Judgment :- Srinivasan, J. In this batch of writ petitions, the validity of Ss. 24 and 25 of the Cine Workers and Cinema Theatre Workers (Regulation of Employment) ct, 50 of 1981, hereinafter called the Act, is challenged. Besides that, a challenge is also made of the validity of the notification of the Government of India bearing No. S. 35016/1/86-SS/II, Ministry of Labour, dated April 30, 1986. 2. Ss. 24 and 25 of the Act are in the following terms : "24. Application of Act 19 of 1952 : The provisions of the Employees" Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, as in force for the time being, shall apply to every cinema theatre in which five or more workers are employed on any day, and is if such cinema theatre were an establishment to which the aforesaid Act had been applied by a notification of the Central Government under the proviso to Sub-s. (3) of S. 1 thereof and as if each such worker were an employee within the meaning of that Act." " 25. Application of Act 39 of 1972 :- The provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, as in force for the time being shall apply to or in relation to every worker employed in a cinema theatre in which five or more workers are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months, as they apply to, or in relation to, employees within the meaning of that Act. "3. The Act was passed in order to provide for the regulation of the conditions of employment of certain cine-workers and cinema theatre workers and for matters connected therewith. While the expression, 'cine-worker' has been defined in S. 2(c) of the Act, there is no definition of the expression 'cinema theatre worker' nor is there any definition of the word 'worker'. But Ss. 24 and 25 of the Act use the expression 'worker' or 'workers'. The notification, which is referred to above, is making the provisions of Employees' Provident Funds Scheme, 1952, applicable retrospectively from October 1, 1984 to cinema theatres employing 5 or more workers as specified in S. 24 of the Act. 4. The validity of S. 25 is attacked on two grounds. (1) The provisions of the said Section are inconsistent with S. 1(3)(b) of me Payment of Gratuity Act read with S. 14 of the said Act. 4. The validity of S. 25 is attacked on two grounds. (1) The provisions of the said Section are inconsistent with S. 1(3)(b) of me Payment of Gratuity Act read with S. 14 of the said Act. Under S. 1(3)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, the said Act is made applicable to every shop or establishment within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in respect of shops and establishments in a State in which 10 or more persons are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding 12 months. Under S. 14 of the said Act, that Act has been given an overriding effect. As per the Section, the provisions of the said Act or any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than that Act or in any instrument or contract having effect by virtue of any enactment other than that Act. Hence the argument is two fold. First it is urged that when S. 1(3)(b) makes the Payment of Gratuity Act applicable only to an establishment employing 10 or more persons, S. 25 provides that the said Act will apply to a cinema theatre in which 5 or more workers are employed. Learned counsel contends that when the main Act, that is, Payment of Gratuity Act, provides for the applicability with reference to an establishment employing 10 or more persons, the Act, with which we are now concerned, can not by reference make a different provision, which is really inconsistent with the provisions in the main Act. We are unable to accept this argument. When S. 25 says that the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act are applicable to a Cinema theatre in which 5 or more persons are employed, it will only mean that the said Section is carving out a special class of establishment. While the Payment of Gratuity Act applies to all establishments, as contemplated under that Act, having in its employment 10 or more employees, S. 25 makes a special provision with regard to workers in cinema theatres. Thus S. 25 can be construed as a special enactment, while the provisions in the Payment of Gratuity Act can be construed as a General enactment. The principle 'special prevails over general', will automatically apply to this case and therefore there is no inconsistency between the two provisions. 5. Thus S. 25 can be construed as a special enactment, while the provisions in the Payment of Gratuity Act can be construed as a General enactment. The principle 'special prevails over general', will automatically apply to this case and therefore there is no inconsistency between the two provisions. 5. The matter can be viewed in a different manner also. S. 25 of the Act can be taken to be bringing in an amendment to the provisions of S. 1(3)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act. After the introduction of S. 25 in the Act in question, the provisions of S. 1(3)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act can be read as every shop or establishment in which 10 or more persons are employed and every cinema theatre in which 5 or more workers are employed ". In other words, the general class is brought in by S. 1(3)(b) and the special class out of that general clause is brought in by S. 25. Hence there is no inconsistency between the Payment of Gratuity Act and the Act now in question. 