Judgment : The tenant against whom an order of eviction has been passed by the Rent Controller, Mayiladuthurai in R.C.O.P.No.62 of 1983 and which was confirmed by the appellate authority of Mayiladuthurai on the ground that the tenant has sub-let the premises, has come forward with this revision. 2. The landlord has filed an application for eviction of the tenant on the grounds of wilful default under Sec.l0(2)(i), requirement of the premises for own use and occupation under Sec.10(2)(ii)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 and on the ground of subletting without his consent. As far as the ground of wilful default and requirement of the premises for own use and occupation are concerned, the petition has been dismissed by the Rent Controller and there is no appeal against the said order. On the ground of sub-letting, the petitioner in his petition has stated as follows: “The respondent is not personally residing in the premises. He appears to have permitted some third party to reside in the same. Though the respondent would claim the occupant to be a family member, the said assertion, is not correct.” The respondent in his counter as against this allegation, has contended as follows: The ground that the respondent is not residing there is incorrect. The respondent his brother’s wife and family members are residing there. The respondents children are having school education at Mayiladuthurai Town. The plea as if the respondent has sub-let the premises to third party is incorrect. 3. On the above pleadings, the Rent Controller has held that the petitioner has proved the allegation of sub-letting by the respondent and ordered eviction on that ground. The appeal preferred by the tenant was also dismissed by the appellate authority. It is against this order of dismissal of the appeal, the tenant has come forward with this revision. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent would argue that concurrent findings have been given by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority and therefore the revision itself is not maintainable and in support of his above contention, the learned counsel relies upon the decisions reported in V.S.KChetti Choultry v. Veerasami (1972)1 M.L.J. 184 : A.I.R. 1972 Mad. 303: 85 L.W. 192: 1972 Ren.C.R. 555 and Rajagopala Iyer v. Top In Town Dry Cleaners, (1992)1 M.L.J. 167 . 303: 85 L.W. 192: 1972 Ren.C.R. 555 and Rajagopala Iyer v. Top In Town Dry Cleaners, (1992)1 M.L.J. 167 . According to the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, once the petitioner has established that there was sub-letting by the respondent, it is clear that the orders passed by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority are legal and proper and therefore, there was no jurisdiction to interfere in the revision under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would argue that the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent that the revisional court has no jurisdiction to entertain the civil revision petition if there are concurrent findings, is not a tenable one if the proved facts on record show that there is a miscarriage of justice. According to the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, the power conferred on the High Court under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, may not be as narrow as the Revisional power of the High Court under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it is not wide enough to make the High Court, a second court of first appeal. This contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is what has been observed by the Supreme Court while interpreting the scope and ambit of Sec.25 of the Act in the decision reported in M/s.Sri Rajalakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1253. 5. Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is as follows: “25. Revision: (1) The High Court may, on the application of any person aggrieved by an order of the appellate authority, call for and examine the record of the appellate authority, to satisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, in any case, it appears to the High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass orders accordingly. 2. 2. Every application to the High Court for the exercise of its power under Sub-sec.(l) shall be preferred within one month from the date on which the order or proceeding to which the application relates is communicated to the applicant: Provided that the High Court may, in its discretion, allow further time not exceeding one month for the filing of any such application, if it is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time specified in this sub-section”. Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is as follows: “115. Revision: (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears- .(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or .(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or .(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit.” When we consider Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, it would show that a person aggrieved by an order of appellate authority can file an application to the High Court to satisfy itself as to the correctness of the order passed by the appellate authority. As per Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a revision would lie to the High Court only in cases where there is no provision for an appeal being filed against an order passed by a Subordinate Court. Therefore, there is a vast difference between the powers conferred on the High Court under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the powers conferred on the High Court under Sec.25 of the Act is wider than the powers’ conferred on it under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In cases where the allegations in the application filed under Sec.25 of the Act, are to the effect that in the order passed by the appellate authority, there was a taint of unreasonableness resulting in a miscarriage of justice, the High Court is empowered to exercise its powers conferred under Sec.25 of the Act. In cases where the allegations in the application filed under Sec.25 of the Act, are to the effect that in the order passed by the appellate authority, there was a taint of unreasonableness resulting in a miscarriage of justice, the High Court is empowered to exercise its powers conferred under Sec.25 of the Act. Therefore, it is for us to consider whether there is any unreasonableness in the order passed by the appellate authority which had resulted in the miscarriage of justice and therefore it cannot be stated that where there is a concurrent finding by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority the High Court is not empowered to exercise its revisional powers under Sec.25 of the Act. It has therefore become necessary for us to consider the evidence adduced. .6. The allegation in the petition itself is not very precise as regards the allegation of subletting is concerned since the petitioner has stated that it appears to him that the respondent had sub-let the premises to a third party to reside in the same. From the very wording and use of the words, “it appears” it can be inferred that the petitioner is not sure of his allegation. In the counter, the respondent has categorically stated that his children are having school education at Mayiladuthurai and that himself and his brother’s wife and family members are residing there. P. W.1 the petitioner in his evidence has stated that he does not know whether the children of the respondent and his brother are studying in Mayiladuthurai. It would go to show that the petitioner is not in a position to challenge the version of the respondent in the counter. R.W.I the Respondent would say in his evidence that Kousalya is his brother’s wife, that she is