Judgment :- Arunachalam, J. Petitioner Venkateswari has preferred this habeas corpus petition pleading for setting her and her two children Balaji and Yazhini at liberty forthwith, after quashing the order passed by the first respondent under Sec. 3 of the Foreigners Act dated 17. 1993 directing them to reside in the Special Camp at Chengalpattu. She has further prayed for award of a compensation of Rs. 1 lakh for illegal detention of herself and her two children. 2. After this habeas corpus petition was entertained oft 29. 1994, notice was ordered to the respondents. On the request of learned Additional Public Prosecutor, time was afforded to the respondents to file their counter statements. No counter statements have been filed, but Mr.I. Subramaniam, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has advanced arguments on the basis of the original records placed before us by him. .3. In the affidavit sworn to by the petitioner in support of her prayer, she has stated that she is an Indian citizen born of Indian parents, Subramanian and Chinnammal. She underwent education in Kottur and completed Plus Two from the Government Higher Secondary School, Kottur Malaiandipattanam, Pollachi Taluk, in 1981. She married Nithyanandan, a Sri Lankan refugee in 1988. By an order dated 27. 1991, her husband was detained in the Special Camp at Madurai by orders passed by the first respondent in exercise of his powers under Sec. 3 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. Petitioner made are presentation to the State Government for his release. Though her request for the release of her husband was rejected, the State Government permitted her and her two children to stay along with her husband in the Special Camp at Madurai, through an order dated 27. 1992. While she was at Special Camp Madurai, she was permitted to go out of the camp, whenever she desired and in fact, she had the facility of going for work, every morning and returning on the same evening. In other words, she would have it, that there were no restrictions placed on her movements. Petitioner has further stated in her affidavit that subsequently, her husband was transferred to the Special Camp at Chengalpattu. In other words, she would have it, that there were no restrictions placed on her movements. Petitioner has further stated in her affidavit that subsequently, her husband was transferred to the Special Camp at Chengalpattu. At the Special Camp, Chengalpattu, restrictions were placed on her movements, even though no order of detention or compulsory residence at the Camp was passed against her other than the permission to stay with her husband, while so, to her shock and surprise, she became aware, that the first respondent had passed an order against her in purported exercise of his powers under Sec. 3 of the Foreigner’s Act. Through the said order, she was required to reside in the Chingleput Camp. According to her, the camp is in fact a jail and she was put behind the bars most of the time. Her correspondence was censored, affecting her right to privacy. Visitors were also restricted. In spite of her representations respondents had failed to revoke the aforestated order, although she is an Indian citizen and her children as well are Indian citizens. It has also been stated in the affidavit that her children aged about 4 years and 5 years cannot constitute any major threat to national security or the public order, which could have impelled the respondents to invoke their extraordinary powers under the Act. Not having any alternate or effective remedy, petitioner has chosen to invoke, our powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. When we took up this habeas corpus petition for hearing yesterday (211. 1994), it was represented by Mr.I. Subramaniam, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, that the petitioner and her two children, who were inmates of Special Camp, Chengalpattu, were permitted by the Government to leave the Special Camp by issue of suitable orders, and in pursuance thereof, they had left the Special Camp at Chengalpattu of 210. 1994. He further stated that this action of permitting the petitioner and her two children to leave the Special Camp, Chengalpattu, was in pursuance of the instant habeas corpus petition preferred by the petitioner, seeking relief from this Court. A communication dated 11. 1994 addressed to the Public Prosecutor of this Court by R. Balakrishnan, Secretary to Government informing these details was placed for our scrutiny. .5. A communication dated 11. 1994 addressed to the Public Prosecutor of this Court by R. Balakrishnan, Secretary to Government informing these details was placed for our scrutiny. .5. In the course of his submissions learned Additional Public Prosecutor stated, that Nithyanandan, husband of the petitioner, a Sri Lankan Citizen, is concerned in Crime No. 1441/88 on the file of Anna Nagar Police Station, Madurai, registered for offences punishable under Secs. 120-B, 452, 342 and 397, I.P.C. apart from offences punishable under the Arms Act and Explosive Substances Act. It appears that Nithyanandan is involved in a bank robbery case, which had occurred at Madurai. To restrict the movements of Nithyanandan in India, an order under the Foreigners Act was passed by the State Government and he was directed to reside at the Special Camp, Madurai. While Nithyanandan was an inmate at Special Camp, Madurai, petitioner sent in a representation to the State Government, averring therein, that she had none to support her children and herself and hence release of Nithyanandan could be considered by the State Government or in the alternative she and her children may be permitted to stay along with her husband in the Special Camp, Madurai. The State Government, while turning down the request of the petitioner to release her husband from the clutches of the order passed under the Foreigners Act, permitted her through an order dated 27. 