JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioners are employees of respondent No. 1 Life Insurance Corporation of India. At the relevant time they were working as Assistants in the clerical staff. By this petition they challenge the legality and validity of the decision of respondent No. 1 Corporation deducting from the salaries of the petitioners amount for the days of their absence from duty for which they had applied for leave. 2. Necessary facts for deciding the question raised in the petition are as follows : Petitioners had proceeded on leave in the month of August, 1977 for participating in a dharna programme organised by the LIC Employees Union, Ahmedabad Division, Ahmedabad. Certain disputes were not resolved. Therefore, the Union of employees gave a call to its members to organise a "dharna" programme to press the demand which the Union had placed before the Management of the Corporation. In compliance with the call given by the Union the petitioners submitted application for obtaining leave. It was submitted in the office of the Corporation at Ahmedabad. Details of the leave applied for and the amount of wages deducted are given in Annexure-A to the petition. Relevant part of the same is reproduced hereinbelow : S. No. Name of employee S.R. No. Date of Dharna Amount deducted 1. S.U. Patel 410984 11.8.1977 25.53 2. P.H. Adhvaryu* 410164 11.8.1977 40.82 3. K.M. Rami 410954 11.8.1977 75.62 24-8-1977 4. M.R. Parmar 427261 12.8.1977 23.02 5. P.N. Vachhani 427154 12.8.1977 33.91 6. B.M. Shah* 410473 19.8.1977 27.86 7. R.K. Chauhan 426352 19.8.1977 26.10 8. I.M. Patel 410208 28.8.1977 39.51 9. B.N. Sanghvi 427260 22.8.1977 23.03 10. G.C. Mehta 427647 22.8.1977 31.35 11. M.P. Shah 410283 22.8.1977 49.75 12. M.G. Rawal 427751 23.8.1977 21.79 13. G.K. Parmar 410564 23.8.1977 36.27 14. P.R. Modi 427176 23.8.1977 24.80 15. J.V. Pansara 426460 23.8.1977 26.97 16. R.P. Parmar 471002 24.8.1977 25.04 17. S.B. Mehta 406494 24.8.1977 49.59 18. N.L. Parmar 426445 24.8.1977 17.67 19. Smt. T.P. Gajjar 410613 24.8.1977 39.99 20. S.R. Desai 410613 24.8.1977 36.27 21. Kum. P.A. Shah 428183 24.8.1977 27.68 22. Smt. B.K. Parikh 410693 24.8.1977 36.27 23. Kum. V.N. Bhatt 427138 24.8.1977 32.44 *deleted from the petition It is an undisputed position that report of leave was submitted on previous day of the day of programme of "dharna." After submission of the leave report, they remained absent in order to participate in "dharna". Kum. P.A. Shah 428183 24.8.1977 27.68 22. Smt. B.K. Parikh 410693 24.8.1977 36.27 23. Kum. V.N. Bhatt 427138 24.8.1977 32.44 *deleted from the petition It is an undisputed position that report of leave was submitted on previous day of the day of programme of "dharna." After submission of the leave report, they remained absent in order to participate in "dharna". The Corporation treated the absence as extraordinary leave on loss of pay and therefore deducted the amount of wages and other amounts as per details mentioned hereinabove. 3. The petitioner had initially tried to raise industrial dispute by requesting the appropriate Government to refer the dispute to proper forum. However, by letter dated July 21,1978 the Government of India refused to refer the dispute on the ground that refusal by the Management of Corporation to grant privilege leave to certain employees for participating in dharna did not amount to change in condition of service so as to attract the provisions of S. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The action of the Management did not seem to be illegal or unjustified and, therefore the Government refused to refer the dispute for adjudication. 4. Thereafter the petitioner submitted application under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Labour Court and sought appropriate order for recovery of the amount in question. Therein the respondent-Corporation appeared and resisted the application. Till the filing of this petition the Labour Court had not taken any decision. Therefore the petitioners approached this Court by way of this petition on 12-11-1981 and prayed for relief as stated above. 5. The petition is resisted on behalf of the respondent-Corporation inter alia on the ground that without waiting for the decision of the Labour Court in application under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the petitioner could not have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. It is also contended that in view of the appropriate provisions of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1950 and the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, the Corporation was justified in taking action of treating the absence as extraordinary leave on loss of pay. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not pressed the alternative prayer of directing the Central Government to refer the dispute to the appropriate forum. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not pressed the alternative prayer of directing the Central Government to refer the dispute to the appropriate forum. It is submitted that the petition has been filed in the year 1981. Now after such a long time, in the end of the year 1993 or beginning of the year 1994 it would not be proper to direct the petitioners to avail of the alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, it is submitted that the petition be decided by this Court on merits. We are of the opinion that the prayer made is just and proper. Moreover, the petitioner does not press the alternative prayer. Therefore we think it proper to decide the petition on merits, without considering the alternative prayer for issuing appropriate direction to Government of India to refer the dispute to appropriate forum. 