residing with her children with him and his family and the children of both himself and his brother viz., ‘Kousalya’s children are studying in Mayiladuthurai. When the petitioner is unable to say whether the children of the respondent and his brother are studying in Mayiladuthurai, the respondent is specific in stating that they are studying in Mayiladuthurai and Kousalya is his brother’s wife. He would also state that he has got lands in Vanathirayapuram village and he goes to that village which is 8 kilometres from Mayiladuthurai, in the morning, attend the lands in that village and return home during night. He would also state that he has got lands in Vanathirayapuram village and he goes to that village which is 8 kilometres from Mayiladuthurai, in the morning, attend the lands in that village and return home during night. This contention of R.W.1 is not disputed by the petitioner except stating that the respondent is residing at Vanathirayapuram on the basis of the Voters’ list of that place. The voters’ list of Vanathirayapuram is relied by the petitioner for the above purpose. The respondent has filed the Voters’ List of Mayiladuthurai for the same year under Ex.R-1. It is seen from the entries in Ex.P-1 and Ex.R-1 the voters’ lists of Vanathirayapuram as well as Mayiladuthurai that the name of the respondent, his wife, and his brother’s wife are entered in both the Voters’ lists. Therefore, no inference could be drawn on the entries in Ex.P-1 to come to the conclusion that the respondent is residing in Vanathirayapuram after parting with possession of the demised property and a woman by name Kousalya is residing in the petition-mentioned property. Both the voters’ lists being for the same year, we can only infer that the name of all the family members of the respondent have been entered in both the voters’ lists and it will not give room for drawing an inference that the respondent is residing at Vanathirayapuram and has parted possession of the petition-mentioned property in favour of Kousalya and she is residing at Mayiladuthurai. .7. The Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority have come to the conclusion that it is an after-thought of the respondent to contend that his brother’s wife is residing with him in view of the interlineation made in the counter in which the word "brother’s" is written by the respondent between the words "his" and wife". The writing of the word "brother’s" between the two words ‘his’ and ‘wife’ in the counter need not necessarily lead us to the conclusion that it is an after-thought of the respondent to state in the counter that his brother’s wife is residing with him in view of the fact that it is his specific case that the allegation that he is not personally residing there is incorrect. 8. Before proceeding further, it is expedient to consider the actual ingredients of subletting to decide whether there is sub-letting. 8. Before proceeding further, it is expedient to consider the actual ingredients of subletting to decide whether there is sub-letting. As per the decision reported in M/s.Delhi Stationers and Print-ers v. Rajendra Kumar, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1208, subletting means transfer of an exclusive right to enjoy the property in favour of the third party and the said right must be in lieu of payment of some compensation or rent and parting of the legal possession means possession with the right to include and also a right to exclude others and mere occupation is not sufficient to infer either subtenancy or parting with possession. In the present case, there is absolutely no evidence that Kousalya, the alleged tenant pays any rent to the tenant, the respondent herein, and in return she has been permitted to be in the legal possession of the property with right to include and exclude others from the said property. In the decision reported in Rangamannar Chetty v. Rangiah, (1952)1 M.L.J. 652 : A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 182: 65 L.W. 462: 1952 M.W.N. 421, it is held as follows: "There cannot be a sub-letting, unless the lessee parted with legal possession. The mere fact that another is allowed to use the premises while the lessee retains the legal possession is not enough to create a sub-lease. To create a lease or sub-lease a right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the property should be conferred on another." In the decision reported in Dipak Banerjee v. Lilabati Chakraborty, (1987)4 S.C.C. 161 , it has been held that in order to prove tenancy or subtenancy the first ingredient that has to be established is that the alleged sub-tenant is in exclusive possession or a part of the premises and the tenant retains no control over that part of the premises. In the present case, there is neither any pleading nor evidence that the alleged sub-tenant is in exclusive possession and the respondent has no control over the petition-mentioned property. The second ingredient to prove the subtenancy is that the right to occupy the premises must be in lieu of payment of some compensation or rent. As already observed by me, there is no evidence that the alleged subtenant pays any rent to the respondent. The second ingredient to prove the subtenancy is that the right to occupy the premises must be in lieu of payment of some compensation or rent. As already observed by me, there is no evidence that the alleged subtenant pays any rent to the respondent. Therefore, the theory of subtenancy fails when we approach the case on hand in the light of the decision reported in Dipak Banerjee v. Lilabati Chakraborty, (1987)4 S.C.C. 161 also. It has been held in the decision reported in Sree Venkateswara Varukadalai Mills represented by its Partner v. Vijayalakshmi, (1991)2 M.L.J. 156 , as follows: “A tenant can be said to sub-let the demised premises to a third party only when the tenant had permitted the third party to occupy the premises and had divested himself completely of the possession of the premises or part thereof. In other words, there must be transfer of the exclusive right to enjoy the demised premises by the tenant in favour of a third party and the said right must be in lieu of payment of some compensation or rent. If a tenant had permitted a third party to use the premises along with him while the tenant retains legal possession it will not amount to sub-letting. There cannot be subletting unless the lessee parted with legal possession.” When we analyse the evidence on record, in the light of the above decision also, it leads us to the conclusion that the allegation made by the petitioner that the respondent has sublet the premises cannot be said to have been proved by the petitioner. Yet, the Rent Controller and the appellate authority have held that the petitioner has proved the allegation of subtenancy against the respondent and ordered eviction. I am of opinion that the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority is an unreasonable conclusion which has resulted in a miscarriage of justice and therefore, this Court is entitled to exercise its powers under Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and pass an order reversing the order passed by the learned appellate authority. In that view, I am of opinion that the order of the learned appellate authority ordering eviction of the respondent on the ground of subletting is liable to be set aside and the civil revision petition has therefore to be allowed. 9. In that view, I am of opinion that the order of the learned appellate authority ordering eviction of the respondent on the ground of subletting is liable to be set aside and the civil revision petition has therefore to be allowed. 9. In the result, the civil revision petition is allowed setting aside the order of the appellate authority and dismissing the R.C.O.P.No.62 of 1983. No costs.