1992 to join her husband along with her children in the Special Camp, Madurai. It was also brought to our notice by the Additional Public Prosecutor that the Government had then requested the District Collector, Madurai, to make suitable arrangements for the stay of the petitioner in the Special Camp. He was further requested to regulate her movements in and outside the Special Gamp for her gainful employment outside. In pursuance of this order, petitioner and her children joined Nithyanandan in the Special Camp, Madurai, on and from 28. 1992. 6. While so, the State Government decided to shift Nithyanandan from the Special Camp, Madurai, to the Special Camp at Chengalpattu. Such transfer was made through an order dated 17. 1993. In pursuance of this order, petitioner and her children joined Nithyanandan in the Special Camp, Madurai, on and from 28. 1992. 6. While so, the State Government decided to shift Nithyanandan from the Special Camp, Madurai, to the Special Camp at Chengalpattu. Such transfer was made through an order dated 17. 1993. However, on the same day, the State Government chose to pass an order under Sec. 3(2)(e) of the Foreigners Act for regulating the continued presence of Venkateswari (petitioner), a foreigner, and directed her residence along with her children at Special Camp at Chengalpattu for Sri Lankan Immigrants/refugees identified and located by the District Collector of Chengai M.G.R.District. The order further reads, that the said Sri Lankan Tamil N. Venkateswari, wife of Nithyanandan, together with her two children shall not leave the boundaries of the Special Camp at Chengalpattu for Sri Lankan Immigrants/refugees identified and located by the District Collector, except with the permission of the Collector. It was fairly stated by Mr.I. Subramaniam that in effect an order under Sec. 3(2)(e) of Foreigners Act had been passed against the petitioner, though it could not have been done, since petitioner Venkateswari is an Indian citizen and, will not fall within the definition of a foreigner under the Act. Mr.I. Subramaniam strenuously contended, that a bona fide mistake had been committed by the State Government, in passing the impugned order under Sec. 3 (2)(e) of the Foreigners Act and such mistake could not be projected as though an illegality had been committed, to claim a compensation. He further submitted that when the State Government became aware of that illegality through service of papers in the instant habeas corpus petition, it had chosen to revoke the order passed against the petitioner and that was one more step taken by the Government to portray its bona fides. 7. Since the communication placed before us dated 11. 1994, addressed to the learned Public Prosecutor, by R. Balakrishnan, Secretary to Government, did not indicate that the impugned order had been revoked, but it had only chosen to state that Venkateswari had been permitted to leave the Special Camp with her two children, we wanted proof of the order passed against the petitioner under the Foreigners Act having been revoked. A telephonic message addressed to the Tahsildar, Chengalpattu, by the Collector in RC 125487/93/D-7, dated 210. A telephonic message addressed to the Tahsildar, Chengalpattu, by the Collector in RC 125487/93/D-7, dated 210. 1994, has been placed before us, which reads as hereunder: “Tmt.Venkateswari, W/o.Nithyanandan (Sri Lankan Tamil) is at present lodged in the Special Camp at Chengalpattu with her two children Balaji and Yazhini. Orders issued under Foreigners Act, 1946 are revoked. Please therefore permit Tmt. Venkateswari to leave the Special Camp at Chengalpattu with her two children forthwith. A report as to the action taken by you may be sent to Collector, Kancheepuram. Report compliance by 7 p.m. on 210. 1994.” This telephonic message placed before us contains an endorsement, which reads as hereunder. “Released at 9.30 a.m. on 210. 1994.” 8. While the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that there is no scope whatever for issue of a habeas in view of the release of the petitioner and her two children on 210. 1994, from the Special Camp, Chengalpattu, Mr.P.V.S. Giridhar, learned counsel representing the petitioner, submitted that the detention of the petitioner and her two children, in pursuance of an order passed under the Foreigners Act, was admittedly illegal and hence the petitioner will be justified in pressing her claim for compensation, which forms an integral part of this habeas corpus petition. He also pointed out that this habeas corpus petition could not be brought before this Court sufficiently early for disposal, since A. Sivaraj, Deputy Tahsildar, Special Camp, Chengalpattu, refused to attest the vakalat signed by the petitioner, though he had attested on the last page of the affidavit sworn to by Venkateswari on 30.6.1994. Petitioner’s counsel received a telegram from Venkateswari stating that the Deputy Tahsildar had refused to put signature on the papers (obviously referring to the vakalat) and that he wanted her Counsel to meet him. This telegram is dated 17. 