Judgment : The present action had been initiated by the detenu Sakthi alias Sakthivel, under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, directing the respondents to produce him before this Court and set him at liberty forthwith. .2. The District Magistrate and Collector of Chidambaranar District, Tuticorin, second respondent in exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 clamped upon the detenu the impugned order of detention in his proceedings H.S.(M)Confdl. No. 15/94 dated 13. 1994 with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and health. 3. Apart from the ground case, the incident of which took place at 8.30 hours on 3. 1994 getting registered as a case in Crime No. 141 of 1994 of Kovilpatti West Police Station, for alleged offences under Secs. 427, 307, 506, Part II, I.P.C. and Sec. 25(1) of the Indian Arms Act, he had come to adverse notice in three other cases, the first one in Crime No. 769/ 1993 on the file of the Kovilpatti West Police Station for an offence under Sec. 395, I.P.C. the second one in Crime No. 31/1994 of Ettaiyapuram Police Station for offences under Secs. 341 and 506(ii), I.P.C. and the third one in Crime No. 40/94 of Kalugumalai Police Station, for the offence under Sec. 397, I.P.C. The investigation in all those cases, it is said is pending. During the course of investigation the detenu had been arrested on 3. 1994. 4. Though manifold grounds had been taken in assailing the impugned order of detention, Mrs.R. Subadra Devi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner detenu, thought fit to press into service the following two grounds alone for consideration, obviously feeling the other grounds, if pressed, may not stand even a minute’s scrutiny. They are: (1) The family members of the detenu were not at all informed of the place of detention of the detenu by the second respondent-Detaining Authority pursuant to the order of the detention, infringing the constitutional guarantee available under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. (2) The facts of the ground case, if perused with little bit of care, caution and circumspection would indicate that the simplicitor law and order situation is magnified as one prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. (2) The facts of the ground case, if perused with little bit of care, caution and circumspection would indicate that the simplicitor law and order situation is magnified as one prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 5. Mr.R. Raghupathi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor representing the respondents would, however, repel the submissions as above and produce the relevant file for perusal and consideration of this Court. .6. We may now enter into the arena of discussion for consideration of the rival submissions as above. A perusal of the relevant file indicates, in a clinching fashion, that one Anusuya, sister of the detenu had been intimated as respects the place, where the detenu had been detained by means of a communication on 23. 1994 and in token of receipt of the communication, the said sister of the detenu had acknowledged, by subscribing her signature, which had been attested by two independent witnesses. Such being the case, this submission, as such merits little substance. 7. Before entering into a discussion as to whether the facts and circumstances of the ground case constitutes a public disorder or a mere law and order situation, better it is, we think to understand those two concepts, in a better fashion and such a feat can be performed by citing a decision in the case of Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1143, emerging from the Apex Court of this country. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court settled a nice distinction between “public order” and “law and order” in a scintillating fashion and what their Lordships said about those concepts, if penned down here, would be of immense help in deciding the question as now posed in this case with ease and grace and without any difficulty whatever. It is reflected thus: “13. The true distinction between the areas of ‘public order’ and ‘law and order’ lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of Maw and order’ and ‘public order’ is a fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. The distinction between the two concepts of Maw and order’ and ‘public order’ is a fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. That test is clearly fulfilled in the facts and circumstances of the present case.” 17. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular act of violence creating disorder that distinguishes it as an act affecting public order from that concerning law and order. Some offences primarily injure specific and only secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure the public interest and affect individuals only remotely. The question is of the survival of the society and the problem is the method of control. Whenever there is an armed hold-up by gangsters in an exclusive residential area persons are deprived of watch or cash, or ladies relieved of their gold-chains or ornaments at the point of a knife or revolver, they become victims of organised crime. There is very little that the police can do about it except to keep a constant vigil over the movements of such persons. The particular acts enumerated in the grounds of detention clearly show that the activities of the detenu cover a wide field and fail within the contours of the concept of public order.” 8. For appreciating the second submission raised by learned counsel for the petitioner detenu, the facts of the ground case would be of immense use and help. Such facts are referred to in paragraphs 3 of the grounds of detention, which runs as under: “Duraisingam, son of Chinnappa Konar is residing at A.K.S. Road, Kovilpatti and he is running a tiffin stall in the name of Karthik at his house. On 3. 1994 at 8.30 hrs. while he was attending his business, Thiruvalarkal 1. Madasamy, son of Karadkarai, Bharathinagar, Mettu Street, Kovilpatti, 2. Vetri alias Vetrivel alias Uthandan, son of Uthandan, Pottalkadu, 3. On 3. 1994 at 8.30 hrs. while he was attending his business, Thiruvalarkal 1. Madasamy, son of Karadkarai, Bharathinagar, Mettu Street, Kovilpatti, 2. Vetri alias Vetrivel alias Uthandan, son of Uthandan, Pottalkadu, 3. Ramar alias Ramachandran, son of Karnan, Pottalkadu and 4. Sakthi alias Sakthivel, son of Kothandapani Padayachi, Paravakari were taking tiffin and some customers were standing for tiffin as there was no seat, so Duraisingam urged them to finish their tiffin fastly and give seat to others. But they did not mind him and joked among them. On seeing their jokes, the waiters Murugesan and Chinnathambi also urged them to finish their tiffin fastly and give seat to them. But they replied by uttering At once, Duraisingam instructed and insisted then, don’t use filthy words and vacate the seat so saying Thiruvalarkal Madasamy took out his country made revolver and the remaining three others took out their aruvals which were hidden and pushed down the milk pot, boiler and threw out the idli and thosai which were kept for selling. When Duraisingam tried to resist them, Thiru Madasamy shot with his country made revolver, but it did not explode and in the same manner, Vetri, Sakthi and Ramar tried to cut him by uttering”, He raised alarm and ran towards north. On seeing it, the neighbouring shop keepers Kathiresan, Nainar, Iyyanar and some other shop keepers rushed there so saying, they threatened them, the crowd ran scatterly. They also menaced the shop keepers to close their shops and they closed their shop for apprehending danger to their lives and properties. By doing their acts, the pedestrians and the public ran pell-mell scatterly with fear. The vehicles which came on the way returned back on the same way. Therefore a feeling of insecurity in the minds of public was created by them and the routine life paralysed. They threatened the public by showing their weapons and ran towards south.” “..........By committing the above described crimes in the public in the busy locality and residential area in the broad day light he has created an alarm and a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the public of that area and thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.” 9. From the facts of the ground case as stated above, it is rather crystal clear that the activity of the petitioner- detenu, done conjointly with his comrades, affected even tempo of the life of the society by creating a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the public of that area. Further the fear psychosis created by the detenu and his other comrades in the minds of the members of the community, was such that such culprits and assailants would go unpunished which has the potential of the society, and not merely some individual to suffer. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the activities of the detenu petitioner would squarely fall within the tentacles of explanation appended to clause ‘A’ of Sec. 2 of Act No. 14 of 1982. In this view of the matter the second submission projected by learned counsel for the petitioner also bristles next to nothing. 10. For the reasons as above, the H.C.P. deserves dismissal and the same is accordingly dismissed.