JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner No. 1 - Sarvajanik Nirman Mazdoor Sangh, Bhilwara, has filed this petition for its members - Bheru son of Hardeo and Zahir Mohammed son of Taj Mohammed, the petitioners No. 2 and 3 respectively, against the award of the Labour Court, Udaipur dated 16.4.1984, whereby the learned Labour Judge rejected the reference. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the Labour Court has committed an error in dismissing the reference of the workman. He submitted that the Labour Court has committed an error in relying upon the judgment of this Court in Mahi Karmchari Sangh v. State of Rajasthan, (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1186/81, decided on 13.4.1982), as facts of this case were totally different than the facts of this case. He further submitted that the point in question is fully covered by two judgments of this Court. One of a Division Bench, in D.B. Civil Special Appeal 25/91, decided on 1.10.1991 and, another one, of learned Single Judge V.G. Palshikar, J., in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1586/84 (Mangi Lal v. State of Raj. ), decided on September 13, 1994, who has relied upon the judgment of Division Bench (supra) while allowing the petition. 3. In the Single Bench matter, it was in dispute that the workman completed 240 days under one employer. He was employed with one Assistant Engineer for some days and with another Assistant Engineer for some days. The learned Single Judge relying upon the observations made by the Division Bench in the aforesaid judgment, held that the order of retrenchment of that petitioner was un-sustainable in law and, therefore, set aside the same. The Division Bench has held in its judgment that merely because the petitioner worked in different sub-divisions of the same department, will not make any difference and the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act ought to have been followed. 4. The Division Bench has held in its judgment that merely because the petitioner worked in different sub-divisions of the same department, will not make any difference and the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act ought to have been followed. 4. One more judgment, is relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, which is reported in 1991(1) RLW 31 (Hem Kumar v. State of Raj.) , wherein also a learned Single Judge of this Court held that though the services of the petitioner may be under various schemes, but he was under the service of respondent No. 4, as such, the continuation of the petitioner under various schemes will be of no avail as the order does not say that appointment of the petitioner is under the particular scheme only and it will be subject to expiry of the scheme. It may be stated that the learned Single Judge himself has thereafter observed that - ''If that were so, perhaps the respondent would have taken a benefit of section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act. But the order which have been issued from time to time does not say so''.Therefore, under that circumstances, the learned Single Judge held that the termination of the services of the petitioner was in violation of Section 25-F of the Act. 5. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that both the workmen have completed 240 days but the dispute is that they have not completed 240 days continuously in one unit. Initially they were appointed in the workshop of Electricity Sub Division, Bhilwara, in November, 1977 and they were in that workshop till July 1978. Thereafter, from August, 1978, they were on the muster roll of East City, Bhilwara and their services were terminated at Electricity Sub-Division, Bhilwara. From February, 1979, till March, 1979, they continue to work on the muster roll of East City, Bhilwara Sub-Division and thereafter they were again appointed in the Electricity Sub-Division, Bhilwara and they worked there till May, 1980. Thereafter, without any order in writing, by an oral order, they have been removed from service. From February, 1979, till March, 1979, they continue to work on the muster roll of East City, Bhilwara Sub-Division and thereafter they were again appointed in the Electricity Sub-Division, Bhilwara and they worked there till May, 1980. Thereafter, without any order in writing, by an oral order, they have been removed from service. It is to be noted that the petitioners have not placed their appointment orders before this Court but, from the facts stated above, it clearly appears that their appointment was by several different appointment orders in different units from time to time and it is also not disputed both of them have not completed 240 days continuously in one unit. 6. The term ''unit'' has been considered by this Court in its decision dated 13.4.1982, delivered in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1186/81 (supra), which is as under:- ''The expression 'unit' has been defined to mean territorial jurisdiction of the authority competent to make appointments on workcharged establishment and the work charged establishment has been defined under clause 2(1)(i) to mean and include such establishment as is employee upon the actual execution or upon the sub-ordinate supervision of Departmental Labour, stores and machinery in connection with such work or sub-work. It would appear that for the different categories of workman there are different appointing authorities having their own territorial jurisdiction and appointments are made on work charged Establishments which have relation to the actual execution of a particular work or sub work.'' 7. Relying upon that judgment, the learned Labour Court held that none of the workmen completed 240 days continuously in one unit and, therefore, they are not entitled for reinstatement and accordingly it has rejected the reference. 8. The judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court, relied upon by the Labour Court, was never considered by either the Division Bench or learned Single Judge in the aforesaid judgments cited before me. In fact, the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has also relied upon on one more judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court, reported in 1987(1) RLR 71 (Vijay Singh v. State of Raj. In fact, the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 has also relied upon on one more judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court, reported in 1987(1) RLR 71 (Vijay Singh v. State of Raj. SBCWP No. 1589/84, decided on 8.1.1987), wherein it has categorically been stated that period of employment of workmen under different units cannot be clubbed together for the purposes of completion of statutory period of 240 days and as he has worked for less than 240 days in unit from where he had been retrenched, he is not entitled to benefit of Section 25-F. In that case also Mr. Mridul appeared for the petitioner and Mr. Mridul in other two cases which have been cited before me. Therefore, the law is well settled. In this case I do not see any error, much less any jurisdictional error, committed by the Labour Court in rejecting the reference, which does not call for interference by the hands of this Court in its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, this petition is liable to be rejected. 9. It may be stated that this petition is labelled as a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and not under Article 227 but mere labelling at the petition under Article 226 will not make it a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 10. Even if I was inclined to accept the submissions made by learned counsel for the petition on merits of the case, then also, no writ could have been issued by this court in the absence of State of Rajasthan being a party on record of this case, as no writ can no against the Executive Engineer, P.W.D., Electricity Sub-Division, Bhilwara. State is always necessary party because any order of this Court has to be satisfied by the State and because payment has to be made by the State and further, it is question of public exchequer. Therefore, in the absence of State of Rajasthan being party on record of this case, no direction can be issued against the existing respondents and thus, this petition is required to be rejected. 11. In view of above discussion, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.Rule discharged, with no order as to costs. *******