1994. On 17. 1994, Mr.P.V.S. Giridhar learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, forwarded a letter to the Deputy Tahsildar, Special Camp for Sri Lankan Refugees Chengalpattu, informing the addressee, that he stood informed by his client that he had refused to attest the vakalat as requested by her for filing this habeas corpus petition in the High Court, apart from expressing his desire to meet him in person. The letter of the Advocate further reads that though it would be a pleasure for him to meet the Deputy Tahsildar, he regretted that he was unable to do so due to constraint of time. Deputy Tahsildar was informed, that there was no legal requirement for a person to attest the Vakalat to meet the counsel and it was sufficient if the person signing the vakalat did so in the presence of the Deputy Tahsildar. Therefore, counsel requested the Deputy Tahsildar to kindly arrange to have the vakalat of Venkateswari attested forthwith to enable her to prosecute this habeas corpus petition in the High Court. In the same letter, counsel has also stated that the Deputy Tahsildar must probably be aware that Venkateswari is an Indian citizen who has been illegally detained in the Special Camp, meant for Sri Lankans. This letter despatched by petitioner’s counsel was returned to him, with an endorsement ‘refused-returned to sender’. It is prima facie apparent, that this letter was despatched not on 17. 1994, but about 12 days later. However, the postal endorsement clearly indicates that it stood refused by the addressee. In view of the attitude exhibited by A. Sivaraj, Deputy Tahsildar, Special Camp, Chingleput, petitioner was able to have the instant habeas corpus petition filed on 18. 1994, brought before court, only 29. 1994, with a vakalat, still not attested. Petitioner had then brought to the notice of this Court through a memo that the Deputy Tahsildar had refused to accept the envelope containing the legal notice for his attestation of the vakalat. 9. We have already detailed the panorama of facts, which had unfortunately led to the petitioner and her two children, getting detained in the Special Camp at Chengalpattu from the middle of July, 1993 till she was sent away from the Camp on 210. 1994, after the filing of the instant habeas corpus petition. That an order under Sec.3 of the Foreigners Act could not have been passed against the petitioner, since she is admittedly an Indian citizen, has been unhesitatingly conceded before us. Such concession had to be necessarily made, for, it neither requires skill nor deep study, to hold, that the impugned order passed against the petitioner under the Foreigners Act cannot but be a nullity, for the Act contemplates orders of this nature being passed against foreigners and certainly not against Indian citizens. Such concession had to be necessarily made, for, it neither requires skill nor deep study, to hold, that the impugned order passed against the petitioner under the Foreigners Act cannot but be a nullity, for the Act contemplates orders of this nature being passed against foreigners and certainly not against Indian citizens. There is no dispute that the petitioner is an Indian citizen and not a foreigner. 10. Before we consider, if the State Government had only committed a mistake, while passing the impugned order or had chosen to pass the said order without application of mind and mechanically too, we would like to refer in brief to the earlier history, which led to the entry of the petitioner and her two children into the Special Camp, Madurai, to be in the company of her husband Nithyanandan, who was already there on an order under the Foreigners Act. That Nithyanandan, is a foreigner, being a Sri Lankan National has not been challenged before us. Equally the order passed against him under the Foreigners Act is also not the subject matter of dispute now before us. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner agreed, that only on the request of the petitioner, to permit her stay along with her husband, at the Special Camp, Madurai, in the company of her children, in the event of her plea for the release of her husband was not accused to, she joined her husband and commenced staying in the Madurai Special Camp on and from 28. 1992. It is apparent that the stay of the petitioner along with her two children, in the Special Camp, Madurai, was not in pursuance of an order passed under the Foreigners Act, but was the logical consequence of her request, to stay with her husband in the company of her children, since she had none to support her. It is also clear that even at that point of time, the authorities were aware, that the petitioner, was an Indian citizen and not a foreigner and therefore could not have been dealt with under the provisions of the Foreigners Act. Hence, the State Government had correctly acceded to the request of the petitioner and allowed her to stay in the Special Camp, along with her husband and children, obviously on humanitarian consideration. Hence, the State Government had correctly acceded to the request of the petitioner and allowed her to stay in the Special Camp, along with her husband and children, obviously on humanitarian consideration. It can, therefore, be safely held, that the stay of the petitioner along with her children in the Special Camp at Madurai, cannot be termed to be illegal custody. 