Judgment :- When the petition for stay filed by the Writ Petitioner and the petition for vacating stay filed by the respondents-Department came up for hearing, arguments were addressed at considerable length and the issues raised also are such, requiring the disposal of the main Writ Petition, the main Writ Petition itself has been taken up for hearing. As a matter of fact, the learned counsel for the Writ Petitioners has no objection for the same. 2.The Writ Petition has been filed for a writ ofcertiorarified mandamusto call for and quash the proceedings of the first respondent-Tribunal in its Order No. 221/93-C in E/Misc. 705, 1019 and 1187/92-C E/Stay/1697/92-C in E/1426/91-C, whereunder the petitioner was directed to make a pre-deposit of Rs. 1, 75, 00, 000 (Rs. 1.75 Crores) and to furnish bank guarantee for the balance amount of duty within ten days to enable the Tribunal to proceed with the hearing of the main appeal and consequently, direct the first respondent-Tribunal to proceed with the hearing of the main appeal and consequently, direct the first respondent-Tribunal to hear and dispose of the main appeal without insisting upon any deposit of duty and penalty. The appeal before the Tribunal was filed against the order of the Collector of Central Excise, Coimbatore, confirming the demand of difference in duty to the tune of Rs. 3, 24, 91, 945.43 under Rule 9(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and the penalty of Rs. 10, 000/- imposed on the petitioners. The stand of the respondents-Department is that the petitioners have manufactured and cleared Calcium-bi-sulphite solution for captive consumption without paying the Central Excise duty said to be due in terms of Section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the Rules made thereunder. It appears that the petitioners manufacture among other items of goods, and wood pulp which it is said to be exempted from payment of duty under Notification No. 119/86-C.E., dated 1-3-1986 as amended from time to time. In the course of manufacture of wood pulp, they are said to be manufacturing Calcium-bi-sulphite solution stated to be falling under Central Excise Tariff sub-heading No. 2806.90 by reacting sulphur-di-oxide with lime slurry. It appears that the petitioners have not included the product in question in the classification list, since they have used the same within the factory. In the course of manufacture of wood pulp, they are said to be manufacturing Calcium-bi-sulphite solution stated to be falling under Central Excise Tariff sub-heading No. 2806.90 by reacting sulphur-di-oxide with lime slurry. It appears that the petitioners have not included the product in question in the classification list, since they have used the same within the factory. According to the respondents-Department, the product does not have any specific exemption from payment of excise duty and the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. It is on that view, the duty was levied with consequential penalty. 3.Aggrieved against the orders of the authorities below, the petitioners filed an appeal before the first respondent-Tribunal under Section 35B of the Central Excise Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Section 35F provides that where in any appeal the decision or order appealed against relates to any duty demanded in respect of goods, the person desirous of filing such an appeal shall pending the appeal deposit with the adjudicating authority the duty demanded or the penalty levied. The Proviso to Section 35F provides that where in any particular case, the Tribunal is of the opinion that the deposit of duty demanded or penalty levied would cause "undue hardship to such person", the Appellate Tribunal may dispense with such deposit subject to such condition as it may deem fit to impose so as to safeguard the interests of the Revenue. The petitioners moved the Tribunal invoking the powers of the Tribunal under the Proviso to Section 35F for stay of the collection and consequently dispensing with the requirement of the pre-deposit contemplated under the main provisions of Section 35F of the Act so as to enable the Tribunal to have the appeal disposed of on merits without such deposit. The Tribunal, after hearing the learned counsel appearing on either side for the respective parties before it came to the conclusion that the issues involved in the case will have to be examined after detailed hearing of both sides during the hearing of the main appeal and in their view, the petitioners have not been able to make out a strong case on merits or on limitation. But, at the same time, having regard to the fact noticed by it, that the differential quantity on which duty has been confirmed, does not appear to be very accurate. But, at the same time, having regard to the fact noticed by it, that the differential quantity on which duty has been confirmed, does not appear to be very accurate. The Tribunal thought fit to direct only the deposit of a portion of the duty, viz., Rs. 1, 75, 00, 000/- (Rs. 1.75 Crores) and to direct the furnishing of a Bank guarantee for the balance of the amount as conditions for the waiver of the required pre-deposit of the duty and penalty. Aggrieved, the petitioners have filed the above Writ Petition. 4.Mr. Krishna Srinivas, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners took me at length through some of the correspondence between the petitioners and the Officers of the Department, the order of the Collector and the impugned order of the Tribunal as also several decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court. In substance, the endeavour of the learned counsel was to substantiate the plea that the proceedings against the petitioners were barred by limitation for the reason that the respondents-Department could not avail, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the extended period of limitation of five years provided under Section 11A of the Act. It was also contended that the product in question could not be said to be a marketable product, attracting the levy of excise duty and this aspect also was not taken due account of by the Tribunal. The learned counsel also contended that the order of the Tribunal must be considered to be a non-speaking order, since it does not give sufficient reasons to justify its order and at any rate, on the very reasoning of the Tribunal that there were no accurate data relating to the differential quantity, the Tribunal ought to have allowed the application as prayed for without any condition. Argued the learned counsel further that the Tribunal has also failed to take into account the relevant decisions which obliged the Tribunal considering such an application to take into account not only financial hardship of an applicant, but also the over all hardship that may be caused in insisting upon the payment of the duty and penalty levied or a portion of it as a condition precedent for the hearing and disposal of the appeal on merits. The grievance of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Tribunal had failed to advert to the over all hardship that may be caused on account of the imposition of the conditions as has been done by the Tribunal in the impugned order. 