Judgment : 1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. Sri.K.Subramaniam, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the impugned order of the third respondent dated 9. 1995 based on the communication of the second respondent dated 28. 1995 inNa. Ka.No. 12418/95 A3, is patently illegal and unsustainable. Learned counsel submitted that although the impugned order is challenged on several grounds, he emphasised in the first place one ground viz., the impugned order passed by the third respondent said to have been on the basis of the communication of the second respondent is one passed without jurisdiction and authority in law. In support of this submission, he pointed out to paragraph 9 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 which reads thus: “It is submitted mat no doubt, the power under Section 7-B shall be exercisable by the Temple Administration Board. It is submitted that no final order was passed by the 2nd respondent and only the order dated 26. 1994 was kept in abeyance in the instant case. Considering the atrocities committed by the writ petitioner and the loss of revenue to the temple by way of illegal sale of donation tickets by the Arakattalai, the order was issued by the 2nd respondent herein. The 2nd respondent has acted only in the best interests of the institution, which cannot be termed as an ‘illegality’. In the instant case, the Chairman, Board of Trustees acted adversely to the interests of the institution by selling illegal and unauthorised donation Tiruppani tickets and therefore, giving an opportunity of making representation to the trustee seems to be unnecessary. The other allegations made in this paragraph are denied.” 2. On the basis of what is stated in the paragraph of the counter-affidavit extracted above, he contended that the first respondent, having passed the order dated 26. 1994, the third respondent would not pass the impugned order suspending the same. According to the learned counsel, the third respondent is not the authority as is clear from Section 7-B of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1991. He further submitted that the impugned order was passed not only without any authority in law, but even without affording any opportunity at any stage by anyone of the respondents. 3. According to the learned counsel, the third respondent is not the authority as is clear from Section 7-B of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1991. He further submitted that the impugned order was passed not only without any authority in law, but even without affording any opportunity at any stage by anyone of the respondents. 3. Ms.B.Yamini representing Mr.G.Sukumaran, learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 and Mr.P.M.Bhaskaran, learned counsel for the third respondent submitted that since the petitioners’ activities were illegal and it was engaged in collecting donations from the public illegally to impugned order was passed only stopping the work. They also submitted that under the impugned order the third respondent did not take any independent decision. All that he done was only to act on the basis of the letter of the sec ond respondent. They argued in support and justification of the impugned order contending mat the said order was passed in the best interest of the temple administration. But, both the learned counsel were not in a position to convince me as to how the third respondent was competent to pass the impugned order. The order passed by the first respondent could not have been kept under suspension by the third respondent for reasons more than one. Firstly, the third respondent had no authority and no jurisdiction in law to suspend the order passed by the first respondent. Secondly, such an order could not have been passed without any notice and opportunity to the petitioner. 4. In view of this clear position and having regard to the statements made in the counter-affidavit filed by respondents 1 to 3,1 do not think it necessary for this Court to examine on the merits of the various contentions raised in the writ petition. I think it is appropriate to leave these contentions open to be urged and decided at appropriate stage before appropriate forum. In this view, I proceed to pass the following order: .(1) The writ petition is allowed; and .(2) The impugned order dated 9. 1995 is quashed; and .(3) It is open to the respondents to take appropriate action against the petitioner, if so desired, but, in accordance with law. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. No costs.