11. However, the compulsory stay of the petitioner and her children at Special Camp, Chengalpattu, directed on 17. 1993, through an order passed under the Foreigners Act, will have to be necessarily held to be custody illegal and not warranted by law. If, in the usual course, the State Government was under the impression, that the request of the petitioner to stay with her children in the company of her husband at the Special Camp, Madurai continued for her further stay at Special Camp, Chengalpattu as well, that could have been complied with by passing an order similar to the one that was passed on 27. 1992. An order of that nature alone could have been legally and validly passed in the instant case. If such an order had been passed similar to the order passed on 27. 1992, the concerned officials at the Special Camp, Chengalpattu, must have taken steps to allow the petitioner, to move out of the Camp for gainful employment and regulations, if any will have to be only very limited in nature. However, the impugned order, in pursuance of which, the petitioner and her children got confined in the Special Camp, Chengalpattu reads as hereunder: “In exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 3(2)(e) of Foreigners Act, 1946 (Central Act 31 of 1946) read with the Notification of the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs No. 4/3/56(1) -F. 1, dated the 19th April, 1958 for regulating the continued presence of the Foreigner N. Venkateswari, wife of Nithiyanandan together with two children of Sri Lanka, who is now kept as an inmate in the Special Camp at Melur, the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby orders that the said Tmt.N. Venkateswari, W/o Nithiyanandan together with two children shall now reside in the Special Camp at Chengalpattu for Sri Lankan immigrants/refugees identified and located by the Collector of Chengai M.G.R. District. 2. 2. The said Sri Lankan Tamil N. Venkateswari, W/o.Nithyanandan together with two children, shall not leave the boundaries of the Special Camp at Chengalpattu for Sri Lankan Immigrants/refugees identified and located by the District Collector at the Special Camp, Chengalpattu except with the permission of the Collector.” Through this order, petitioner has been christened as a foreigner of Sri Lankan origin and hence she had to be kept as an inmate in the Special Camp, Chengalpattu with a view to regulating her continued presence in India. Further, in pursuance of this order, the said Sri Lankan Tamil N. Venkateswari shall not leave the boundaries of the Special Camp at Chengalpattu except with the permission of the Collector. Apart from the order extracted above showing clearly that the same had been passed treating the petitioner as a foreigner, it was fairly stated by Mr.I. Subramaniam that this is the nature of format used for detaining foreign citizens to have their movements regulated, when orders stood issued under Sec. 3 of the Act. 12. There cannot be a second opinion, that when an order is sought to be passed under Sec. 3 of the Foreigners Act, the authority concerned must have before him details of the person against whom the order was sought to be passed not only showing that he or she was a foreigner, but also material to indicate, the need for regulating his or her continued presence in the country. Only on application of mind on those two important facts, can an order under Sec. 3 of the Act, be validly promulgated. If only the authority concerned had looked into the basic material as to whether the petitioner was a foreigner or an Indian citizen, he would not have passed the impugned order, which is a text book example of an order passed mechanically without application of mind. It is not possible for us to accept that a mistake had occurred. It is not known as to how a mistake could occur, especially when the authority concerned, must have been aware that an earlier order had been passed on 27. 1992, permitting the petitioner to stay with her husband, on her request, and if need be, that request alone may have to be continued, for, in law an order under the Foreigners Act cannot be passed against her. 1992, permitting the petitioner to stay with her husband, on her request, and if need be, that request alone may have to be continued, for, in law an order under the Foreigners Act cannot be passed against her. When the papers regarding transfer of Nithyanandan to Special Camp, Chengalpattu were being processed, the authority concerned must have necessarily become aware of the earlier request of Venkateswari and in spite of it, if he had chosen to pass the impugned order, it only further proclaims that no sanctity is sought to be attached even when orders are passed under the Foreigners Act. If a mistake had been committed on 17. 