PURUSHOTTAM DAS GOEL v. PRABHAKAR PANDEY — 1995 DIGILAW 1001 (ALL)

D. S. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Sri B. R. Tripathi and Sri R. C. Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioners. ( 2 ) FROM the pleadings before the court it transpires that Sri Prabhakar Pandey, the respondent no. 1, has initiated proceedings against the petitioners under Section 15 of the Payment of wages Act, 1936, hereinafter called the Act for recovery of his wages from them who are, indisputably, the employers and persons responsible for the payment of his wages. The proceedings are pending before the City Magistrate, Kanpur, the respondent No. 2 who is the prescribed authority under the Act. ( 3 ) IN the said proceedings the respondent No. 1 moved an application under Section 17-A of the act praying that the movable and immovable properties of the petitioners specified therein be conditionally attached. The petitioners filed their objection. Therefore, the respondent No. 2 passed one-line order dated November 16, 1977 directing the petitioners to furnish two sureties otherwise their properties mentioned at Item No. 1 (a) to 2 (j) be attached. A copy of the order dated November 16, 1977 has been filed along with the petition as Annexure-V. The order was followed by a communication dated November 28, 1977 from the respondent No. 2 to the concerned police station requiring implementation and enforcement of the order dated November 16, 1977. A true copy of the said communication dated November 28, 1977 is Annexure-VIII to the petition. The order dated November 16, 1977 and the communication dated November 28, 1977, aforesaid, are under challenge in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of india. ( 4 ) THE short, but effective, contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the order dated November 16, 1977, enforcement whereof was sought by the communication dated november 28, 1977, is bad in law inasmuch as it does not disclose any reason rendering it impossible to discern as to what material contributed to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority forming basis of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 17-A of the Act. ( 5 ) LEARNED Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents No. 2 and 3 submits that the impugned order dated November 16, 1977, is perfectly legal having been passed by the prescribed authority within the four-corners of its jurisdiction under Section 17-A of the Act, which did not oblige it to give reasons. ( 5 ) LEARNED Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents No. 2 and 3 submits that the impugned order dated November 16, 1977, is perfectly legal having been passed by the prescribed authority within the four-corners of its jurisdiction under Section 17-A of the Act, which did not oblige it to give reasons. He, therefore, submits that the order is not liable to be interfered with and ought to be upheld. ( 6 ) SECTION 17-A of the Act reads as under: "17-A Conditional attachment of property of employer or other person responsible for payment of wages: (1) Where at any time after an application has been made under Sub-section (2) of section 15 the authority, or where at any time after an appeal has been filed under Section 17 by an employed per-son or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf or any Inspector under this Act or any other person permitted by the authority to make an application under Sub-section (2) of Section 15 the Court referred to in that section, is satisfied that the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages under Section 3 is likely to evade payment of any amount that may be directed to be paid under Section 15 or Section 17, the authority or the court, as the case may be, except in cases where the authority or Court is of opinion that the ends of justice would be defeated by the delay, after giving the employer or other person an opportunity of being heard, may direct the attachment of so much of the property of the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages as is, in the opinion of the authority or Court, sufficient to satisfy the amount which may be payable under the direction. (2) The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), relating to attachment before judgment under that Code shall, so far as my be, apply to any order attachment under sub-section (1)". (2) The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), relating to attachment before judgment under that Code shall, so far as my be, apply to any order attachment under sub-section (1)". ( 7 ) IT is to be noticed that Section 17-A of the Act empowers the prescribed authority to direct the attachment of so much of the property of the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages as is, in its opinion, sufficient to satisfy the amount which may be payable under the direction to be given under Section 15 or 17 of the Act. The formation of the opinion of the authority has to be preceded by satisfaction that the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages is likely to evade payment of any amount that may be directed to be paid under Section 15 or 17 of the Act. The satisfaction or the opinion contemplated by Section 17-A of the Act is objective and has to be founded on legally cognizable material. The order to be passed on the basis of such satisfaction or opinion must disclose and spell out reasons so that it may be discernible to all concerned that the material which contributed to the satisfaction or formation of the opinion of the authority or court was adequate to sustain the order. The power of the authority under Section 17-A of the Act is quasi-judicial in nature. The authority is therefore, bound to give reasons for exercise of such power. It cannot be gainsaid that the requirement of giving reasons by a statutory authority in exercise of quasi-judicial powers is a part of requirement of the principles of natural justice. Non-disclosure of reasons is violative of the principles of natural justice rendering the order void. ( 8 ) TESTED on the above touchstone the order dated November 16, 1977 fails. It cannot be gainsaid that the requirement of giving reasons by a statutory authority in exercise of quasi-judicial powers is a part of requirement of the principles of natural justice. Non-disclosure of reasons is violative of the principles of natural justice rendering the order void. ( 8 ) TESTED on the above touchstone the order dated November 16, 1977 fails. The order is one-line order disclosing no reasons rendering it absolutely impossible to know as to what contributed to the satisfaction of the respondent No. 2 that the petitioners were likely to evade payment of the amount that may be directed to be paid to the respondent No. 1 under Section 15 of the Act and also to the formation of his opinion regarding the quantum of property, attachment whereof was necessary to satisfy the amount that may be required to be paid to the said respondent No. 1. The order dated November 16, 1977 is, therefore, clearly invalid and cannot be upheld. ( 9 ) IN the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated November 16, 1977 (Annexure-V to the writ petition) is quashed. The order dated November 16, 1977 having been quashed the communication dated November 28, 1977 (annexure-VIII to the writ petition)requiring implementation and enforcement of the order dated November 16, 1977 becomes ineffective and shall stand quashed. There is no order as to costs. .