Judgment : This revision is canvassed challenging the judgment and decree of the Principal District Judge, Erode, made in C.M.A.No.64 of 1992, dated 19. 1993, whereby granting injunction in favour of the respondents herein and restraining the revision petitioner from taking delivery of possession of the suit property, which was rejected by the learned First Additional District Munsif in I.A.No.1584 of 1992. 2. The revision petitioner is the auction purchaser of the suit property, furnished with the sale certificate issued by the executing court, namely, the Principal District Munsif Court of Erode as the suit property was purchased by her in the court auction held on 21. 1992. The suit property was the mortgaged hypotheca given by the first defendant in the suit, being the father of the plaintiffs, who are the respondents herein, and the other two sons, in the year 1974, by executing a simple mortgagee. However, which resulted in filing the suit by the mortgage passing a decree on contest, followed by the preliminary and final decree and then the suit property was brought to court auction sale and after completing all the formalities, it was sold out in the court auction and purchased by the revision petitioner herein as aforementioned. In the meanwhile, a partition suit was filed by the plaintiffs in the year 1981 with regard to the suit property and though it was dismissed before the trial court, it was decreed in appeal in A.S.No.5 of 1988. It was stated that l/4th share of the plaintiffs was declared in the appeal. However, it appears that further proceedings have not been taken in the said appeal. When the court auction purchaser, the revision petitioner herein, after getting the sale certificate in her favour was about to take delivery of possession through legal process anticipating the same, the present suit has been filed for the relief of declaring that the court auction sale held in favour of the revision petitioner dated 21. 1992 is not valid, null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs. In the suit, the auction purchaser was the second defendant. The said suit was filed by the two sons of the first defendant, who was the mortgagor in the first suit, It is stated that the first defendant has to more sons and it appears that they have not joined the litigation but however, two sons alone have filed the suit. The said suit was filed by the two sons of the first defendant, who was the mortgagor in the first suit, It is stated that the first defendant has to more sons and it appears that they have not joined the litigation but however, two sons alone have filed the suit. In the said suit, I.A.No.1584 of 1992 was filed by the two sons of the judgment debtor, praying for the issuance of temporary injunction restraining the revision petitioner/ respondent not to take delivery of the possession of the suit property either by legal process or otherwise. After contest, the trial court dismissed the said petition on merits and thereby declined to grant the interim order of injunction. Against which, an appeal was preferred and in the appeal, the learned Principal District Judge, Erode, set aside the order of the learned trial Judge but however, granted interim injunction till the disposal of the suit. This lower appellate court’s finding is being canvassed in this revision as aforementioned. 3. I have heard the Bar for the respective parties herein and perused the fair order passed by the learned lower appellate authority. At the outset in this context, I may observe that the impugned order passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Erode, cannot be allowed to sustain for the simple reason that if the court auction sale held on 22.1,1992, in which the revision petitioner has become the successful bidder, is tainted with fraud or undue influence or liable to be set aside on any ground, the law provides a remedy for not only the respondents, who are the plaintiffs, but also for third parties, under O.21, Rules 89 and Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It appears that the court auction sale in the instant case was held on 21. 1992 after observing all the procedural formalities. Clearly, after a lapse of six months almost, the present suit by the two sons of the judgment-debtor, namely, the mortgagor has been filed and entertained by the trial court, in which, an application seeking injunction has also been filed and the trial court after contest, declined to grant any relief as asked for. Clearly, after a lapse of six months almost, the present suit by the two sons of the judgment-debtor, namely, the mortgagor has been filed and entertained by the trial court, in which, an application seeking injunction has also been filed and the trial court after contest, declined to grant any relief as asked for. It was not the finding of the lower applleate court that the, mortgage deed created by the first defendant, namely, the father of the present plaintiff’s and two more sons, are binding or not following the mortgage decree passed by a court of law in favour of the mortgagee, who brought the mortgaged hypotheca for sale in discharge of the mortgage decree. The questions to be decided according to the lower appellate authority is whether the plaintiffs have got any quantum of share or not in the suit property, if so, to what quantum of share. Of course, it was strange to see that the observation made by the lower appellate authority in this regard, is not a matter directly involved for a decision in the present suit, which is pending trial. The crux of the matter to be decided in the trial court is whether the court auction sale held on 21. 1992 in which the revision petitioner became the successful bidder and the sale thus held is vitiated or invalid for any reason set out above, If) this being the position, I am at every difficulty to understand and follow the rationale thesis which has been adhered to by the lower appellate authority. When the trial court found no prima facie case in favour of the applicant under O.39, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has rightly rejected it. But if the said order is found incorrect, then the lower appellate authority is certainly entitled to grant injunction, otherwise, to dismiss the appeal. When the trial court found no prima facie case in favour of the applicant under O.39, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has rightly rejected it. But if the said order is found incorrect, then the lower appellate authority is certainly entitled to grant injunction, otherwise, to dismiss the appeal. But instead, it is noticed that the lower appellate court has passed an observation probably thinking that this proceedings comes under the purview of O.21, Rule 89 or 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that therefore, suo motu usurping the power, irrespective of the prayer asked for and agitated for and on behalf of the respective parties and wrongly given an option to the respondents to deposit the entire decretal amount and accordingly, granted interim injunction for the simple reasoning that the suit property was found in the possession of the respondents. In this regard, I find every difficulty to countenance the observation of the lower appellate authority, which is clearly not on par with the law and erroneous, in my respectful view. It is also seen at this stage that the lower appellate authority did not even whisper a single word about the legal credence to be attached to the sale certificate and the entire consideration paid by the court auction purchaser, who is totally a third party to the present ‘lis’. Viewed in this angle, with great constraint, I have necessarily to hold that the conclusion and finding of the lower appellate authority is clearly vulnerable and cannot be sustained for the reason of want of propriety and legality and being erroneous in nature. The approach adopted by the lower appellate authority is not correct and not at all germane to the factual aspects involved in the instant case. Therefore, it is liable to be set aside. 4. However, in the context of a share stated to have been quantified in A.S.No.5 of 1988, in which, both the plaintiffs are parties and in the context that the matter has not been pursued further, whether the doctrine of pious obligation comes into the facts of the instant case or whether the debts contracted by the first defendant, namely, the father of the present plaintiffs are all binding in nature or not are all the relevant questions among others to be gone into and adjudicated during the trial. It was represented by the Bar that the written statement has already been filed but however issues are yet to be framed. Under these circumstances, I feel that the ends of justice would be met properly if I remand the whole matter to the trial court after setting aside the fair and final order passed by the learned lower appellate authority to consider the matter afresh along with trial of the suit, which is to be taken immediately by framing necessary issues, if not already framed, and to dispose of the trial of the suit itself in accordance with law within a period of eight weeks from today. The application as well as the suit shall be disposed of altogether and simultaneously and both parties are hereby permitted to adduce their oral and documentary evidence in full and vindicate their cases before the trial court, for which, the Bar for both parties have assured to cooperate with the trial court in disposing the suit and the application within that period without getting any adjournment. None of my observations made above, would influence the mind of the trial Judge in disposing the suit and the application, after full trial afresh. 5. Thus, in the result, the revision succeeds and the order passed by the Principal District Judge, Erode in C.M.A.No.64 of 1992 is set aside and the whole matter is remanded to the trial court to be disposed of afresh along with the trial of the suit and the trial court is directed to frame the issues immediately in the suit and dispose the same in accordance with law within a period of 8 weeks from today after giving full opportunity to both parties. There will be no order as to costs under the circumstances.