1993, that could have been rectified soon after the petitioner and her children had been taken to the Special Camp, Chingleput. That approach had not admittedly been made in this case, for apparently it was taken for granted that the petitioner was also a foreigner, whose presence in this country, had to be necessarily regulated. The State Government, appears to have got out of its slumber, only after notice was issued in the instant habeas corpus petition. Thereafter, it appears, that remarks were called for from the concerned authorities to have confirmation, that the petitioner was in fact an Indian citizen. This procedure ought to have been adopted, before the impugned order was passed and not belatedly. The records placed before us, clearly show, that an order passed under Sec. 3(2)(e) of the Foreigners Act, was also served on the petitioner, while lodging her at Special Camp, Chengalpattu. 13. When it is obvious beyond any shadow of doubt, that the order passed under Sec. 3 (2)(e) of the Foreigners Act, dated 17. 1993 is a total nullity, it has to be necessarily held, that restraints placed on the petitioner and her children, from moving out of the camp cannot but amount to illegal detention. Merely, because the petitioner and her children are now free from the clutches of illegal detention, thereby making issue of habeas, at this point of time infructuous, it cannot be urged, that the petitioner had no remedy whatever, that she could still seek in this habeas corpus petition. Merely, because the petitioner and her children are now free from the clutches of illegal detention, thereby making issue of habeas, at this point of time infructuous, it cannot be urged, that the petitioner had no remedy whatever, that she could still seek in this habeas corpus petition. It has often been held, by the Supreme Court that in cases of this nature, while disposing of habeas corpus petitions, when the conscience of the court is struck it will be open to it to pass orders awarding suitable compensations. Of course, compensations awarded in such habeas corpus petitions, will not always affect the rights of parties, to go to a Civil Forum and work out their remedies for a full and final compensation. However, in this habeas corpus petition, after we had discussions in open court with counsel on either side, petitioner’s counsel had made the following endorsement: “In view of the compensation being awarded, I undertake not to claim compensation in respect of the detention in any other forum.” 14. In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, (1993)2 S.C.C. 746 , Supreme Court has observed that courts can evolve new tools and mould remedies to provide redressal in cases of deprivation of fundamental rights like that under Art. 21, especially of havenots and that award of compensation in proceedings for enforcement of fundamental rights under Arts. 32 and 226 is a remedy available in public law. 15. Usually, any disputed question of fact, may have to be decided, on the basis of evidence. Then interests of justice would demand a full-fledged enquiry to be conducted in the normal Forum before a claim for compensation could be decided and quantumised. In the instant case, no such enquiry, much less detailed, would be required, for, there is no dispute whatever, that an Indian citizen, who could not have been detained in law, under the Foreigners Act, stood detained as a foreigner in a Special Camp, in pursuance of an order passed by the State Government. We have already held, that the State cannot escape from its liability, by merely stating, that a mistake had occurred and hence that mistake should be held as bona fide and the State Government exonerated. We have already given enough reasons, as to why, such a contention cannot be accepted, and hence no reiteration would be required. We have already held, that the State cannot escape from its liability, by merely stating, that a mistake had occurred and hence that mistake should be held as bona fide and the State Government exonerated. We have already given enough reasons, as to why, such a contention cannot be accepted, and hence no reiteration would be required. That the petitioner will be entitled to compensation and that too in this proceeding, will have to be upheld. 16. While deciding the quantum of compensation to be awarded, we are bound to take note of the request, made by the petitioner, when her husband as an inmate, in the Special Camp, Madurai, to permit her to join him, with her children, since she had lack of support outside. It was in its benevolence that the State Government had permitted the petitioner to join her husband with her children, in that particular Special Camp. If the same system had continued on transfer to the camp at Chengalpattu, petitioner could not have expressed any grievance whatever. We are bound to repeat, that there were practically no restrictions imposed on the petitioner, when she was an inmate of Special Camp, Madurai, for, who was permitted to move about and engage herself in gainful employment. Regulation of her movements were minimum in nature. However, when she was put as an inmate of Special Camp at Chengalpattu, her movements, stood totally restricted, for, without the permission of the Collector, she will not be allowed to leave the precincts of the Special Camp. Curtailment of her liberty on the basis of an illegal order, had certainly affected her fundamental right. Apart from the petitioner, her two children had also been denied normal education, which they would have received, if they had not been put in the Special Camp along with their mother, in pursuance of an order passed under the Foreigners Act. The affidavit of the petitioner, shows that her two children are now aged about 