Judgment :- The courts below have ordered eviction on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent. According to the respondent, the tenant had not paid rent from December, 1981 till the filing of the petition for eviction. The petitioner raised a plea that he was a tenant under the previous owner, the husband of the respondent herein and when rent was sent by cheque, the previous owner refused to accept the same and the tenant filed a petition for deposit of rent into court, which was numbered as R.C.O.P. No.181 of 1982 and an order was passed On 14. 1982 directing deposit of rent into court. According to the petitioner, he was depositing as per that order continuously in that proceeding and therefore, there was no default or wilful default on his part. The courts below have negatived the contention of the petitioner herein. The courts below have found that the previous owner Krishnamachary died on 23. 1992. Even before an order was passed in R.C.O.P. No.181 of 1982 filed by the petitioner herein and that inspite of the fact that the previous landlord has died, the petitioner herein obtained an order of depositing the amounts in the said R.C.O.P. and continued to de-positin those proceedings. Later, the petitioner herein claimed that he had received a notice from some other person not to pay the rent to the present respondent and therefore, he did not pay the same to her. There was a suit filed by the present respondent in O.S.No.9 of 1983 to establish her title and a decree was passed in her favour. The petitioner herein was a party to that suit. Even after the filing of the suit he chose to continue to deposit the rent taking the stand that he will act according to the decree of the court which would be ultimately passed in the suit. In the present proceedings, the contention of the tenant was that he was not aware of the death of Krishnamachary, when an order was passed in R.C.O.P. No.181 of 1982. The courts below have found on the evidence that he was quite aware of the death. The courts below have relied on the admission made by the petitioner in O.S.No.9 of 1983 in his deposition and that he came to know of the death of Krishnamachary from the newspaper. The courts below have found on the evidence that he was quite aware of the death. The courts below have relied on the admission made by the petitioner in O.S.No.9 of 1983 in his deposition and that he came to know of the death of Krishnamachary from the newspaper. In the present proceedings, the petitioner attempted to say that he did not know to read Tamil and he did not read newspaper and he was not aware of the death of the prior landlord. That version has been rightly disbelieved by the courts below. In the circumstances, the courts below have come to the conclusion that the petitioner wilfully refrained from paying rent to the respondent and instead deposited the rent in a proceeding in which he obtained an order by suppressing the factum of death of the prior landlord. In those circumstances, there can be no doubt whatever that the tenant is guilty of wilful default. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that P.W.1, the brother of the respondent had admitted in his evidence that in O.S.No.9 of 1983 there was an averment in the plaint to the effect that the petitioner herein had deposited rent in court, P.W.1 has also stated in the same evidence that he came to know of the deposit of rent by R.W. 1 only during the course of the present proceedings. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that P.W.1 has not spoken the truth, in view of the above version given by him. There is no merit.in this contention, P.W. 1 has stated only what has been stated in the plaint in O.S.No.9 of 1983 that the petitioner herein was depositing rent in the court. That does not mean that he admits that he knows the deposit of rent in R.C.O.P.No.181 of 1982. Further, learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the deposition of P.W. 1 to the effect that he received notice on behalf of deceased Krishnamachary in R.C.O.P.No.181 of 1982 on 13. 1982 and learned counsel contends that the respondent was fully aware of the proceedings in R.C.O.P.No.181 of 1982 and also deposit of rent in the said proceedings. Further, learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the deposition of P.W. 1 to the effect that he received notice on behalf of deceased Krishnamachary in R.C.O.P.No.181 of 1982 on 13. 