JUDGMENT The writ petitioner was appointed in 1987 as a Municipal Prosecutor under the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (CMC) and was posted in the 3rd Court of Municipal Magistrate at Town Hall to conduct criminal cases. There are also other Municipal Prosecutors. The Municipal Prosecutors moved a writ petition before this Court for raising their pay scale. On that writ petition Ruma Pal, J. issued direction on 20.3.92 for enhancement of the pay scale of the Municipal Prosecutors. For non-compliance of the said order a contempt application was moved and the learned Judge inter alia directed for personal appearance of the concerned respondents in connection with that contempt application. Ultimately the learned Judge also issued a warrant of arrest against the Mayor for securing his presence in Court. All these things have been stated in the present writ petition. Be that as it may, on 24th March, 1992 the Chief Municipal Law Officer, at the instance of superior authority asked the petitioner to explain the circumstances in which the petitioner reported to the learned Court of Magistrate on 9.2.91 and 14.2.91 that the accused in case No. 3977(C) of 1990 and case No. 585(C) of 1990 respectively were not liable and the CMC did not want to proceed. The petitioner offered his written explanation in the matter. Subsequently however by order dated the 3rd November, 1992 (annexure-A) the petitioner was informed by the Chief Municipal Law Officer, CMC that whereas a disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner was contemplated, the Municipal Commissioner by his order dated the 24th October, 1992 directed to place the petitioner under suspension with immediate effect and that the petitioner would be entitled to draw subsistence allowance admissible under the rules. Thereafter the petitioner moved the present writ petition for quashing the said order of suspension and also for prohibiting the respondents from further proceeding with the contemplated disciplinary proceeding. On 22.12.92, Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. passed direction for affidavits. It also appears that by the said order of the Court the respondents were required to submit charge-sheet by 15.1.93 and in that case the enquiry proceeding could be proceeded with and concluded but no final order could be passed pending disposal of this writ application. Thereafter the charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner by order of the Municipal Commissioner under Memo No. L-9 dated 2.1.93. Annexure-A to the affidavit-in-opposition is the charge-sheet. Thereafter the charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner by order of the Municipal Commissioner under Memo No. L-9 dated 2.1.93. Annexure-A to the affidavit-in-opposition is the charge-sheet. Subsequently, Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were also appointed by the Disciplinary Authority. The petitioner also submitted a written statement to the Chief Municipal Law Officer, CMC against the charges brought against him. That written statement is annexure-B to the affidavit affirmed by the petitioner on 29th December, 1993 which is stated to be an application in aid of the writ application. In the said application dated 29.1293 the petitioner has prayed for entire salary, allowances and other benefits with effect from 3.11.92 till disposal of the writ application and for a direction staying all further disciplinary proceedings till disposal of the writ application and also for a direction upon the respondents to tender true copies of all reports as stated in prayer (C) to the said application. This application and the writ application have been heard together and both are being disposed of by this order. 2. As we have seen, neither in the writ application nor in the subsequent application purporting to have been filed in aid of the writ application there is any prayer for quashing the charge-sheet. But at the time of hearing the learned Advocate for the petitioner also desired the court to quash the charge-sheet. I am afraid, this cannot be done, firstly because there is no such prayer either in the writ application or in the application filed purportingly in aid of the writ application and secondly because the respondents had no opportunity to controvert by affirming affidavit any case for quashing the charge-sheet as advanced at the time of argument inasmuch as no such case was, and could have been pleaded in the writ application nor was any such case pleaded in the subsequent application filed by the petitioner in aid of the writ application. Therefore the question of quashing the charge-sheet cannot be entertained for consideration on merits in disposing of the present writ application and the application filed purportingly in aid of the writ application. 3. Therefore the question of quashing the charge-sheet cannot be entertained for consideration on merits in disposing of the present writ application and the application filed purportingly in aid of the writ application. 3. As regards suspension pending enquiry, it has been submitted inter alia by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that under Section 21 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 suspension is an appealable punishment and therefore before passing an order of suspension the petitioner should have been given opportunity to explain the matter and the order also should have been a reasoned one. Section 21(3) CMC Act, 1980 runs thus : "Any officer or employee of the Corporation may be reduced in rank, suspended, removed or dismissed for any breach of departmental rules or of discipline or for negligence of duties or for other misconduct by the authority by whom such officer or employee has been appointed." Section 87 of the old Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 which has been repealed by the new CMC Act, 1980 also inter alia contained more or less similar provisions to the effect that every Municipal Officer and servant could be fined, reduced in rank, suspended, removed or dismissed or his increment of pay could be withheld for any breach of departmental rules or of discipline or for carelessness, negligence of duties or other misconduct by the appropriate authority. The learned Advocate for the petitioner referred to Regulation 50 of the Corporation of Calcutta Service Regulations, sanctioned by the State Government under Section 534 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. The said Regulations, it is needless to mention, continues to be in force even after the advent of the new CMC Act, 1980 in view of Section 25 read with Section 3(36) of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899. It is submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the respondents had no power to suspend the petitioner in contemplation of or pending any disciplinary proceeding. The learned Advocate for the respondents has on the other hand relied on Section 17 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899 in support of his argument that the Authority having power to make appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed by it in exercise of that power. The learned Advocate for the respondents has on the other hand relied on Section 17 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899 in support of his argument that the Authority having power to make appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed by it in exercise of that power. In this connection, he