( 1 ) THE appellant was found guilty of offence under Section 3 of the Railway property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966. The said provision reads as follows: "3. Penalty for unlawful possession of railway property. Whoever is found, or is proved to have been, in possession of any railway property reasonably suspected of having been stolen or unlawfully obtained shall, unless he proves that the railway property came into his possession lawfully, be punishable (A) for the first offence, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both and in the absence of special and adequate reasons to be mentioned in the judgment of the court, such imprisonment shall not be less than one year and such fine shall not be less than one thousand rupees; (B) for the second or a subsequent offence, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and also with fine and in the absence of special and adequate reasons to be mentioned in the judgment of the court, such imprisonment shall not be less than two years and such fine shall not be less than two thousand rupees. " ( 2 ) THE trial Magistrate for recorded reasons ordered the release of the appellant on probation. On appeal to the court of Session at the instance of the state government of orissa, the order of the trial Magistrate was reversed and it was viewed that since the penal provision provided for a minimum sentence, there was no occasion for the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 to be invoked. That view was taken by the court of Session because of a judicial precedent of the High court operating. As a result, the appellant was sentenced by the court of Session to one years rigorous imprisonment and payment of Rs. 1,000. 00 as fine spelled out as the minimum prescribed under the law. The High court on revision by the appellant confirmed the view of the court of Session. That view is now being challenged before us. ( 3 ) IT may be mentioned that at none of the appellate or revisional stages, or even here, has the conviction of the appellant been challenged. The controversy is on the point whether the appellant could plead for release on probation. That view is now being challenged before us. ( 3 ) IT may be mentioned that at none of the appellate or revisional stages, or even here, has the conviction of the appellant been challenged. The controversy is on the point whether the appellant could plead for release on probation. The high court has taken the view that when there is a minimum period of imprisonment prescribed that would not get substituted by an order of release on probation. ( 4 ) OUR attention may now be focussed on the provision of the section itself. As is evident, it has two clauses. Clause (a) operates to award punishment for the first offence. Clause (b) operates to award punishment for the second or subsequent offence. Both are worded differently. Whereas for clause (a) the maximum term of imprisonment which can be imposed can be upto 5 years, the minimum term of imprisonment imposable is upto one year, and there is a mandate that it shall not be for a period less than one year unless and until for some special and adequate reasons to be mentioned in the judgment of the court, a lesser period of imprisonment had been awarded. It is in this way that the sentence of imprisonment is compartmentalised. The other alternate punishment is imposition of fine. Whereas there is no maximum limit of the fine imposable, but which can in no event be excessive and unreasonable, there is, on the same analogy, a minimum of Rs. 1,000. 00 fine imposable, unless and until for special and adequate reasons to be mentioned in the judgment of the court, the fine imposed was less than one thousand rupees. This too has its own compartment. Clause (a) gives a choice to the court to either award imprisonment or impose fine, or both. It is the choice of the court which determines whether imprisonment alone should be awarded or fine alone be imposed or both should be awarded. It is thus obvious that it is not obligatory on the court to always award imprisonment as a punishment. Once it is so understood it is difficult to comprehend that a minimum sentence alone thereunder is imposable to which the Probation of offenders Act would not be applicable. ( 5 ) THE above result is also achieved when clause (a) is compared with clause (b ). Once it is so understood it is difficult to comprehend that a minimum sentence alone thereunder is imposable to which the Probation of offenders Act would not be applicable. ( 5 ) THE above result is also achieved when clause (a) is compared with clause (b ). For the second or subsequent offence the court is obligated to award imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and also impose fine. The awardable imprisonment however cannot be less than two years and such fine cannot be less than two thousand rupees, unless for special and adequate reasons, to be mentioned in the judgment of the court, the imprisonment of less than two years is imposed and a fine less than Rs. 2,000. 00 is imposed. Here there is a compulsion to impose both kinds of sentences, unless the court exercises discretion to do away with imposing any punishment. The limited distinction in the two clauses is prominent. ( 6 ) SINCE we are confined to the applicability of clause (a) to the instant case, where awarding of imprisonment or imposition of fine, or both were not essential, we will steer the way by altering the sentence of the appellant, at this point of time, as was prayed before the High court, to an imposition of fine to the tune of Rs. 3,000. 00, setting aside the sentence of imprisonment, and ordering that such fine shall be deposited by the appellant within a period of three months, as otherwise he shall undergo simple imprisonment of three months in default. This obviates us to pronounce on the relevance of the Probation of offenders Act to the situation. ( 7 ) WITH this end result the appeal is partially allowed.