1982 and learned counsel contends that the respondent was fully aware of the proceedings in R.C.O.P.No.181 of 1982 and also deposit of rent in the said proceedings. According to learned counsel for the petitioner it is for the respondent to take steps to withdraw rent from the court in R.C.O.P. No.181 of 1982 aware of the proceedings in R.C.O.P.No.181 of 1982 and there is no default on his part as long as he continued to make deposit. There is absolutely no substance in the above contention. Once it is found that the petitioner was aware of the death of the prior i landlord and inspite of the same, suppressed the fact and fraudulently obtained an order from the Rent Controller for deposit of rent, that itself shows that he was clearly guilty of wilful default. In such circumstances, the petitioner cannot place any reliance on the failure of the respondents to withdraw the rent from the court deposit. We are only concerned with the question of wilful default on the part of the tenant. The act enjoins a duty on the tenant to tender or to pay the rent. In the absence of such tender or payment of the rent by the tenant, the tenant is guilty of default. The facts of the case clearly make out wilful default on the part of the petitioner herein. Reliance is placed by learned counsel for the petitioner in Thaiyal Nayaki v.Ayyavu Chettiar, (1976)1 M.L.J. 15 (S.N.). It was found in that case that the tenant opened an account in a post-office and deposited the rents for every month, when the landlord rejected the money order sent by him. It was held that in those circumstances, the tenant was not guilty of wilful default. 3. My attention is drawn to judgment in T. S. Rajagopal v. M.N.Saraswathi Ammal, 90 L.W. 26. This Court found factually that the landlady accepted rents, though sent in lump sums and without regard to regularly as provided for in the statute. It was held that there was no wilful default. The Rent Controller ordered eviction holding that there is wilful default, but the appellate authority reversed the same. This Court found factually that the landlady accepted rents, though sent in lump sums and without regard to regularly as provided for in the statute. It was held that there was no wilful default. The Rent Controller ordered eviction holding that there is wilful default, but the appellate authority reversed the same. On revision, the revisional authority set aside the order of the appellate authority and held that there was a case of wilful default. On further revision, this Court set aside the order of the revisional authority and restored the order of the appellate authority holding that there was no wilful default. While doing so, the court said that the expression ‘wilful default’ is not an expression of art, but a meaningful phraseology used by the statute with a definite purpose and the default committed by a tenant should be so telling and conspicuous that any responsible person apprised of such circumstances and having the occasion to adjudicate upon such facts should come to the conclusion that the tenant was recalcitrant and supremely indifferent and purposely evading the performance of his legitimate obligation of sending the rents to the landlady in time. It was also held that the entirety of the facts presents a situation whereby a genuine doubt could be created as to whether such an attitude of the tenant in sending the rents in a delayed fashion was due to the landlady’s prior acceptance of such tenders and that too without demur, then it cannot be automatically concluded that even in such circumstances, the badge of wilful default should be assigned to the conduct of the tenant. It was held that wilfulness should be the result of recalcitrance and deliberateness. 4. In Usman Koya v. Muthukrishnan, (1978)1 M.L.J. 10 : A.I.R. 1978 Mad. 168: (1977)90 L.W. 711 : (1978)1 Ren.C.R. 199: (1978)2 Rent.L.R. 161, referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court held that there is no provision in the act in enabling a tenant who had deposited in court the amount towards rent. Admittedly due from him in view of his doubt as to the person entitled to receive the payment, to withdraw the amount as the same represented the rent due to the persons having interest in the demised premises. Admittedly due from him in view of his doubt as to the person entitled to receive the payment, to withdraw the amount as the same represented the rent due to the persons having interest in the demised premises. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that in the present case deposit having been made in R.C.O.P. No.181 of 1982, the petitioner was not in a position to withdraw the same and pay to the respondent and the respondent could have withdrawn the amount from the court. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the amounts were available to the credit of the respondent and it was for the respondent to have withdrawn the same and in the absence of failure to do so, the fault was only on the side of the respondent and there has been no wilful default on the part of the petitioner. I do not accept this contention, in view of the facts already stated above. 