Judgment G.C.Bharuka, J. 1. The present appeal is directed against the order dated September 22, 1990, passed by the Subordinate Judge I, Bhagalpur, in Miscellaneous Case No. 2 of 1990 by which the award of the arbitrators in question has been made the rule of the court except in relation to grant of interest. 2. The foundational facts are not in controversy. The respondent carried on agency business of Hindustan Lever Ltd. at Bhagalpur. It had insured its stock-in-trade valued up to Rs. 4,15,000 with the appellant insurance company under Insurance Policy No. 31619/4/F/301/87. The period of coverage was October 7, 1987, to October 6, 1988. On December 7, 1987, a fire broke out in the godown of the respondent causing losses. The information regarding fire was sent to the divisional manager of the company at Bhagalpur. The company appointed two surveyors, who after inspection, assessed the damages to the extent of Rs. 2,500 only. But, according to the respondent, the loss caused was to the extent of Rs. 3,45,679.93. Keeping in view the report of the surveyors the appellant company refused to entertain the claim on the ground that it was exaggerated as is evident from its letter dated March 17, 1988 (exhibit A-5). Keeping in view the dispute on quantum of loss as provided under Clause 13 of the policy, the insurer and the insured both appointed their independent arbitrator and the said arbitrators in their turn appointed an umpire. The arbitrators, by their award dated March 15, 1990, assessed the compensation at Rs. 3,45,679.93 with interest thereon with effect from December 7, 1987, till the date of payment at the rate chargeable by the bank. Though the court below by the impugned judgment, has affirmed the quantum of compensation it has modified the award to the extent that the respondent insured is not entitled to any interest till the date of award, i.e., March 15, 1990. But, in the last paragraph of the decree, it has been ordered that the interest at the rate of 16.5% will be payable for the period December 7, 1987, to March 19, 1989, as well. No cross-objection has been filed on behalf of the respondents. 3. But, in the last paragraph of the decree, it has been ordered that the interest at the rate of 16.5% will be payable for the period December 7, 1987, to March 19, 1989, as well. No cross-objection has been filed on behalf of the respondents. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the impugned judgment and decree on two grounds, namely, (i) since the appellant had repudiated its claim under the policy, therefore, the arbitration proceedings, the award and the consequent judgment and decree as impugned are without jurisdiction and are fit to be set aside, and (ii) even otherwise the grant of interest under the decree for the period December 7, 1987, to March 19, 1989, is bad being contrary to the directions contained in the impugned judgment in this regard. 4. Mr. S.C. Ghose, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has in reply submitted that the reference to arbitrators and the consequent proceedings leading to the passing of the impugned judgment and decree were all valid keeping in view the stipulations in the insurance policy read with the provisions of the Arbitration Act. According to him, the dispute being one under the policy, the arbitration clause had become operative. By referring to the document, exhibit A-5, he has further submitted that from a fair reading of this document it becomes quite clear that the dispute raised by the appellant-company was not in relation to its liability as such, but was pertaining to the quantum of damages. He has further submitted that the appellant having once participated in the arbitration proceedings without raising any objection regarding its jurisdiction, the said issue is no more available to them for being raised at any subsequent stage. 5. Learned counsel for both the parties have relied on various decisions in support of their contentions, to which I will be referring hereinafter. 6. Under the insurance policy in question, the risk covered was against fire in respect of the goods referred to in the schedule of the policy. The exclusion clause provided that the said insurance will not cover the first Rs. 2,500 of each and every loss in respect of which the insured was to be indemnified under the policy. Clause 13 is for arbitration, which reads as under : "13. The exclusion clause provided that the said insurance will not cover the first Rs. 2,500 of each and every loss in respect of which the insured was to be indemnified under the policy. Clause 13 is for arbitration, which reads as under : "13. If any difference shall arise as to the quantum to be paid under this policy (liability being otherwise admitted) such difference shall independently of all other questions be referred to the decision of an arbitrator to be appointed in writing by the parties in difference, or if they cannot agree upon a single arbitrator to the decision of two disinterested persons as arbitrators of whom one shall be appointed in writing by each of the parties within two calendar months after having been required so to do in writing by other party in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, as amended from time to time and for the time being in force in case either party shall refuse or fail to appoint arbitrator within two calendar months after receipt of notice in writing requiring an appointment, the other party shall be at liberty to appoint sole arbitrator and in case of disagreement between the arbitrators, the difference shall be referred to the decision of an umpire who shall have been appointed by them in writing before entering on the reference and who shall sit with the arbitrators and preside at their meetings. It is clearly agreed and understood that no difference or dispute shall be referable to arbitration as hereinbefore provided, if the company has disputed or not accepted liability under or in respect of this policy. It is hereby expressly stipulated and declared that it shall be a condition precedent to any right of action or suit upon this policy that the award by such arbitrator, arbitrators or umpire of the amount of loss or damage shall be first obtained." 