K. NARAYAN, J. The petitioner has approached this Court for a writ of habeas corpus and a direction for his release on the ground that his detention has been illegal, unconstitutional and unwarranted by the law of procedure. He had also desired, of course, as an interim relief, his release on bail in the matter of case crime No 151 of 1994, Police Station Gosaiganj, district Faizabad, under Sections 147, 148, 307 and 302 read with Section 148, IPC. 2. The facts giving rise to the present petition, are that the petitioner was arrested by Shri D. D. Shukla, Sub-Inspector of Police and Station Officer, Police Station, Gosaiganj at 2. 30 p. m. on 26-9-1994, for his alleged involve ment in a case registered at crime No. 176 of 1994, under Sections 352, 504 and 506, IPC. Since he was also said to be involved in the matter of crime No. 151 of 1994, the investigation of which had already been transferred to CBCID under some orders of the Government, an information about the arrest was sent to said office at Gorakhpur possibly on (sic) one. Consequent upon that Shri Shiv Ratan Singh, an Inspector of the said department at Gorakh pur, rushed to Gosaiganj. It may also be mentioned here that a few more persons, namely, Verendra Singh, Sesh Kumar Singh and Brahma Dutt Singh were also arrested on the same day simultaneously in the matter of case crime No, 176 of 1994 and detained for offence of case crime No. 151 of 1994. Though the matter in respect of them may be the same, the details need not be gone into hero. The Inspector interrogated the accused persons who were already in the lock up and, thereafter, two challans were sent simultaneously on 27-9-1994 one in respect of crime No. 151 of 1994, and other in respect of crime No. 176 of 1994 by Shri Shiv Ratan Singh and Shri D. D. Shukla respectively. 3. The contention of the petitioner has been that his detention in the matter of crime No. 151 of 1994 at the instance of Shri Shiv Ratan Singh has been illegal as the provisions of Sections 50, 167 and "267, Or. P. C. as well as of Article 22 (1) of the Constitution of India were not properly complied with and the detention has been an unauthorised one. P. C. as well as of Article 22 (1) of the Constitution of India were not properly complied with and the detention has been an unauthorised one. His contention in this behalf has been that (1) he was not informed of the reasons of his arrest and deten tion in the matter of crime No. 151 of 1994 and in that way the provisions of Article 22 (1) of the Constitution were flouted and also (2) that once the detention had been made by the police of Gosaiganj, the detention at the insistence of another police officer without application of Section 267, Cr. P. C. was bad, (3) it was also contended that the remand in respect of the petitioner was not properly obtained by the Investigating Officer on subsequent dates specially on 15-11-1994, when the request was made by an unconcerned man Shri D. D. Shukla, who was neither investigating nor was Station Officer for the case crime No. 151 of 1994, (4) his contention has also been that the remand was obtained on flimsy grounds and the Magistrate had failed to care for the protection of liberty of the petitioner which was his duty, while grant ing remand. 4. In order to properly appreciate the contentions of the petitioner in respect of validity of his arrest and detention in the matter of crime No. 151 of 1994, a brief resume of Article 22 (1) of the Constitution and of Section 50, Cr. P. C. which has been legislated as a matter of guidance and direction to the police officer, to keep the spirit of Article 22 (1) alive in their mind, will be necessary. Needless to say that ail laws of the country derive their authority from the Constitution. A reference to Article 21 of the Constitution will also be of use. Both Articles 21 and 22 find place in Part dealing with Funda mental Rights, in the Constitution. Under Article 21, the Fundamental Right of life and personal liberty have been guaranteed, of course, they have been made subject to exceptions which may be according to procedure established by law. A personal liberty is curtailed by arrest and curtailment is continued by detention. Under Article 21, the Fundamental Right of life and personal liberty have been guaranteed, of course, they have been made subject to exceptions which may be according to procedure established by law. A personal liberty is curtailed by arrest and curtailment is continued by detention. Arrest in certain cases may be a momentary affair, as the process of arrest does not last long and once the arrest is complete, the detention may or may not be continued for some time or more. Article 22 (1) guarantees that no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. The matters relating to legal help can be skipped for the purposes of the present case. The main factor which has to be considered is that if the arrest has been followed by the information desired by Article 22 (1) of the Constitution and whether it has been done as soon as might be or not. The same principles were put weight under Section 50, Cr. P. C. Under Article 22 (1) the right has been enshrined and Section 50, Cr. P. C. is a man date to the police officer in deference to the provision; contained in Article 22 (1) of the Constitution. 