4 and 5 years respectively. About a year ago, they would have been 3 years and 4 years of age respectively. It is common knowledge, that children are entertained in schools from the age of 3 years. The affidavit of the petitioner, shows that her two children are now aged about 4 and 5 years respectively. About a year ago, they would have been 3 years and 4 years of age respectively. It is common knowledge, that children are entertained in schools from the age of 3 years. That these children would require education has certainly been in the vision of the camp authorities, for we were informed that one Murugesan, another inmate of the Special Camp, Chengalpattu, used to offer tuitions to children in the said camp and such facilities were afforded to the children of the petitioner as well. Sporadic tuitions inside the Camp premises can never be equated to regular classes conducted in a school. It is possible to conclude, that due to restrictions imposed on the movements of the petitioner her children had been denied education which they would have normally received it the impugned order had not been clamped. While considering the nature and quantum of compensation awardable in the instant case, this aspect will also have to engage our serious attention. Merely because the husband of the petitioner is allegedly involved in a grave crime of dacoity, that cannot justify an illegal order being passed against the petitioner, under Sec. 3 of the Foreigners Act. We find that the petitioner had claimed a compensation of Rs. 1 lakh in this petition. We are of the opinion that the compensation claimed in the petition is rather huge and is not based on any rationale. We cannot also overlook, that if the petitioner had not been sent to the Special Camp at Chengalpattu, in pursuance of the impugned order, in all probability she would have asked for a similar treatment, as she had sought earlier to stay with her husband and children in the camp, to which her husband stood transferred on 17. 1993. In the event, in the usual course, her plea might have been acceded to in view of the orders passed earlier and if that had been so done, movements of the petitioner would not have been restricted and in all possibility her children would have received education outside the camp. 1993. In the event, in the usual course, her plea might have been acceded to in view of the orders passed earlier and if that had been so done, movements of the petitioner would not have been restricted and in all possibility her children would have received education outside the camp. It cannot be gainsaid, that for 15 months, movements of the petitioner stood restricted due to the illegal order passed under the Foreigners Act and further the said illegality had an impact on her children, who were unable to pursue their studies which they would have normally done. 17. Taking these factors into account, coupled with the finality, which would be the outcome of the compensation now to be awarded by us, in view of the endorsement rightly made by petitioner’s counsel, we are duty bound to award a compensation, which would be just, fair and reasonable. On the undisputed facts and peculiar circumstances available in the instant case, in our opinion Rs. 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) would be the compensation to which the petitioner would be entitled to. If the petitioner had not sought permission to stay with her husband and her children in the Special Camp at Madurai and the impugned illegal order had been passed, then the quantum of compensation to which she would be entitled would have been much higher. The whole trend of activity of the petitioner and the mechanical approach of the State Government have passed through the weighing process of quantamising compensation and the ultimate outcome is a sum of Rs.50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only), which as we have stated earlier, in our opinion, is just and fair, looked at from any logical standard. The State Government is bound to pay this sum of Rs.50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only), which we have now awarded as compensation to the petitioner, on or before 23rd December, 1994. It will be better for the State Government to keep all records straight, for, even in the telephonic message forwarded by the Tahsildar to the Collector, mention has been made that Tmt.Venkateswari, wife of Nithyanandan is a Sri Lankan Tamil. Even if an initial mistake had been committed as urged which, of course, we have not accepted, the rectification process must have been strictly followed, even which we are sorry to state, has not engaged the attention of the authorities concerned. 18. Even if an initial mistake had been committed as urged which, of course, we have not accepted, the rectification process must have been strictly followed, even which we are sorry to state, has not engaged the attention of the authorities concerned. 