7. The letter dated March 17, 1988, which has been claimed to be a communication by the appellant to the respondent insured as repudiating the claim, reads as under : "To Dated : 17-3-88.Globe Enterprises, Mandroja Lane, Bhagalpur. Ref. : Fire loss in your godown, vide claim No. 31619/4/ F/4/87 on 7-12-87. The letter dated March 17, 1988, which has been claimed to be a communication by the appellant to the respondent insured as repudiating the claim, reads as under : "To Dated : 17-3-88.Globe Enterprises, Mandroja Lane, Bhagalpur. Ref. : Fire loss in your godown, vide claim No. 31619/4/ F/4/87 on 7-12-87. Dear Sir, With reference to your above claim we have to advise you that the surveyor has observed in his final report that the fire was of a minor nature and loss is within the excess clause of Rs. 2,500 of the policy, and that the insured has lodged an exaggerated claim which they are unable to substantiate. We, therefore, regret that we have no liability under the claim. We are sorry for the inconvenience caused to you. Thanking you. Yours sincerely, for Oriental Insurance Co., (Sd.) Divisional Manager. cc. to State Bank of India, City Branch, Bhagalpur, for information." 8. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant on the issue of jurisdiction of the arbitrators is based on a construction of Clause 13 of the insurance policy and the letter dated March 17, 1988, as quoted above. A reading of the said letter shows that the appellant had tried to disown the liability on the ground that the claim lodged by the respondent was exaggerated. There was no repudiation of liability on their part on the ground that but for the quantum they were not liable to reimburse the respondent for the loss sustained by them. Therefore, the dispute really was one in respect of the quantum of compensation. In respect of the quantum of loss sustained by the respondent, the dispute could have been resolved only by the arbitrators in view of the specific stipulations made in this regard in Clause 13 of the policy. The first and third paragraphs of the arbitration clause make it mandatory that the dispute regarding the amount of loss or damage has to be necessarily resolved by the arbitrators in the first instance. 9. The reliance placed by the appellant on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vulcan Insurance Co. Ltd. V/s. Manaraj Singh, AIR 1987 SC 287 , is wholly misplaced. 9. The reliance placed by the appellant on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vulcan Insurance Co. Ltd. V/s. Manaraj Singh, AIR 1987 SC 287 , is wholly misplaced. In paragraph 11 of the judgment, their Lordships have clearly noticed that in that case the insurance corporation had repudiated the claim altogether and the said repudiation was not based on any dispute as to quantum of loss or damage suffered. Their Lordships have clearly held that if the rejection of the claim made by the insured be on the ground that he had suffered no loss as a result of the fire or the amount of loss was not to the extent claimed by him, then the difference would be in respect of the amount of loss or damage within the meaning of the arbitration clause. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the arbitrators were well within their jurisdiction in. pronouncing the award. The objection relating to jurisdiction as raised by the appellant thus fails. 10. In the facts of the present case, the appellant is even otherwise estopped from raising the objection regarding jurisdiction of the arbitrators. It is because not only had they readily appointed their arbitrator in terms of Clause 13 of the policy but they had also all through actively participated in the arbitration proceedings without raising any objection regarding the validity thereof at any stage till the making of the award. The present one is not a case where the proceedings before the arbitrator suffered from the vice of any inherent lack of jurisdiction. The decisions in the case of Jagannath Kapoor V/s. Premier Credit and Instalment Corporation (P.) Ltd., AIR 1973 All 49 and in the case of Dilip Construction Co. V/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd., AIR 1973 MP 261 , relied on by learned counsel for the appellant is of no avail to him because in these two decisions the proposition laid down is that an objection relating to inherent lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage and such a defect cannot be cured by waiver or acquiescence. 11. So far as the second objection relating to payment of interest for the period December 7, 1987, to March 19, 1989, is concerned, even Mr. 11. So far as the second objection relating to payment of interest for the period December 7, 1987, to March 19, 1989, is concerned, even Mr. S.C. Ghose, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, agreed that it is a mistake apparent on the face of the record and the decree needs to be rectified to this extent. In this view of the matter, it is held that the appellant will not be entitled to any interest for the aforesaid period and the decree will be rectified to that extent. 12. For the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed in part. In the circumstances of the present case, I direct that the parties will bear their own costs throughout.