5. In order to consider the submissions in the matter of arrest and then application of Section 50, Cr. P. C. and Article 22 (1) of the Constitution facts may be arrived at. The contention of the petitioner has been that he was never told the grounds of his arrest as directed by the above said two provisions while on the contrary, the contention of the State has been that he was so explained. The question is as to whether this positive fact, of which burden could be only upon the State was at all proved. The question is as to whether this positive fact, of which burden could be only upon the State was at all proved. The officer, who had arrested was Sri Dhruv Dev Shukla and he has filed an affidavit wherein it was stated in para 4 that the petitioner was informed of the offence that was committed by him in detail at the time of arrest, and all facts that were con veyed were recorded in the general diary No. 15 at 17 p. m. on 26-9- 1994 when the petitioner was lodged in the lock up. It is remarkable that though Sri D. D, Shukla was himself the arresting officer, this para has been verified not from the personal knowledge or even belief but on the basis of record, that is, general diary. The contents of the general diary will be mentioned later but a more important aspect remains that it prove who has, according to the entries in the general diary conveyed the fact is unable to state about them as a matter of fact from his personal knowledge. Of course in the writ jurisdiction the matters are not to be weighed with the same measures as they are in regular trials but certain aspects cannot be lost sight of. Under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, books maintained in regular course of business can be a corroborative evidence in their nature, they cannot form a substantive piece of evidence. On the contrary in the present case, though substantive piece of evidence could have been tendered and though the who could have tendered it has not been sworn the affidavit on personal knowledge and has withheld or avoided the narration as a fact and the entry in the General Diary has been relied upon. 6. A reference may also be made here to the decision in the case of Hajari Lal v. State, reported in 1991 LLJ 230, where it was held that a mere record in the general diary that the arrest was effected after telling the reasons, there for, was insufficient and the detention thereafter was held to be bad to the extent that the infirmity was not cured. 7. The general diary is a matter of record at the police station. The communication of the reasons for arrest has to be forthwith and has to be in the nature of full particulars of the offence. 7. The general diary is a matter of record at the police station. The communication of the reasons for arrest has to be forthwith and has to be in the nature of full particulars of the offence. It is expected that the police officers also make certain memorandum on such occasions to refresh their memories in the event of evidence in that behalf. That has to be the first document and either it has nut been prepared at all or it has been withheld. Recording of the fact in the general diary is a later stage and by that time detention would have been for time taken in bringing the person to Police Station. In the instant case, evidently as it appears from the copy of the general diary, the arrest was accompanied by seizure of two guns and a vehicle also and in that event preparation of a memorandum must have taken place. There is no dispute about the fact that investigation in the matter of crime No. 151 of 1994 had already been transferred from the local police to the CBC1d. The position of Shri D. D. Shukla in the matter of that crime there after stood as one of a person who could have acted on the directions of the other police officers and that would require a written order or authority from that police officer, which is not there. We will not dilate upon this aspect as we have not been addressed in that behalf. 8. The effect of this failure on the part of arresting officer has been repeatedly laid down by Honble Supreme Court as well as High Court at Allahabad in many cases which we wish to mention below. They, however, remain unattended to for the reasons best known to the department. 9. The first case that we would like to refer here is the decision in the case of Madhu Limaye reported in AIR 1969 SC 1014 , wherein, it has been held: "article 22 (1) embodies a rule which has always been regarded as vital and fundamental for safeguarding personal liberty in all legal systems where the rule of law prevails. For example, the 6th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America contains similar provisions and so does Article 34 of the Japanese Constitution of 1946. For example, the 6th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America contains similar provisions and so does Article 34 of the Japanese Constitution of 1946. In England whenever a rest is made with out a warrant, the arrested person has right to be informed not only that he is being arrested but also of the reasons or grounds for the arrest. The House of Lords to Christie v. Leachimky, 1947 (1) All BR 567 went into the origin and development of this Rule. Io the words of Viscount Simon it a policeman who enter tained a reasonable suspicion that AT had committed a felony, were at liberty to arrest him and arch him off to a police station without giving any explanation of why he was doing this, the prima facie right of personal liberty would be gravely infringed. Viscount Simon laid down several propositions which were not meant to be exhaustive. For our purposes we may refer to the first and the third. (1) If a policeman arrests without warrant upon reasonable suspicion of felony, or of other crime of a sort which does not require a warrant, ho must in ordinary circumstances inform the person arrested of the true ground of arrest. He is not entitled to keep the reason to himself or to give a reason which is not the true reason. In other words, a citizen is entitled to know on what charge or on suspicion of what crime he is seized. (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3) The