18. In the normal course, after having directed the State Government to pay a compensation to the petitioner for the injury and harm caused to her, we would not have proceeded further to individually take action, for compensation against any official of the State Government, for, it can always be presumed, that the State works through its officials, However, in this case, we are constrained to take separate action for compensation against A. Sivaraj, Deputy Tahsildar, Special Camp, Chengalpattu. We afforded an opportunity to Thiru S. Sivaraj, who was present in Court to show cause as to why he should not be directed to pay a compensation to the petitioner, for the injury and harm suffered by her due to non-discharge of duties, which he was bound to do as a public servant. This compensation process, does not relate to the illegality committed by the State Government, by passing an order under Sec. 3 of the Foreigners Act, which led to the petitioner and her children becoming inmates of the Special Camp at Chingleput. 19. The facts, which we would presently narrate, will indicate the high-handed action of Thiru A. Sivaraj, Deputy Tahsildar, Special Camp, Chengalpattu, paying scant regard to liberties of individuals and in a way attempting to thwart their seeking, quick and effective remedies by moving the courts concerned, whether the grievance of the petitioner is legitimate or otherwise, as far as her stay in Special Camp, Chengalpattu, is concerned, that may have to be necessarily decided by the courts and A. Sivaraj, Deputy Tahsildar, Special Camp, Chengalpattu, has no role to play in that process. The records placed before us indicate, that the said A. Sivaraj has attested the affidavit sworn to by the petitioner, on 30.6.1994, at the Special Camp. Though it appears that he was told, that the affidavit will have to be attested on each page, he restricted his attestation only to the last page. The records placed before us indicate, that the said A. Sivaraj has attested the affidavit sworn to by the petitioner, on 30.6.1994, at the Special Camp. Though it appears that he was told, that the affidavit will have to be attested on each page, he restricted his attestation only to the last page. The contention that such attestation was requested cannot be brushed aside as non-existent, for A. Sivaraj, who is present in court, was questioned by us, He stated that he was following a procedure, by which he would attest only signatures found in the last page of the document and not in each page. We were also informed by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, that A. Sivaraj refused to attest the vakalat and wanted the presence of the petitioner’s counsel before him. That A. Sivaraj would have exhibited such conduct, can easily be comprehended from several circumstances, which we will presently narrate. He has admittedly attested the affidavit of the petitioner on 30.6.1994. On that day, in the usual course, a vakalat must have also been placed for his signature in attestation, as is evident from the further correspondence and telegram, which he must have refused. No counsel, who sends an affidavit for preferring a habeas corpus petition, would have omitted to append a vakalat to be signed by the party concerned and attested as well by the camp authority. If A. Sivaraj had not refused to attest the affidavit in full and the vakalat in particular, there was no need for the petitioner to have forwarded a telegram to her counsel at Madras, stating that the Deputy Tahsildar had refused to put his signature and he. was wanting to meet her counsel. As we have already stated, this telegram is dated 17. 1994 and the attestation of the affidavit is on 30.6.1994. When we questioned A. Sivaraj in court in the forenoon session, he stated that he was not in the habit of attesting vakalats, for he had no instructions to attest vakalats. When we asked him as to the authority who should issue instructions, he was unable to offer any positive reply. He admitted that as a Deputy Tahsildar he is accustomed to receive revenue petitions accompanied by vakalats, in which he used to find attestations of the signatures found therein. When we asked him as to the authority who should issue instructions, he was unable to offer any positive reply. He admitted that as a Deputy Tahsildar he is accustomed to receive revenue petitions accompanied by vakalats, in which he used to find attestations of the signatures found therein. It is therefore, evident, that A. Sivaraj who was aware of the procedure, that will have to be followed had still refused to attest the vakalat in the instant case. That he should have refused is also evident, from his answer before us that he had no instructions to attest the vakalat. He did not state before us, that he had not refused to attest the vakalat. Even ignoring this facet, we questioned him, as to why he had refused to receive the registered letter addressed to him by his designation by Mr.P.V.S. Giridhar learned Counsel who is representing the petitioner herein. We have already extracted the contents of the letter of Mr. Giridhar. Initially A. Sivaraj stated before us, that he was not available in the Special Camp and in his absence none else would be available and therefore he will not be in a position to account as to why the communication from the Advocate, stood returned with an endorsement "refused" "returned to the addresses’. Since we were shocked at his reply, that this Special Camp, intended for housing foreigners of Sri Lankan origin whose movements stood regulated and restricted, had no authority to man it in his absence, though he is supposed to be in overall charge, in disbelief, we expressed our dismay and anguish. He then came out with an answer, that a duty Inspector would be available in his absence. It cannot, therefore, be