5. In Soundarapandian Nadar v. Madasamy Mudaliar, (1982)1 M.L.J. 299 , the tenant was remitting the rent by money order month after month and finally resorted to deposit the amount in the bank when the landlord refused to receive money orders. No doubt, the deposit was made only in his own name. The court held that the tenant was bona fide making a deposit and there was no wilful default on his part. My attention is drawn to Rathinam Pillai v. Mohammed Kasim, (1985)1 M.L.J. 194. It was held that the facts and circumstances of the case have to be taken note of before coming to the conclusion that the tenant has committed wilful default in payment of rent. In that case, there was a wrong adjustment of property tax towards payment of rent and the amount was deposited in savings bank once in two or three months. The court held that there may be default but, it cannot be held to be wilful default. .6. In Shanmughanathan v. Balasingam, 1986 T.L.N.J. 277, it was held that once the tenant has taken all steps available for payment of rent to the landlord, then he cannot be considered to have made any wilful default. Learned counsel for the petitioner places strong reliance on the judgment of a Division Bench in Durgai Ammal v. R.T.Mani, (1989)1 L.W. 155. In that case the landlord refused to receive the rent. Learned counsel for the petitioner places strong reliance on the judgment of a Division Bench in Durgai Ammal v. R.T.Mani, (1989)1 L.W. 155. In that case the landlord refused to receive the rent. The court said that when the landlord refused to receive the rent by the tenant, it is his fault and he cannot subsequently say that the tenant has not exercised his right given under Sec.8 of the Act and therefore, he will not be taken to have committed wilful default. It is also held that if the tenant has not deposited the rent before the Rent Controller in case of bona fide doubt as to the person who is entitled to receive the rent and the person concerned does not help to remove the doubt of the tenant, the tenant cannot be said to have committed wilful default in payment of rent. In that case it was held that the finding of the appellate authority that the tenant committed wilful default in payment of rent is wrong and therefore, it was set aside. The ruling has no application to the present case. According to the learned counsel it was Krishnamachari, the prior landlord who refused to receive the rent and therefore, the petitioner approached the court in R.C.O.P. No.181 of 1982. That part of the case has not been proved at all, because at the time when the Rent Controller passed the order in R.C.O.P. No.181 of 1982 Krishnamachari was not alive to contest the proceeding. Any order passed in a proceeding against a dead person will be a nullity and no reliance can be placed on the said order to contend that the petitioner having continued to deposit in R.C.O.P. No.181 of 1982 committed no default. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner invites my attention to the judgment in A.S.Pandurangan Chettiar v. C.S.R.Bashyam, (1991)2 L.W. 628 . Cheques which were sent to the landlord have not been encashed by him. The tenant, therefore, deposited the rent in the Savings Bank account in his own name. There was no notice by the landlord demanding arrears of rent. In those circumstances, the court held that there was no wilful default on the part of the tenant. 8. The rulings referred to above by learned counsel for the petitioner do not have a bearing in this case. There was no notice by the landlord demanding arrears of rent. In those circumstances, the court held that there was no wilful default on the part of the tenant. 8. The rulings referred to above by learned counsel for the petitioner do not have a bearing in this case. As pointed out by P.R.Gokulakrishnan, J. (as he then was) in Rathinam Pillai v. Mohammed Kasim, (1985)1 M.L.J. 194, each case has to be decided on the facts thereof and the question whether there is wilful default or not on the part of the tenant has to be decided on the facts of each case. 9. In T.S.Rajagopal v. M.N.Saraswathi Ammal, 90 L.W. 26, as already adverted to the court held that the revisional authority can only interfere if the order of the appellate authority was in any way illegal, irregular or improper and such jurisdiction cannot normally be extended so as to interfere with a finding of fact based on acceptable material made by the appellate authority. 10. In the present case, both the authorities have come to the conclusion on the evidence available on record that the petitioner herein is guilty of wilful default. I have already adverted to the facts of the case and the way in which the petitioner obtained an order in R.C.O.P.No.181 of 1982 even though he was aware of the death of his prior landlord and without impleading the legal representatives as parties thereto. .11. It is next argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the property belongs, admittedly, to a Trust and the petition for eviction has been filed only by the respondent in her individual capacity and the Trust is not shown as a party. This contention has not been raised in the courts below and it is raised for the first time here. I am not permitting the petitioner to raise such a contention. Even otherwise in the original petitioner for eviction sufficient averments have been made by the respondent to show that she is entitled to collect the rent and she is the landlord within the meaning of the Act. 12. In the circumstances, there is no merit whatever in the civil revision petitions and they are dismissed.