requirement that the person arrested should be informed of the reason why he is seized naturally does not exist if the circum stances are such that he must know the general, nature of the alleged offence for which he is detained. Lord gave an illustration of the circumstances where the accused must know why he is being arrested. There is no need to explain the reasons of arrest if the arrested man is caught red handed and the crime is patent to high Heaven. Lord gave an illustration of the circumstances where the accused must know why he is being arrested. There is no need to explain the reasons of arrest if the arrested man is caught red handed and the crime is patent to high Heaven. The two requirements of clause (1) of Article 22 are meant to afford the earliest opportunity to the arrested person to remove any mistake might retention or misunderstanding in the minds of the arresting authority and, also to know exactly what the accusation against him is so that he can exercise the second right, namely, of consulting a legal practitioner of his choice and to be depended by him. Clause (2) of Article 22 provides the next and most material safeguard that the arrested person must be produced before the Magistrate within 24 hours of such arrest so that an independent authority exercising judicial cowers may without delay apply its mind to his case. The Criminal Procedure Code contains analogous provisions in Sections 60 and 340 but our Constitution makers were anxious to make these safeguards an integral part of fundamental rights. This is what Dr. B. R. Ambedkar said while moving for insertion of Article 15-A as numbered in the drat. Bill of the Constitution which corres ponded to present Article 22. "article 15-A merely lifts from the provisions of the Criminal Proce dure Code two of the most fundamental principles which every civilised country follows as principles of international justice, it is quite true that these two provisions contained in clause (1) and clause (2) are already to be found in the Criminal Procedure Code and thereby probably it might be said that we are really not making any very fundamental change. But we are, as contended making a fundamental change because what we are doing by the introduction of Article 15-A is to put a limitation open the autho rity both of Parliament as well as of the Provincial Legislature not to abrogate these two provisions, because they are now intro duced in our Constitution itself. As stated in Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi, AIR 1953 SC 277 , this Court has often reiterated that those who feel called upon to deprive other persons of liberty in the discharge of what they conceive to be their duty must, strictly and scrupulously observe the forms and rules of law. As stated in Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi, AIR 1953 SC 277 , this Court has often reiterated that those who feel called upon to deprive other persons of liberty in the discharge of what they conceive to be their duty must, strictly and scrupulously observe the forms and rules of law. Whenever that is not done the peti tioner would be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus directing his release. " 10. We may take liberty of late Dr. Ambedkar to add to his address that this recognition of this right of liberty found place in Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 as shown by him. They are reproduced below : "491. Power to issue directions of the nature of a habeas corpus.- (1) Any High Court may, whenever it thinks lit, direct- (a) that a person within the limits of its appellate criminal juris diction be brought up before the Court to be dealt with according to law ; (b) that a person illegally or improperly detained in public or private custody within such limits be set at liberty ; (c) that a prisoner detained in any jail situate within such limits be brought before the Court to be there examined as a witness in any matter pending or to be inquired into in such Court ; (d) that a prisoner detained as aforesaid be brought before a Court-martial or any Commissioners for trial or to be examined touching any matter pending before such Court-martial or Commissioners respectively ; (e) that a prisoner within such limits be removed from one custody to another for the purposes of trial; and (f) that the body of a defendant within such limits be brought in on the Sheriffs return of copy corpus to a writ of attachment. (2) The High Court may, from time to time, frame rules to regulate the procedure in cases under this section. (3) Nothing in this section applies to persons detained under the Bengal State Prisoner Regulation, 1818, Madras Regulation II of 1819, or Bombay Regulation V of 1827, or the State Prisoners . Act, 1850, or the State Prisoners Act, 1858. " 11. The High Court had also made rules in that behalf in Chapter XXI of its Rules. (3) Nothing in this section applies to persons detained under the Bengal State Prisoner Regulation, 1818, Madras Regulation II of 1819, or Bombay Regulation V of 1827, or the State Prisoners . Act, 1850, or the State Prisoners Act, 1858. " 11. The High Court had also made rules in that behalf in Chapter XXI of its Rules. It is only unfortunate that the police and courts have now begun careless for the principles, when they have been enshrined is a fundamental right and given a place in the source of the law of the country i. e. our Constitution. 