5.Mr. Ramakrishna Reddy, the learned counsel for the respondents while reiterating the stand taken in the counter affidavit also drawing inspiration from the order of the Tribunal, contended that the inaccuracy in the data relating to the differential quantity, if at all, was due to the different communications giving varying details by the petitioners themselves, who according to the learned counsel did not maintain proper record or accounts in this regard and this by itself would constitute sufficient ground to avail of the extended period of limitation contemplated under Section 11A of the Act. That apart, the learned counsel also contended relying upon some of the decisions of the Supreme Court as also this Court that normally this Court may not be pleased to interfere with an order of the nature passed by the Tribunal and that at any rate, the order under challenge is a reasonable one not warranting any interference, having regard to the fact that only a portion of the duty alone has been directed to be paid pending disposal of the appeal as a condition for the waiver of the deposit contemplated under Section 35F of the Act. 6.I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. In my view, there is no justification for me for adverting to the various decisions relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on either side with reference to the merits of the contentions in the appeal itself, pending before the Tribunal pertaining to the plea of bar of limitation as well as the marketability of the commodity etc. That is a matter, which has to be decided only by the first respondent-Tribunal in the main appeal pending before the Tribunal itself. It is enough if the decisions relied upon are kept in view only in appreciating the grievance of the petitioners with reference to the manner of exercise of the powers conferred upon the Tribunal under the Proviso. It is also not necessary for this Court to express any considered view even on the existence or otherwise of aprima faciecase on merits. It is also not necessary for this Court to express any considered view even on the existence or otherwise of aprima faciecase on merits. Consequently, I am of the opinion that there is no need to set out in detail the various decisions referred to by the learned counsel appearing on either side as also the ratio laid down therein. 7.So far as the challenge made to the impugned order of the Tribunal is concerned, the only question and the limited consideration that if required to be undertaken to by this Court, exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is to see whether the Tribunal has duly applied its mind to the relevant considerations necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction. Even if there is an error committed by the Tribunal in so exercising its jurisdiction under the Proviso, this Court may not deal with the challenge as if this Court is functioning as an Appellate Court over the order of the Tribunal. Instead the consideration by this Court should be one keeping thus in mind that it is functioning as a supervisory and controlling authority. Consequently, unless the order of the Tribunal is shown to be such, which could not have been passed by any reasonable authority, exercising such jurisdiction or so shocking to the conscience of this Court, there is no scope for interference in a routine manner. 8.In view of the above, it becomes necessary for me to consider the grievance of the learned counsel for the petitioner made about the non-application of mind and non-furnishing of sufficient and relevant reasons as sufficient factors vitiating the order. As noticed earlier, the said grievance is sought to be substantiated by contending that the Tribunal has not adverted to and recorded even anyprima facieview on the plea of limitation and the marketability of the goods said to have been pleaded before the Tribunal as also the alleged absence of consideration of the over all hardship that may be caused to the petitioners in passing the conditional order of the nature under challenge in this writ petition. No doubt, the Tribunal has not adverted to all the decisions that were stated to have been placed before it for consideration on the merits of the claim, but yet, in my view, the conclusion that the petitioners have not been able to make out a strong case on merits or limitation, in my view, would constitute due and sufficient application of mind and proper consideration of the matter. Otherwise, the conclusions are likely to be exposed to the challenge of pre-determination of the issues in appeal itself. The consideration in Paragraph 5 of the order of the Tribunal after a careful narration of the respective claims of the parties before it at considerable length would, in my view, constitute sufficient consideration that is expected of the Tribunal while discharging the powers conferred under the proviso to Sec. 35F of the Act. The Tribunal cannot be said to have been either totally oblivious or indifferent to the relevant considerations and the reasons assigned in Paragraph 5, in my view, are sufficient to discredit a grievance that is sought to be projected before this Court against the Tribunal. It is too much also to expect the Tribunal to embark upon still further detailed consideration even at that stage of the matter. Apart from the fact that as to who was responsible for the inaccuracy relating to the data pertaining to the differential quantity of the commodity at this stage, the fact that the Tribunal has taken into account that fact also and given due allowance also by considerably reducing the quantum of money to be deposited cannot be totally ignored. The very fact that the Tribunal has thought fit to direct the deposit of only a portion of the amount would go to show that the Tribunal has taken into account the over all hardships also and it is futile to contend that unless the very words "it has taken into account the overall other considerations also", are engrafted in the orders the Tribunal could not be said to have adverted to such aspects. As noticed earlier, consideration at this stage cannot be expected to be of a more detailed nature than the one that has been undertaken by the Tribunal. As noticed earlier, consideration at this stage cannot be expected to be of a more detailed nature than the one that has been undertaken by the Tribunal. In my view, the consideration by the Tribunal cannot be said to be vitiated for any of the grounds urged by the learned counsel before me.9.At the same time, keeping in view the difficulties expressed and the over all aspects of the matter, I am of the view that interest of justice will be better served if instead of the deposit of Rs. 1, 75, 00, 000/- the quantum is reduced to Rs. 1, 00, 00, 000/- (Rs. One Crore) and the petitioner is directed to furnish a Bank Guarantee for the balance of the duty within four weeks from this date and the Tribunal shall, on complying with the conditions as above, proceed to consider and dispose of the appeal. To the extent indicated above, the order of the Tribunal shall stand modified and in other respects, the writ petition shall stand dismissed. No costs.