Honble SINGHAL, J. – The present writ petition has been filed by the followers of Ram Snehi Charitable Trust who are aggrieved by the action of the trustees in disposing of the trust property. (2). It is stated that Ramdwara is a religious place where all types of religious activities are undertaken. In the reply submitted this fact has not been denied by the respondent No.7 Ghanshyam Das Sindhi and respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 have admitted that the said place is used for religious discourse of Ram Snehi Trust. (3). It is submitted and a prayer is made that the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 should ensure the demolition of the construction of the property and it should not be considered to be a case of deemed sanction. The property in question was sold on 27th March 1989 by a registered sale-deed for a sum of Rs. Six lacs. On the basis of this fact it is submitted that the trust has no power to dispose of the property. It is submitted that the religious placed of worship cannot be sold. It is submitted that para 415 of Principles of Hindu Law by Mulla is as under :– ``Alienation of debutter property :– (1) As a general rule of Hindu law, property given for the maintenance of religious worship, and of charities connected with it, is inalienable. It is competent however, for the shebait or mohunt in charge of the property, in his capacity of shebait or mohunt as manager of the property, to incur debts and borrow money on a mortgage of the property for the purpose of keeping up the religious worship, and for the benefit and preservation of the property. The power, however, to incur debts must be measu- red by an existing necessity for incurring them. (2) The power of a shebait or a mohunt to alienate debutter property is analogous to that of a manager for an infant heir as defined by the Judicial Committee in Hunooman Persaud vs. Mussamat Babooee (1856) 6 MLA 393. As held in that case he has no power to alienate debutter property except `in a case of need or for the benefit of the estate. He is not entitled to sell the property for the purpose of investing the price of it so as to bring in an income larger than derived from the property itself. As held in that case he has no power to alienate debutter property except `in a case of need or for the benefit of the estate. He is not entitled to sell the property for the purpose of investing the price of it so as to bring in an income larger than derived from the property itself. Nor can he, except for legal necessity, grant a permanent lease of debutter property, though he may create proper derivative tenures and estates conformable to usage. Where, however, a grant of a permanent lease has been affirmed by judgment of the Court, the judgment will operate as resjudicata and the succeeding shebait or mohunt will be bound by it. (4). Attention has also been drawn to the provisions of Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 wherein previous sanction is required to be obtained for transfer u/s 31. The provisions of Sec. 31 are as under :– ``Previous sanction to be obtained for certain transfers : (1) Subject to the directions in the instrument of trust or any direction given under this Act or any other law by any court – (a) no sale, exchange or gift of any immovable property or of movable property exeeding five thousand rupees in value, and (b) no lease, for a period exceeding five years in the case of agricultural land or for a period exceeding three years in the case of non-agricultural land or a building, belonging to a public trust shall be valid without the previous sanction of the Assistant Commissioner, (2) An application for the sanction of the Assistant Commissioner under sub-section (1) shall be made in the prescribed manner and form. (3) Where, on an application duly made for sanction in respect of any transaction specified in sub-section (1), the Assistant Commissioner does not, within two months of the receipt thereof, pass final orders, it shall be presumed that he has accorded sanction in respect of that transaction; provided that the application described the transaction with sufficientaccuracy. (4) The Assistant Commissioner shall not refuse to accord sanction in respect of any transaction specified. In sub-section (1) unless such transaction is, in his opinion, likely to be prejudicial to the interests of the public trust, and no order refusing to accord sanction shall be passed unless the working trustee of such public trust has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (5). In sub-section (1) unless such transaction is, in his opinion, likely to be prejudicial to the interests of the public trust, and no order refusing to accord sanction shall be passed unless the working trustee of such public trust has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (5). It is submitted that the property cannot be sold at all and in the present case it has been sold at through away price and the funds are mis-used. (6). The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 7 is that the petitioner has no locus standi and that the sale has already been finalised and a registered sale-deed has been executed. There was a deemed sanction and, therefore, the compliance have been carried in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 31. The writ petition has been filed after great delay and there is material change in circumstances and as such the writ petition should be dismissed on the preliminary grounds. (7). Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioners are the followers and, therefore, they have locus standi. It is submitted that in accorda- nce with the provisions of Sec. 31 an application for sanction was to be submitted to the Assistant Commissioner and sub-section (3) of Sec. 31 has contemplated that in the said application the transaction has to be specified. The Patna High Court in the case of Channoo Mahto and Ors. vs. Jang Bahadur Singh & Ors. (1), has held as under :– ``A `transaction is the doing or performing of any business; management of any affair; performance; that which is done; an affair, A `transaction is something already done and completed; a `proceeding is either something which is now going on; or, if ended, is still contemplated with reference to its progress of successive stages. A `transaction, in the ordinary sense of the word, is some business or dealing which is carried on, or transacted between two or more persons. A `transaction, as the derivation denotes, is something which has been concluded between persons by a cross or reciprocal action as it were ; see Gujja Lal vs. Fatteh Lal. ILR 6 Val. 171 (FB) (F) In this case, Garth, C.J., further added, `If the parties to a suit were to adjust their differences inter se the adjustment would be a `transaction. (8). ILR 6 Val. 171 (FB) (F) In this case, Garth, C.J., further added, `If the parties to a suit were to adjust their differences inter se the adjustment would be a `transaction. (8). Reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of P.K. Subramania Iyer vs. Commissioner of Gift Tax, Kerala (2), where the meaning of `Transaction has been given as under :– ``A `transaction, in the ordinary sense of the word said Garth CJ in Gujju Lall vs. Futeh Lal 1881 ILR 6 Cal. 171, is some business or dealing which is carried on or transacted between two or more persons. To the same effect was the definition given by Jackson J. in the said decision: A transaction, as the derivation denotes, is something which has been concluded between persons by a cross of reciprocal action as it were. Section 4(f) of the Australian Gift Duty Assessment Act 1941-42, provides that the expression`disposition of property includes`any transa- ction entered into by any person with intent thereby to diminish, directly or indirectly the value of his own property and to increase the value of the property of any other person. (9). On the basis of the above interpretation of the word `transaction it is submitted that since the transaction was not specified in the application submitted there was no application in the eye of law and, therefore, the transfer is not valid. Sub- section (1) of Section 31 also contemplates that no sale shall be valid without previous sanction of the Assistant Commissioner. Sub-section (3) has raised only a presumption that if Assistant Commissioner does not within two months of the receipt of the application pass final order, then it shall be presumed that he has accorded sanction in respect of that transaction. Therefore, the presumption which has been raised u/ss. (3) of Sec. 31 is not similar as exist in the JDA Act etc. where a different phrase has been used. The decision of Nagpur High Court in the case of Chandrabhan Chunnilal Gour vs. Dr. Shrawan Kumar Khunnolal Gour and Anr. (3), has also been relied upon wherein the word `Void and `not being valid were inter- preted and it was held that there is no real difference between a transfer being void or not being valid. (10). The decision of Nagpur High Court in the case of Chandrabhan Chunnilal Gour vs. Dr. Shrawan Kumar Khunnolal Gour and Anr. (3), has also been relied upon wherein the word `Void and `not being valid were inter- preted and it was held that there is no real difference between a transfer being void or not being valid. (10). In respect of delay it is submitted that when demolition work was started in January 1994, the petitioner approached the site but initially the identity of the persons who were demolishing the property has not been disclosed and subsequently, it was stated that the building is being constructed for sale and the fact of sale having been effected in favour of respondent No.7 was not disclosed. The sale which was effected in 1989 could not be known to the petitioners. Learned counsel for the respondents has also submitted that the sale which is registered under the Registration Act in accordance with the provisions contained u/s 17 and the title is in favour of the person in whose favour the registration has been done u/s 47 and this court cannot interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the registered sale-deed. In respect of delay the decision of Apex Court in the case of Hari Singh vs. State of U.P.(4), has been relied upon. (11). Learned counsel for the petitioner has also stated that a representation was submitted to the Assistant Commissioner and to other dignitories, but no action has been taken so far. It is submitted that the remedy of appeal u/s 38 or reference u/s 40 could not have been available in view of the statement given by the State Government in the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly and it would have been only an empty formality. (12). I have considered over the matter. It was observed by the Apex Court in the case of R. Venugopala Naidu and Ors. vs. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities and Ors. (5) held as under : ``This court in Chenchu Ram Reddy vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh 1986 (3) SCC 391 AIR 1986 SC 1158 , has held that the property of religious and charitable endowments or institutions must be jealously protected because large segment of the community has beneficial interest therein. vs. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities and Ors. (5) held as under : ``This court in Chenchu Ram Reddy vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh 1986 (3) SCC 391 AIR 1986 SC 1158 , has held that the property of religious and charitable endowments or institutions must be jealously protected because large segment of the community has beneficial interest therein. Sale by private negotiations which is not visible to the public eye and may even give rise to public suspicion should not, therefore, be permitted unless there are special reasons to justify the same. It has further been held that care must be taken to fix the reserve price after ascertaining the market value for safeguarding the interest of the endowment. This judgment was given by the Apex Court in the proceedings arisen out of a suit u/s 92 of the CPC. (13). The provisions of Sec. 44 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 have excluded the application of the provisions of Sec. 92 and 93 of CPC because power has been given for moving an application u/s 38 for appropriate directions. If the application is submitted to the Assistant Commissioner, then he has to give the dire- ctions and he may also make an application to the Court. Sec. 45 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act has given the power to the Assistant Commissioner to make an enquiry and forward the case for enquiry and report to any officer not below the rank of Asstt. Commissioner or such other officer as may be authorised by the State Government in that behalf. Sec. 49 has given powers to the Assistant Commissioner on perusal of the committee report u/s 44 or on inspection made u/s 48 for calling the explanation of the working trustee in respect of any material defect. Against the decision of the Asstt. Commissioner, application u/s 50 can be moved to the court. In the present case, the application is alleged to have been submitted on 3.9.1987. It is stated by the Assistant Commissioner that the application submitted by Ram Niwas Garg was returned on 19th August 1987 to apply in the prescribed form. From the reading of the register it is found that the said application was received on 9.9.1987 and is entered at Sr. No. 2650 by the receipt clerk and thereafter it was delivered to the dealing clerk and his signatures were received. (14). From the reading of the register it is found that the said application was received on 9.9.1987 and is entered at Sr. No. 2650 by the receipt clerk and thereafter it was delivered to the dealing clerk and his signatures were received. (14). From the reply submitted, it has also been stated that an enquiry has been instituted in this regard. It is a very sorry state of affairs that still an enquiry is going on after a lapse of such a long time. The dealing clerk has given his signatures for having received the pro-forma. The action should have been taken immediately when the representation was submitted by the petitioner. It may be that the dealing clerk or may be the officer concerned, or other persons who are involved in such type of fraud. It has become a practice in the government departments that after the paper is received, it is taken out with ulterior motive and no action is taken thereon. A copy of this order be sent to the Commissioner, Devasthan for taking immediate disciplinary action and file a criminal complaint for the removal of the said application from record. The compliance report should be sent to this court within three months. (15). So far as the question of locus standi is concerned, since the petitioners are the followers of Ram Snehi Charitable Trust which is proved from the documents on record, I am satisfied that they have locus standi to file this writ petition. (16). The delay of about 4 years after the execution of the sale- deed will also not come in their way since it has not been proved that such a sale was in their knowledge. The demolition of the building was started in January 1994 and the fact did not come to their knowledge at any earlier time and as such it cannot be said that there is any delay on their part. (17). The contention that there was a deemed permission and constructions have been made thereon in accordance with such deemed permission, I am of the view that the application u/s 31 could have been moved in respect of any `transaction which is required to be satisfied in the application itself. The word `transaction has been discussed above in the two authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The word `transaction has been discussed above in the two authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. `Transaction refers to a particular set of facts which are in existence or had been in existence and not for future acts. If the complete details are not given the result would be non-compliance of the provisions of Act. An attention was drawn towards form No. 9 of Rule 25 and the said form has contemplated that only sale, exchange, gift or lease to be disclosed. It has not contemplated the agreement for sale or any proposed future sale to be disclosed. The actual amount in case of sale or the estimated amount in case of transfer has to be mentioned in its column No.7. This form has contemplated that the trust was supposed to disclose the actual sale value. Since the application in form No. 9 was submitted in September 1987 whereas the agreement for sale was executed on 29.12.1988, the details of the said agreement has not been shown and, therefore, there was no disclosure in the application itself. Under Chapter XXC of the Income Tax Act the agreement of sale has to be approved before the sale is effected. The requirement of application under sub-section (2) of Sec. 31 is that the correct facts should be stated on which the Assistant Commissioner has to apply his mind and pass the order thereon. The provisions of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 31 says that the Assistant Commissioner shall not refuse the accord sanction in respect of any transaction specified. In sub-section (1) unless such transaction is, in his opinion likely to be prejudicial to the interest of public trust and no order refusing to accord sanction should be passed unless a reasonable opportunity of being heard is given. This makes it clear that the appli- cation of mind by the Assistant Commissioner has to be there and transaction should