12. More specific in this behalf is the case of Subhash Bhandari reported in 1986 LLJ 271. In this case which has been subsequently followed in the decision in Ramakant v. State, 1988 LLJ 118 ; Ashok Kumar Singh v. State, 1987 LLJ 373 ; Hajari Lal v. State, 1991 LLJ 231, it has been held that the extent of full particulars of the offence required to be narrated in view of Section 50 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is that information given should be sufficient to inform the arrested person to explain why he has been arrested (para 27 to 29 ). It was also held that the section confers a valuable right and non- conformance to the procedure established by law and this conclusion was based on still earlier decision of High Court of Calcutta in the case of Govind Prasad v. State of West Bengal, 1975 Cr LJ 1249. It will simply increase the volume of the judgment if all cases referred to in the case of Subhash Bhandari are referred to here and it will suffice to say that this decision has not only been on a well discussed one but seems to be a good and last law on the subject, which it covers and is still a good law. The same principle was also laid down in the case of Ram Chandra alias Munai v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini, AIR 1982 All 160. 13. This, of course, can be said to be in respect of the immediate arrest, which was affected by Sri D. O. Shukla. Thereafter begins the effect of deten tion. The same principle was also laid down in the case of Ram Chandra alias Munai v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini, AIR 1982 All 160. 13. This, of course, can be said to be in respect of the immediate arrest, which was affected by Sri D. O. Shukla. Thereafter begins the effect of deten tion. Undoubtedly a person once arrested cannot be arrested again unless ha has already been set at liberty though he can be detained for some additional reason but then that detention has also to be followed by formalities that are required by law to be observed at the time of arrest under Section 50 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is said that in the instant case after this arrest, a telephonic information was given to Sri Shiv Ratan Singh, who rushed from Gorakhpur to Gosaiganj and interrogated the petitioner. It has been contended in the counter- affidavit of Shiv Ratan Singh that reasons of arrest were communicated. He bad also relied upon the entries in the general diary in that behalf. Obviously, he was not present at the time when G. D. of 26-9- 1994 was recorded. His affidavit, therefore, is or no better footing that contention of Shri D. D. Shukla though it may also be mentioned that this para 6 was also verified on the basis of record. 14. It was also urged on behalf of the State that Sri Shiv Ratan Singh had interrogated the petitioner and others and their statements were recorded. Though ordinarily the statements are of up value, it was urged that since detenues other than the petitioner had confessed the guilt, the petitioner also must have come to know of the reasons. It was also urged that he had also shown his alibi in his statement. Apart from the incredibility etc. of this aspect what is more important is not the knowledge of the petitioner but the communication of the grounds by the officer detaining the detenue and requiting the Magistrate for authorisation of his detention. The value lies in adher ence and compliance with the procedure and not in the intelligence and understanding of the detenue. The duty is upon the officer to inform and not upon the detenue to enquire or understand. The value lies in adher ence and compliance with the procedure and not in the intelligence and understanding of the detenue. The duty is upon the officer to inform and not upon the detenue to enquire or understand. There is no evidence worth the name that Sri Shiv Ratati Singh had conveyed even a word as a reason and ground for arrest and detention for the offence in case crime No. 151 of 1994. 15. The next argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner has been that once the petitioner was held, legally or illegally, he could only be required by the court to appear before it under Section 267, Cr. P. C. and the procedure that the detention request was also issued simultaneously by Shiv Ratan Singh was neither legal nor justified. We may mention here that on 27-9-1994, two requests for remand seem to have been sent along with the petitioner, to the Magistrate concerned, one by Shri D. O. Shukla and the other by Shiv Ratan Singh. The request for remand which might have been sent by Sri D. D. Shukla is not before us as that is not in issue here, but the request sent by Sri Shiv Ratan Singh is in itself a peculiar one. The date of arrest has not been filled in, though it is said that the remand was first and for the period 27-9-1994 to 8-10-1994. The columns in this behalf prescribed in the body have been left unattended to and are blank. The only reason mentioned was that the investigation could not be completed within 24 hours. The Magistrate has accepted it and granted remand almost in a machanical manner for the period applied for. 16. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that such remand could not be applied and the police officer should have proceeded with the procedure prescribed in Section 276, Cr. P. C. cannot be very sound in itself. No law or procedure can contemplate every possibility and no law has been brought to our notice that where a person has been arrested in the matter of one crime, he cannot be detained by the police officer in respect of another crime without prior orders of the court. P. C. cannot be very sound in itself. No law or procedure can contemplate every possibility and no law has been brought to our notice that where a person has been arrested in the matter of one crime, he cannot be detained by the police officer in respect of another crime without prior orders of the court. It may be the ordinary principle of law that whatever is prescribed by law must be done in the prescribed manner but where contingency arises which has not been prescribed by law or proce dure, the procedure adopted by the person concerned would only be weighed on application of desirability and prejudice, it any. Applying those principles, there does not appear any reason to think that this submission of the request for remand by the Inspector of CBCID was wrong in itself though merits thereof have to be seen with reference to other factors. 