6. A question arises, whether the provisions in S. 24 are violative of the principle of equality enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. In M. Viswanatha Pai v. R.P.F. Commissioner. (71-F.J.R. 505) a Division Bench of the Kerala Court has held that the Act is not violative of Art. 14 and a specific classification in the legislature being for the benefit of a particular weaker Section of the society, is certainly valid as the classification is based upon intelligible differential and it has nexus with the object of the classification. The same reasoning would apply in this case with regard to the provisions of S. 25 of the Act. Hence there is no merit in the contention that the provisions of S. 25 are inconsistent with the provisions of S. 1(3)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act. 7. The second limb of the argument is that S. 14 of the Payment of Gratuity Act has an overriding effect and therefore S. 25 of the Act cannot prevail over the same. We do not accept this contention for three reasons. First we have now held that there is no inconsistency between the provisions of S. 25 of the Act and S. 1(3)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act and hence S. 14 of the latter Act cannot come into play. We do not accept this contention for three reasons. First we have now held that there is no inconsistency between the provisions of S. 25 of the Act and S. 1(3)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act and hence S. 14 of the latter Act cannot come into play. Secondly, if as stated by us earlier, the provisions of S. 25 are to be read as an amendment to the provisions of S. 1(3)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, then it can be treated as part of the said Act and therefore it cannot be said that it forms part of another Act so as to be subject to the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act. Thirdly, a legal fiction is introduced by Ss. 24 and 25 of the Act and by virtue of the said fiction, the workers mentioned in the two sections are deemed to be employees within the meaning of the other two Acts, viz. the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, and the Payment of Gratuity Act. Further, in view of the said fiction, there is no question of the provisions of the Payment. of Gratuity Act having an overriding effect as against the provisions introduced by Ss. 24 and 25 of the impugned Act. 8. The next argument advanced by the learned counsel with regard to S. 25 of the Act is that it uses the expression 'every worker'. In fact, this argument has been advanced by him with regard to the provisions of both Ss. 24 and 25. According to the learned counsel, these two Sections use only the expression 'worker', whereas the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act and the Payment of Gratuity Act use the expression 'employee'. Learned counsel contends that when there is no definition of the expression 'worker', the provisions of Ss. 24 and 25 become unworkable, as it will not be known as to who is a 'worker' within the meaning of the two Sections. We are unable to accept this contention. As pointed out already, the two sections contain a legal fiction that every worker of a cinema theatre having 5 or more workers in its establishment shall be deemed to be an employee within the meaning of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act and the Payment of Gratuity Act. We are unable to accept this contention. As pointed out already, the two sections contain a legal fiction that every worker of a cinema theatre having 5 or more workers in its establishment shall be deemed to be an employee within the meaning of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act and the Payment of Gratuity Act. Hence an employee within the purview of those two Acts becomes automatically a worker within the meaning of the impugned Act. Consequently, there will be no difficulty whatever in ascertaining as to who is a worker, contemplated by Ss. 24 and 25 of the impugned Act. 9. We can also tackle the matter by another process of reasoning. It is well known that if an expression used in an enactment is not defined by that particular enactment, the meaning to be attributed to that expression is the same as is used in common parlance for the vide Porritts & Spencer (Asia) Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Bhogilal Chunilal v. State of Bombay. The meaning of the word 'worker' in common parlance is too well known to be set out herein. Very often, the term is used as synonym of the word 'employee'. In O. P. Malhotra's the law of the Industrial Disputes, Fourth Edition, Vol. I, page 465, it is stated as follows :" The term 'employee' in S. 4 of the Australian Common wealth and Arbitration Act has been defined laying more stress on the nexus of the employee with 'an industry' which is as follows : 'Employee means an employee in any industry and includes any person whose usual occupation is that of employee in any industry.' The expression 'workman' has also been defined in other statutes such as the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The other cognate expressions like 'worker' and 'employee' have also been defined in other statutes. For instances S. 2(1) of the Factories Act, 1948 defines the expression 'worker' on the construction of which a good bit of case law has developed. Likewise, the expression 'employee' has been defined in the State statutes such as the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, and Payment of Bonus Act, 1965. "10. Learned counsel for the petitioners contend that in labour law the principle that the meaning attributable in common parlance can be used to understand an expression used in the legislation is not applicable. "10. Learned counsel for the petitioners contend that in labour law the principle that the meaning attributable in common parlance can be used to understand an expression used in the legislation is not applicable. According to learned counsel, the term 'worker' has been defined differently in different enactments. He points out that the expression 'workman' has been used in the Industrial Disputes Act and it has been defined in a particular manner. Similarly the expression 'worker', has been defined in other enactments in a different manner. Therefore, it is contended that when the impugned Act uses the expression 'worker', it cannot be understood in any particular manner unless the Act itself gives the definition. 