7. It is submitted that no opportunity of being heard was afforded to the petitioners before deducting the amount from the wages. No inquiry was held nor any show cause notice was given to any of the petitioners. Even if the Corporation wished to treat the absence as extraordinary leave without pay, an opportunity ought to have been granted to the petitioners calling upon them to show cause why their absence be not treated as extraordinary leave on loss of pay. It is submitted that as per rule, if leave is at the credit of the workman, pay cannot be deducted, and leave which may be at the credit of the workman should have been granted. It is further submitted that absence without leave would amount to misconduct as per rules. Therefore if any action is to be. taken on the basis of such misconduct, the petitioners should have been afforded an opportunity of being heard. On the basis of such misconduct no action could have been taken without holding inquiry and without complying with the principles of natural justice. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on Regulation 30(2) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. The title of Regulation 30 is, "Employees not to be absent from duty without permission or be late in attendance." Cl. (1) of Regulation 30 provides that an employee shall not absent himself from duty without obtaining permission of the competent authority. Proviso to Cl. The title of Regulation 30 is, "Employees not to be absent from duty without permission or be late in attendance." Cl. (1) of Regulation 30 provides that an employee shall not absent himself from duty without obtaining permission of the competent authority. Proviso to Cl. (1) of the Regulation provides that in case of unforeseen emergency, an employee may be allowed to avail of one days casual leave without prior sanction, subject to the condition that the competent authority is promptly advised of the circumstances in which prior sanction could not be obtained. It is also provided that in case of temporary indisposition, production of a medical certificate may, at the absolute discretion of the competent authority, be dispensed with. Cl. (2) of Regulation 30 reads as follows : An employee who absents himself from duty without leave or overstays his leave shall not be entitled to draw any pay and allowances during such absence or overstayal, and shall further be liable to such disciplinary measures as the competent authority may deem necessary. Provided, however, that the competent authority may treat such period of absence or overstayal, if not followed by termination of service, as period spent on privilege, sick, special or extraordinary leave, but the employee shall not be entitled as of right to such treatment. Provided further that notwithstanding anything contained in Regulation 65 the competent authority may treat such absence or overstayal as period spent on extraordinary leave irrespective of whether the employee has any other leave to his credit or not." Clause (3) of Regulation 30 deals with cases of habitual late attendance with which we arc not concerned. Regulation 65 reads as follows : "65. Extraordinary leave may be granted to an employee when no leave is due to him under these Regulations. Except in exceptional circumstances, the duration of extraordinary leave shall not exceed three months on any one occasion and 12 months during the entire period of an employees service. A competent authority may commute retrospectively periods of absence without leave into extraordinary leave." 9. In view of the aforesaid provisions and particularly Cl. (2) of Regulation 30, it is submitted on behalf of respondent-Corporation that it was not necessary to give an opportunity of being heard to the petitioners. It is further submitted that the Corporation has not treated absence as misconduct. In view of the aforesaid provisions and particularly Cl. (2) of Regulation 30, it is submitted on behalf of respondent-Corporation that it was not necessary to give an opportunity of being heard to the petitioners. It is further submitted that the Corporation has not treated absence as misconduct. Authority of the Corporation has exercised option of treating the period of absence as period spent on extraordinary leave and for such treatment an employee is not entitled to be heard as of right. It is submitted that the rule does not provide that an opportunity of being heard to the employee concerned be granted before taking action as provided under Regulation 30(2) which has been extracted hereinabove. 10. It cannot be denied that the action taken against the petitioners adversely affects them. The action taken by the Corporation results into financial loss to the petitioners, howsoever minimal it may be. It is undoubtedly an action which has civil consequences and it is adverse to the interests of the petitioners. Therefore, before taking such action the petitioners ought to have been afforded an opportunity of being heard. This is the minimum requirement of principles of natural justice. Principles of natural justice in essence means fair play in action. Every authority on whom power is conferred, either judicial or administrative, is required to exercise power in just, fair and reasonable manner. Principles, of natural justice are required to be read into the provisions of the rules unless observance of the same is excluded expressly or by necessary implication. The contention that since the regulation does not provide for affording an opportunity of being heard to the employee concerned, it was not necessary to afford an opportunity of being heard to the employee concerned cannot be accepted. 