17. As already said above, this request for remand by the Inspector CBCID was not even properly made what to say of a proper request. Once a person is arrested and remand is desired, the detention is to be authorised by the Magistrate under Section 167, Cr. P. C. Clause (1) of the second proviso to the requirement before application for remand is if it was that the investi gation cannot be completed within a period of 24 hours fixed by Section 57 and there are good grounds for believing that accusation or information is well founded. It is only when both the be factors are available, that the police officer in charge of the police station or police officer making investigation can request for a remand. This request for remand is to be accompanied by the copy of the entry in the diary, which would mean case diary and the accused. IB. In the instant case, the situation obtaining on 27-9-1994 was in the form that nothing about satisfaction or availability of information or its being well founded was mentioned in the request for remand. Not only this, it is very evident from the entries in the case diary of Sri Shiv Ratan Singh annexed as C. A. I. to the affidavit of Shri D. D. Shukla that he was not seized of material papers or that date. Not only this, it is very evident from the entries in the case diary of Sri Shiv Ratan Singh annexed as C. A. I. to the affidavit of Shri D. D. Shukla that he was not seized of material papers or that date. It begins with the narration as usual that earlier entries in the case diary had already been sent to the officer on 23-9-1994. The entries in the case diary are prepared in duplicate, one copy remains in the register, the other being sent to the officer concerned with the investigation. The situation simply shows that the other papers, dated 23-9-1994 which had already been sent to the officer on that date were not available with the Inspector concerned and consequently there could not be any occasion for sending them or- their copies to the Magistrate along with the request for remand. Thus it is evident that the directions contained under Section 167 (1) for transmitting to the nearest Judicial Magistrate of the entries in the diary prescribed relating to the case could not be complied and has, in fact not been complied with. In the absence of these papers authorisation by the Magistrate for detention of the petitioner in the matter of case crime No. 151 of 1994 is nothing more than a mechanical order and in utter disregard to the principles of law and confidence reposed in the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of depriving a citizen of their liberty which is valuable right of every citizen under the Constitution. A police officer could be thought to be ignorant of the valuable right and more concerned with his investigation but the action of the Magistrate in granting remand in this mechanical manner is bound to shake the confidence of the public in the judicial system itself. In any event this will remain an illegality with the detention which cannot be cured. 19. The other evidence of the in act attitude of the Magistrate in the matter of this remand is shown by the subsequent requests for remand and grant thereof. The order, dated 27-9-1994 has sanctioned the remand up to 8-10-1994. For some reason or the other, the petitioner was not produced before the Magistrate on 8 10-1994 and instead a letter, dated 10-10-1994 was sent. The order, dated 27-9-1994 has sanctioned the remand up to 8-10-1994. For some reason or the other, the petitioner was not produced before the Magistrate on 8 10-1994 and instead a letter, dated 10-10-1994 was sent. Naturally the petitioner could not have been before the Magistrate on that date as there is nothing to show that he was summoned by the Magistrate from Jail. Apart from this factor the detention from 2-10-1994 to 10-10-1994 was without any authority the request, dated 10-10-1994 is also insufficient in itself. The reason for the extension of remand in this letter was janch ke sabhi Gawahan tatha Panchan ke kathan evam mal rasayan parikshyan heiu bheja 3ana Shesh Hai. " Sufficiently or otherwise of this ground shall be considered along with the subsequent requests for remand which were in the same form in the request, dated 20-10-1994, 2-11-1994 and 15-11-1994. Is the liberty of a person arrested to be considered so cheap that it shall be curtailed by the luxury of the police officer in not interrogating the witnesses or not sending the material for chemical examination what to say about it, the interrogation of the witnesses of Panchayatnama and that too by the CBCIO while naturally those witnesses must have been interrogated once immediately after inquest if it had taken place, by the local police, was mentioned as a reason. Extending such stereotype requests and extension of remand on these grounds which do not, in fact, justify extension of judicial custody should not be allowed. Detention of a man for more than 24 hours which is the time to complete the investigation should not be permitted as a routine. The Magis trate is supposed to be an independent judicial person. Primarily the arrest is to be made only then there is really some material against the person. Arrest is not a primary