11. Learned counsel also draws our attention to S. 16 of the impugned Act. He points out that under that Section, the provisions of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 are made applicable to every cine-worker, who has worked in not less than three feature films with one or more producers, as if such cine-worker were an employee within the meaning of that Act. It is contended that the expression, 'cine-worker' has been defined in the Act and therefore there is no difficulty in understanding S. 16 of the Act. An argument is developed that when the Act has chosen to define the expression 'cine-worker' and failed to define the expression 'cinema theatre worker' the meaning of the word 'worker' as used in Ss. 24 and 25 is not clear at all and therefore the sections are unworkable. We are unable to accept this argument. The reason for defining the expression 'cine-worker' in the Act is quite obvious. Unless otherwise proved, it cannot be said definitely as to who are all the workers and who are all the respective employers in the production of a film. A question will naturally arise whether an actor, musician, director or dancer is a 'worker' within the meaning of the Act. Hence the Legislature thought it fit and necessary to define the expression 'cine-worker' so that there should not be any confusion in understanding that expression. A special definition is therefore introduced in the Act with reference to the expression 'cine-worker', but not in the case of a worker of a cinema theatre. It is not in dispute that cinema theatre is an establishment. A special definition is therefore introduced in the Act with reference to the expression 'cine-worker', but not in the case of a worker of a cinema theatre. It is not in dispute that cinema theatre is an establishment. Hence it can be easily found out that an employee of the establishment, viz. cinema theatre, is a worker in that unit. Consequently, the Legislature did not separately define the word 'worker', but introduced a legal fiction that whoever is a worker in a cinema theatre having 5 or more workers is an employee within the meaning of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. 12. We must also point out that the constitutionality of a statute is always presumed and courts must always endeavour to uphold the validity of statutory provision. It should also be the endeavour of the Court to interpret the legislation in such manner that it is easily workable. The maxim Ut res magis valet quam pereat will apply. See I.T. Commr. v. Teja Singh and Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab. 13. In State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara the Constitutional Bench referred to the earlier judgment in Chiranjit Lal v. The Union of India 1950 SCR 869 and summarised the relevant principles. In this case, it is sufficient to refer to principles 1 and 2 as set out therein. They read as follows :" The presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, since it must be assumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. The presumption may be rebutted in certain cases by showing that on the face of the statute, there is no classification at all and no difference peculiar to any individual or class and not applicable to any other individual or class, and yet the law hits only a particular individual or class". A similar principle has been reiterated in Municipal Corpn., Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohammed. It is worth extracting the following passage from the said judgment :"* There is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him, who attacks it, to show that there has been clear violation of the constitutional principles. "Having regard to the above principles, we hold that Ss. It is worth extracting the following passage from the said judgment :"* There is always a presumption in favour of constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him, who attacks it, to show that there has been clear violation of the constitutional principles. "Having regard to the above principles, we hold that Ss. 24 and 25 of the Act are valid and they are workable. 14. Now we turn to the notification dated April 30, 1986. The Supreme Court has considered the notification in detail and held that it is not enforceable in so far as it relates to the period prior to the passing of the notification, viz. October 1, 1984 to April 30, 1986 vide District Exhibitors Association, Muzaffarnagar v. Union of India. After a detailed discussion of the question, the court said :" In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeals as indicated above by setting aside the judgment of the High Court. We declare that the appellants are not liable to pay the employee's contribution for the period from October 1, 1984 to April 30, 1986." Following the said judgment, we hold that the writ petitioners are not liable to pay provident fund for the period from October 1, 1984 to April 30, 1986. 15. In view of the orders of stay passed by this Court in these matters, the petitioners had not deducted or collected the employees' contribution. If they are now made to pay from April, 1986 to this date, they will not able to realise the employees' contribution. It is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioners that several employees have retired and even with reference to the employees who are now in service it will not be possible to collect the amounts from them and it is also not possible to deduct the contributions from their future wages. It is therefore an eminently fit case for issuing equitable directions. Insofar as the petitioners in these writ petitions are concerned, they need not make any contribution to the Employees Provident Funds till the end of November, 1994. They must implement the notification dated April 30, 1986 from December, 1994 onwards. In other words, they shall make necessary deductions from the salary payable to the workers from December, 1994 as regards the contribution of the employees and they must also make their contribution from December, 1994 onwards. They must implement the notification dated April 30, 1986 from December, 1994 onwards. In other words, they shall make necessary deductions from the salary payable to the workers from December, 1994 as regards the contribution of the employees and they must also make their contribution from December, 1994 onwards. 16. The writ petitions are allowed to the extent indicated above and dismissed in other respects. There will be no order as to costs. 17. In view of the disposal of the main writ petitions, W.M.P. Nos. 19116, 21521 to 21523 of 1980; 93, 4392 to 4394, 7292, 11905 of 1987; 19135 & 21770 of 1989; 8848 & 16810 of 1992; 4062, 3369, 3435, 11410, 19215, 20051, 20096, 20103 of 1993; and 3191, 3892, 3893, 7912, 8883, 9712, 10083 and 10726 of 1994 are dismissed.