contended, that the communication forwarded by the Advocate stood returned without the knowledge of any authority at the Special Camp. It was rather astonishing, when he chose to reply before us, in the following pattern, when we pointed out the various commissions, committed by him in the discharge of his public duty. The reply was "omissions" When serious lapses committed by him were pointed out in open court, if still this officer would choose to state before us, that in his opinion no omissions existed, we cannot but take a very serious note of the attitude of this Deputy Tahsildar. The reply was "omissions" When serious lapses committed by him were pointed out in open court, if still this officer would choose to state before us, that in his opinion no omissions existed, we cannot but take a very serious note of the attitude of this Deputy Tahsildar. He also stated, that no guidelines have been fixed by any authority, directing him to attest vakalats and so no grievance can be made on that score. 20. As we have already stated, an officer who had committed grave acts of dereliction of public duty, was not even inclined to express regret, but would choose to justify his actions. When his superior officer, who was also present in court, went near this officer and prompted a little, he hesitantly attempted to express regret, even which on the face of it, exhibited lack of sincerity. Any regret expressed, must be the outcome of realisation of mistake committed and must also be purposeful, with an assurance, to avoid recurrence. In the absence of these criteria, the attempted expression of regret, can have no value whatever and in the instant case, having noticed the behaviour of this officer in court and the manner in which he was answering questions, we have no hesitation in rejecting the half-hearted hesitant regret, which does not stand backed up by a feeling of remorse and instinctive repentance, for the grave derelictions of duty committed. A. Sivaraj, Deputy Tahsildar, Special Camp, Chengalpattu, must realise, that he is a public servant bound to serve the public for such a duty is cast on him. He cannot claim to be a "Be all and end all" with unlimited powers, to act as he liked. The manner in which he had refused to attest the vakalat and wanting the presence of the Advocate for that purpose and choosing to refuse acceptance of the communication forwarded by the Advocate, clearly exhibit his high-handed and devil-may-care manner in the discharge of his public duty. If this officer had only attested the vakalat on 30.6.1994 along with the affidavit of the petitioner, this habeas corpus petition would have come up for hearing even in July, 1994 and would not have been delayed till 29. 1994 to get entry into this Court. If this officer had only attested the vakalat on 30.6.1994 along with the affidavit of the petitioner, this habeas corpus petition would have come up for hearing even in July, 1994 and would not have been delayed till 29. 1994 to get entry into this Court. At least for over 2 1/2 months if the petitioner had to reside in the Special Camp, in spite of her anxiety to seek remedy through Court, it was due to the irresponsible and condemnable behaviour of A. Sivaraj. Public servants like A. Sivaraj must have to be sent to a place, which may not require any direct contact with the public or should be subjected to training where they would be taught the Code of conduct in relation to behaviour with the members of the public. For the harm and injury caused to the petitioner because of his irresponsible activity, we direct A. Sivaraj, to pay a compensation of Rs. 5,000 (Rupees five thousand only) to the petitioner. This compensation will have to be individually paid by A. Sivaraj and not by the State Government. This award of compensation, we hope, will be an eye opener to public servants, similarly placed like Thiru A. Sivaraj. This compensation of Rs. 5,000 (Rupees five thousand only) will also have to be paid to the petitioner by A. Sivaraj on or before 23rd December, 1994. 21. While holding that at this stage no scope whatever exists for issue of a habeas since the petitioner and her children have already been sent out of the Special Camp at Chengalpattu we conclude, that the petitioner will be entitled to compensation not only from the State Government, but also from A. Sivaraj, Deputy Tahsildar, Special Gamp, Chengalpattu. As we have already stated, State Government shall pay Rs. 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only), as compensation to the petitioner, while A. Sivaraj shall pay a compensation of Rs. 5,000 (Rupees five thousand only) to the petitioner within the period stipulated earlier. 22. We have already stated about the endorsement made by petitioner’s counsel that no further claim would be made for compensation, on the instant facts, in any other forum. That endorsement has been taken note of by us, while quantumising the compensation and as rightly submitted by Mr.P.V.S. Giridhar, in view of the compensation now awarded, no claim shall lie for further compensation in any other Forum. 23. That endorsement has been taken note of by us, while quantumising the compensation and as rightly submitted by Mr.P.V.S. Giridhar, in view of the compensation now awarded, no claim shall lie for further compensation in any other Forum. 23. This habeas corpus petition is disposed of accordingly.