has also referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in (1) Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers' Union, AIR 1959 SC 1342 and (2) V. P. Gindronia v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1970 (II) Labour Law Journal 143 in support of his argument that Corporation Authorities have power to suspend an employee. Even apart from the said two decisions and the provisions of the Bengal General Clauses Act, I find that regulations 50 and 54 of the Corporation of Calcutta Service Regulations specifically contemplate suspension pending enquiry. Therefore, there is no scope of argument that the CMC Authorities had no power to suspend the petitioner in contemplation of or during the continuance of any departmental enquiry. As regards the argument of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the order of suspension must give out elaborate reasons for suspension I must say that such argument is also not tenable. The order of suspension itself states that a disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner was contemplated. This is enough for sustaining an order of interim suspension. In this case, as we have seen, the petitioner was asked to explain the matter before the interim suspension order was passed. 4. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has also argued that regulation 50(c) of the Corporation of Calcutta Service Regulations provides that when an employee is suspended from duty pending enquiry into his conduct, the charge-sheet shall be sent to him as early as possible and not later than one month from the date of order of suspension and in exceptional cases the said time may be extended by further 3 months. It has been submitted in this connection by him that the charge-sheet in the present case had not been issued within one month from the date of the order of suspension and that no exceptional case had been made out for extension of time and as such the continuance of the suspension was bad. The charge-sheet in this case of course has been issued within 3 months of the date of order of suspension. The charge-sheet in this case of course has been issued within 3 months of the date of order of suspension. But the question whether there was any exceptional case for getting the benefit of the extended time under regulation 50(c) cannot be agitated now in view of the fact that Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee. J. by order dated 22.12.92 virtually granted time to issue charge-sheet within 15.1.93 and the charge-sheet has been indeed issued within that time. It is next argued by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that regulation 50(d) requires the final order for punishment or dismissal to be passed ordinarily within six months from the date of furnishing the charge-sheet but in this case the period of six months has already elapsed. This argument has no decisive force because the word 'ordinarily' as used in regulation 50(d) connotes that the proceeding may continue even after the period of six months, if necessary. I therefore find no reason to interfere with the continuing suspension at the present stage. 5. It is submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the petitioner applied for certified copies of certain documents as mentioned in annexure-C and C-1 to the application filed purportingly in aid of the writ application but the certified copies thereof could not be furnished on the ground that the records had been destroyed. I find that in annexure-III to the charge-sheet the certified copies of the concerned case records have been mentioned as some of the documents by which the articles of charges against the petitioner are proposed to be sustained. 6. I find that in annexure-III to the charge-sheet the certified copies of the concerned case records have been mentioned as some of the documents by which the articles of charges against the petitioner are proposed to be sustained. 6. In the circumstances, there would be a direction upon the respondents for supplying to the petitioner copies of the documents mentioned in the said list annexure-III to the charge-sheet within two weeks from the date of communication of order and in the event the respondents fail to supply any of the documents mentioned in the said annexure-III or if the petitioner otherwise cannot get any other document which he may feel necessary to obtain for his defence he may take the plea of such non-availability of documents with the Inquiry Officer at the time of hearing in the enquiry proceeding and if such plea is taken by the petitioner the Inquiry Officer will consider the same in the background of the totality of the facts and circumstances including the evidence that may be adduced at the time of hearing and determine whether the petitioner has been prejudiced thereby in his defence and decide the matter in accordance with law. At this stage, this Court does not enter into that question and leaves the matter open to be agitated by the petitioner before the Inquiry Officer. In view of regulation 54(la) the respondents are however directed to give subsistence allowance to the petitioner at the rate of 75% of his pay with effect from the date of expiry of one year from the date of the initial order of suspension. All arrear of subsistence allowance shall be paid by the respondents to the petitioner within six weeks from this date, if not already paid. The respondents are further directed to complete the departmental enquiry against the petitioner and pass final order therein in accordance with law within four months from the date of communication of this order. If the respondents cannot conclude the enquiry proceeding and pass final order within the aforesaid period of four months and the petitioner is not in any way responsible for the same, in that event the petitioner will have the liberty to apply before this Court with notice to the respondents for lifting the suspension order. It is further directed that if in disposing of the enquiry proceeding any punishment is awarded to the petitioner. It is further directed that if in disposing of the enquiry proceeding any punishment is awarded to the petitioner. Such punishment shall not be given effect to for a period of 3 weeks from the date of communication of such order to the petitioner. Since for reasons already stated. I am not entering into the merits of the charge-sheet and the proceeding started against the petitioner on the basis of the charge-sheet, I am not considering the decision of this Court in (3)Export Inspection Council of India v. K. K. Mitra, 1987 (2) CLJ 344 so far it relates to the question of similar punishment or the decision in (4) Virendra Prasad v. Union of India, 90 CWN 1172 so far it relates to the question of misconduct as cited by the learned Advocate for the petitioner and the petitioner will be at liberty to take those points before the Inquiry Officer at the time of hearing in the enquiry proceeding. I am making it perfectly clear that all points remain open to be agitated before the Inquiry Officer at the time of hearing and nothing in this order shall be construed as any opinion of this Court on any matter except the legality of the interim order of suspension and the continuance of such suspension. The writ petition and the application under consideration stand disposed of accordingly. No cost is however ordered. All parties to act on a signed copy of the operative portion of this judgment on the usual undertaking.