. ( 25 ) REGARDING attestation and verification also, law appears to have been well-settled since the decision in Subbaraos case (supra) and reiterated from time to time. It is an admitted fact that the petition is signed by the petitioner. Similarly, annexures and documents have also been signed by him. ( 25 ) REGARDING attestation and verification also, law appears to have been well-settled since the decision in Subbaraos case (supra) and reiterated from time to time. It is an admitted fact that the petition is signed by the petitioner. Similarly, annexures and documents have also been signed by him. It is also not in dispute that endorsement "attested copy" is made in petition as well as in annexures and documents. What is contended is that in the petition, it is not stated as required by Order 6 Rule 15 of the Code as to which facts have been verified by the petitioner on his personal knowledge and which facts he verified upon the information received by him and believed to be true. Now even while construing election statutes, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that there must be substantial compliance with the provisions of law. In sahodrabai Rais case, (supra), the Court also considered the provisions of the Representation of the People Act as well as the provisions of the Code and observed that there must be substantial compliance with such provisions. Again, looking to the dictionary meaning of "attest", it is clear that it means "to affirm to be true and/or genuine". Hence, seeing the matter from any angle, it cannot be said that there was absence of substantial compliance with the requirement of law. The election petition filed by the petitioner, therefore, cannot be dismissed. ( 26 ) THERE is yet another ground on which the order passed by the tribunal does not require any interference. Under the Representation of the people Act, there is a specific provision for dismissal of election petition if the requirements of the Statute have not been fulfilled. Sec. 86 obliges the High Court to dismiss the petition by stating "high Court shall dismiss the election petition if such petition does not comply with certain provisions of law. Mr. Joshi submitted that in the Gujarat Cooperative societies Act, 1961 (Parent Act), there is no provision for dismissal of the petition and the Tribunal is not bound to dismiss the petition for noncompliance with certain requirements of Sec. 145w of the Act. In my view, Mr. Joshi is right in making distinction between Secs. 145v and 145w of the Act. The legislature was conscious of the distinction between mandatory requirement on the one hand and directory requirement on the other hand. In my view, Mr. Joshi is right in making distinction between Secs. 145v and 145w of the Act. The legislature was conscious of the distinction between mandatory requirement on the one hand and directory requirement on the other hand. When it thought that a particular provision must be regarded as mandatory, non-compliance of which may result in dismissal of the petition, it has made a specific provision to that effect. For instance, in sec. 145v, in no uncertain terms the legislature has provided that the election petitioner will have to deposit an amount of Rs. 500. 00 and unless such amount is deposited, the Tribunal shall dismiss the petition summarily. The same phraseology is not found in Sec. 145w of the Act. Similarly, the rule-making authority has also used both the expressions "shall" and "may" in different set of circumstances. In Rule 75 (2), it is stated that the election petition shall be accompanied by certain documents, etc. Rule 76 states that the petitioner shall join some persons as respondents in the petition. Rule 77 lays down that every election petition shall be tried by the Tribunal in a particular manner. Subrule (1) of Rule 75 states that an election petition calling in question any election "may" be presented within two months from the declaration of the result of such election. Similarly, sub-rule (2) of Rule 77 enables the Tribunal "dismiss the petition" by using the expression "may" if such petition does not comply with the provision of Rule 75. Mr. Vakharia, no doubt, submitted that the power conferred on the Tribunal is coupled with duty and if the election petition is not as per the requirement of law, the tribunal has no option but to dismiss the petition. He further submitted that as per well settled principles of interpretation of statutes, in a given set of circumstances, the Court may have to read "may" as "shall"" or "must". In this case also, according to the Counsel, "may" must be read as "shall" or "must" and if the election petition is not in consonance with the statutory provisions, the Tribunal cannot exercise its discretion by entertaining the election petition. I am afraid, I cannot uphold the argument. It is true that in a given case, "may" can be read as "shall" or vice-versa. I am afraid, I cannot uphold the argument. It is true that in a given case, "may" can be read as "shall" or vice-versa. But, in my opinion, looking to the phraseology used by the rule-making authority in Rules 75, 76 and 77, it is clear that the authority was conscious of both the expressions "may" and "shall". If the authority uses "may" at one place and "shall" at another place in the same Rule, the Court will not jump to the conclusion that both the expressions were used by the authority without application of mind. In my judgment, if