11. Here reference may be made to Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of M/s. Torrent Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, reported in 31(2) GLR 1017. In para 8 of the reported decision it is inter alia observed as follows : "The absence of specific provision containing principles of natural justice in the rule does not mean that the provisions of the rule exclude the observance of principles of natural justice. The principles of natural justice is nothing but fair play in action. No one needs direction from the Parliament that he is required to act fairly. The principles of natural justice is nothing but fair play in action. No one needs direction from the Parliament that he is required to act fairly. Any one, be it an Executive Officer, or a Judicial Officer, who has been conferred with discretionary powers and who is charged with a duty to act judicially or impartially, is bound to act fairly. Therefore, the provision as regards applicability of principles of natural justice has got to be read into the provisions of the rule, unless it is shown that the legislature has expressly or by necessary implication excluded the observance of principles of natural justice." 12. Reference may also be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1981 SC 818 . In para 42 of the reported decision the Supreme Court has observed that if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against the decision is provided, Courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing show of all its formal trappings and dilatory features of the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. The Supreme Court further observed that this rule of fair play "must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands." It is further observed that the Court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. However, the Supreme Court emphasised that the core of the rule must remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise. 13. Here reference may also be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, reported in 1994 (1) JT SC 551 : ( AIR 1994 SC 1558 ). 13. Here reference may also be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, reported in 1994 (1) JT SC 551 : ( AIR 1994 SC 1558 ). In para 20 of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court has inter alia observed as follows : "Principles of natural justice have an important place in modern Administrative Law. They have been defined to meaty "fair play in action." In the same paragraph it is further observed that an order of an authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is procedurally ultra vires and, therefore, suffers from a jurisdictional error. 14. In view of the settled legal position, as per (he decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court, simply because the rule does not make specific provision with regard to affording opportunity of being heard, it cannot be said that the observance of the principles of natural justice is dispensed with. On the contrary where provision of the statute or rule is silent as regards observance of the principles of natural justice, the Court should read the principles of natural justice in such provisions. This is so because there is; presumption that the legislature intends the statutory authority to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Therefore, the contention raised on the basis of the provisions of the' regulations is of no help to the respondents. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bank of India v. T.S. Kelawala, reported in (1990)4 SCC 744 . It is submitted that in the aforesaid decision the Honble Supreme Court has laid down the principle of no work, no pay. It is further submitted that when the worker 4 indulges in a misconduct, such as deliberate refusal to work, the employer can take disciplinary action including deduction of wages; that in such cases it is not necessary to hold inquiry and the insistence on inquiry in such cases would frustrate the very object of the inquiry. 16. With utmost respect, the observations made by Honble Supreme Court in para 5 of the judgment are sought to be read out of context. 16. With utmost respect, the observations made by Honble Supreme Court in para 5 of the judgment are sought to be read out of context. In the case before the Honble Supreme Court, the facts were that in support of the demand made by the employees, All India Bank Employees Association had given call for country-wide strike. The Bank had issued circular to all its Managers and Agents to deduct wages of employees who would participate in the strike for the days they go on strike. The Employees Union had givencall of strike for four hours on December 27, 1977. Therefore, on December 27, 1977 the Bank issued administrative circular warning the employees that they would be committing breach of the contract of their service if they participate in the strike, and they would not be entitled to draw salary for the full days work if they did so, and A consequently they need not report for work for rest of the working hours on that day. Notwithstanding this warning the employees went on j four hours strike from the beginning of the working hours on December 27, 1977. It was an undisputed position that the banking hours for the public covered the said four hours. The employees resumed work on that day after the strike hours. The bank did not prevent them from resuming the work. On January 16, 1978 the Bank issued circular directing its Managers and Agents to deduct full days salary of those employees who had participated in the strike. 