not be prejudicial to the interest of public trust. If the value of sale or the details of purchaser is not given, then how the mind can be applied. Similarly, there may be an instance where the trust may sale a part of its pr45operty to a different sect having no faith in the sect of seller the result would be a communal riot. If the value of sale or the details of purchaser is not given, then how the mind can be applied. Similarly, there may be an instance where the trust may sale a part of its pr45operty to a different sect having no faith in the sect of seller the result would be a communal riot. There may be certain such type of other contingencies which have to be taken into consideration by the Assistant Commissioner for refusal to grant sanction. The interest of the public trust, therefore, has to be seen in the larger interest of the trust and public. (18). The provisions of Sec. 31(3) contemplates that where an application duly made for sanction in respect of transaction specified u/ss (1) of Sec. 31 the Assistant Commissioner shall within two months of the receipt of the application pass final order and if he fails to do so, it shall be presumed that he has accorded sanction in respect of that transaction provided that the application describes the transaction with sufficient accuracy. An allegation has been made that the Assistant Commissioner was in collusion with the respondents in the transaction. The allegation may be correct or may be incorrect for which no finding is being given by me but such type of allegations are bound to come if the application is not decided timely. The proper course for the Assistant Commissioner was to issue a notice to the trustee and public submitting the application for sanction and pass the appropriate order either according the sanction or refuse the sanction and give the reasons thereof. In the present case when the application itself is not on record, nothing can be said. It is however, observed that the Commissioner shall issue appropriate instructions to the Assistant Commissioners to dispose of the application within the time speci- fied and if the application is not disposed of by the Assistant Commissioner they shall be liable for the disciplinary proceedings for not taking steps within time. It is further directed that a register of all the applications received shall be maintained by the Assistant Commissioner and it will be the duty of the Commissioner to see the due compliance and to take action against the defaulting officers. (19). It is further directed that a register of all the applications received shall be maintained by the Assistant Commissioner and it will be the duty of the Commissioner to see the due compliance and to take action against the defaulting officers. (19). The provisions that the transaction has to be described with sufficient accuracy is lacking in the present case because the transaction itself was entered into subsequent to the alleged filing of the application and, therefore, no help of the provisions of Sec. 31 (3) can be availed. It may also be observed that the observations made in the case of R. Venugopala Naidu and Ors. vs. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities & Ors. (supra), properties of religious or charitable endowments or institutions must be alonely protected because large segment of the community has beneficial interest therein. Sale by private negotiations which is not visible to the public eye and may even give rise to public suspicion should not, therefore, be permitted unless there are special reasons to justify the same. The properties of the public trust should be sold by public auction and sufficient advertisement in the news paper should be given in respect thereof. The allegations under hand dealing is always raised in a private negotiation which may or may not be correct. (20). The contention that the religious property cannot be sold at all has to be examined from the provisions of trust deed itself. If the trust-deed as the provision authorising effect of sale then that has to be considered in the light of the resolution dated 31.1.1987 and 2.2.88 and 14.2.89. Even if the trust- deed is authorising sale still the question arises that whether any other purchaser was not available or a public notice was given for the sale of the trust property. No such notice was given for the sale of the trust property by the trust and, therefore, the allegation of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the sale has been effected at through-away price has substance. (21). The preliminary objections, therefore, having no force are dismissed. On merit also the observations have been made above, and, therefore, it is directed that there was no proper application submitted in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 31 and, therefore it cannot be considered as deemed sanction. (21). The preliminary objections, therefore, having no force are dismissed. On merit also the observations have been made above, and, therefore, it is directed that there was no proper application submitted in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 31 and, therefore it cannot be considered as deemed sanction. The copy of the application which has been submitted by the petitioner shall be considered to be an application u/s 38 of the Act. The Assistant Commissioner has failed to complete the said enquiry and, therefore, the said application shall be referred to the District Court within 15 days in accordance with the provision of Sec. 40. The stay which has been granted shall continue for 30 days from today. The petitioner would be entitled to move the proper application to the court in the proceedings u/s 40 which shall be entitled to pass the proper order with regard to further construction of the building. (22). The writ petition is accordingly allowed with the observations made above.