the contention of the petitioner is accepted and "may" is read as "shall", it would virtually unsettle hitherto settled law inasmuch as beginning from Sahodrabai Rais case (supra), the highest Court of the country has ruled that the re should be substantial compliance with the provisions of election laws. If "may" is read as "shall" and the petition will be dismissed on that count, the concept of substantial compliance will have to be given go-bye. Such interpretation would be contrary to and inconsistent with the law laid down by the supreme Court and binding to all Courts and authorities within the territory of India under Art. 141 of the Constitution. I am of the view that when enact and strict compliance of the provisions of election statutes has not been insisted upon by the final Court and substantial compliance is treated as sufficient, "may" in Rule 77 must be read as "may" and not as "shall". Hence, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. ( 27 ) THE matter can be seen yet from another angle. The word may is used in sub-rule (2) of Rule 77 and sub-rule (1) of Rule 75. Both the provisions relate to election petitions. In both of them, powers of the tribunal have been mentioned. Now, probably, it cannot be contended that the expression "may" in sub-rule (1) of Rule 75 should be read as "shall" or "must". The reason being the substantive provision in the parent act in the form of second proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 145u. Section 145u has been quoted in earlier part of the judgment. According to the parent Act, an election petition can be presented by an aggrieved party within two months from the date of declaration of result of election. The reason being the substantive provision in the parent act in the form of second proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 145u. Section 145u has been quoted in earlier part of the judgment. According to the parent Act, an election petition can be presented by an aggrieved party within two months from the date of declaration of result of election. The second proviso, however, enables the Tribunal to admit any petition after expiry of that period if the petitioner satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the petition within the stipulated period. Thus, the parent Act enables the Tribunal to entertain an election petition after the statutory period is over in certain cases. Rule 75 (1) provides for filing of the election petition within the period of two months from the date of declaration of election. If this provision is held to be mandatory by reading "may" as "shall", the Tribunal cannot entertain an election petition after the expiry of the statutory period of two months even if sufficient cause" has been made out for not the petition within the stipulated period. In that case, Rule 75 (2) which is in the nature of subordinate legislation would be inconsistent with the parent Act. As per settled law, a delegated or subordinate legislation cannot be contrary to or inconsistent with the parent Act. Hence, the provision of sub-rule (1) or rule 75 must be construed as enabling one by reading "may" as "may" only. If it is held that the rule-making authority was conscious of the distinction between "may" and "shall" and has advisedly used expression "may" when the provision was considered directory, in my opinion, it cannot be said that in sub-rule (2) of Rule 77, may" must be read as "shall". Again, reading of "may" as "shall" and direction to the petitioner to comply with the provisions of the Act and the Rules strictly would be contrary to various pronouncements of the Honble Supreme Court and no such interpretation can be accepted. I am, therefore, unable to uphold the second contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. ( 28 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any substance in any of the contentions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the petitions require to be dismissed. Accordingly, all these three petitions are dismissed. I am, therefore, unable to uphold the second contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. ( 28 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any substance in any of the contentions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the petitions require to be dismissed. Accordingly, all these three petitions are dismissed. Notices issued in all these petitions are discharged. Ad-interim relief granted earlier stands vacated. No order as to costs. ( 29 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner prays that ad-interim relief granted earlier may be continued for some time so as to enable the petitioner to approach the higher forum. The learned Counsel for the first respondent strongly objects to such prayer. He submits that no prejudice will be caused to the petitioners if evidence will be recorded by the tribunal. He also submits that the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal no. 500 of 1993 has directed the Tribunal to dispose on" the petition as expeditiously as possible but certainly within the period of six months. Hence, no ad-interim relief should be continued. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, I am of the opinion that the ends of justice would be met if for some time ad-interim relief is continued to enable thy petitioner to approach higher forum. Ad-interim relief granted earlier is, therefore, ordered to continue upto 11/04/1994. .