requirement for interrogation of investigation and detention in any case is not required till there is some good material. Deten tion only to collect the material evidence is just placing the cart before the horse. It is still worse if it gets a judicial seal. Arrest is not a primary requirement for interrogation of investigation and detention in any case is not required till there is some good material. Deten tion only to collect the material evidence is just placing the cart before the horse. It is still worse if it gets a judicial seal. Once a arrested person is produced before the Magistrate he is supposed to be not only impartial but also alive to his duties enshrined in the Constitution and the Act, to see that the liberty of a person which has been so well respected and reiterated times and again in the Constitution and various judicial decisions is not merely because the arrested person has been produced by the police officer with a so called written request from the Investigating Officer concerned. These requests are required to be in writing and when they are in writing it is expected that the person to whom they are addressed also goes through them and does not leave it to the discretion of another police officer to write an order and sign the same. Where remand is granted for every insufficient reasons and judicial mind is not applied, the detention becomes illegal and unwarranted. We have already mentioned above that in the first request for remand, dated 27-9-1994 even the columns were not properly filled in. It is remarkable that the request was addressed to III A. C. J. M. and was enter tained by the C. J. M. and even that aspect was not cared to be noted. 20. Further more, the request of remand, dated 15-11-1994, has been made by Shri D. D. Shukla, Station Officer. Gosaiganj, and not by Sri Shiv Ratan Singh, Inspector of CB CID who is investigating the case. The remand under Section 167, Cr. P. C. is to be prayed by the officer-in-charge of the police station or police officer making investigation. In the instant case, the investigation had already been handed over to the CBCID and the officer-in-charge of the police station within the territory of which the offence might have been committed loses his domain over it. Apart from this situation, he is not even a police officer making the investigation. In the instant case, the investigation had already been handed over to the CBCID and the officer-in-charge of the police station within the territory of which the offence might have been committed loses his domain over it. Apart from this situation, he is not even a police officer making the investigation. Seeking of remand by him was, therefore, open to all doubts, in the matter of authority and, if that was pot proper, grant of the remand after 15-11-1994 was also against the principles laid down in Section 167, Cr. P. C. 21. In view of the observations, it is clear that the detention of the petitioner in the matter of case crime No. 151 of 1994 P. S. has not been legal from the very beginning of it, that is, when his remand was obtain ed, when he was interrogated in the police lock up and even subsequently neither the remands were obtained in proper time, and even they were obtained on dates after the expiry of few days in illegal detention and also by person who was not authorised by law to obtain the same. His detention having been continued against the principles of law and procedure prescribed by law for detention, has been rendered illegal and is unauthorised. He is, therefore, entitled to the release by way of a writ of habeas corpus. 22. The form of the final relief is to be considered. It may be that his arrest and detention have been rendered illegal and against law and procedure yet it cannot be said that he is unconcerned and may not be required by the law. In fact, no observation at this stage is possible or desirable. Section 167, Cr. P. C. itself has made allowance for such contingency and that appears to be reasonable as well. Clause (2) of Section 167, Cr. P. C. by way of explana tion clarifies that a person may be detained in custody in the event of failure in the matter of remand till he furnishes bail. The liberty, detention and custody are distinct from each other. The detention may be an absolute curb on the liberty as the body is itself held in restraint and custody on the other hand is something less than detention where though the domain remains, the absolute liberty is curtailed but that curtailment is limited, to the appearance on different occasions. The liberty, detention and custody are distinct from each other. The detention may be an absolute curb on the liberty as the body is itself held in restraint and custody on the other hand is something less than detention where though the domain remains, the absolute liberty is curtailed but that curtailment is limited, to the appearance on different occasions. That may not be considered to be detention though, of course, person is still continuing in custody of the court. In the circum stances obtaining in the present case that sort of custody seems to be justified than absolute release which may give rise to various other complications. Therefore, the petitioner should be directed to be released on furnishing personal bond, which, of course, he seems to have earned from the illegality in the matter of his detention in view of Section 167, Cr. P. C. in general and Explanation I in particular. 23. The petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The petitioner shall be released unless wanted in some other case on furnishing personal bond and two sureties in the amount of Rs. 10,000 each before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Faizabad. Petition allowed. .