17. The action of the bank was challenged by Sling writ petition in the Bombay High Court. The High Court quashed and set aside the circular of the Bank. The L.P.A. preferred by the Bank was dismissed. The matter was carried in appeal before the Supreme Court. In this factual background the-Honble Supreme Court has cleared one misconception regarding necessity of holding inquiry when misconduct is not disputed and is resorted to on a mass scale such as when the employees go on strike, legal and illegal. The L.P.A. preferred by the Bank was dismissed. The matter was carried in appeal before the Supreme Court. In this factual background the-Honble Supreme Court has cleared one misconception regarding necessity of holding inquiry when misconduct is not disputed and is resorted to on a mass scale such as when the employees go on strike, legal and illegal. In para 5 of the reported decision the Honble Supreme Court has observed as follows : "There is no doubt that whenever a worker indulges in a misconduct such as a deliberate refusal to work, the employer can take a disciplinary action against him and impose on him the penalty prescribed for it which may include some deduction from his wages. However, when misconduct is not disputed but is, on the other hand, admitted and is resorted to on a mass scale such as when the employees go on strike, legal or illegal, there is no need to hold an inquiry. To insist on an inquiry even in such cases is to pervert the very object of the inquiry. In a mass action such as a strike it is not possible to hold an inquiry against every employee nor is it necessary to do so unless, of course, an employee contends that although he did not want to go on strike and wanted to resume his duty, he was prevented from doing so by the other employees or that the employer did not give him proper assistance to resume his duty though he had asked for it. That was certainly not the situation in the present case in respect of any of the employees and that is not the contention of the employees either. Hence, in cases such as the present one, the only question that has to be considered is whether, when admittedly the employees refuse to work by going on strike, the employer is entitled to deduct wages for the relevant period or not." After the aforesaid observations the Honble Supreme Court examine the facts of the case and observed that attendance of the employees after four working hours was useless because there was no work to do during the rest of the hours. It was for this reason that the Bank had made it clear in advance that if they went on strike for four hours as declared, they would not be entitled to the wages for the whole day and they need not report for work thereafter. In this factual background the Honble Supreme Court held that the action of the Bank was proper and in facts of the case there was no need to hold inquiry. 18. In the instant case the facts are required to be examined. It is an admitted position that in the branch office of the respondent-Corporation where the petitioners are working there are about 700 employees in the cadre of Assistant in which the petitioners are working. The petitioners are in all 22 in number. This factual position is made clear at the Bar and it is not disputed. It may be noted that the programme of dharna was not as a mass action resorted to by all the employees of the cadre of Assistants. Again, analysis of the chart at Annexure-A to the petition reveals the following particulars : (i) On August 11,12 and 19 only two employees had sat on dharna; (ii) On August 22, 23 and 24 only four employees had sat on dharna; and (iii) On August 25 five employees had participated in dharna programme. Thus, by no stretch of reasoning the action on the part of the petitioners can be said to be a mass action. The action was only with a view to focus the attention of the management on their demand. Out of 700 (seven hundred) employee in the cadre of Assistants, if two, four or five members had participated in dharna and remained absent, it cannot be said to be a strike on mass scale or any programme in support of the demand so as to paralyse the working of the office. When few of the workmen may have participated in dharna programme pursuant to the call given by the Union, it can never be said that inquiry would not be possible. 19. Besides, a very distinguishing feature emanating from the facts of the present case is that the petitioners did submit report for leave on the day previous to the day for which they sought leave. That was neither rejected nor granted on the same day. 19. Besides, a very distinguishing feature emanating from the facts of the present case is that the petitioners did submit report for leave on the day previous to the day for which they sought leave. That was neither rejected nor granted on the same day. It was after the day of leave that the Corporation treated the absence as extraordinary leave on loss of pay and thereby deducted the amount of wages and other amounts as detailed hereinbefore. Therefore it cannot be said that inquiry was not possible. Even in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondent-Corporation, it is not stated that the inquiry was not possible to be held and therefore it has not been held. Nothing is pointed out either in the affidavit-in-reply or even at the stage of argument that it was not possible to hold inquiry against the petitioners concerned. In view of the aforesaid position, reliance placed on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Bank of India v. T.S. Kelawala (supra) would be of no help to the respondent-Corporation. 20. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that there is considerable delay in filing the petition. The incident in question took place in August, 1977. Action of deducting the wages was taken by the respondent-Corporation some time in September or October, 1977, while the petition is filed in November, 1981. Therefore it is submitted that this Court should not exercise power under-Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. However, the delay in approaching this Court has been sufficiently explained. The petitioners first approached the Central Government for raising dispute under the appropriate provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Central Government did not refer the dispute as per its decision dated July 21, 1978. Thereafter the petitioners were advised to pursue the remedy under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by filing recovery application before the Labour Court. Since they felt that they may not get relief before the Labour Court, even before the Labour Court decided their application, they have approached this Court by filing this petition. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that there is inexcusable delay in approaching this Court. Moreover, on account of delay no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the respondent-Corporation. Whatever prejudice that may be caused, would be to the petitioners. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that there is inexcusable delay in approaching this Court. Moreover, on account of delay no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the respondent-Corporation. Whatever prejudice that may be caused, would be to the petitioners. Therefore, simply because there is delay which, in our opinion, has been sufficiently explained, it would not be proper to refuse the petitioners the benefit of the provisions of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 21. As regards the delay in filing the petition is concerned, it may be noted that there is no blanket rule that delay of a particular period should be considered unreasonable, irrespective of the facts of a petitioner case. Unreasonable delay is a relative concept and what may be considered to be unreasonable delay in one case may not be so in facts and circumstances of another case. Reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of R.S. Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1974 SC 259 : (1974 Lab IC 165). In that case there was delay of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of the complaint and it was contended that there was unreasonable delay and it was sufficient to disentitle the petitioner to any relief in a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The Honble Supreme Court repelled the contention and observed as follows : "The Rule which says that a Court may not inquire into belated or stale claims is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. The question is one of discretion to be followed on the facts of each case. It may also be noted that tire principle on which the Court proceeds in refusing reliefs to the petitioner on ground of laches or delay is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there was reasonable explanation for the delay. It may also be noted that tire principle on which the Court proceeds in refusing reliefs to the petitioner on ground of laches or delay is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there was reasonable explanation for the delay. It may be noticed that the claim for enforcement of the fundamental right of equal opportunity under Art. 16 is itself a fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 32 and this Court which has been assigned the role of a sentinel on the qui vive for protection of the fundamental rights cannot easily allow itself to be persuaded to refuse relief solely on the jejune ground of laches, delay or the like." Similarly in the case of Trilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, reported in AIR 1970 SC 898 , in para 11 of the judgment of the Supreme Court has observed as under : "The question is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. This Court need not necessarily give the total time to the litigant to move this Court under Article 32, even though he may be within statutory limitation. Similarly in a suitable case this Court may entertain a petition even after limitation. It will all depend on what the breach of the Fundamental Right and the remedy claimed and how the delay use." 22. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kiritkumar D. Vyas v. State, reported in (1982)23(2) GLR 79 : (1983 Lab IC 67), has followed the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court. In that decision the Division Bench has observed that the Court will frown upon delay and latches on the part of the aggrieved party, if in the meanwhile the rights of innocent persons have intervened. And howsoever just-the grievance of b aggrieved party may be, if by condoning the delay, rights of other innocent persons were to be adversely affected or jeopardised then the Court would be reluctant to brook such delays. In the instant case the delay in approaching this Court has been explained as indicated hereinabove. And howsoever just-the grievance of b aggrieved party may be, if by condoning the delay, rights of other innocent persons were to be adversely affected or jeopardised then the Court would be reluctant to brook such delays. In the instant case the delay in approaching this Court has been explained as indicated hereinabove. Even if it is considered that the delay is not sufficiently explained, then also it is not even painted out that rights of innocent persons have intervened and other innocent persons would be adversely affected if the petition is decided on merits. As observed hereinabove, no prejudice whatsoever is likely to be caused to the respondent-Corporation on account of the delay in filing the petition. 23. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that this Court should not grant the prayer made in this petition inasmuch as there are disputed questions of fact. However, the learned Counsel for the respondent has not pointed out any averment from affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of respondents, which may even remotely suggest that the respondent-Corporation has disputed the facts. Therefore, the contention that the prayer made in this petition be not granted on the ground that there are disputed questions of facts has no merits. 24. As far as the contention raised on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners have an alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has also no merits. It may be noted that the dispute has its roots in the incident which took place in August, 1977. The petition is filed in the year 1981. It is being decided in the year 1993-94. The petition cannot be thrown away on the ground that the petitioners have an alternative remedy. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of A.V. Venkateswaran v. R.S. Wadhwani, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1506 , "the rule that the party who applies for the issue of a high prerogative writ should, before he approaches the Court, have exhausted other remedies open to him under the law is not one which bars the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petition or to deal with it, but is rather a rule which courts have laid down for the exercise of their discretion. Thus it is a self-imposed restriction imposed by the courts while exercising discretion. Thus it is a self-imposed restriction imposed by the courts while exercising discretion. In facts of the case, we do not think that the interest of justice would be served if the petition is rejected on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. On the contrary if such course is adopted it would frustrate the ends of justice. The High Court would ordinarily not adopt a course in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution which would not serve the ends of justice. 25. In view of the aforesaid position, the action of the respondent-Corporation in deducting the wages of the petitioners cannot be sustained as being violative of the principles of natural justice and therefore the prayer made in para 19(b) for directing the respondents to refund the amount deducted from the wages of the petitioners is required to be granted. 26. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that since the action taken by the respondent-Corporation is being set aside on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been complied with and the inquiry has not been held, the respondent-Corporation should be permitted to hold inquiry and take appropriate action in accordance with law. Normally we would have accepted such request. However, having regard to the following circumstances, we do not think that such an opportunity should be granted : (i) the incident is of August, 1977; (ii) the amount deducted from the wages of the employees concerned is very nominal. The lowest figure is Rs. 17.67 (Rupees seventeen and paise sixty seven) i.e. in respect of petitioner - N.L. Parmar, and the highest figure is Rs. 75.62 (Rupees seventy-five and paise sixty two) i.e. in respect of petitioner - K.M. Rami. After lapse of a period of about seventeen years it would not be proper that the Corporation may be permitted to hold inquiry in respect of the incident which has become stale. Therefore we do not think it proper to accede to this request. 27. In the result the petition is allowed. The action of the respondent-Corporation to deduct the amount of wages from the salary of the petitioners as indicated in para 2 hereinabove is quashed and set aside. Therefore we do not think it proper to accede to this request. 27. In the result the petition is allowed. The action of the respondent-Corporation to deduct the amount of wages from the salary of the petitioners as indicated in para 2 hereinabove is quashed and set aside. The respondent-Corporation is directed to refund the amount deducted from their wages to each of the petitioners concerned within a period of one month from the date of this judgment, failing which the amount shall carry interest at the rate of 18% per annum till the amount is refunded. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. Petition allowed.